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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses a methodological impasse within film studies which is 
of ongoing concern because of the way that it demonstrates the discipline’s 
conflicting approaches to ideology. This impasse arises because proponents 
of poststructuralism and cognitivism utilise methodologies which not only 
make internally consistent interpretations of films, but are also able to 
discount the theoretical criticisms of the rival paradigm. Attempts to debate 
and transcend these divisions have been unsuccessful. This thesis 
contributes to this gap in knowledge by arguing that both academic theories 
(such as poststructuralism and cognitivism) and filmmaking practice are 
influenced by the same historically contingent socio-cultural determinants. 
Academic claims about film’s effects can then be conceptualised as 
aggregates of thought which are analogous to the dramatic manipulations 
that filmmakers unconsciously work into their films, with both forms of cultural 
activity (academic theorising and filmmaking practice) influenced by the 
same diachronic socio-cultural contexts. The term that I use for these 
specific forms of filmmaking practice is writing formations. A filmic writing 
formation is a form of filmmaking practice influenced by the same cultural 
ideas which also inform academic hermeneutics.  
 
The thesis does not undertake a conventional extended literature review as a 
means to identify the gap in the literature. This is because contested 
theoretical discourses are part of the thesis’ subject matter. I analyse 
academic literature in the same way that I analyse film, conceptualising both 
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activities as being determined by the same specific historical and socio-
cultural contexts. 
 
The thesis analyses Shakespearean films because they offer multiple 
diachronic texts which are foregrounded as interpretations, and in which 
different approaches to filmmaking can be clearly compared and contrasted 
across time. They clarify the complex and often unconscious relationships 
between academic theorising and filmic writing formations by facilitating an 
investigation of how the historic development of academic discourse relates 
to the historic development of filmmaking practice. The corpus of texts for 
analysis has been confined to Anglo-American realist film adaptations, and 
European and American debates about, and criticism of, realist film from the 
advent of poststructuralism in the late 1960s to the present day. 
 
The thesis is structured as an investigation into the current theoretical 
impasse and the unsatisfactory attempts to transcend it, the articulation of a 
new methodology relating to filmic writing formations, the elaboration of how 
different filmic writing formations operate within realist film adaptation, and a 
close case study of the unfolding historical processes whereby academic 
theory and filmmaking practice relate to the same socio-cultural determinants 
using four adaptations of Hamlet from different time periods. It concludes by 
explaining how filmmakers exploit and manipulate forms of filmic grammar 
which correspond to academic theories about those forms of filmic grammar, 
with both activities influenced by the same underlying diachronic culture. The 
thesis argues, then, that academic poststructuralism and cognitivism can be 
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conceptualised as explanations for different but contiguous aspects of 
filmmaking practice, rather than as mutually exclusive claims about film’s 
effects. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
This thesis is concerned with the contested position of theory within film 
studies, and more specifically with the contested position of politicised 
academic approaches to film. By film theory, here, I mean various attempts 
to situate explanations of film’s effects within overarching contexts derived 
from hermeneutic traditions which were initially developed outside film 
studies. In terms of the historical development of the discipline it was of 
enormous importance that, roughly from the late 1960s until the late ‘80s, the 
broad hermeneutic traditions which dominated film studies focused on the 
medium’s political, unconscious and ideological effects (for example, Baudry 
1985; Comolli and Narboni 1969; Heath 1981; Metz 1985; Mulvey 1992; 
Willemen 1972; Wollen 1972). These approaches were not monolithic, and 
had numerous distinguishing variations between them, but in terms of the 
focus in this thesis they can be characterised as, and associated with the 
term, poststructuralism. By the 1990s a substantial and influential critique of 
poststructuralism’s emphasis on the political, the unconscious and the 
ideological had been articulated (for example, Bordwell 1989a; Bordwell 
1989b; Bordwell and Carroll 1996; Carroll 1982; Carroll 1988; Prince 1996). 
Again, this body of work had significant variations in origin and content, but 
also had important methodological consistencies. In this thesis this broad 
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approach is termed cognitivism, because of its focus on conscious cognitive 
processes rather than unconscious ideological ones. 
 
The thesis does not attempt to settle these important and enduring 
theoretical disputes by critiquing the a priori suppositions of rival paradigms, 
or by applying these suppositions to selected films to discover which theory 
best accounts for those films’ operations. The reason for this is because, as I 
discuss in sections 1.2 and 2.2.2, proponents of rival paradigms have 
constructed internally consistent logics which not only make their own 
coherent analyses of films, but which also prevent meaningful inter-paradigm 
debate. It is possible, therefore, to construct consistent explanations of most 
bodies of films from very different theoretical positions, and to mount 
defences of those theoretical positions which do not accept the philosophical 
criticisms of rival paradigms. In an attempt to address this theoretical 
impasse, this thesis instead posits the following primary research question: 
Does the historical development of broad underlying socio-cultural contexts 
influence both specific forms of academic theorising and specific forms of 
filmmaking practice? By asking this question, the thesis can trace the 
historical development of academic discourse (in which there is a broad shift 
from the dominance of poststructuralism to the dominance of cognitivism) 
against the historical development of various forms of filmmaking practice. 
These two developmental trajectories can then be positioned within the 
context of shared socio-cultural determinants, with historical developments in 
the underlying culture influencing two different, but interrelated, historical 
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developments in academic discourse, and in filmmaking practice. Rival 
academic claims about film can thus be conceptualised not as irreconcilable 
truth claims (as is presently the case), but as historically contingent 
manifestations of socio-cultural factors which also have an impact on 
filmmaking practice. The thesis’ main contention, then, is that debates within 
the diachronic development of academic discourse reflect shifting socio-
cultural sensibilities which also generate somewhat analogous developments 
in filmmaking practice. The thesis constructs an extensive taxonomy of these 
relationships. Accordingly, as will be demonstrated by the later case study of 
Hamlet adaptations, the thesis claims that both theoretical academic 
discourse and filmmaking practice reflect the same historically specific 
underlying ideological and cultural pressures. In sum, I argue that socio-
cultural developments which facilitate the articulation of academic 
poststructuralism also facilitate new aesthetic practices that engage, 
unconsciously and obliquely, with some of the themes and issues central to 
academic poststructuralism. 
 
The impasse between poststructuralism and cognitivism is of ongoing 
importance to film studies, but not because any form of meaningful 
scholarship is impossible given that the discipline cannot agree on shared 
theoretical premises. This is clearly not the case. Rather, the impasse is of 
continuing relevance because of the way that it highlights conflicting 
approaches to ideology. There have been existing attempts to address the 
impasse, and to synthesise theoretical approaches so that the criticisms of 
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rival paradigms might be countered. These are discussed in detail in section 
2.2.3, but the failure of these existing attempts to transcend the impasse 
means that a new approach is required in order to analyse competing claims 
about film’s ideological effects in a way that does not merely replicate those 
existing inter-paradigm criticisms which hold no legitimacy for the rival. Such 
an approach necessitates an analysis of the historically contingent 
relationships between filmmaking, film theorising, and the socio-cultural 
contexts which influence these activities. Accordingly, the thesis does not 
conduct a conventional literature review in one location. This is because 
contested academic discourses are part of the thesis’ subject matter. Since 
academic discourses and filmmaking practice are both conceptualised as 
activities which are determined by the same specific historical and socio-
cultural contexts, both are subjected to the same form of critical analysis in 
order to develop new knowledge. This chapter and the next analyse 
academic discourses in order to establish, and discuss from a theoretical 
perspective, the aforementioned important gap in knowledge. Thereafter, in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5, I use academic literature to theorise and construct a 
new taxonomy of the relationships between academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice, before applying this to a detailed case study of these 
relationships’ diachronic development in chapter 6. 
 
This analysis, along with all the other analytical elements of the thesis, is 
inevitably located within particular aspects of the contested theoretical 
paradigms which the thesis addresses as its subject matter. There are 
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therefore negotiations to be made between that which is analysed and how it 
is analysed. This is something that is addressed throughout the thesis, 
because the methodology employed inevitably influences findings and 
conclusions. In seeking to analyse the ways in which two paradigms employ 
ostensibly irreconcilable methodological logics, it is necessary to make 
decisions about which methodological logic to employ. Section 2.3.1 
engages with this problem in detail by accounting for the thesis’ academic 
subject position, but even in so doing it recognises the central 
poststructuralist tenet that it is impossible to adopt the scientifically objective 
position from which the cognitivist academic claims to operate (see section 
2.2.1). 
 
Important elements of the thesis’ methodology, then, have a distinctly 
poststructuralist rather than cognitivist context. The first of these is the broad 
approach to how the relationships between filmmaking, film theorising, and 
their determining socio-cultural contexts are conceptualised. An important 
element of film studies’ specific form of poststructuralism is derived from the 
writings of Karl Marx. This Marxist context provides the basis for my analysis 
of the relationships between the material world and the ideological 
suppositions and institutions which are derived from, and which legitimate, 
the ways in which society engages with the material world. Marx explained 
this relationship within the framework of his base/superstructure model 
14 
 
(1970a [1859]).1 The base, for Marx, is the economic realm of divisions of 
labour, property ownership, and the means of material production. The 
superstructure is the cultural and institutional realm which is determined by, 
and which legitimates, the material relations in the economic base. Thus, the 
superstructural realm of ideas, culture and politics is determined by material 
relations within the base. As section 1.3 discusses, I conceive the relations 
between base and superstructure through the filter of Louis Althusser’s 
revision (1971), in which the relationships between the two elements are 
more complex and more dialectic than in Marx’s original model. 
Nevertheless, my attempt to address the theoretical impasse within film 
studies starts at this point, with both academic theorising and filmmaking 
practice conceptualised as two interrelated superstructural manifestations of 
the same developments within the base. The former, academic theorising, is 
a verbal manifestation of material relations in the base. The latter, 
filmmaking, is an aesthetic manifestation of material relations in the base. 
 
The thesis explores, then, how filmmaking is influenced by the same socio-
cultural and political contexts which also influence academic discourses. 
Both of these superstructural activities are dependent on historically 
developing conditions within the base, so that a particular shift in that base 
leads to specific, interrelated shifts in both filmmaking and film theorising. 
The analysis of diachronic film texts can thereby be charted alongside the 
                                                          
1 The original dates of texts reissued long after the original publication date are 
included in square brackets after their first mention, so as to avoid any confusion 
about the chronology of academic discourse. 
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analysis of diachronic forms of academic theorising, with a development 
such as academic poststructuralism relating to an underlying socio-cultural 
development which also impacts on filmmaking practice.2 
 
I call the relationships between and within these two superstructural forms 
writing formations. This is because the history of theoretical discourse in film 
studies, and in the humanities and wider culture more broadly, is influenced 
by conditions conducive to certain forms of thinking (and therefore of writing, 
either into academic prose or into filmic images). As Marx put it, “[t]he mode 
of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life 
process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their 
consciousness” (1970a, pp.20-21). As with all the theoretical concepts 
operating in this thesis, Marx’s claim is highly contested,3 and is part of a 
wide philosophical context whose epistemological validity is incompatible 
with rival approaches. I will discuss how this wide context relates more 
specifically to the film theories analysed in this thesis shortly, but it is also 
important to address the underlying context, both for the way that it informs 
those more specific theories, and for the way that it structures my approach 
to conceptualising the relationships between material determinants and 
superstructural ideas. 
                                                          
2 Sections 1.5 and 2.3.3 explain why Shakespearean adaptations offer useful 
conditions to facilitate this analysis. 
3 As discussed, the thesis’ methodology cannot operate from a position outside the 
theories which it analyses. 
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Perhaps the clearest distinction between those approaches which think of 
consciousness as being determined by Marx’s “social, political and 
intellectual life process[es] in general” (1970a, pp.20-21), and those 
approaches which think of consciousness as determining those processes, is 
provided in Paul Ricoeur’s Freud and philosophy: An essay on method 
(1970). Ricoeur juxtaposes two approaches to how the human mind can 
understand the world. One approach is the hermeneutics of truth, which 
claims that although objective knowledge of the external world is 
problematic, the internal processes governing the way that human 
consciousness perceives that world are stable and rational. He writes that 
this approach is concerned with “a care or concern for the object [the 
objective world] and a wish to describe and not reduce it. […] ‘Believe in 
order to understand, understand in order to believe’ – such is its maxim; and 
its maxim is the ‘hermeneutic circle’ itself of believing and undserstanding” 
(1970, p.28).The second approach is the hermeneutics of suspicion, which 
claims that it is not only the objective world that is unreliable, but also that the 
human subject is not fully in control of the internal mental mechanisms by 
which (s)he attempts to understand the objective world. Ricoeur writes that, 
for this latter approach, the “home of meaning is not consciousness but 
something other than consciousness” (1970, p. 55). He associates this 
model principally with Marx, in which the ‘something other than 
consciouness’ is ideology determined by material relations; with Nietzche, in 
which that something is the conventionality of language; and with Freud, in 
which the ‘something other than consciouness’ is the unconscious. 
17 
 
 
The validity of these competing models, in relation to how the discipline of 
film studies relates to the cinema, is at the centre of the thesis’ approach to 
the operations of filmic writing formations. But it is also a central scaffold of 
the thesis’ methodology in relation to how both academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice operate. This is because the motivational underpinnings 
of academic theorising and of filmmaking practice can be conceptualised 
within the parameters of both a hermeneutics of truth and of a hermeneutics 
of suspicion. They can be understood either as a stable, conscious, rational 
engagment with a problematic objective world or, alternatively, as a 
problematic, unconscious, irrational engagment with that problematic 
objective world. 
 
This thesis positions the human subjectivities engaging in academic 
theorising and filmmaking practice, at least in part, within the context of 
Ricouer’s hermeneutics of suspicion. Existing attempts to characterise films 
within the contexts of either the hermeneutics of truth, or the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, have not been able to generate evidence for either claim that 
would satisfy the criticisms of the rival hermeneutic. But by utilising the 
hermeneutics of suspicion it is possible to construct a methodology which 
can generate evidence that academic theorising’s claims about film reflect 
the same socio-cultural, historical, philosophical, economic, and unconscious 
determinants that at least partly condition aesthetic manifestations of those 
same determinants within film. As stated in the context of the research 
question, if it is possible that both academic theorising and filmmaking 
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practice are activities that engage with an objective world without necessarily 
operating from a stable conscious position, and that the two activities might 
be motivated by factors at least partly outside the control of the subjectivities 
engaged in those activities, then it is possible to ask whether the underlying 
socio-cultural factors that determine the subjectivity operating in theoretical 
discourse also determine the subjectivity operating in filmmaking practice. In 
the sense that such a question might fall back into the way that rival 
theoretical paradigms construct readings of films based only on their internal 
suppositions, the thesis constructs a history for the relationship between 
theoretical discourse and filmmaking practice. In other words, a paradigm 
which looks for evidence of ideology in film texts will always be able to find 
examples of ideology, just as a paradigm that looks for evidence of dramatic 
manipulations of rational deduction in film texts will always be able to find 
examples of that rational deduction. But if the history of academic theorising 
demonstrates that the understanding of ideology is a diachronically  
unfolding process, in which the academic superstructure gradually develops 
this understanding of ideology, then it might also be the case that the 
aesthetic superstructure of filmmaking practice reflects the same 
development, albeit in a different form. The thesis argues, then, that 
unconscious developments in theoretical discourse correspond 
diachronically with unconscious developments in filmmaking practice. It 
claims that the writing formations operating in film at a particular historical 
moment are dependent on conditions within the base which correspond to 
writing formations in theoretical discourse from the same moment.4 It is 
                                                          
4 As I discuss in section 1.3, the case study which investigates this historical 
19 
 
beyond the remit of the thesis to draw a final conclusion on which paradigm 
represents an objective ‘truth’ about how film operates. Rather, the thesis 
makes connections between rival paradigms’ truth claims and the 
unconscious motivations operating in filmmaking practice, and uses these 
connections to answer the aforementioned primary research question: Does 
the historical development of broad underlying socio-cultural contexts 
influence both specific forms of academic theorising and specific forms of 
filmmaking practice? 
 
In order to answer this question, and ascertain whether writing formations in 
films share the same socio-cultural determinants as academic theorising, it is 
necessary to do a number of things, each of which constitutes an important 
part of the thesis’ overall structure, and each of which is briefly introduced 
below. First, it is important to establish which theoretical paradigms are of 
concern here, and why the impasse between them is of continuing relevance 
to film studies (section 1.2). Second, it is necessary to construct an effective 
methodology to theorise and then conduct the diachronic analysis of filmic 
writing formations (section 1.3). Third, it is necessary to explain in more 
detail how theoretical academic paradigms reflect the same socio-cultural 
determinants operating within filmic writing formations (section 1.4). An 
important part of this process is establishing which specific elements of these 
                                                                                                                                                                    
development actually investigates filmmaking from before and after a particular 
academic theoretical development, rather than from that specific moment itself. The 
reason for this, briefly at this stage, is to help clarify the ways in which the impact of 
the base on academic theorising can be correspondingly discerned within two 
historic filmic writing formations, one prior to that academic theorising, and one after 
it. 
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paradigms’ analyses of how film operates one might expect to see at work in 
filmic writing formations. Fourth, it is important to establish which corpus of 
film texts make for the best analysis of this diachronic development (section 
1.5). Only then is it possible to construct a working taxonomy of how relevant 
filmic writing formations operate (chapters 3, 4 and 5) that can then be 
applied to a detailed case study to uncover the diachronic development of 
these writing formations (chapter 6), which are tasks that take up the bulk of 
the thesis proper. 
 
1.2 The impasse between poststructuralism and cognitivism 
 
The thesis principally engages with, and juxtaposes, two historically 
significant paradigms within film studies; poststructuralism and cognitivism. It 
does this in both quite broad terms and, when it comes to constructing a 
taxonomy of filmic writing formations and testing those diachronically, in 
more specific terms that focus on particular elements of those paradigms 
based on the works of particular writers, since these particular elements help 
to delimit and thereby clarify the parameters of my analysis.  
 
The broad approach to these paradigms highlights the specific reasons why 
they have been juxtaposed, both in this thesis and in debates within film 
studies more generally (for example, Bordwell 1989a; Bordwell 1996; 
Bordwell 2005; Buckland 1989; Carroll 1982; Carroll 1996; Heath 1983; 
Žižek 2001) (and indeed, within the context of Ricoeur’s rival hermeneutics, 
in the history of Western thought in a very wide sense (see section 2.2.2)). 
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These are; firstly, ideology, which for poststructuralism is central, and which 
for cognitivism is displaced or even disavowed; and secondly, the 
unconscious, which for poststructuralism is a key motivation for the 
pleasures inherent in filmmaking and film spectating, and which for 
cognitivism is replaced by a rational goal-driven filmmaker and film 
spectator.5 It was of considerable historical importance to the discipline of 
film studies that the academic movement which fits loosely under the 
umbrella term poststructuralism, and which Stephen Heath has characterised 
as the “encounter of Marxism and psychoanalysis on the terrain of semiotics” 
(1985, p.511), thought of film’s political/ideological and aesthetic/emotional 
effects as working symbiotically and, at least in part, unconsciously. Chapter 
2 engages with theoretical approaches to these claims in more detail, but for 
now it is sufficient to say that they were derived in part from Althusser’s 
notion of interpellation (1971), and in part from what Heath calls the ‘dialectic 
of the subject’ (1975/6, p.50), which he developed principally from the 
psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan. 
 
Both the praxis-driven agenda of poststructuralism, and cognitivist critiques 
of that agenda, foreground the link between ideology and the unconscious. 
Laura Mulvey’s polemic Visual pleasure and narrative cinema, for example, 
links ideology and the unconscious both in terms of how spectatorship 
operates within realist6 cinema, in which “the unconscious (formed by the 
                                                          
5 Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 discuss some of the nuances and inconsistencies relating 
to these broad theoretical points in more detail. 
6 See section 2.2.1 for clarification on what I mean by realist film. 
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dominant order) structure[s] ways of seeing and pleasure in looking” (1992, 
p.747), and in terms of the academic’s intervention against this dominant 
order; “[p]sychoanalytic theory is thus appropriated here as a political 
weapon, demonstrating the way the unconscious of patriarchal society has 
structured film form” (1992, p.746). For the broad poststructuralist approach 
to film, Heath’s synthesis of Marxism, psychoanalysis and semiotics means 
that society is conceived as a system operating to maintain the hegemony of 
social elites (whether those be thought of in terms of class, gender, race or 
sexuality) through a culture that unconsciously legitimates the status-quo by 
concealing material and socio-cultural relations which might otherwise 
expose the injustice of hegemony. Realist film is one part of this process; a 
pleasure-generating apparatus which obfuscates, legitimates and 
perpetuates inequality. The poststructuralist film academic attempts to 
expose, and thereby transcend, this unconscious ideological process. 
 
In terms of the rival theoretical approaches to film of interest to this thesis, it 
is of central importance that the poststructuralist link between ideology and 
the unconscious is at the heart of the cognitivist critique of the paradigm that 
it to a large extent displaced during the course of the 1990s and into the new 
century. As with poststructuralism, cognitivism is not a monolithic entity; 
indeed Noel Carroll, a key exponent, characterises it as “piecemeal 
theorizing” (1996, p.58) as opposed to poststructuralism’s “unified, single 
theory” (1996, p.39). What does unite these otherwise relatively disparate 
cognitive approaches, though, is an a priori rejection of poststructuralism’s 
focus on unconscious ideology. For the cognitivist, the unconscious is, at 
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most, a subsidiary component of a spectator’s response to film. Rather than 
being a passive dupe interpellated by film’s unconscious manipulations, 
cognitivism conceptualises the spectator as active and rational. For David 
Bordwell (s)he is a “goal-directed spectator, equipped with schemata and 
ready to make assumptions, form expectations, motivate material, recall 
information, and project hypotheses” (1985a, p.335).7 
 
These diametrically opposed approaches to the spectator mean that 
proponents of cognitivism reject the ideological consequences of 
poststructuralism’s unconscious model. Bordwell, one of the key exponents 
of cognitivism, sees the conflation of the unconscious and ideology as not 
only fallacious but also as an institutionalised limitation on the possibilities of 
understanding film more fully. His characterisation of how the institutionalised 
poststructuralist critic conducts analysis demonstrates the cognitivist 
rejection of both ideology and the unconscious: 
 
Take male characters to be functioning as father figures or 
undergoing the Oedipal trajectory. Take female characters to be 
playing the role of mother or as posing a castration threat. Then 
trace the ways in which (1) the male either (a) succeeds his father 
or (b) loses his identity; and (2) the woman is either (a) 
transformed into a fetish for male desire, (b) eliminated from the 
text, or (c) transported into a realm beyond patriarchal definition. 
(Bordwell 1989, p.198) 
 
Section 2.2.2 explores the philosophical impasse between these paradigms 
in more detail, focusing particularly on rival approaches to academic 
                                                          
7 I provide a more detailed definition of cognitivism in section 2.2.1. 
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subjectivity, and the failure of existing attempts to negotiate the impasse (see 
2.2.3). For now it is enough to emphasise that the impasse between these 
two models is of ongoing concern because of the unresolved issues of 
ideology and the unconscious. The thesis’ primary research question, then, 
engages with a wider epistemological problem in film studies – whether 
filmmaking/film spectating includes unconscious processes, and whether 
these processes are ideological. As stated, the thesis does not propose 
resolving this wider problem, but instead focuses on how academic claims 
about this unresolved issue correlate with forms of filmmaking practice 
influenced by the same socio-cultural conditions which informed those 
academic claims. 
 
This is the broad theoretical context structuring the thesis. But it is also 
important, at this point, to say something about the more specific elements of 
the two paradigms I employ here, because these specific elements form a 
central component of the thesis’ methodological approach that I want to 
outline next. In part, a close focus on particular elements of the two 
paradigms is necessary in terms of manageability because, as has already 
been mentioned, both paradigms are, in some respects, diffuse. To an 
extent, this focus is useful because it helps to narrow and clarify the 
parameters of the thesis’ subsequent taxonomy (in chapters 3, 4 and 5) and 
case study (in chapter 6). 
 
The specific element of poststructuralist film theory that I concentrate on, and 
which is discussed in more detail in sections 2.2.1, 2.2.3, and chapter 3, is 
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derived from the work of Jean-Louis Baudry, Christian Metz, and the 
aforementioned Heath. Baudry’s argument concerned how realist film 
obfuscates its constructed nature, so that the ideological values of the 
filmmakers are obscured and thereby transmitted (1985, pp.533-4). Metz 
made a distinction between discours, filmmaking which reveals its artifice, 
and histoire, filmmaking which conceals its artifice, with the former a potential 
critique of ideology, and the latter a transmitter of ideology (1985, p.544). For 
Heath, Metz’s two forms are in constant oscillation, and realist film achieves 
both its pleasurable and its ideological effects from this oscillation. The 
movement of the cinematic camera, and of the mise-en-scène which it films, 
means that film inevitably and repeatedly reveals its artifice (discours) as 
characters move from a world that seems real towards and off a frame that 
suddenly marks the boundaries of that world, or speak from positions which 
are temporarily not shown. In so doing the camera momentarily reveals the 
cracks and fissures in the ideological system which creates the film, and 
which positions and constitutes the subjectivity of the spectator, before 
suturing over that revelation through continuity editing and mechanisms of 
identification (back into histoire) (Heath 1985). This process is unconscious 
(particularly in terms of the pleasure of the process) and ideological. These 
two elements are fundamentally entwined – following the logic of Freud’s 
fort/da game (1955, pp.14-17), in which a young child repeatedly throws and 
retrieves a cotton reel (to pre-emptively demonstrate an illusory mastery over 
loss), the spectator’s unpleasure created by the temporary revelation of 
artifice is a necessary part of the pleasure of the suture back to the 
concealment of the artifice, which Heath calls “the jubilation of the final 
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image” (1985, p.514).The process, therefore, is masochistic – the 
acceptance of a temporary, painful revelation that not only is film an illusion, 
but that an ideological system positions the spectator as a constituted 
subject within that system. The pleasurable resolution of this unpleasure, 
back to the concealment of the cinematic artifice, and back to the spectator’s 
illusion of individual agency within an ideological system which in fact 
constitutes subjectivity, is enhanced by the temporary unpleasure. Realist 
cinema then, for Heath, is anamorphic (see 1.4 and 2.3.2), in that it both 
foregrounds and contains the revelation of its artifice, and of its role in 
hegemonic ideology. He calls this the “drama of vision” (1985, p.514). 
 
The specific element of cognitivism, on the other hand, that the thesis 
focuses on, is Carroll’s notion of erotetic narration (1990). Given that this is a 
cognitivist idea, it is based on a rational, rather than unconscious, motivation. 
For Carroll, spectators have an inbuilt desire to find answers to the unknown, 
so that narrative operates by creating ambiguity about events before 
resolving those ambiguities. He claims that erotetic narration “proceeds by 
generating a series of questions that the plot then goes on to answer” (1990, 
p.130). To juxtapose this with Heath’s drama of vision I call this cognitive 
process the drama of knowledge. 
 
Carroll’s erotetic narration (the drama of knowledge) is useful, in terms of 
comparisons with Heath’s masochistic anamorphism (the drama of vision), 
not just because both models demonstrate their paradigms’ underlying a 
priori foundations in regard to the conscious/unconscious spectator and to 
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ideology, but because they also both engage with the same aesthetic 
practices in film.8 Doubt about the grammatical status of ambiguously 
attributed camera positions, or of the temporary destabilising effect of jump 
scares, for example, can be interpreted in two different, internally consistent, 
ways. They can be interpreted as enhanced forms of ambiguity about artifice, 
in the context of the drama of vision, or as enhanced forms of ambiguity 
about information, in the context of the drama of knowledge (see chapter 5). 
As I have already claimed about the rival paradigms more generally, both of 
these explanations of the same aesthetic practices have a coherent logic. 
The criticism of either interpretation, if it was derived from the rival paradigm, 
would also make a convincing case to one who shared the a priori 
suppositions of the critic, but would have no philosophical merit for the 
proponent of the rival paradigm. As such, a new methodology is required to 
make meaningful conclusions about the operations of these rival 
approaches. 
 
1.3 Shared socio-cultural determinants in academic theorising and 
filmic writing formations 
 
The incommensurability of poststructuralism’s and cognitivism’s a priori 
foundations means that attempted synthesis has not been successful. 
Section 2.2.3 discusses these attempts in more detail. The thesis addresses 
the impasse by constructing a methodology which can account for operations 
                                                          
8 Chapter 5 discusses how different filmic writing formations operate in detail. 
28 
 
associated with both of these theoretical contexts within a body of films. This 
is not a matter of happy pluralism in which each theory is demonstrated as 
equally applicable, not least because the claims of one paradigm, if followed 
all the way to their deductive foundations, would inevitably invalidate the 
claims of the other (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Instead, an attempt is 
made here to position theoretical premises about film within a context in 
which those premises can be seen as being conditioned by factors which 
facilitate certain unconscious aesthetic operations somewhat analogous to 
those theoretical premises within film. To be clear, I am not claiming that 
filmmaking inevitably engages with academic theory in a conscious manner.9 
Nor am I suggesting that realist filmmaking is a direct attempt to engage with 
the theoretical premises of either paradigm. Instead, I argue that the 
concerns of academic theory reflect particular diachronic modes of thought 
that can also be discerned, in a different form, in filmmaking practice. 
 
As already mentioned, the theoretical context for this approach is Marx’s 
base/superstructure model, and more specifically Althusser’s revision which 
complicates both the relationships between base and superstructure, and the 
relationships within the superstructure. For Marx there was a linear 
relationship between the two, so that “[t]he mode of production of material life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general” (1970a, 
pp.20-21). Althusser claimed that the economic, the social, the political and 
                                                          
9 Although there are some examples that have links with theoretical ideas in a more 
conscious manner. Alfred Hitchcock’s engagement with Freud (Wood 1965), and 
Jean-Luc Godard’s reflexive filmmaking (Wollen 1985) are clear examples. 
29 
 
the intellectual each have their own determinants, which may interact, but 
which have their own internal dynamism. There is therefore, for Althusser, a 
“‘relative autonomy’ of the superstructure with respect to the base” (Althusser 
1971, p.130). 
 
I conceive academic theorising and filmmaking practice as two of these 
relatively autonomous superstructural elements. They are relatively 
autonomous in terms of their relationships with the base, and with one 
another, in two senses. Firstly, in the sense that they are both relatively 
conditioned by the same circumstances in the base. That is, the same 
circumstances in the base produce somewhat similar results in different 
aspects of the superstructure. Different superstructural elements are not 
completely autonomous from influences in the base, but neither are they 
entirely determined by the base because each superstructural element has 
its own specific internal dynamism. Film theorising and filmmaking are two 
different superstructural forms which are neither completely determined by 
the base nor completely autonomous from it. Secondly, academic theorising 
and filmmaking practice can be thought of as relatively autonomous 
superstructural elements in the sense that Althusser’s relative autonomy 
works dialectically between base and superstructure, so that developments 
in the superstructure have an impact on developments within the base, as 
well as vice versa. Althusser claims, then, that “there is a ‘reciprocal action’ 
of the superstructure on the base” (1971, p.130). In the complex equation of 
influences between and across different elements of the superstructure and 
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base, therefore, academic theorising and filmmaking practice can influence 
one another vicariously through their ‘reciprocal’ influences on the base.10 
 
The principal relationship between academic theorising and filmmaking 
practice, though, is the way in which both reflect complex determinations 
which construct subjectivity. I have already mentioned the broad context for 
this process; the hermeneutics of suspicion, in which consciousness is 
conditioned by external factors. Two somewhat interrelated concepts are 
more specific examples of this process. The first of these, which again has 
already been discussed, is Althusser’s notion of interpellation. This is the 
process by which the individual is hailed or called into ideology, and adopts a 
position of subjectivity designated to him or her by ideology. Indeed, for 
Althusser “[t]he existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of 
individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” (1971, p.163). 
Interpellation, furthermore, conceals those conditions which determine the 
particular form of subjectivity which it constructs since “[i]deology represents 
the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence” 
(1971, p.153). This is an approximate model for the way that I conceptualise 
the subjectivities operating in academic theorising and in filmmaking practice; 
the individuals involved operate in a system which convinces them that they 
act according to their own self-determined agency, but in which their 
                                                          
10
 Any such influences would necessarily be somewhat imprecise and difficult to 
gauge, particularly given the limited readership of academic discourse. 
Nevertheless, the impact of ideas such as Mulvey’s aforementioned notion of the 
‘male gaze’ operates within the context of wider cultural movements which do 
influence society outside of academia, but which gather some of their momentum 
and legitimacy from academic arguments. 
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motivations are conditioned by external, ideological factors, at least in part. 
Both academic theorising and filmmaking practice are arenas in which the 
subjects involved have been interpellated by ideology and adopted specific 
positions. Both arenas reflect the same ideological hailing system which 
“represents the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence” (1971, p.153). Although both arenas have the same determinants, 
the positions into which ideology interpellates the subjects involved are 
different. 
 
Interpellation, however, only provides part of the model for understanding the 
relationships between academic theorising and filmmaking practice. This is 
partly because, at least for some of Althusser’s critics, it was too rigid a 
system which failed to account for ideological conflict engendered by 
interpellation, or for a resisting subject.11 It is also partly because a more 
nuanced approach to the relationships between ideology and subjectivity 
was articulated, as a revision of Althusser’s argument, by Heath. Heath’s 
notion was that ideology does not simply constitute subjectivity in a unitary 
and linear manner, but that there is what he called a “dialectic of the subject” 
(1975/6, p.50) constantly both constituting the social world and being 
constituted by that social world. Subjectivity is, for Heath, an interminable 
process rather than a position. Heath reached this understanding because of 
his use of Lacan. Sections 2.3.2 and 3.3 discuss in more detail Heath’s 
                                                          
11 Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake (2006, pp.12-17) offer an overview of these 
debates. They contend that early attempts to apply interpellation to film missed 
some of the subtleties in Althusser’s argument. 
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relationships between this conception of subjectivity as process and the 
anamorphism of cinema, because it is central to the thesis’ approach to how 
writing formations operate in filmmaking practice. For now, in terms of how 
Heath’s dialectic subjectivity operates in terms of academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice, it is enough to say that Heath thinks of the subject as 
occupying a place within Lacan’s Symbolic Order. This is an order in which 
the subject attempts to reconcile his or her individuality with illusory positions 
designated within the linguistic realm of rules and prohibitions, but in which 
such attempts are based on a misrecognition that is doomed to failure 
(although not to an end in failure, because the misrecognition and the 
attempted reconciliation is an interminable process (Heath 1981, p.53)). 
Heath’s subject then, unlike Althusser’s, is not a coherent unified position, 
but a fissured, contradictory process. Ideology is therefore not as total and as 
monolithic as in Althusser’s conception. Heath claims that  
 
it is not […] that there is first of all the construction of a subject for 
social/ideological formations and then the placing of that 
constructed subject-support in those formations, it is that the two 
processes are one in a kind of necessary simultaneity. […] The 
individual is always entering, emerging, as subject. 
(1981, p.126) 
 
The dialectic of the subject, then, can account for a more nuanced form of 
subjectivity which influences ideology, as well as vice versa. This leaves 
room for some kind of subjectatorial agency, both in terms of academic 
theorising, and in terms of filmmaking practice, albeit a subjectatorial agency 
filtered through a dialectic relationship with ideology. This is the theoretical 
basis for the thesis’ investigations into the relationships between academic 
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theorising and filmmaking practice – both are writing formations constructed 
by dialectic subjects. 
 
1.4 The relationships between academic theorising and filmic writing 
formations 
 
The thesis attempts to demonstrate that the writing formations operating in 
academic theorising and in filmmaking practice reflect dialectic subjectivities 
relating to the same ideological pressures on those subjectivities. As I have 
already mentioned (see section 1.2), it is possible for rival paradigms to 
conduct coherent analyses of film texts which find evidence of either 
unconscious ideology or of rational deduction. This is because, in part, both 
the theoretical models that make these analyses, and the unconscious and 
rational elements within the film texts which these analyses interpret, reflect 
what the paradigms frequently conceptualise as universal and ahistorical 
aspects of human consciousness and the unconscious. Section 5.2 
discusses at length the ways in which aspects of the theoretical claims of 
both paradigms exist outside specific cultural and historical contexts, and the 
problematic nature of these claims. To some extent, then, film theorising, 
filmmaking and film spectating are motivated by thought processes that are 
not thought of (by proponents of both poststructuralism and cognitivism) as 
being culturally or historically specific. However, both academic theorising 
and filmmaking practice also have a clear historical development that relates 
to broader socio-cultural contexts (developments in both the superstructure 
and the base). This provides the test conditions for my analysis of the 
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relationships between academic theorising and filmmaking practice. If there 
is a historically specific development in academic theorising then it is 
possible to look for evidence for a concomitant development in filmmaking 
practice which also responds to the same socio-cultural determinants that 
conditioned the development in academic theorising. A shift in the complex 
interrelationships constituting and being constituted by the dialectic subjects 
involved in academic theorising and filmmaking practice should generate 
evidence of two interrelated but relatively autonomous superstructural 
manifestations of that shift. The former would be a shift in the verbal writing 
formations in the superstructure of academic theorising, and the latter would 
be a shift in the aesthetic writing formations in the superstructure of 
filmmaking practice. The developments in these writing formations would be 
different, but motivated by the same underlying determinants, and with the 
dialectic subjects involved in constructing those writing formations 
responding to the same socio-cultural developments, and to the same 
ideological pressures. 
 
I establish, in section 5.2, that cognitivist writing formations, in both academic 
theorising and filmmaking practice, are relatively universal and ahistorical, at 
least compared to poststructuralist writing formations. Poststructuralism has 
a much more complex, and much more dialectic, relationship with history and 
with socio-cultural contexts. 
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A number of Lacanian concepts structure my approach to this. The first of 
these is the notion of après-coup,12 which for Lacan (1977a, pp.30-113) is 
the crucially important fact that psychoanalytic time does not move in a 
simple linear manner. Just as therapy reveals buried trauma, so too the 
significance of ideas can only be understood retrospectively. Consequently, 
Lacan’s whole project was a re-reading of Freud which revealed the 
absences and slippages in meaning which had until then been overlooked. 
This partly meant that Lacan’s après-coup was a reworking of Freud’s 
concept of retrospection (nachträglichkeit), but at the more fundamental level 
meant that Lacan thought of his own work as a further discovery of meaning 
which Freud had already begun to discover. Après-coup also means that it is 
possible to look for earlier manifestations of Freudian and Lacanian ideas in 
sublimated forms which required subsequent Freudian and Lacanian 
analyses to discern the (proto-)psychoanalytic character of those earlier 
forms. As section 2.3.2 discusses at length, this thesis will use Lacan’s 
analysis of Hans Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors (1533) (Fig.1.1) as an 
example of anamorphosis, and this demonstrates the point about the 
historical development of psychoanalytic ideas. 
 
                                                          
12 This translates roughly as ‘deferred action’. 
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Fig.1.1 
 
Although section 2.3.2 discusses this in more detail it is worth exploring this 
briefly to demonstrate this historic method that I am going to use as the 
barometer for my analysis of how different superstructural ideas relate to one 
another in a diachronic manner. The Ambassadors (1533) subscribes to the 
(then relatively recently developed) geometric logic of perspectival painting, 
but also includes an element which defies that geometric logic. This is an 
oblique skull, which dominates the bottom the painting, and which only 
obtains its own perspectival unity if the viewer moves to a position which 
breaks the perspectival unity of the rest of the work. For Lacan (1992) this is 
an example of anamorphosis, which is the revelation that all attempts to 
render any experience of reality into the Symbolic Order (of art, literature, 
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culture, language and order more generally) are doomed to reveal the 
limitations of the Symbolic Order, and to instead give a glimpse of another 
order which Lacan called the Real. The Real, for Lacan, is not an expression 
of reality itself, but is that which cannot be contained within the illusionism of 
the Symbolic. Because it shatters the apparent unity of the Symbolic Order 
(and of the subject who exists within that Order) the Real appears as 
traumatic – hence Holbein’s skull and its association with the obliteration of 
the subjectivity that exists within the Symbolic Order. 
 
The importance of Lacan’s argument, in terms of the historical development 
of superstructural ideas that I am developing here, is as follows. The 
perspectival geometry operating in the Symbolic Order in Holbein’s painting 
is not merely a technical exercise, or just a technical development that marks 
Renaissance painting as being distinct from the earlier non-perspectival 
painting of the Middle Ages. It is also an aesthetic manifestation of a broad 
cultural sensibility which structures the Symbolic Order at this historic 
moment. This sensibility has numerous manifestations, including at the 
verbal epistemological level. The defining verbal expression of this, for 
Lacan, and for Ricoeur, in his articulation of the historic development of the 
hermeneutics of truth, was Descartes’ Principles of philosophy (1982 [1644]). 
Descartes’ attempt to explain how one might know that the world exists, and 
that the senses are not merely an illusion, rested upon his famous 
expression cogito ergo sum (1982, p.5), in which although the subject might 
doubt the existence of the objective world, the subject could rely upon the 
existence of the consciousness which does the doubting. The Cartesian 
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subject, for Ricoeur, “knows that things are doubtful, that they are not such 
as they appear; but he does not doubt that consciousness is such as it 
appears to itself” (1970, p.33). This historically specific form of subjectivity, 
expressed in precise, verbal epistemological terms by Descartes, has 
concomitant forms of aesthetic expression too. Paul H. Fry (2012, pp.6-7) 
has argued that Cartesian doubt is present in the works of Shakespeare and 
Cervantes. Lacan makes an even more specific point about Cartesian doubt 
and its aesthetic manifestations. This is because Descartes makes a series 
of deductions that position the objective world in a certain relation to his 
conception of subjectivity. First, cogito ergo sum, the subject knows that it, if 
nothing else, must exist. Second, because it exists it must have been 
created. Third, the act of creation would require an omnipotent God. Fourth, 
an omnipotent God must be benevolent, and fifth, therefore not wish to fool 
the subject’s senses. Thus the objective world can reasonably be supposed 
to exist, but it is something that emanates out from the more certain centrality 
of the cogito, and from which its epistemological status is derived. The 
Cartesian subject is therefore the centre of meaning, which is an 
epistemological approach that finds an aesthetic form in the geometry of 
perspectival painting, which constructs an impression of reality that flows out 
from the viewing subject. Lacan claims, consequently, that during this 
historical period 
 
we find the progressive interrogation of the geometral laws of 
perspective, and it is around research on perspective that is 
centred a privileged interest for the domain of vision – whose 
relation with the institution of the Cartesian subject, which is itself 
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a sort of geometral point, a point of perspective, we cannot fail to 
see. 
(Lacan 1977b, p.86) 
 
Up to this point, both the verbal academic superstructure, and the pictorial 
aesthetic superstructure reflect the same historically specific epistemology; 
centralised, unified Cartesian subjectivity. However, this is only the beginning 
of Lacan’s argument. Holbein’s skull shatters this Cartesian subjectivity (or, 
at least, has the potential to, which is an important distinction I am coming on 
to). It has the potential to demonstrate the limitations of the illusory Symbolic 
Order, of which Cartesian subjectivity is a part, and reveal instead the trauma 
of the Real. Crucially, for Lacan this revelation appears as an inevitable 
consequence of the historically specific attempt to locate a particular form of 
subjectivity in the Symbolic Order: “at the very heart of the period in which 
the subject emerged and geometral optics was an object of research, 
Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as 
annihilated” (1977b, p.88). 
 
Furthermore, it is significant here that Lacan’s analysis of this historical 
context makes it clear that the full effects of Holbein’s anamorphosis are also 
historically specific. It is no accident that in both of the passages quoted 
above Lacan specifies the diachronic consequences of the Cartesian 
subject’s split in the Symbolic Order: “we find the progressive interrogation” 
(1977b, p.86, my emphasis); “we cannot fail to see” (p.86, my emphasis); 
“Holbein makes visible for us” (p.88, my emphasis). This is because of 
Lacan’s understanding of the nature of the Real. In part, because it is the 
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register beyond the linguistic realm of law that is the Symbolic Order, it is 
difficult to express the Real in language. It is therefore not surprising that 
Holbein could glimpse the Real aesthetically, but Descartes could not 
articulate it verbally. But there is also something important about the 
historical development of thought in relation to the Real, and to the Symbolic 
Order,13 which impacts on how these ideas can be conceptualised. And this 
is something that can only be understood retrospectively, so that Lacan’s 
après-coup method is the means to uncover and recognise the significance 
of sublimated aesthetic intuitions about how subjectivity relates to the 
Symbolic Order and to the Real. Even if the Real is still the same “something 
faced with which all words cease and all categories fail” (Lacan 1988, p.164), 
as it was in Descartes’ time, changed/changing conditions in academic 
theorising eventually allow for it to be approached not only at the aesthetic 
level, but also at the verbal academic level. It is perhaps Slavoj Žižek who 
expresses this idea most clearly: “If the Real is impossible, it is precisely this 
impossibility which is to be grasped through its effects” (1989, p.163). 
Descartes’ cogito could not articulate this idea whatsoever. Holbein’s intuition 
about the inevitable limitations of this cogito could only point towards these 
limitations, rather than express the ways in which they might be analysed, 
and then only at the vague aesthetic level, rather than at the precise verbal 
level. But the contradictions inherent in the Symbolic Order can eventually be 
meaningfully analysed, once the après-coup method diachronically activates 
those contradictions. 
                                                          
13 Neither Lacan nor any of those developing his ideas have been very specific 
about identifying the precise points of this historical development. 
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If, therefore, different socio-cultural and historical contexts are conducive to 
different forms of subjectivity, and to critiques of those forms of subjectivity, 
then it is possible to trace the relationships between academic and aesthetic 
approaches to that subjectivity. For Lacan, modern subjectivity, and that 
includes contemporary subjectivity, begins in Descartes’ time. From the 
outset, the fact that this subjectivity was part of the Symbolic Order, and 
therefore inevitably incomplete, was intuited at an aesthetic level, beyond the 
linguistic constraints of the Symbolic. But a verbal, academic approach to the 
limitations of this subjectivity could only emerge at a later point. Part of this 
later emergence was the hermeneutics of suspicion. A further aspect of this 
later emergence was the development of academic poststructuralism, 
applying Freudian nachträglichkeit, Lacanian après-coup, Marxist 
approaches to ideology etc. to, amongst other things, film. Just as Descartes’ 
cogito and Holbein’s anamorphosis are two related superstructural 
reflections of the same underlying historically and culturally specific 
phenomena, so too this thesis is an exploration of the relationships between 
the poststructuralist critique of Descartes’ cogito, and filmmaking reflections 
of the same socio-cultural context which makes that academic, theoretical 
critique. 
 
These are the historical parameters of the thesis. I do not make an attempt to 
analyse the impact of the more recent dominance of cognitivist theory on 
filmmaking practice. This is for two reasons; firstly because, as I have 
already mentioned, and as I discuss in detail in section 5.2, cognitivism 
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conceptualises filmmaking and film spectating in relatively ahistorical terms, 
at least in the context of the underlying forms of perception and deduction 
that structure those processes. Secondly, this is because I look at filmmaking 
from some time after the concomitant development of academic theorising. 
Filmmaking from the same historic moment that a form of film theorising 
developed would be transitional in a manner that would complicate the 
parameters of my analysis. Setting a slightly longer time frame between 
academic theorising and filmmaking practice allows for a clearer analysis of 
the ways that the latter reflects the same socio-cultural factors that helped 
determine the former. Given cognitivism’s relatively recent impact on film 
studies the time is not yet right for an analysis of the ways that cognitivism 
reflects the same determinants at work in filmmaking.14 On the other hand, 
the earlier advent of poststructuralism facilitates a clearer argument. 
Academic poststructuralism, therefore, is the barometer of this research. In 
its early days it made claims about preceding films that activated an après-
coup approach to their unconscious and ideological effects. This thesis 
analyses the ways in which filmmaking after the advent of academic 
poststructuralism share determinants with that poststructuralism, and how 
those determinants take on an aesthetic form. 
 
I will not make any precipitous comments about the conclusion that the 
thesis reaches, once it has constructed a taxonomy of how filmic writing 
                                                          
14 Indeed, it may never be. As I argue elsewhere (Geal 2015), the broad optimism of 
cognitivism’s underlying post-Cold War neo-liberal determinants may be giving way 
to a very different socio-cultural climate. 
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formations relate to academic theorising (see chapters 3, 4 and 5) and has 
tested the historical development of those writing formations in the case 
study (in chapter 6). It is worth briefly speculating, though, in hypothetical 
terms, about the broad potential trajectory of these relationships. After all, 
academic poststructuralism is an avowed attempt to intervene against 
hegemony by exposing the ideological illusionism of realist cinema. Given 
that this endeavour is conditioned by a specific socio-cultural context, it is at 
least hypothetically possible that the same socio-cultural context might 
produce an oppositional cinema which eschews ideological illusionism so as 
to intervene against hegemony too. Or, conversely, it is possible that if 
academic poststructuralism is one side of an ideological conflict then realist 
filmmaking remains an agent of ideology. Filmmaking might then respond to 
academic poststructuralism’s determinants defensively and/or offensively. If 
proponents of academic poststructuralism attempt to expose how realist film 
obfuscates its constructed nature, then filmmakers might respond to the 
socio-cultural conditions that determine academic and filmmaking 
subjectivities by developing more sophisticated forms of obfuscation that 
intuit academic  articulations about the contradictions in the Symbolic Order. 
If academic poststructuralism reveals the fissures in the Symbolic Order then 
filmmaking might develop more sophisticated ways to suture over those 
fissures. Finally, it is possible, and indeed as I suggest in chapter 6 and 7, 
most likely, that filmmaking is able to respond in both of these ways. The 
dialectic subjectivities involved in filmmaking are, after all, not monolithic. 
Just as the superstructure of academic theorising is a contested arena, so 
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too is the superstructure of filmmaking practice. In this sense the choice of 
film texts for analysis in this thesis is important, to which I now turn. 
 
1.5 Shakespearean adaptation and filmic writing formations 
 
The superstructure of filmmaking practice is potentially as fissured and 
contradictory as the overtly contested superstructure of academic theorising. 
Filmmaking might engage with the same determinants that condition 
academic poststructuralism by attempting to consciously share the subjective 
goal of exposing film’s ideological realism, or by unconsciously developing 
techniques to respond to the exposure of film’s ideological realism. If the 
latter is the case then filmmaking practice might unconsciously attempt to 
contain the alienating effects of academic revelations about the inevitable 
limitations of the spectator’s subjective position within the Symbolic Order. 
 
This thesis does not attempt to explore the significance of the first of these 
two possibilities. It is certainly the case that some avant-garde film 
movements, sometimes practiced by the same dialectic subjectivities 
operating in the superstructure of academic theorising, have attempted to 
create reflexive films which make the same critiques of ideology as academic 
poststructuralism, but in an experimental, non-realist aesthetic form.15 These 
films are important and interesting, but they are not representative of the 
                                                          
15
 See, for example, Le Vent D’Est (Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin 1969), 
Riddles of the Sphinx (Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen 1977), News from Home 
(Chantal Akerman 1977). 
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broad filmmaking superstructure. Instead, the thesis engages with realism 
which, for academic poststructuralism, is cinema’s principal ideological 
component. Chapter 3 gives a detailed account of how realism operates in 
relation to filmic writing formations, but for now its central feature is its 
verisimilitude which obfuscates its constructed nature. Poststructuralism, the 
academic theoretical development that I am using as the barometer for 
related shifts in academic theorising and filmmaking practice, places realism 
at the centre of its critique of unconscious ideology in film. It is therefore 
important that my analysis of the impact of these related shifts focuses on 
the same realism. 
 
It is also necessary that the corpus of films selected for this analysis includes 
diachronic examples, so that the impact of socio-cultural determinants on 
academic poststructuralism can be measured against film texts from before 
this impact, and from after it. These film texts also need to be selected in a 
dispassionate manner, so that they do not confuse my analysis by facilitating 
certain prescribed conclusions. For example, genres might provide useful 
examples of this kind of historical development, but certain genres have 
frequently been associated with particular socio-cultural contexts and 
interpretations. This is because, more broadly, the analysis of specific bodies 
of films has often been conducive to certain conclusions. John Mullarkey, 
discussing this tendency, argues that “the distinction between exemplary and 
non-exemplary films becomes problematic, [...] for why should a philosopher 
making a transcendent, ontological claim about film – that all (proper) films 
are (essentially) x – have favourites at all (that quite conveniently show this 
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trait explicitly)?” (2009, p.4). Thus, conclusions about how socio-cultural 
determinants in one genre relate to socio-cultural determinants in academic 
theorising would raise questions about how those determinants affect other 
genres. Analysing a particular auteur, similarly, would generate evidence 
about how a particular dialectic subject engages with those determinants, but 
not about how those determinants relate to filmmaking practice more widely. 
 
The thesis circumvents these limitations by selecting a body of diachronic 
film texts which do not operate within a single generic framework. These are 
adaptations of Shakespearean plays. To a certain extent, some of these 
films have quasi-generic features (see section 2.3.3). But as the analyses 
within the thesis demonstrate, an array of films such as Shakespearean 
adaptations, made by many different types of directors, in the styles of 
numerous genres, from different historical periods and cultures, allows for 
Mullarkey’s assertion that “all (proper) films are (essentially) x” (2009, p.4). 
 
There are elements of Shakespearean adaptation which complicate my 
analysis of the relationships between academic theorising and filmmaking 
practice, and elements which clarify that analysis. The analysis is 
complicated by the fact that adaptations of canonical non-film texts activate 
an additional layer of filmic anamorphosis. This thesis is concerned with the 
anamorphic ways in which realist filmmaking manipulates the temporary 
revelation, and subsequent containment, of cinema’s constructed nature in 
relation to film’s grammatical status; Heath’s drama of vision (see section 
3.3). I contend that realist canonical adaptation has a similar temporary 
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revelation, and subsequent containment, of cinema’s constructed nature in 
relation to adaptation’s status as a re-articulation of a foregrounded piece of 
artifice; I call this the drama of authorship (see section 3.3). This complicates 
matters because it is necessary for the thesis to account for the drama of 
authorship in my taxonomy of how filmic writing formations operate. 
Constructing such a taxonomy is a substantial endeavour (chapter 4). It is 
also necessary to theorise the reasons why this approach to adaptation has 
not been hitherto articulated at the academic level (see section 3.4). 
 
These complications also clarify my analysis, however. Because there is an 
additional layer of anamorphosis operating in filmic writing formations in 
Shakespearean adaptations, the diachronic development of the dramas of 
vision and of authorship are easier to identify. There is, in other words, more 
anamorphic data to analyse. There are two further reasons why 
Shakespearean adaptation helps clarify my analysis. The first of these is the 
foregrounded interpretative nature of the adapting process. The contiguous 
elements of otherwise disparate forms of filmmaking are always clear; for 
instance, Romeo always espies Juliet on her balcony, and Hamlet always 
confronts his father’s ghost. Different adaptations approach these scenes in 
multifarious ways, but the continuity and the variation each help to clarify the 
specific socio-cultural and historic contexts at play in each individual 
adaptation. The case study, then, can compare and contrast very different 
diachronic approaches to the same ‘original’ moments – each historical 
approach is clearly foregrounded as an interpretation, and each interpretative 
strategy can be clearly juxtaposed with different interpretative strategies of 
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the same source material. The second further clarification offered by 
Shakespearean adaptation relates to this foregrounded interpretative nature. 
This is because Shakespeare’s canonical status facilitates enhanced forms 
of recorded information about the motivations of filmmakers, who seem to 
feel the need to articulate justifications for their interpretations. Section 6.2 
explores these in detail, but for now it is sufficient to say that a culturally 
specific  impulse to legitimate an adaptation provides numerous ancillary 
texts which reveal much about the motivations of the dialectic subjectivities 
involved in filmmaking practice. These ancillary texts include shooting 
scripts, published screenplays, production notes, interviews, press kits, 
autobiographies and book-length elaborations of the making of certain films. 
As such, Shakespearean adaptation provides numerous privileged 
conditions for the thesis’ diachronic analysis. 
 
1.6 The structure of the thesis 
 
This introductory chapter has set out the broad context within which an 
important impasse within film studies arises. Chapter 2 explores this in more 
detail.16 Chapters 1 and 2, then, explain the relevance of ideological 
                                                          
16 As such chapter 2 is, in part, a review of existing literature, but given that 
theoretical discourse is part of the subject matter of this thesis, the chapter, like 
those that follow it, is concerned with critiquing academic discourse as an inherent 
element of the study, rather than merely reviewing it as an underlying context for the 
project. Furthermore, given the meta-theoretical nature of the thesis, it is not 
practicable to outline and critique all of the relevant academic literature in one place. 
The critique of this literature links to the thesis’ investigations in three related, but 
best separated segments. The first of these is in chapter 2, which first outlines and 
critiques film studies’ theoretical impasse, before setting out a methodology to 
negotiate the impasse by constructing the characteristics of writing formations in 
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approaches to film within the discipline, position that relevance within the 
context of an important impasse in the discipline’s discursive history, explore 
the limitations of the discipline’s current attempts to address this impasse, 
and outline a methodological solution to these limitations. This solution is 
based on a diachronic approach to the impact of complex socio-cultural 
determinants on the superstructural subjectivities operating in both academic 
theorising and filmmaking practice. These first two chapters set out a 
methodology which can analyse writing formations in those two 
superstructural forms, and which can correlate historical developments in 
one writing formation with historical developments in the other. Together they 
comprise the first part of the thesis. 
 
The second main part of the thesis constructs the characteristics of those 
writing formations. It consists of three chapters: Chapter 3 is a theoretical 
account of a poststructuralist filmic writing formation which outlines how the 
dramas of vision and of authorship operate. Chapter 4 offers a detailed 
taxonomy of this process, focusing on the drama of authorship, which is an 
                                                                                                                                                                    
academic theorising and filmmaking practice which are manifestations of the same 
socio-cultural determinants. The second related literature critique and its 
subsequent investigative response takes place in chapter 3, which explores the 
theoretical context for a poststructuralist approach to authorial enunciation in realist 
adaptation, and the reasons why such an approach has not hitherto been 
conducted, and in chapter 4, which applies this context to a detailed taxonomy of 
how authorial enunciation within realist adaptation contributes towards a 
poststructuralist filmic writing formation. The third related literature critique and its 
subsequent investigative response takes place in chapter 5, which explores 
theoretical approaches to the relationships between academic theory and artistic 
practice, and outlines the characteristics of different filmic writing formations derived 
from these relationships, and in chapter 6, which looks for the impact of these 
relationships in a case study of four diachronic adaptations of Hamlet. 
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academic premise that has not yet been articulated within the discipline, and 
which therefore contributes new knowledge in the field of adaptation studies. 
This taxonomy provides different examples of how realist adaptation 
manipulates cinematic and authorial anamorphism. The diachronic 
development of these examples can then be analysed in the subsequent 
case study (chapter 6). The final part of the second main section, chapter 5, 
analyses the ways in which filmic writing formations are historically specific. 
This is another important premise for the case study’s diachronic analysis. 
Chapter 5 also outlines the characteristics of a cognitivist filmic writing 
formation that operates within the context of the drama of knowledge. 
 
The third main part of the thesis is this case study (chapter 6). It charts the 
diachronic development of the poststructuralist and cognitivist writing 
formations that have been defined in chapters 3, 4 and 5. It uses four 
adaptations of Hamlet (and a supplementary adaptation of Macbeth) to do 
this since these films establish the two clear categories that are required for 
the thesis’ specific analysis of the historical relationships between academic 
theorising and filmmaking practice; films made prior to the impact of 
academic poststructuralism, and films made after that impact (see section 
2.3.2). 
 
The overall nature, and the ideological and aesthetic consequences of these 
relationships are discussed in the conclusion (chapter 7). First, however, it is 
necessary to say more about existing academic approaches to ideology in 
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film, and to elaborate in detail how the thesis proposes to intervene in those 
approaches, to which I now turn. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Rationale and methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As chapter 1 outlined, the thesis addresses the theoretical deadlock between 
poststructuralism and cognitivism, two leading paradigms within film studies. 
This chapter explores the continuing importance of the discipline’s conflicting 
approaches to ideology and the unconscious, which these two paradigms 
contest. It is divided into two principal parts. The first (2.2) makes the case 
for the continuing significance of the impasse between these paradigms 
(2.2.2), and the reasons why existing studies have not been able to resolve 
the deadlock (2.2.3). The second part of this chapter (2.3) outlines the 
methodological manner in which the thesis addresses this impasse by 
exploring the impact of socio-cultural developments in the base on two 
superstructural forms; academic theorising and filmmaking practice. 
 
2.2 Rationale 
 
2.2.1 Poststructuralism and cognitivism: Working definitions 
 
The starting point for an exploration of the theoretical impasse between 
poststructuralism and cognitivism is a set of working definitions of these 
terms, so as to avoid any confusion about the parameters of the subsequent 
debates, or about how the paradigms relate to the thesis. Both 
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poststructuralism and cognitivism demonstrate the dialectic, historically 
developing nature of thought. The term post-structuralism explicitly refers to 
a prior theory. Similarly, part of the cognitivist vanguard was Bordwell’s and 
Carroll’s influential Post-Theory: Reconstructing film studies (1996), which 
again refers to a prior theory or theories. Attempts to define the exact 
parameters of these paradigms are therefore problematic, because each 
paradigm engages with, challenges, and/or critiques concepts that relate to 
other forms of theorising in an interminably dialectic process. 
 
The structuralism to which poststructuralism refers was a model based on 
structural linguistics and semiotics and was itself, in a precursor to the 
dialectic trend evident in poststructuralism and cognitivism, a reworking of 
early to mid-twentieth century linguistics (associated with Ferdinand de 
Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss) by philosophers such as Roland Barthes 
in the 1950s and ‘60s (Hayward 2006, p.386). This reworking positioned 
linguistics within Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion (see section 1.1), so 
that language was thought of as a constraining force that shapes human 
consciousness. The structures to which structuralism refers, beginning with 
language and extending out into multifarious cultural and societal forms, 
were perceived to constrict agency and condition thought. Richard Lapsley 
and Michael Westlake characterise this approach to the limitations of 
independent human agency as follows: “the subject for structuralism is more 
constituted than constituting, no longer the self-determining individual […] but 
the effect of that into which he or she is born and lives” (Lapsley and 
Westlake 2006, p.xi). The task of the structuralist theorist was to reveal this 
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process, and in film studies this meant demonstrating film’s common 
structures which limit spectatorial agency. 
 
Structuralism began to be replaced by poststructuralism in the later 1960s 
and ‘70s because it became apparent that the former had an overly 
monolithic conception of the relationships between people and socio-cultural 
structures. In film studies this meant that structuralism was criticised for 
reducing all texts to the same set of inevitable effects. Poststructuralism is 
interested in accounting for differences, as well as similarities, in texts, 
audiences, filmmaking contexts etc. (Hayward 2006, pp.387-8). In order to 
facilitate this interest in difference, poststructuralism is far more 
methodologically eclectic than structuralism; a synthesis characterised by 
Heath as the “encounter of Marxism and psychoanalysis on the terrain of 
semiotics” (1985, p.511). This does not make poststructuralism any easier to 
define, but in film studies in particular it means the manipulation of 
approaches such as psychoanalysis and feminism to explain spectatorial 
pleasure and identification, and to examine the means by which film might 
both constrain and engender the spectator’s agency. 
 
Poststructuralism is therefore a very broad paradigm which has an 
indeterminate border with structuralism. The differences within 
structuralism/poststructuralism are far less marked, however, than the 
differences between structuralism/poststructuralism and cognitivism which 
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was a paradigm developed in the 1980s and ‘90s.17 Whereas 
poststructuralism is an attempt to add nuance in order to extend and remedy 
structuralism’s limitations, cognitivism makes an explicit rejection of both 
structuralism’s and poststructuralism’s a priori foundations.18 
Poststructuralism retains and attempts to reinvigorate structuralism’s political 
interventions against hegemony, whereas cognitivism rejects this ambition. 
Instead of exploring how film might manipulate spectators within an 
ideological context, cognitivism focuses on the spectator as a rational agent 
who decodes meaning in film (Carroll 1996, p.65). 
 
Cognitivism, then, employs an ostensibly scientific methodology or, more 
accurately, set of interrelated methodologies within the context of what 
Carroll calls “piecemeal theorizing” (1996, p.58). The following section, 2.2.2, 
discusses the impact of these scientific approaches in relation to 
poststructuralism, but the significant point here is that this scientism is a 
defining feature of cognitivism, in contradistinction to poststructuralism’s 
focus on the unconscious and ideological processes manipulating filmmaking 
and film spectating. 
 
                                                          
17 See Geal 2015 for a detailed account which situates cognitivism within a specific 
historical context. 
18 See 2.2.2 for a more detailed discussion about how this impacts on the impasse 
between poststructuralism and cognitivism. 
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2.2.2 The continuing relevance of the impasse between 
poststructuralism and cognitivism19 
 
These very different approaches to scientism, the unconscious and ideology 
are at the heart of a theoretical impasse within film studies which the thesis 
addresses. This section is a quite lengthy analysis of this deadlock, which is 
important to address in detail because of the way that it frames the specific 
methodological solution I propose to address the impasse in section 2.3.2. 
 
The conflict between poststructuralism and cognitivism has specific 
characteristics in film studies, but is also representative of a broad trajectory 
in the history of Western thought. I have already mentioned (in section 1.1) 
Ricoeur’ s juxtaposed hermeneutics of truth and of suspicion, of which 
cognitivism and poststructuralism are examples. For some commentators, 
though, the differences between these theories are representative of even 
more fundamental, and even more historically far-reaching ways of thinking. 
Žižek,20 for example, claims that  
                                                          
19 Parts of this section appear in Geal 2015. 
20 Aligning, here, Žižek with poststructuralism is potentially problematic, given that 
he claims that his own work is not poststructuralist, and goes so far as to argue 
“against the distorted picture of Lacan as belonging to the field of ‘post-
structuralism’” (1989, p.7). His principal objection to his conception of 
poststructuralism is its deconstructionist content, which he associates principally 
with Derrida (2005, pp.193-5, see Belsey 2002, pp.93-94). Film studies’ 
poststructuralist engagement with Derrida has been relatively minimal (see Brunette 
and Wills 1989; Conley 1991; Ropars-Wuilleumier 1981 for examples of Derridean 
film studies), and this thesis’ conception of poststructuralism is certainly more 
indebted to Lacan (and Žižek) than Derrida. In Žižek’s direct criticism of cognitivism 
as the antithesis of his own materialist and psychoanalytic account of ideology, he 
fits into the broad concept of poststructuralism as it is employed in this thesis. 
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the antagonism between Theory and Post-Theory is a particular 
case of the global battle for intellectual hegemony and visibility 
between exponents of post-modern/deconstructionist cultural 
studies and [...] cognitivists and popularisers of hard sciences.  
(Žižek 2001, p.2) 
 
He links these antagonisms to a series of intellectual controversies, such as 
the de Man and Sokal affairs, with antecedents going back through Freud, 
Darwin and German Idealism down to Socrates (2001, pp.2-5). Casey 
Haskin, similarly, claims that the conflict is “hardly unique to film theory. Its 
bipolar pattern is a staple of endless histories of intellectual conflict, in 
philosophy, religion, and elsewhere” (2009, p.36). The contested status of 
film theory, then, is representative of an interminable struggle over 
knowledge. 
 
More specifically, in film studies, there are two principal (and interrelated) 
areas of contention which prevent meaningful dialogue between 
poststructuralism and cognitivism. These issues have already been 
introduced (in section 1.2), but are here addressed in more detail; they are 1) 
whether the spectator (and by extension filmmaker) is principally a rational 
agent or an unconscious subject, and 2) whether this agency/subjectivity 
relates to ideology.21 
                                                          
21 There is also a third reason why meaningful discourse between the paradigms 
has been problematic, and this relates to the way that rivals have grouped together 
and classified studies according to criteria which their original authors do not 
necessarily accept. The notion of ‘Theory’ or ‘Grand Theory’, as critiqued by 
cognitivism, is particularly prone to such generalisations. Research which might 
more accurately be called structuralism, auteur-structuralism, poststructuralism, 
psychoanalytic theory or apparatus theory have frequently been grouped together 
under such generalising rubrics as SLAB (Saussure, Lacan, Althusser, Barthes) 
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Cognitivism conceptualises the film scholar, film spectator and filmmaker as 
rational agents – both within the wide Cartesian sense inherent within 
Ricoeur’ s hermeneutics of truth, and within a more specific and more 
contemporary sense derived from developments in analytic philosophy 
(Carroll 1990, p.8) and cognitive psychology (Bordwell 1989a, p.xiv). Both of 
these developments stress the (potential) rationality and objectivity of human 
thought. This rationality and objectivity means that academic knowledge can 
attain the (self-)exalted standards of science. Bertrand Russell claims that 
analytic philosophy’s legitimacy is derived from its “incorporation of 
mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus 
able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have 
the quality of science rather than of philosophy” (2000 [1945], p.743). Joseph 
and Barbara Anderson, similarly, claim that cognitive psychology’s 
“adherence to the basic demands of scientific procedure, while inquiring into 
the processes of the mind, allows the resulting output to be called ‘cognitive 
science’ rather than ‘cognitive belief’ or ‘cognitive metaphor’ (1996, pp.348-
9). 
 
A cognitivist approach to film, then, does not merely reject 
poststructuralism’s approach to the unconscious because it offers an 
alternative account. It rejects the idea of the unconscious because it offers 
                                                                                                                                                                    
theory (Bordwell 1989a), subject-position theory (Bordwell 1996), Grand Theory 
(Bordwell and Carroll 1996) and with a capital ‘T’, Theory (Bordwell and Carroll 
1996). This generalisation about rivals has not helped the discipline negotiate its 
present situation. 
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what it upholds to be a more scientifically valid account. Poststructuralism’s 
vague, unverifiable claims can then be disproved empirically. Bordwell, for 
example, gives a lengthy description of the active perceptual skills that a 
spectator exercises whilst watching a film. These motivate a spectator into “a 
game of controlled expectation and likely confirmation” (1985b, p.38) which 
disproves poststructuralism’s passive account of subjectivity within the 
contexts of interpellation or the dialectic of the subject. 
 
However, the empirical basis of this cognitivist disproval is problematic. From 
a cognitivist perspective, empiricism demonstrates objectivity – the analyst is 
rational, and applies an objective scientific methodology. (The results of this 
analysis, too, are rational, in the sense that the spectator under inquiry is 
shown to be active and conscious rather than passive and unconscious.) But 
the empirical method, and the objectivity of the analyst who applies it, are 
both unsound, from a poststructuralist perspective. 
 
Scientific objectivity entails an important presupposition about empiricism 
which the poststructuralist position rejects. I have already discussed the 
agency/subjectivity of the spectator/filmmaker at length (see sections 1.2 and 
2.2.1), but the same irreconcilable distinction applies to the ways that the 
paradigms conceptualise protocols conditioning academic 
agency/subjectivity. The rational objective cognitivist academic situates him 
or herself outside the parameters of analysis. The analysed object may be 
inconsistent or biased, but the cognitive analyst operates from a detached, 
stable and impartial position. The data gathered by this analyst is thereby 
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that which empiricism reveals as being objectively ‘there’, and the analyst’s 
method is thus, as Anderson and Anderson put it, “‘cognitive science’ rather 
than ‘cognitive belief’ or ‘cognitive metaphor’” (1996 pp.348-9). 
 
The poststructuralist, however, claims that all forms of subjectivity, including 
his or her own, are ambiguously situated within ideological structures. The 
analyst, therefore, according to this poststructuralist argument, inevitably 
projects unconscious aspects of his or her subjectivity onto that which is 
analysed. I will account for my own position of subjective academic 
enunciation in section 2.3.1, but for now it is sufficient to say that, from a 
poststructuralist perspective, cognitivism’s objective empiricism is not only 
unattainable, but also problematic in the way that it obfuscates and disavows 
the academic’s inevitable and inescapable subjectivity. As Žižek argues, 
cognitivism’s empiricism, although an “apparently modest position, involves a 
much more immoderate position of enunciation of the Post-Theorist 
himself/herself as the observer exempted from the object of his/her study” 
(2001, p.16). 
 
These two fundamentally antagonistic approaches to objectivity and 
subjectivity underpin the thesis’ analysis of academic discourse’s and 
filmmaking practice’s shared determinants. It is not necessary here to 
discuss in detail the various ways in which proponents of each paradigm 
critique rival (and defend their own) philosophical premises. This is because, 
as has already been mentioned (section 1.2), each paradigm has an internal 
logic that is impervious to the a priori premises of its rival. I will develop this 
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in more detail shortly, but in order to do this it is necessary to say something 
about the failure of previous attempts at compromise between the 
paradigms, to which I now turn. 
 
2.2.3 Failed attempts to address the impasse 
 
The thesis makes an intervention in the deadlock between cognitivism and 
poststructuralism based on an analysis of how academic discourse and 
filmmaking practice share the same socio-cultural determinants. This section 
explains why it is not possible to address the discipline’s theoretical impasse 
in a more traditional way. It examines existing attempts to synthesise these 
paradigms, and addresses the reasons why such attempts do not resolve the 
fundamental philosophical conflict underpinning the impasse. 
 
The principal focus of studies attempting to reconcile cognitivist criticisms of 
poststructuralism was on adding an empirical dimension to the study of 
ideology and subjectivity. In the wake of the cognitivist offensive, this was the 
poststructuralist attempted compromise. Proponents of cognitivism criticised 
poststructuralism for both a failure to generate convincing evidence for its 
claims, and for its focus on ideology, but studies which engaged with these 
criticisms responded more to the former point than the latter. As Lapsley and 
Westlake argue, paraphrasing Lacan, “although there is no metalanguage, 
we cannot but search for one” (2006, p.xvi), so questions about ideology, 
and attempts to understand its operations theoretically, have always 
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remained pertinent.22 There were therefore, in the 1990s, attempts to refine 
broadly poststructuralist approaches to ideology by engaging with cognitivist 
criticisms about a lack of empirical evidence (for example, Mayne 1993; 
Prince 1996; Stacey 1994). 
 
Jackie Stacey’s investigation into female audiences is a relevant example of 
this kind of work. It attempts to find evidence for hitherto speculative 
theoretical claims by conducting ethnographic research, via questionnaires, 
of real spectators’ experiences. Stacey claims that she attempts to construct 
a  
 
dialectical relationship [...] between the material studied and the 
theory which is used to analyse it. Female spectators’ accounts 
of the cinema are used to criticise or confirm existing film theory, 
and indeed produce new or refined categories which could 
usefully add to our understanding of how audiences watch films. 
(Stacey 1994, p.72) 
 
Although her methods include an ethnographic dimension, Stacey’s analysis 
is informed by this “existing film theory” (1994 p.72), as are her conclusions. 
In terms of her underlying approach, she writes that “although Freudian and 
Lacanian theories of the unconscious are not central subjects of my 
investigation, questions of pleasure, fantasy, identification and desire in 
female spectatorship, which have been so central to those theories, form a 
                                                          
22 It is significant that philosophical studies which claim to exist outside the historic 
boundaries of film theory, such as Jean-Francois Lyotard’s postmodernism (1990, 
p.26), or Gilles Deleuze’s distinction between the movement-image and the time-
image (1989, 1992), maintain something akin to the poststructuralist binary 
distinction between realist film and the avant-garde. 
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crucial part of my analysis” (1994, p.48). Stacey’s approach to her subject 
matter, then, has affinities with the kind of theoretical inquiry that she is trying 
to move beyond. In terms of her conclusions, she claims that “[t]he nostalgia 
of the female spectators in this study is for several ‘lost objects’: […] this 
sense of loss is bound up with the extent to which femininity is culturally 
constructed as an unattainable visual image of desirability” (1994, p.241). 
This conclusion is replete with psychoanalytic associations in two senses. 
The first of these is a broad psychoanalytic sense in which Stacey’s 
“unattainable image of desirability” (p.241) is coterminous with Lacan’s objet 
petit-a (1977a), the unattainable object of desire, which is also an après-coup 
reworking of Freud’s ‘lost object’ (1953 [1917]), which she explicitly 
mentions. The second is a more specific sense located within psychoanalytic 
film theory, and particularly in Mulvey’s (1992) influential analysis of the 
female cinematic spectacle, which Stacey uses as the starting point of the 
“existing film theory” which she attempts to “criticise or confirm” (1994, p.72). 
Her conclusion that “femininity is culturally constructed as an unattainable 
visual image of desirability” (1994, p.241) is almost identical to Mulvey’s 
claim that “[t]he determining male gaze projects its phantasy onto the female 
figure which is styled accordingly” (1992, p.750) 
 
Cognitivist scientism criticises ostensibly empirical revisions of 
poststructuralism, such as Stacey’s account, for a failure to apply empiricism 
adequately, and for these lingering psychoanalytic/ideological biases. In 
terms of the former this means that Elizabeth Traube’s review of Stacey’s 
book complains that “[e]thnographically […] the analysis is somewhat thin, its 
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claims asserted and reiterated rather than grounded in a full account of 
everyday practices. From an anthropological perspective, the book is not 
really an ethnography” (Traube 1995, p.404). In terms of the latter criticism, 
Bordwell argues that even if such analyses are “a matter of reading viewers 
rather than texts, as when Cultural Studies adherents undertake quasi-
ethnographic interpretation of audiences”, they continue to generate 
“readings that are substantially indistinguishable from the sort of commentary 
that became commonplace in the 1970s”. As such, he concludes, this form of 
“culturalism is often closer to subject-position theory than adherents 
acknowledge” (1996, p.26). 
 
Such attempts to respond to the criticisms of a rival paradigm are thereby 
unable to satisfy the methodological and ideological criteria of that rival. This 
is also the case when proponents of rival paradigms have attempted to 
directly debate with one another. Cognitivism’s most vociferous interlocutor 
was Carroll, who conducted journal-published arguments with Heath in the 
early ‘80s (Carroll 1982; Heath 1983, see Lapsley and Westlake 2006, 
pp.143-148 for an overview), and with Warren Buckland in the late ‘80s and 
early ‘90s (Buckland 1989; Carroll 1988; Carroll 1992). A more recent repeat 
of these arguments provides the clearest demonstration of the 
incommensurability of the rival approaches. Žižek’s critique (2001) of 
Bordwell’s cognitivism, which I have already mentioned (see section 2.2.2), 
problematizes empiricism’s objectivity, but this criticism does not satisfy any 
criteria which Bordwell accepts as valid. Thus, Bordwell’s website’s response 
claims that Žižek’s critique “instantiates all the conceptual commitments and 
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rhetorical habits I criticize”, and that it is “more than a little surprising to find 
that at nearly every opportunity Žižek doesn’t engage with the substantive 
arguments of Post-Theory at all” (2005). 
 
The failure of the rival paradigms to agree on the parameters for these 
“substantive arguments” (Bordwell 2005) is, then, the result of their 
diametrically opposed approaches to scientism, ideology and the 
unconscious. Each paradigm can only answer the other through an internal 
logic which carries no legitimacy for the rival paradigm. For Mullarkey, the 
fact that “Bordwell is coming from a position that sees itself as so different 
from Žižek that even where a dialogue of sorts might begin, it amounts to 
nothing” (2009, p.60, original emphasis) leads him to ask “is this a question, 
therefore, of different, incommensurate axioms, [...] adversaries using 
language rules from one ‘phrase regimen’ and applying them to another?” 
(Mullarkey 2009, p.60). Existing attempts to debate between these 
irreconcilable paradigms, as well as existing attempts to design and apply 
synthesising methodologies, have therefore been unsuccessful. The next 
section is an account of the way that this thesis proposes to address this 
impasse. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
 
This second part of the chapter discusses the thesis’ intervention in the 
theoretical impasse discussed above. In order to do this it is necessary to 
expand on three areas of importance that have already been outlined in the 
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introduction. They are; first, the thesis’ subject position – that is, the ways in 
which my methodology operates within an existing theoretical milieu which is, 
inescapably, partial and subjective. The second element of this is my 
approach to academic discourses and forms of filmmaking practice as 
historically specific examples of the same socio-cultural determinants. This 
facilitates a diachronic analysis of the relationships between theoretical ideas 
about film, and unconscious manifestations of the same socio-cultural 
pressures which informed those theoretical ideas, within filmmaking practice. 
The third element is a more detailed account of why Shakespearean films 
provide the most useful set of diachronic film texts to conduct this analysis. 
 
2.3.1 The thesis’ subject position 
 
Firstly, then, the thesis engages with approaches to subjectivity/objectivity 
that are at the heart of the impasse outlined above. A poststructuralist 
approach means that academic activity is conceptualised as inescapably 
subjective, and that the analyst, as well as that which is analysed, is part of a 
complex matrix of ideological/socio-cultural structures. A cognitive approach 
conceptualises its own academic activity as independent, autonomous and 
objective (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). It is not possible, given the 
irreconcilability of these two approaches, for my academic study to be both 
inescapably subjective and autonomously objective. A decision must be 
made about which of these binary positions to adopt, and such a decision is 
inevitably based on an a priori philosophical position vis-à-vis ideology, the 
unconscious, scientism etc. 
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This is potentially problematic, because the thesis attempts to construct 
relatively dispassionate schemata to analyse the impact of socio-cultural 
determinants on academic discourse and filmmaking practice. There is 
perhaps something to be said for applying a cognitivist conceptualisation of 
autonomous objectivity to this task, because such a position would offer an 
appropriate level of distance between the analyst and that which is analysed, 
and thereby satisfy the dispassionate element of my methodology. Such an 
approach, however, would still make deductive decisions about its subject 
matter. And, indeed, cognitivism’s a priori suppositions would involve a 
greater degree of arbitrariness than those suppositions associated with 
poststructuralism. This is because cognitivism rejects so many inherent 
poststructuralist elements in toto, whereas poststructuralism, as studies such 
as Stacey’s (1994) partly demonstrate, can attempt to incorporate some 
elements of cognitivist empirical methodology, and is willing to question the 
validity of its claims. As I discussed earlier (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), 
cognitivism’s scientism invalidates all other forms of knowledge, whereas the 
poststructuralist focus on the un-conscious also accepts the juxtaposed 
presence and validity of the conscious. I mentioned earlier (in sections 2.2.2 
and 2.2.3) Žižek’s argument that cognitivism’s ostensible objectivity does not 
account for the author’s own act of enunciation (Žižek 2001, p.15-6). 
Bordwell’s response to Žižek’s point demonstrates how a cognitivist 
approach to this thesis would prevent an analysis of rival approaches. He 
writes that “Žižek uses enunciation theory for the basis of his objection. If you 
don’t accept a theory of enunciation (which neither Carroll nor I do), the 
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objection fails” (Bordwell 2005). From such a position it is not possible to 
adequately analyse and test competing theoretical claims, since the 
epistemology of its rival is completely outside its own internal logic 
 
My enunciative position, if I am to successfully analyse the relationships 
between rival theoretical claims and filmmaking practice, needs to be able to 
accept not merely the hypothetical possibility of those rival theoretical claims, 
but also the possibility that they have some kind of analogous manifestation 
in filmmaking practice. The cognitivist rejection of subjectivity, demonstrated 
here in Bordwell’s refusal to accept a theory of enunciation, would prevent 
this from happening. As such, my approach must accept that the 
unconscious operations of ideology need to at least be accepted as possible, 
testable criteria, and therefore must accept that my own position of 
enunciation will have an impact on the methodological approach adopted, 
and on how the data analysed will be interpreted. The thesis’ position of 
enunciation is therefore partly derived from a priori principles, but it is also 
the only position which can account for poststructuralist as well as cognitivist 
epistemologies, and therefore the best position from which to construct a 
workable schema to analyse the impact of the same socio-cultural 
determinants on academic discourse and filmmaking practice. The next 
section discusses how I propose to construct this schema. 
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2.3.2 Addressing the impasse by analysing the shared socio-cultural 
determinants in academic theorising and filmic writing formations 
 
The historical and socio-cultural specificity of two interrelated forms of 
superstructural dialectic subjectivity, academic discourse and filmmaking 
practice, is a central element of the thesis’ methodology. I have already given 
an existing example of this – geometric perspective and anamorphism in 
Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533) (see section 1.4). To recap this briefly – 
the painting’s geometry is an aesthetic manifestation of the historically and 
socio-culturally concomitant Cartesian subjectivity, which is an academic, 
verbal expression of the same underlying concept of a rational, humanistic 
subject from whom the objective world emanates. Holbein’s anamorphic skull 
is an aesthetic intuition about the limitations and contradictions inherent in 
this subjectivity. Holbein’s and Descartes’ Early Modern culture could not, 
however, express these limitations in verbal terms. It required Lacan’s later 
après-coup interpretation to explain how the Cartesian subject exists within 
the Symbolic Order, in which attempts to reconcile the individual with illusory 
forms of subjectivity are doomed to a failure that reveals another order, the 
Real. Holbein’s socio-cultural moment could only produce an aesthetic 
intuition about the limitations of Cartesian subjectivity, whereas Lacan’s 
socio-cultural moment can identify this in precise verbal terms. These two 
different approaches to Cartesian subjectivity are facilitated by the shifting of 
socio-cultural determinants across time. 
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This thesis traces similar diachronic shifts, but in relation to more recent 
filmmaking practice. More precisely, I construct two historically (and socio-
culturally) specific bodies of filmmaking practice, and relate these to 
particular developments in academic discourse. I call these historically and 
socio-culturally specific modes of thinking and practicing writing formations. I 
have developed the term ‘writing formations’ in relation to the term ‘reading 
formations’, which is an important element of reception theory. Reception 
theory is an attempt to generate empirical evidence for different ways that 
audiences have interpreted film texts. Rather than interpreting films 
themselves, reception theorists make explanations of interpretations of films 
(Staiger 1992, p.81). To explain a specific interpretation they construct 
specific reading formations, each of which is a historically and socio-
culturally particular set of hermeneutic possibilities. For Tony Bennett, 
reading formations are “a set of intersecting discourses that productively 
activate a given body of texts and the relations between them in a specific 
way” (1983, p.5). I conceptualise writing formations in a similar manner, 
except they relate to the intersecting discourses that insert meaning into a 
text, rather than a reading formation’s set of intersecting discourses which 
activate meaning out of an existing text. 
 
The term ‘academic writing formations’ is merely another way of saying 
‘theoretical paradigms’, although my terminological reference to reading 
formations emphasises the historic and socio-cultural contingency of these 
theoretical paradigms. Filmic writing formations are forms of filmmaking 
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practice determined by the same socio-cultural and historical conditions 
which influence academic writing formations. 
 
As already noted (in section 1.3), I conceptualise the relationships between 
these different forms of writing formation within the context of Althusser’s 
revision (1971) of Marx’s base/superstructure model (1970a). Developments 
in the material base have an impact on ideas in the ideological 
superstructure, and these relationships are all complex, intersubjective and, 
as Althusser puts it, “relatively autonomous” (1971, p.130). As such, the 
thesis requires a methodology which can identify clear developmental shifts 
in both academic discourse and filmmaking practice, and try to find evidence 
for how developments in one relate to developments in the other. 
 
Following on from Lacan’s après-coup interpretation of Holbein’s 
anamorphism, I use poststructuralism as the barometer for this historical 
development. This is principally because, as I discuss in section 5.2, a 
cognitivist approach does not conceptualise human perception, deduction, 
computation etc. as being historically and culturally specific. It is reasonable 
to expect, then, that filmic writing formations which respond to the same 
conditions that determine the academic cognitivist writing formation will do so 
in a relatively ahistoric manner. I will call this a filmic cognitivist writing 
formation – a set of filmmaking practices that exploit dramatic manipulations 
of those processes which an academic cognitivist writing formation 
conceptualises as film’s fundamental pleasures. Just as an academic 
cognitivist writing formation conceptualises audience pleasure in terms of 
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aspects such as active rational deduction, inquiry, speculation, and 
confirmation, so too a filmic cognitivist writing formation manipulates these 
activities (of this rational agent) to generate dramatic pleasure. 
 
Significantly, because cognitivism thinks of these processes in ahistoric 
terms, it is reasonable to expect that filmmaking will also manipulate these 
processes in relatively ahistoric terms. That is not to say that new or different 
ways to manipulate these processes may not be developed. Indeed, a 
significant strand of cognitivism is devoted to exploring and explaining 
different historical and socio-cultural ways in which filmmakers operate (see, 
for example, Bordwell 1985a; 1989a; 1997). But, fundamentally, although 
manipulations of these processes may vary, the processes themselves are 
understood, within a cognitivist context, as unvarying. 
 
Poststructuralism, on the other hand, as Lacan’s après-coup interpretation of 
Holbein’s anamorphism demonstrates, is conceptualised in a much more 
historically contingent manner. Moreover, proponents of film studies’ 
academic poststructuralism frequently position the paradigm’s historical 
emergence within an existing historical and socio-cultural context. This 
context is the political protests in Paris in May 1968 (see, for example, Allen 
1995, pp.7-8; Harvey 1978; Lapsley and Westlake 2006, p.1; Stam, 
Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis 1992, p.21). Post ’68 film theory is 
positioned, within this discourse, as an intellectual response to the socio-
cultural movement underpinning les événements. Poststructuralist film theory 
is understood as a praxis-driven continuation of the political upheavals of the 
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era. The link, then, between specific historical determinant and intellectual 
manifestation is already foregrounded within poststructuralist discourse. 
 
As such, the emergence of an academic poststructuralist writing formation 
offers a clear example of the connections between specific underlying base 
and specific intellectual superstructure which this thesis requires in order to 
investigate the relationships between intellectual and filmmaking responses 
to the same underlying determinants. One half of the superstructural subject 
matter is therefore already foregrounded as a historically specific response to 
a particular socio-cultural period of history. This period begins, then, in1968. 
 
The relationships between filmmaking practice and this socio-cultural period 
are less clear cut, however. As I have already discussed, aesthetic 
anamorphic intuitions about the limitations of Cartesian subjectivity in the 
Symbolic Order are at least as old as Holbein. Aesthetic practice can contain 
sublimated, unconscious manifestations of ideas which can only be 
expressed in precise verbal terms within later academic discourse. In terms 
of filmmaking from before the advent of academic poststructuralism, I call 
these unconscious elements proto-poststructuralist. They are proto-
poststructuralist, as opposed to pre-poststructuralist, because although these 
unconscious elements precede the verbal articulation of academic 
poststructuralism, they contain aesthetic intuitions temporally pointing 
towards the later verbal articulation. That is, this form of filmmaking inevitably 
demonstrates the limitations of Cartesian subjectivity in the Symbolic Order. 
It contains elements of that which an academic poststructuralist writing 
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formation defines as the drama of vision (see sections 1.2 and 3.3). But, 
crucially, it does this before the verbal articulation of academic 
poststructuralism, and before the specific historical socio-cultural context 
which allowed academic poststructuralism to articulate this verbally had 
emerged. I define this filmmaking writing formation, then, as a filmic proto-
poststructuralist writing formation, as opposed to a later form of filmmaking 
practice that unconsciously responds to the socio-cultural context which also 
determines academic poststructuralism, and which I call a filmic post-
poststructuralist writing formation. These two filmic writing formations offer 
the possibility of investigating the ways in which academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice respond to the same socio-cultural determinants, 
because the former (a proto-poststructuralist writing formation) precedes the 
historical determinants which conditioned academic poststructuralism, 
whereas the latter (a post-poststructuralist writing formation) follows those 
historical determinants. It is then possible to ask the principal research 
question which concerns this thesis, and which was introduced in section 
1.1: are the writing formations operating in film at a particular historical 
moment dependent on conditions within the base which correspond to writing 
formations in theoretical discourse from the same moment? 
 
A given film text need not have only one filmic writing formation within it. Just 
as Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533) aesthetically inscribed both Cartesian 
subjectivity, and the intuition of the limitations of that subjectivity, so too films 
may aesthetically inscribe the manipulation of information (which concerns 
academic cognitivism), and the manipulation of vision (which concerns 
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academic poststructuralism). This will become clear in the thesis’ case study 
(see chapter 6). But the different historical contexts of these writing 
formations, with filmic poststructuralist writing formations historically specific, 
and a filmic cognitivist writing formation ahistoric, will help to demonstrate the 
correlations between academic/verbal and filmmaking/aesthetic 
manifestations of the same socio-cultural determinants. Academic 
poststructuralism, and filmic proto-poststructuralist and post-poststructuralist 
writing formations, offer the historically specific conditions to analyse how 
academic discourse and filmmaking practice respond to the same socio-
cultural determinants. Although academic cognitivism clearly has its own 
historic and socio-cultural specificity, it conceptualises the underlying 
dramatic intentions of filmmaking, and the underlying perceptions and 
cognitions of film spectating, as relatively universal and ahistoric. An analysis 
of the historically specific correlations between academic poststructuralism 
on the one hand, and proto- and post- poststructuralist filmic writing 
formations on the other, would expect to find that filmic cognitive writing 
formations operating in the same film texts would remain relatively uniform 
across the two otherwise diachronically distinct proto- and post- 
poststructuralist writing formations. The correlations between verbal 
academic poststructuralist claims about film, and unconscious aesthetic 
poststructuralist manipulations within film will thereby be clarified. 
 
Before embarking on such an analysis, however, it is necessary to select 
appropriate film textual examples of the proto- and post- poststructuralist 
writing formations, and to account for the specific characteristics of these 
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various filmic writing formations. This latter task occupies the next two 
chapters. I turn to the former now. 
 
2.3.3 Shakespearean adaptation and the diachronic analysis of filmic 
writing formations 
 
The methodology outlined in the previous section requires a corpus of 
diachronic film texts for analysis. The historical context of these films 
facilitates the exploration of filmic writing formations from before, and from 
after, the advent of academic poststructuralism. There are a number of 
reasons why Shakespearean films offer a useful set of texts for such a task. 
These have been outlined in section 1.5, but now that the thesis’ 
methodology has been set out, it is possible to discuss more specific ways in 
which Shakespearean films will be used to conduct my analysis. 
 
I have already stated that investigating Shakespearean adaptations is 
important in relation to avoiding the links which academic discourses have 
often made between frequently discussed films/genres and particular 
theoretical developments. Thus, for example, Mulvey’s influential critique of 
gendered voyeurism was derived from analyses of melodramas, and the 
work of Joseph von Sternberg in particular (Mulvey 1992); studies of 
cinematic abjection originated in analyses of the monstrous feminine in the 
horror genre (Creed 1993); investigations into the suppression of masculine 
specularisation have focused upon the western (Neale 1993); and the work 
of auteurs such as Raoul Walsh (Cook and Johnston 1988) and Douglas Sirk 
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(Willemen 1972) have been explored in relation to the presentation rather 
than effacement of ideological contradiction etc. These studies have all made 
valuable contributions to the development of theoretical discourse, but they 
also demonstrate that particular types of study are conducive to particular 
conclusions. Their contributions need not necessarily be rejected just 
because they were derived from certain aggregations of films and genres, 
but returning to those same texts does not allow for dispassionate analyses 
of their wider applicability. The eclectic nature of Shakespearean adaptations 
allows for a manageable investigation into the relationships between 
theoretical discourse and filmic writing formations without subscription to the 
frequently prescribed conclusions associated with specific directors and 
genres. The validity of any conclusions that I derive from an analysis of these 
adaptations will therefore not be undermined by the notion that the analysis 
of certain films facilitates certain conclusions, as it would if I were to examine 
the historical development of a particular genre or director. 
 
Shakespearean adaptation also provides additional layers of ancillary non-
film texts, which offer further insight into the conscious and unconscious 
motivations of filmmakers. Furthermore, Shakespearean adaptation also 
includes enhanced forms of cinematic anamorphosis. This supplements 
realism’s inevitable poststructuralist suture from grammatical inconsistency 
(which reveals artifice) to grammatical consistency (which subsumes that 
revelation) with a suture from the adaptations’ foregrounded authored nature 
(which reveals artifice) to techniques which subsume and contain that 
foregrounded authorship. Realist film inevitably (and unconsciously) 
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manipulates the poststructuralist drama of vision, while realist 
Shakespearean adaptation manipulates both this drama of vision and what I 
call the drama of authorship (see section 3.3). Furthermore, as section 3.4 
discusses at length, academic discourses relating to Shakespearean 
adaptation frequently legitimate those elements of the films which subsume 
the revelation of authorial artifice by placing them within an existing 
Shakespearean context.23 As such, exploring Shakespearean adaptation, in 
                                                          
23 A very brief outline of the dominant trends in Shakespearean film criticism is 
useful here to contextualise the thesis’ overall position in regard to the same subject 
matter. More detailed discussions about specific elements of Shakespearean film 
criticism are given throughout the thesis, where they apply directly to its 
metatheoretical subject matter. See footnote 16 in section 1.6 for a justification for 
this piecemeal approach to contextualising relevant academic literature. 
The first attempts (for example, Davies 1988; Eckert 1972; Jorgens 1977) to 
consider film versions of Shakespeare plays were influenced by early theoretical 
justifications for the artistry of film (Arnheim 1958) and, more specifically, by 
Bluestone’s (1957) model for conceiving the creative process involved in translating 
from (a conservative and canonical approach to drama as) literature to the screen. 
They sought to justify the films that they chose to discuss as relevant and valid 
adaptations which metamorphosed the perceived spirit of Shakespeare’s texts into 
a new medium. These claims about the texts’ perceived spirit were grounded in a 
normative and valorising approach to Shakespeare (see, for example, Bradley 2007 
[1904]; Rossiter 1961; Tillyard 1998 [1943]). 
 
This fidelity context has continued to dominate much of the field, despite the 
broader move within adaptation studies towards dialogism (see section 3.4). These 
fidelity studies have focused on accounting for what is included or elided (for 
example, Guneratne 2006; Tatspaugh 2000), and on how directors can exploit filmic 
techniques to explore specific elements of the perceived meaning within the 
playtexts (for example, Coursen 2005; Crowl 2003; Davies 1994; Hindle 2007; 
Rothwell 1999). Given the literary background of these writers it is perhaps natural 
that they should, when writing about film, utilise the element of film theory that most 
confirms their presuppositions; auteur theory, even if this theory makes assumptions 
about authorship that run against literary studies’ by then well-established critique of 
the canonical author (see section 3.4 for a discussion about these debates within 
adaptation studies).The extent to which these writers apply atavistic elements of 
literary studies to film is demonstrated by Anthony R. Guneratne’s statement that 
“the starting point of analysis of screen Shakespeare would logically be the politique 
des auteurs” (2006, p.41). Robert Hapgood (1994, 1997), Pamela Mason (2000), 
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relation to my investigation into filmic proto- and post- poststructuralist writing 
formations and academic poststructuralism, complicates matters, by 
increasing the anamorphic content of the films analysed, but also clarifies 
matters, by providing more evidence for how filmic proto- and post- 
poststructuralist writing formations manipulate anamorphic dramas. 
 
The final reason why Shakespearean adaptation offers a useful corpus for 
my analysis is the way in which repeated adaptations of the same source 
texts demonstrate the interpretative nature of filmmaking. In part, this is an 
established element of adaptation studies. Dudley Andrew has written that 
“the explicit, foregrounded relation of a cinematic text to a well-constructed 
original text from which it derives and in some sense strives to reconstruct 
provides the analyst with a clear and useful ‘laboratory’ condition which 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Ace G. Pilkington (1994) and Mark Sokolyansky (2000) all link their accounts of 
successful transposition with the artfulness of particular directors. For Michael 
Hattaway the “director [...] inevitably displaces the author and become the auteur of 
the film” (2000, p.95). 
 
It is symptomatic of the valorised state in which the Shakespearean texts’ perceived 
spirit is held that writers who systematically deny the relevance of the auteur-ial 
approach or of the importance of filmmakers’ close shadowing of the playtexts tend 
to draw similar conclusions to those against whom they argue; namely that the best 
Shakespeare films manage to maintain some specific spiritual quality from their 
source material. Normand Berlin (2002) and Andrew Murphy (2000), for example, 
argue that debates about the ‘correct’ use of the original texts are a misnomer. They 
claim that criticism of the failure to closely parallel the playtexts “does not mean that 
the [...] new work cannot tell us much about the original drama” (Berlin 2002, p.35), 
and that many broad adaptations are “perfectly well located within the broader 
Shakespeare tradition” (Murphy 2000, p.19). 
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should not be neglected” (1984a, pp.97-8).24 The thesis’ study of multiple, 
diachronic interpretations of the same source texts exploits these ‘laboratory’ 
conditions. More specifically, though, my methodology’s focus on writing 
formations is a development of reception theory’s concept of reading 
formations. A reading formation is “a set of intersecting discourses that 
productively activate a given body of texts and the relations between them in 
a specific way” (Bennett 1983, p.5). My concept of writing formations is 
similar to this, except that writing formations relate to the intersecting 
discourses that insert meaning into a text, rather than a reading formation’s 
set of intersecting discourses which activate meaning out of an existing text. 
Multiple diachronic adaptations of the same canonical non-film source texts 
foreground the way in which filmmaking decisions are interpretative 
developments inserted into film texts, because they can be compared and 
contrasted with other examples of diachronic interpretation within film derived 
from the exact same canonical source texts. Filmmaking decisions, in all 
films, are inevitably examples of historically and socio-culturally specific ways 
of interpretative thinking, but they do not necessarily have clear diachronic 
contrasting forms of interpretative thinking against which they can be 
compared and contrasted. Multiple diachronic adaptations of canonical 
source texts offer these conditions. 
 
                                                          
24 Andrew’s focus, as is partly demonstrated in this quote, is on media comparison, 
or at least on what literary adaptation can reveal about the specific parameters of 
the medium of film. It demonstrates, nevertheless, that adaptations can be studied 
for the way that they clarify the questions which film theory asks. 
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The specific film texts which I use as a case study for this analysis are four 
adaptations of Hamlet, directed by Laurence Olivier (1948), Franco Zeffirelli 
(1990), Kenneth Branagh (1996) and Michael Almereyda (2000), 
supplemented with an examination of Orson Welles’ Macbeth (1948). I leave 
the specific reasons why these films offer the best diachronic sample of filmic 
cognitivist, proto- and post- poststructuralist writing formations to the case 
study chapter, because some of those reasons relate to the specific 
characteristics of the writing formations which I outline in the next two 
chapters.25 But the overriding rationale behind the specific reasons is the 
                                                          
25 It is worth briefly addressing here, however, the industrial contexts of these 
adaptations, so as to avoid any suggestion that they do not offer relatively 
comparable texts which can facilitate my diachronic analysis. There are certainly 
some industrial aspects of the films which demonstrate divergence, notably in terms 
of the economic resources involved. There are, however, important commonalities 
which suggest that the films offer stable conditions for comparing and contrasting. 
 
The first of these commonalities is studio approaches to the ‘prestige’ of their 
Shakespearean productions. From the earliest days of the medium, as Robert 
Hamilton Ball (1968) has argued, film adaptations of Shakespearean plays have 
been used to borrow an established stamp of high-culture canonicity into a 
perceived low-culture medium. At the same time, partly because of these class 
binaries, film studios have been wary of investing in potentially unpopular projects – 
as Robert F. Wilson Jr puts it, “Louis B. Mayer, for many years the legendary head 
of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, is reported to have described Shakespeare films 
as ‘box-office poison’” (Wilson 2000, p.7). In an attempt to navigate between these 
positions, studios have used a number of techniques to facilitate such prestigious 
but potentially unprofitable projects. The first of these is to use established stars as 
lead characters. Wilson claims that this process began with Mary Pickford and 
Douglas Fairbanks as the leads in The Taming of the Shrew (Sam Taylor 1929), a 
pairing which also demonstrated the vicarious prestige which could be accrued 
through such a project, as “[t]hese two royals were also willing to invest their own 
money to bring this theatrical classic to the screen” (Wilson 2000, p.8). Shortly after 
this adaptation a second technique was employed to ensure financial success, 
when in A Midsummer Night’s Dream (William Dieterle and Max Reinhardt 1935), 
“Warner [Brothers Studios] hired as director renowned European theatre legend 
Max Reinhardt, who had staged a production of Dream at the Hollywood Bowl in 
1934” (Wilson 2000, p.8). This technique extended the adaptation’s vicarious 
prestige, and mitigated against financial losses both through the director’s skill and 
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through developing a prior stage production which could ensure improved 
performances and cut down on expensive shooting time. 
 
Each of the five adaptations in the case study subscribe to these conventions to a 
greater or lesser extent. The star system demonstrated by the Pickford/Fairbanks 
partnership was soon developed into a more appropriately hybrid model, in which 
casts were/are frequently composed of a mixture of Hollywood stars and those with 
a more ‘classical’ theatrical background (Jackson 2000, p.5). Of the five adaptations 
in the case study, Zeffirelli’s and Branagh’s films follow this model most closely, 
casting ‘classical’ Shakespeareans such as Paul Scofield, Ian Holm, Alan Bates (in 
Zeffirelli’s film), John Gielgud, Derek Jacobi, Richard Attenborough, Brian Blessed, 
Richard Briers, Judi Dench and Don Warrington (in Branagh’s film) alongside 
established Hollywood stars such as Mel Gibson, Glenn Close (in Zeffirelli’s film), 
Charlton Heston, Robin Williams, Kate Winslet, Julie Christie, Jack Lemmon and 
Billy Crystal (in Branagh’s film). This is because these two adaptations carried both 
the prestige credentials of the directors, who had already directed successful 
Shakespearean adaptations (The Taming of the Shrew (Zeffirelli 1967); Romeo and 
Juliet (Zeffirelli 1968); Henry V (Branagh 1989)), and the relatively large budgets 
made available to them following those earlier financial successes. 
 
Olivier’s adaptation eschews such Hollywood stars, other than Olivier himself, who 
was by 1948 well established in such a capacity. Like Zeffirelli and Branagh, he too 
had made a financially successful Shakespearean film prior to his Hamlet (Henry V 
1944). Loncraine had neither the prestige of a prior Shakespearean adaptation, nor 
a very large budget. He did not use ‘classical’ Shakespearean actors, because his 
adaptation is set in contemporary America, but his modest budget did extend to 
recruiting popular American actors such as Ethan Hawke, Bill Murray, Kyle 
MacLachlan and Julia Stiles. Macbeth was Orson Welles’ first Shakespearean film, 
although his directorial prestige had a somewhat ambiguous quality. He had 
directed critical and financial successes on the Shakespearean stage (the all black 
cast ‘voodoo’ Macbeth at Harlem’s Lafayette Theatre in 1936, and the modern dress 
Julius Caesar at New York’s Mercury Theatre in 1937), and directed one of 
cinema’s masterpieces in Citizen Kane (1941), but his reputation following these 
successes was that of a wasting talent. Pamela Mason describes his position in 
relation to the film industry at the time as follows: “Like Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, 
Orson Welles is an isolated figure, driven by his unrelenting passion. […] The 
cinema industry with its priorities so firmly asserted by Hollywood’s premium upon 
financial success has tended to regard him as something of a wild and 
unpredictable grey-beard loon” (Mason 2000, p.183). Given this ‘unrelenting 
passion’ Welles had little interest in attracting Hollywood stars to his Macbeth. 
However, the size of Welles’ budget was not as small as is often supposed. Made in 
the same year as Olivier’s Hamlet, Welles was given $700,000 (Wilson 2000, p.131) 
while Olivier had a budget of £475,000 (Rothwell 1999, p.57). 
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foregrounded, diachronic acts of interpretative filmmaking within these film 
texts which facilitate an analysis of how filmic writing formations from before 
and from after the advent of academic poststructuralism compare and 
contrast with one another. This case study, then, can discern whether the 
historically specific socio-cultural determinants which constituted academic 
poststructuralism also constituted an analogous form of filmmaking practice 
which could intuit a developing understanding of how subjectivity relates to 
the Symbolic Order and to the Real, and manipulate this into an increasingly 
anamorphic form of filmmaking. Such a filmic post-poststructuralist writing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
The reason why not all of Welles’ budget made it into the final film is because he 
spent some of the money staging a theatrical production of what would become the 
film, in order both to improve the cast’s performances, and to cut down on the more 
expensive shooting time on set (Rothwell 1999, p.74). This, again, marks some 
level of continuity with other films from the case study. Olivier’s adaptation was also 
based on a successful theatrical run (Jackson 2000, p.5). It should not be supposed 
that deriving a film adaptation from an existing theatrical performance is purely a 
historically-specific phenomenon – although Zeffirelli’s and Almereyda’s films had 
no direct theatrical antecedent, Branagh’s full-length Hamlet draws heavily on 
Adrian Noble’s Royal Shakespeare Company production which also refused to cut 
any text, and in which Branagh played the lead (Crowl 2000, p.223). 
 
As such, although each of the adaptations in the case study has some form of 
difference from the others, in terms of directorial prestige, the composition of the 
cast, the size of the budget, and whether or not the film was derived from a prior 
theatrical run, each of the adaptations shares some of these characteristics with 
other examples from the case study. There are as many commonalities as 
divergences between the case study films. Therefore, there are no clear distinctions 
between the case study films which might contaminate the  laboratory conditions 
which have been set up to analyse the diachronic impact of socio-cultural 
determinants on filmic writing formations. 
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formation would be discernibly different from a filmic proto-poststructuralist 
writing formation which preceded the advent of academic poststructuralism. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established the ongoing significance of a theoretical 
impasse at the crux of the ways in which film studies engages with ideology 
and the unconscious. It has discussed the reasons why existing studies have 
not been able to transcend the impasse. It then set out a working 
methodology to address this deadlock. Instead of attempting to either 
invalidate or synthesise with irreconcilable rival a priori suppositions, this 
methodology can investigate how theoretical claims about film are 
conditioned by socio-cultural contexts which also influence unconscious 
quasi-theoretical operations within film. This chapter has established that the 
clearest parameters for such an analysis can be found in the avowedly 
historically and socio-culturally situated paradigm of academic 
poststructuralism. Filmmaking from before, and from after, this historically 
specific mode of thinking about film can then be explored in order to analyse 
whether and how the socio-cultural contexts which conditioned the advent of 
academic poststructuralism also conditioned filmmaking from after that 
advent. Filmmaking from before that advent (a proto-poststructuralist writing 
formation) can be compared and contrasted with filmmaking from after that 
advent (a post-poststructuralist writing formation). The chapter then made 
the case that the best set of film texts for this analysis is Shakespearean 
adaptations, because such films provide an array of diachronic 
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interpretations of the same source texts which clarify the ways in which 
filmmaking operates within the contexts of multiple, historically specific 
writing formations. 
 
The rest of the thesis is devoted to this analysis. The case study is a detailed 
exploration of the historical development of different writing formations. 
Before this diachronic analysis can be undertaken, however, it is necessary 
to theorise and construct the characteristics of these various writing 
formations. As has already been mentioned in chapter 1, and as 5.3 
discusses in more detail, outlining a cognitivist writing formation is a relatively 
straightforward process because of academic cognitivism’s perceived 
rational relationship between filmmaking encoding and spectatorial decoding. 
Constructing the characteristics of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation 
is more complex, however, partly because academic poststructuralism 
conceptualises the relationships between filmmaking and film viewing in 
unconscious terms, and partly because a poststructuralist account of 
foregrounded authorial enunciation within realist adaptation, which is the 
logical extension of the poststructuralist account of filmic enunciation, has not 
yet been made. The next two chapters focus on constructing such a writing 
formation; the first (chapter 3) in terms of its theoretical composition, and the 
discursive reasons why poststructuralist thinking on enunciation has not yet 
been applied to realist adaptation, and the second (chapter 4) in terms of 
constructing an extensive taxonomy of how a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation can operate within realist adaptation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation in realist adaptation: 
Theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapter established that the study of historically specific writing 
formations can help to trace the relationships between two superstructural 
manifestations of complex socio-cultural determinants; particular forms of 
filmmaking practice, and academic theorising about such filmmaking. Such a 
study can then address the hitherto irreconcilable impasse between 
academic poststructuralism and cognitivism. The thesis does this, in chapter 
6, through a detailed diachronic case study which demonstrates the historical 
development of filmic writing formations, but before it is possible to undertake 
this task it is necessary to define, and give examples of, these filmic writing 
formations. 
 
This chapter, and the next two, are devoted to this. Chapter 5 outlines the 
characteristics of a cognitivist writing formation, and chapter 4 outlines the 
characteristics of a poststructuralist writing formation. Chapter 4 does not 
break this latter writing formation down into proto- and post- poststructuralist 
writing formations, a task which is best theorised alongside the elaboration of 
the less historically contingent cognitivist writing formation in chapter 5. This 
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chapter explores a number of theoretical premises which are necessary 
constituents of my definition of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation. 
 
Before it is possible to define a filmic poststructuralist writing formation, then, 
it is necessary to clearly elaborate how its constituent elements operate. That 
is, I consider how a realist filmmaker might (sometimes unconsciously) 
attempt to facilitate (sometimes unconscious) pleasure in spectators. In part, 
this means outlining relevant poststructuralist literature. But as sections 1.5 
and 2.3.3 have already discussed, the best comparative set of film texts to 
facilitate an examination of writing formations’ discursive development is 
multiple adaptations of the same (non-film) source texts. Adaptation thus 
clarifies the context for studying writing formations. It also, however, 
complicates matters because, as was introduced in section 2.3.3, realist film 
adaptation obfuscates authorial enunciation, and as such is a heightened 
example of how realist cinema inherently contains a host of traces that reveal 
filmmakers’ partial transformative work and systematically attempts to 
conceal those traces. Extensive examples of this process are given 
throughout chapter 4. In order to demonstrate the relevance of these 
examples it is necessary for this chapter to discuss the theoretical principles 
upon which the idea of realist film’s oscillating revelation and containment of 
its constructed nature is based, and from which I derive my definition of a 
filmic poststructuralist writing formation operating in realist adaptation, which 
is something that has not yet been articulated in film studies. These ideas 
can then be applied to a taxonomy of how a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation operates in realist adaptation, in the following chapter. 
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3.2 Poststructuralism and enunciation: “Who is speaking?” (Lacan 
1977a, p.321) 
 
I have already set out (in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) the broad context for 
academic poststructuralist approaches to film which will form the basis for my 
definition of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation operating in realist 
adaptation. In the historical development of academic poststructuralism in 
film studies, this broad context has focused on enunciation, that is, the extent 
to which various discourses foreground or conceal their partiality. This is 
particularly the case for film studies because of the medium’s apparent ‘real’-
ness, but the theoretical background to enunciation in film is central to long-
term developments in broader critical thinking going back at least to Marx 
(1970a). The way in which realist adaptation relates to enunciation is central 
to my definition of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation, and it is 
therefore necessary to first discuss, in some detail, enunciation’s intellectual 
history in order to clarify some contested, and potentially confusing, 
theoretical premises. 
 
Marx theorised how discourses foreground or conceal their partiality within 
the context of the relationship between economic and political conditions, his 
base/superstructure thesis, as noted in section 1.3.This concept claimed that 
all forms of culture and social organisation (the superstructure) are dictated 
by material relations (the base). This provided a relatively crude model for 
conceiving how ideology operates on individuals and societies. However, his 
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contention that “[t]he mode of production of material life conditions the social, 
political and intellectual life process in general” (1970a, p.20-21) proved to be 
a far too rigid account of the unfolding histories of both superstructure and 
base, and this element of Marx’s writing was soon defined as pejoratively 
‘vulgar’ (Lapsley and Westlake 2006, p.3). 
 
The solution to this problematic, at least for proponents of 
structuralism/poststructuralism, was Althusser’s twofold revision of Marx’s 
economic determinism. In the first instance this meant that Althusser argued 
that the economic and the political each have their own determinants, which 
may interact, but have their own internal dynamism, so that there is a 
“relative autonomy of the superstructure with respect to the base” (1971, 
p.130). Secondly, and of specific importance in relation to subsequent 
thinking about enunciation, Althusser dealt with the problem of accounting for 
the hitherto unquantifiable reasons that allowed social hierarchies to build 
ideological mandates within this context. He did this by arguing that 
individuals consent to their positioning within the relatively autonomous 
interface of superstructure and base because ideology operates as “the 
imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (1971, 
p.153). 
 
To an extent Althusser based this distinction between these imaginary 
relations and real conditions of existence on a proto-psychoanalytic aspect of 
Marx’s thought. In The German ideology (1970b [1846]) Marx explained his 
own earlier advocacy of Hegelian idealism as an example of ideology’s 
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power to conceal existing social elations behind a dominant intellectual mind-
set. In replacing Hegel’s conception of ideas as history’s driving force with a 
conception of ideas reflecting material and social relations, Marx defined 
Hegelian idealism as ideological precisely because it concealed its own 
materialist history. 
 
The concepts of false consciousness and commodity fetishism, which 
elaborate how the process of ideology functions, also impacted on 
Althusser’s revision. False consciousness, in particular, is a much-contested 
concept,26 but Friedrich Engels’ statement that “[i]deology is a process 
accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false 
consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, 
otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all” (Engels in Law 2010, 
p.104) would be influential upon Althusser’s subsequent analyses of ideology 
as an unconscious process (Althusser 1971). 
 
Commodity fetishism, the process whereby the specific material relations 
between people are concealed within the relative values of commodities, 
also influenced Althusser. Marx wrote that 
 
The existence of the things quâ commodities, and the value 
relation between the products of labour which stamps them 
as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their 
physical properties and with the material relations arriving 
therefrom. [...] In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Eagleton 1991 for a discussion about false consciousness’ 
complex legacy. 
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must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the 
religious world. In that world the productions of the human 
brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and 
entering into relation both with one another and the human 
race. So it is in the world of commodities with the product of 
men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to 
the products of labour. 
     (Marx 2007 [1867], p.83) 
 
This approach has clear affinities with subsequent psychoanalytic 
approaches to ideology. Žižek, for example, has related Marx’s recourse to 
“the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world” with a Freudian reading of 
the unconscious. He compares the process of ‘dreamwork’, in which desire is 
repressed and concealed, with Marx’s description of the pseudo-magical 
value that commodities derive from the repression and effacement of the 
material relations within society (Žižek 1994, pp.296-331). 
 
Althusser developed the unconscious element of commodity fetishism and, 
employing Lacan’s understanding of subjectivity (Lacan 1977a [1966]) (see 
section 1.2), argued that “[a]ll ideology hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as subjects” (Althusser 1971, p.162). Interpellated subject 
positions, in which individuals consent to constructed, ideological roles that 
act to conceal “their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971, p.153), 
involve a process of misrecognition that is central to Lacanian thinking. 
 
It is this element of Althusserian Marxism that impacted so heavily on 
structuralism/poststructuralism. Just as the fundamental question for 
therapeutic Lacanian psychoanalysis is “who is speaking?” (Lacan 1977a, 
p.321), so that the misrecognising subject might reconsider his or her 
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neurotic subject position, so too structuralist/poststructuralist Marxism could 
seek to elucidate and thereby dispel the ideological misrecognition of 
interpellation. When applied to the functioning of art and literature this focus 
on misrecognition helped clarify questions not only about how subjects are 
interpellated through culture, but also about how those who produce art 
conceal their manipulations of  “the imaginary relation[s] of individuals to their 
real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971, p.153). Art is the realm that 
imagines reality, staging ideology’s misrecognition. That misrecognition is 
most powerful when the imagination of reality passes itself off as 
unconstructed reality. Althusser’s Lacanian reworking of Marx allowed for a 
study of the concealed enunciation within this illusion. 
 
3.3 Film, adaptation and enunciation: ‘Who’s there?’ Hamlet (1.1.1) 
 
From within this context Baudry defined realist film as a product which 
attempts to efface all traces of its own construction. For Baudry almost all 
forms of editing and story-telling constitute a reality-effect that conceals 
cinema’s inherent transformative work. These processes are intrinsically 
ideological since they create the impression of a seamless flowing of events 
in subjects who are placed into a created, passive position which 
masquerades as a creative, transcendent position. Only by revealing the 
transformative work of the cinematic apparatus can a denunciation of 
ideology be achieved. The important question to ask about the relationships 
between film, enunciation and ideology is therefore, for Baudry,  
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is the work made evident, does consumption of the product bring 
about a ‘knowledge effect’, or is the work concealed? […] In 
which case, concealment of the technical base will also bring 
about an inevitable ideological effect. Its inscription, its 
manifestation as such, on the other hand, would produce a 
knowledge effect, an actualisation of the work process, as 
denunciation of ideology. 
(Baudry 1985, pp.533-4) 
 
In terms of how this relates to adaptation, authorship here need not be the 
kind of singular, authoritative (to exploit the term’s etymology) source of 
origin as is understood by adaptation studies’ mostly historically influential 
paradigm; fidelity criticism27 (see 3.4). Film studies does have one tradition 
which attempts to place this kind of creative brilliance in the hands of a select 
number of auteurs. But the tradition within film studies that builds upon Emile 
Benveniste’s account of authorship recognises that filmmaking is a 
collaborative process, and that cultural artefacts do not necessarily spring 
fully formed from the genius of any of those collaborators. Instead, this 
approach to authorship looks for the ways in which the enunciative traces of 
any construction are suppressed. Authorship is less about origins and 
intentions than about artifice and articulation. 
 
Film studies, as a discipline, has not yet considered the potential impact of 
these ideas on adaptation. Film’s transformative work is potentially 
thematised within adaptation because of the foregrounding of the 
constructed nature of films adapted from acknowledged authorial sources. 
                                                          
27 Trends in adaptation studies are discussed in detail in section 3.4. Throughout 
most of the field’s history fidelity criticism has dominated. This paradigm judges 
(usually negatively) an adaptation against the perceived merits of the valorised 
original. 
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The way in which the presentation or elision of authorship impacts upon 
film’s ideology is somewhat prefigured by Christian Metz’s use of 
Benveniste’s distinction between discours (discourse), the act of telling, and 
histoire (story), narration from a hidden source, which approximates to the 
distinction between third-person and first-person speech. This understanding 
highlights the poststructuralist conception of realist cinema’s seamless, 
ideological, un-authored narrative, since “traditional film is presented as 
story, and not as discourse. And yet it is discourse, [...] but the basic 
characteristic of this kind of discourse, and the very principle of its 
effectiveness as discourse, is precisely that it obliterates all traces of the 
enunciation, and masquerades as story” (Metz 1985, p.544). 
 
However, applying Metz’s distinction to adaptation suggests a different 
relationship to film’s constructed nature. In adaptations of the work of 
canonized authors the narrative discourse’s status as articulation is explicit. If 
a film text is foregrounded as an adaptation of a pre-known work then a 
significant element of its constructed-ness is therefore not obliterated. 
Narrative might therefore not seamlessly unfold, and discours might not 
masquerade as histoire, if the constructed nature of the adaptation’s discours 
is foregrounded. As such, adaptation might reveal cinema’s transformative 
work, fulfilling Baudry’s argument that “its inscription, its manifestation as 
such [...] would produce a knowledge effect, an actualisation of the work 
process, as denunciation of ideology” (1985, p.534). 
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For Heath, though, the revelation of cinema’s transformative work does not 
necessarily produce a knowledge effect. Instead, realist cinema always 
oscillates between illusionism and revelation. As I have already partly 
addressed (in sections 1.2 and 2.3.2), this concept originates in a particular 
approach to Renaissance perspectival painting. Just as Descartes 
conceptualised the objective world as a logical extension of the human 
subject, perspective’s compositional unity constructs a transcendent illusion 
of both space and subjectivity with a singular point designated to “the 
imaginary subject whose place we propose to fill, a place we are nominated 
to assume” (Nichols 1981, p.53). For Bill Nichols the Renaissance 
perspectival system should be thought of “in terms of the constitution of the 
self-as-subject” (1981, p.53) because the vision and the viewer are 
constructed dialectically: “The painting stands in for the world it represents as 
we stand in for the singular but imaginary point of origin; we recognize the 
identification marks of the world re-presented while this very identification 
marks our position, our capture and appropriation” (1981, p.53). 
 
However, this vision is never complete. Any mimetic attempt to replicate the 
objective world exists within Lacan’s Symbolic Order, which is a realm of 
misrecognition in which the subject futilely attempts to reconcile the 
individual with illusory forms of subjectivity. Perspectival painting 
demonstrates the limitations inherent in the Symbolic Order by 
demonstrating that the centrality of the viewing subject is entirely contingent 
on adopting a particular designated position. As Ten Doesschate puts it, 
“perfectly deceptive illusion can be obtained only on two conditions: (a) the 
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spectator shall only use one eye, (b) this eye has to be placed in the central 
point of perspective” (in Heath 1981, p.28, Heath’s emphasis). This limitation, 
both in terms of the specific aesthetic composition of perspectival painting, 
and in terms of the limitations of the subject in the Symbolic Order, can be 
reflexively recognised and exploited via anamorphosis. For Heath 
anamorphosis is “the recognition and exploitation of the possibilities of this 
distortion” (1981, p.28). As I have already discussed, Heath and Lacan use 
the example of Hans Holbein the Younger’s The Ambassadors (1533) 
(Fig.3.1), and more specifically its oblique skull, to demonstrate perspective 
painting’s limitations in terms of delivering a single “place we propose to fill, a 
place we are nominated to assume” (Nichols 1981, p.53), as the skull only 
comes into the kind of focus consistent with perspective painting if it is 
observed from a different, non-centralised position.  
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Fig.3.1 
 
Cinema, because of its movement and its interchange of images, is like an 
overly anamorphic perspectival painting whose transcendent subjective point 
of origin is constantly in flux. The ideological power of Renaissance 
painting’s fixed subject position is therefore always under threat. Establishing 
shots, for example, by revealing unattributed viewpoints that do not seem to 
belong to anyone threaten to reveal the cinematic frame and its constructed 
nature, throwing the viewing subject out of his or her transcendent position. 
The techniques of continuity editing resolve this grammatical threat to 
seamlessness, though, by cutting to shots which attribute the previous 
viewpoint to narrative and character elements within the film’s diegesis 
(Heath 1985, p.514).  
98 
 
 
Heath demonstrated his argument by analysing the opening scenes of 
Steven Spielberg’s Jaws (1975), which opens with an underwater shot that 
will subsequently be attributed to the eponymous shark’s point-of-view 
(Fig.3.2), and cuts to a night-time beach party (Fig.3.3) with dramatic 
changes in colour, from blue-greens to orange-yellows, in music, from the 
famous ominous theme to diegetic harmonica, and in rhythm, from the 
shark’s forward point-of-view thrust to a smooth track across the group 
(Figs.3.3-3.7). The continuity editing techniques of eyeline match and 
shot/reverse shot (Figs.3.7 and 3.8) further establish the narrative space and 
inscribe the audience’s position into that space. Shortly after a girl swims into 
the sea, the forward thrusting, desaturated non-human point-of-view shot 
(Fig.3.9) is used to signify an imminent attack (Heath 1985, pp.512-3). 
 
 
Fig.3.2 
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Fig.3.3 
 
 
Fig.3.4 
 
 
Fig.3.5 
 
 
Fig.3.6 
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Fig.3.7 
 
 
Fig.3.8 
 
 
Fig.3.9 
 
This interchange of shots, for Heath, represents cinema’s inherent dialectic 
between vision’s claim to transcendental truth and the inevitable 
discontinuities and disruptions intrinsic to the camera’s mobility. The 
coherence of cinematic grammar in the scene on the beach, summoning up 
a comfortable, believable narrative space, and positioning the spectator 
within it, is an attempt to reconstruct the truth of vision within a medium in 
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which grammatical coherence is always dialectically juxtaposed with 
alienating incoherence (Heath 1985, p.513). Cinema therefore always has 
the potential to reveal its constructed nature and demonstrate the subject’s 
passivity, but overcomes this threat to ideology through continuity editing, a 
stitching over, or suture, of the potential cut in the subject’s perceived 
creative mastery of what appears to seamlessly unfold before him or her. 
 
In foregrounded adaptations certain filmmaking techniques may operate, in a 
similar manner to how continuity editing sutures over the inherent threat of 
cinematic mobility, as ways to contain the subversive potential of presenting 
authorial enunciation. A detailed taxonomy of these techniques follows in 
chapter 4. It may be, though, that containing this subversive potential might 
not simply be a suppression of the threat to ideology, but also a heightened 
example of how cinema masochistically exploits grammatical threats, such 
as the momentarily unattributed viewpoints of establishing shots, to ensure 
ideological closure through the creation of pleasure. For Heath, this 
grammatical inconsistency within realist cinema’s otherwise unproblematic 
histoire-like continuity is an important element both of how subjects derive 
pleasure from films, and of how ideology successfully operates. Heath 
contends that Baudry’s explanation of how the cinematic apparatus 
ideologically positions subjects is insufficient because it does not explain the 
pleasure of being so positioned. He argues that cinema’s grammatical 
inconsistencies are an almost paradoxical element of how  
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a film is not reducible to its ‘ideology’ but is also the working over 
of that ideology in cinema, with the industry dependent on the 
pleasure of the operation. [...] Film is the constant process of a 
phasing-in of vision, the pleasure of that process – movement 
and fixity and movement again, from fragment […] to totality (the 
jubilation of the final image).    
(Heath 1985, p.514) 
 
Subjects are positioned ideologically through their unconscious enjoyment of 
the threat to realist grammar, the temporary revelation that they are merely 
passive subjects, and its subsequent, cathartic resolution. 
 
Michele Aaron relates this process to Freud’s fort/da game, in which the 
infant masochistically ritualizes separation from the mother by allegorically 
re-playing the scenario through repeatedly casting away a bobbin with the 
cry of ‘gone’ (fort) and winding it back up, ‘here’ (da). Freud interpreted this 
game as a metaphor for the child’s separation from its mother. The child 
could not really dictate when it had access to her, and so created a ritual in 
which this access could be allegorized. It thereby claims limited and 
illusionistic agency over that which is beyond genuine control, moving from 
being passively abandoned to actively abandoning (Freud 1955, pp.14-17). 
Crucially, for Aaron, “[w]hat Freud suggests is that the pleasure of recovery 
is not only experienced through the pain of loss, but is actually increased by 
it” (2007, p.54), so that the unpleasure of non-access to the mother, and the 
pleasure of access, were both equally enjoyable at the allegorical level. The 
temporary unpleasure of the former is worth the cathartic resolution of the 
latter. In realist cinema, the deferred pleasure of the spectator 
misrecognising him/herself as an individually-constituted transcendent 
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illusionistic “self-as-subject” (Nichols 1981, p.53, my emphasis) through 
grammatical consistency is therefore worth the prior revelation of the passive 
process of the “constitution of the self-as-subject” (1981, p.53, my emphasis) 
apparent in moments of grammatical inconsistency. The momentary 
revelation of cinema’s reality-effect and its ideological and pleasure-inducing 
subsequent disavowal is, for Heath and Aaron, inherent to all realist cinema. 
It is my contention, extending this premise, that the revelation and cathartic 
resolution of the grammatical disruption inherent in presenting and 
translating foregrounded authorial enunciation in realist adaptation not only 
functions as another enunciative trace similar to the traces left by the director 
through continuity editing, but also further thematises the suture. 
 
The foregrounded canonical author can be thought of as an anamorphic 
trace similar to those demonstrating the incomplete nature of vision. The 
example of reflexive perspectival painting suggests the similarities – just as 
Holbein painted a symbol of anamorphic vision, so too Diego Velázquez’s 
Las Meninas (1656) (Fig.3.10) reveals an anamorphic symbol of the artist. 
For Michel Foucault this “picture in which the painter is in turn looking out at 
us” invokes a  
 
slender line of reciprocal visibility [which] embraces a whole 
complex network of uncertainties, exchanges, and feints. […] 
Though greeted by that gaze, we are also dismissed by it, 
replaced by that which was always there before we were: […] No 
gaze is stable, or rather, in the neutral furrow of the gaze piercing 
at a right angle through the canvas, subject and object, the 
spectator and the model, reverse their roles to infinity. 
(Foucault 1974 [1966], pp.4-5) 
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Perspectival painting’s traditional “singular but imaginary point of origin” 
(Nichols 1981, p.53) is inverted into the content of that on which the 
painting’s artist is working. Perspectival painting’s traditional “imaginary 
subject whose place we propose to fill, a place we are nominated to assume” 
(p.53) is revealed to be an illusion: “at the vanishing point is the mirror image 
of [Velázquez’s] subject, The King and Queen of Spain, occupying the place 
of origin yet being represented in the painting. This construction seems to 
exclude or bar the viewer from his place at the same time as it displays that 
place” (Foucault 1974, p.52). In so doing, like The Ambassador’s (1533) 
anamorphic skull, or Jaws’ alienating shark point-of-view, Las Meninas 
(1656) reveals the perspectival system’s illusionistic “constitution of the self-
as-subject” (Nichols 1981, p.53). But instead of focusing on how this 
constitution is contingent upon perspectival relations alone, Las Meninas 
(1656) combines the revelation of the perspectival illusion with the explicit 
revelation of the work’s construction at the hands of the artist, or, if one shifts 
the example to film and to adaptation, at the hands of the author. 
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Fig.3.10 
 
Realist filmic adaptations of foregrounded canonical non-film texts operate in 
a similar manner, inscribing the foregrounded artist/author into realist 
cinema’s suturing ostensibly un-authored perspectival system. If film is the 
constant flux between an alienating mobility which decentres and threatens, 
but then continuously reactivates, perspectival painting’s “singular but 
imaginary point of origin" (Nichols 1981, p.53), then I claim that adaptation’s 
foregrounded author is a further allegorical layer (temporarily) demonstrating 
that those origins lie not with the self-as-subject, but with another who in fact 
constructs the subject’s passive illusion of agency. 
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The temporal and temporary aspect of this foregrounding is central to the 
suturing of the anamorphic author into the grammatical logic of realist 
cinema’s seamless perspectival illusion. Lacan makes a distinction between 
the eye and what he calls the gaze, a margin which stresses both the eye’s 
geometral optics and the gaze’s disruptive sense that the viewing subject 
can also be someone else’s viewed object. Thus, The Ambassadors (1533) 
both subscribes to the logic of perspectival painting, and also demonstrates, 
via its anamorphic skull, the futility of that logic and of the transcendent 
subject position it proposes that the viewer fills. Something similar can be 
said of Las Meninas (1656) – it exists within the broad conventions of 
perspectival painting, but problematizes the system’s subjective focal point 
by presenting it as the locus of the artist’s, rather than the viewer’s, vision. I 
claim that realist adaptation, likewise, exists within the broad conventions of 
realist perspectival cinema. It contains the same masochistic oscillation 
between the Lacanian eye’s perspectival unity and the Lacanian gaze’s 
“sensitive spot, a lesion, a locus of pain” (1992, p.140). And, like Las 
Meninas (1656), realist adaptation combines perspectival anamorphosis with 
authorial anamorphosis. Not only is the revelation of film’s perspectival 
illusion sutured into the conventionalised logic of realist grammatical 
consistency, but the performative foregrounding of adaptation’s constructed 
origins is also manipulated for an ideological masochistic effect, and 
subsumed within realist film’s grammatical logic. 
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This is partly an inherent element of the realist cinematic medium’s 
geometry, which facilitates Benveniste’s/Metz’s concealed histoire, with a 
hierarchy of discourses that treats different forms of enunciation, even if they 
have the same foregrounded authorial origins, in diverse ways. Realist 
adaptation generally includes different and differentiated forms of 
enunciation, most notably in terms of character dialogue and narrative 
events. Various forms of literature and drama might arrange these 
discourses in different ways, but realist cinema organises them within the 
context of Colin MacCabe’s claim that “the narrative discourse simply allows 
reality to appear and denies its own status as articulation. […] The camera 
tells us what happens – it tells the truth against which we can measure the 
[other] discourses” (1985, pp.36-7). 
 
Proponents of dialogism, adaptation studies’ principal contemporary 
paradigm,28 might characterise this account as an example of the second of 
twelve pre-dialogic fallacies identified by Thomas Leitch; “[d]ifferences 
between literary and cinematic texts are rooted in essential properties of their 
respective media” (2003, p.150). This criticism is valuable if it challenges the 
notion of a singular and authorially prescribed translation from word to 
image. But the analysis of adaptation’s different media need not only focus 
on fidelity’s humanistic “expressive possibilities of shifting relations between 
words and images” (Jorgens 1977, p.17). It can also explore media 
translations’ ideological consequences. Analysing these translations is not, 
                                                          
28 See the following section, 3.4, for a discussion about dialogism and its 
relationship with my argument. 
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then, an inevitable fallacy which valorises canonicity. The dialogic 
characterisation of the analysis as inevitably such is problematic in the way it 
elides realist adaptation’s masochistic manipulation of foregrounded 
authorship. 
 
The specific significance, in relation to adaptation, of thematising these 
ideological issues relates to competing ideas about self-reflexivity and 
metadrama. Shakespearean cinema’s self-reflexivity, praised by many critics 
as the medium’s principle way to manipulate and explore the plays’ pluralistic 
themes and overcome realist film’s monolithic interpretations (for example, 
Brown 2004; Buchanan 2005; Rasmus 2001; Rothwell 1994), can actually 
participate in film’s ideological suture. For Heath, cinematic metadrama is an 
inherent element of how the ritual of suture produces pleasure in subjects 
because “the drama of vision becomes a constant reflexive fascination in 
films” (1985, p.514). Heath perceives Jaws, in this context, as a 
metadramatic “play on the unseen and the unforeseeable, the hidden shark 
and the moments of violent irruption” (1985, p.514), and conceives the 
relationship between the masochistic continuity editing process and narrative 
in terms of “the pleasure of that process – movement and fixity and 
movement again, from fragment (actually thematized in Jaws as 
dismemberment) to totality (the jubilation of the final image)” (1985, p.514). 
Just as audiences unconsciously thrill to the momentary disruption of 
cinematic coherence, so too filmmakers unconsciously inscribe this 
disruption into narrative form. In the same way as with the fort/da game, the 
deferred pleasure of regaining an imagined mastery is so worth the prior 
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temporary recognition of passivity that realist cinema cannot help but inscribe 
such pleasures into its narratives. 
 
I understand adaptation’s masochistic presentation and subsequent 
disavowal of enunciation, within Heath’s terms, as “a constant reflexive 
fascination in films” (1985, p.514), with “the industry dependent on the 
pleasure of the operation” (1985, p.514). And, since I define this presentation 
and containment of authorial enunciation as an enunciative trace analogous 
to continuity editing, it should be no surprise that just as “the drama of vision 
becomes a constant reflexive fascination in films” (Heath 1985, p.514), so 
too does the masochistic drama of authorship. Shakespearean self-
reflexivity, far from being the key to transcending realist cinema’s perceived 
fixing of the plays’ inherent pluralism, is merely another level of narrativising 
this conservative suture. 
 
3.4 Discursive containment – Auteur-ism, canonicity and the 
‘dead’/hidden author: “Who is speaking thus?” (Barthes 1995, p.125) 29 
 
Before outlining a taxonomy of how Shakespearean adaptation negotiates 
and thematises these premises, and thereby operates within the contexts of 
a filmic poststructuralist writing formation, it is necessary to outline the two 
principle reasons why existing adaptation studies do not locate authorial 
enunciation within the ideological context in which poststructuralist film 
                                                          
29 Some elements of this section have been submitted for inclusion in the upcoming 
Routledge companion to adaptation, which is scheduled for publication in 2017. 
110 
 
theory conceives cinematic enunciation in the way that I have just outlined. 
This is important not only in terms of understanding the theoretical 
foundations of existing studies, but also in terms of establishing how such 
studies complete the suturing hermeneutic inherent in the presentation and 
cathartic resolution of translating foregrounded authorial enunciation in 
adaptations. These academic interpretations which, like realist adaptations 
themselves, foreground authorial enunciation and simultaneously disavow 
the transgressive potential of this foregrounding, can be seen as part of an 
intellectual regime that completes adaptation’s conservative masochism. The 
reasons why existing studies have not discussed the masochistic aspect of 
foregrounded authorial enunciation (which is central to this thesis’ analysis of 
how academic paradigms relate to filmic writing formations) are located 
within the discursive histories of film studies, literary studies and adaptation 
studies, and in the ideological and pleasure-inducing nature of this 
masochism. 
 
Firstly, the specific history of film studies has led primarily to a focus on the 
constructive impact of auteurs/directors rather than authors/script-writers, 
and on filmmakers’ visual, rather than verbal transformative manipulations. 
As early as the second decade of the twentieth century screenplay-writers 
were making the case that they should be considered film’s primary creative 
source (Eisner 1969, p.39), but the impact of the politique des auteurs from 
the 1950s onwards firmly established the director as the focus of critical and 
theoretical attention.  
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As a consequence, studies of adaptation have not been able to locate 
authorial enunciation within the ideological context in which poststructuralist 
film theory conceives cinematic enunciation. Similarly, the impact of the 
politique des auteurs, and its concomitant rejection of the creative impact of 
screenplay-writers and source texts, has led film theory to conceive of 
enunciation solely in relation to continuity editing and the manipulation of 
mise-en-scène at the expense of other enunciative traces; as an auteur-ial 
rather than an authorial imprint. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, adaptation studies’ discursive 
history has prevented the kind of understanding of authorship as enunciation 
outlined above (in section 3.3). It is only quite recently that adaptation studies 
has moved beyond fidelity criticism, a paradigm which focused on how an 
adaptation might translate the perceived ‘spirit’ of an original text. Such an 
approach almost entirely elided an examination of ideology. But the 
subsequent development of dialogism, the paradigm which has to a large 
extent displaced fidelity criticism, continues to elide the canonical author as a 
form of enunciation and, indeed, paradoxically contributes towards realist 
film’s ideological obfuscation of its authored construction. Dialogism draws 
on Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1981 [1975]) intertextual claim that all works of 
literature are constantly informed by and informing other works of art, and 
that, therefore, all films are in a continual dialogue with art and culture, and 
adaptations are just more acute examples of this phenomenon (Stam 
2005a). Certain specific elements of dialogism’s historical development are 
important because of the way that they demonstrate how its particular 
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conception of authorship closes off the kind of ideological approach which 
facilitates this thesis’ analysis of the how changing socio-cultural 
determinants influence both academic discourses and filmmaking practice. 
 
Firstly, the dialogic critique of fidelity traces the bias against adaptation back 
to the early advocates of film as the seventh art who attempted to distance 
the new muse from any dependence on prior literary models (Cartmell and 
Whelehan 2010, p.2). James Naremore extends the historic bias to a 
prevailing Kantian approach to aesthetics, in which “both the making and the 
appreciation of art were conceived as specialized, autonomous, and 
transcendent activities having chiefly to do with media-specific form” (2000, 
p.2). Subsequent dialogic analyses would elide the specific semiotic features 
of various adapted and adapting media in order to avoid the pitfalls of a 
Kantian aesthetics that might downplay textual hybridity. 
 
A Kantian methodology might also fall into the second element of dialogism’s 
critique, namely the valorisation of the text within one (‘original’) medium at 
the expense of another. Naremore linked the propensity of the fidelity analyst 
to think along these lines with the hierarchical cultural tradition exemplified in 
Matthew Arnold’s Culture and anarchy (1869), which valued high over mass 
culture, and tradition over innovation. Instead, the dialogic critic recognises 
that all texts are hybrid reworkings of other texts (Leitch 2005, p.239). This 
means that Arnoldian claims to moral, political or aesthetic hierarchies are 
open to question. Indeed, the context behind these dialogic claims reflects a 
broader academic turn towards thinking of texts as appropriate sites for 
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widespread cultural emancipation. Appropriately, given adaptation studies’ 
interdisciplinary nature, this turn came from within two different disciplines. 
And appropriately, given this dialogic context, these disciplinary turns were 
mutually constitutive. 
 
From a broad cultural studies milieu, Arnold’s binary of high and low culture, 
which had been transmuted into a binary of high art and mass culture by the 
Frankfurt School, was, by the 1980s, being replaced with an investigation of 
how agency might operate within these constraints. John Fiske could 
therefore argue that “[t]he creativity of popular culture lies not in the 
production of commodities so much as in the productive use of industrial 
commodities. […] The culture of everyday life lies in the creative, 
discriminating use of the resources that capitalism provides” (1989, pp.27-8). 
Fiske’s distinction between production and productive use of commodities is 
not dissimilar to the dialogic focus on adaptation’s productive uses of source 
texts. Even if culture consists largely of an attempted ideological imposition 
from above, the product or text does not necessarily impose either Arnold’s 
patronisation or the hegemony identified by the Frankfurt School. Just as 
Fiske thought that capitalism’s false choice between Levi and Wrangler jeans 
could be transcended by a personalising customisation of those jeans, so too 
dialogism thinks that canonical culture’s false choice between, for example, 
Shakespeare and Dickens can be transcended by adaptation’s dialogic 
customisation of those texts. 
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This optimistic interpretation of a text’s emancipatory potential also reflects 
the broad methodological transformation in film studies that preceded the 
rise of dialogism. Various strands of semiotic, psychoanalytic, structuralist 
and poststructuralist thought dominated film theory in the 1970s. Although 
David Bordwell’s characterisation of these methodologies as “subject-
position theory” is reductive (see section 2.2.3), it serves as a useful 
categorisation here because it emphasises the understanding that “cinema 
constructs subject positions as defined by ideology” (1996, p.8). Subject-
position theory was concerned less with the vagaries and subtleties of texts, 
and more with the unconscious interactions between text, cinematic 
apparatus and subject-spectator. Both text and apparatus were conceived as 
acting to deceive and constitute the subject-spectator. Only politically 
engaged theory and theoretically informed avant-garde filmmaking could 
expose the deception of realist cinema. 
  
As I have discussed in sections 1.3 and 2.3.2, academic theory develops in 
relation to underlying historical socio-political contexts. The primacy of 
subject-position theory was displaced by the shifting of these contexts. Neo-
liberalism’s triumph following the fall of the Berlin Wall (see Geal 2015) 
facilitated a re-envisioning of the potential emancipatory interactions between 
texts and subject-spectators. Theory was no longer understood as the radical 
solution to the inevitably ideological text. This reorientation called for an 
understanding of the subversive potential of both texts and audiences. The 
turn, therefore, was away from textual deception and towards textual 
pluralism, Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake, for example, arguing that 
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“[i]n a climate where the notion of an elite vanguard group of intellectuals 
seeking mastery came to be seen as impossible and undesirable, Theory’s 
authority could only decline. What was needed was not direction from and 
legislation by an elite supposedly in the know, but radical democracy in 
which every voice could be heard in difference” (2006, p.xii, my emphasis). 
 
Dialogism’s multiplicity of voices therefore stems from a wider 
epistemological turn towards pluralism. Just as, in terms of text/spectator 
relationships, film theorists started looking at pluralistic rather than monolithic 
audiences (see, for example, Stacey 1994; Staiger 1992), adaptation studies 
facilitated the desire to look at pluralistic rather than monolithic texts. In a 
similar manner to how the study of the spectator-subject turned to the 
diversity of multiple and conflicting forms of audience reception, so too the 
study of the text-object turned to the diversity of multiple and conflicting 
forms of textual hybridity. This helps to explain both dialogism’s historical 
emergence and its subsequent successes. Due to the long dominance of the 
Arnoldian and Kantian approaches to adaptation, by the time that adaptation 
studies characterised these methodologies as being “constitutive of a series 
of binary oppositions that poststructuralist theory has taught us to 
deconstruct” (Naremore 2000, p.2), it did not adopt the approaches of 
poststructuralism (read subject-position theory) tout court because they had 
already been discredited within the then more theoretically current disciplines 
of film studies and cultural theory. Instead, adaptation studies both engaged 
with and foregrounded the era’s shift from theory as radical to the uses of 
texts as radical. If it was no longer possible to be optimistic about the 
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interventions of the radical vanguard critic, then it was important to instead 
be optimistic about the possibilities of more widespread textual and 
interpretative radicalism. 
 
Dialogic critics could then think of texts as replacing the radical function that 
theory had until then claimed only for itself. Stam argues, therefore, that “[w]e 
can still speak of successful or unsuccessful adaptations, but this time 
oriented not by inchoate notions of ‘fidelity’ but rather by attention to […] 
‘readings’ and ‘critiques’ and ‘interpretations’ and ‘rewritings’” (2005a, p.46). 
Replacing the obsolete vanguard critic, “[a]daptations, then, can take an 
activist stance toward their source[s]” (Stam 2000a, p.64). Indeed, 
proponents of dialogism approach theory and text in a strikingly similar 
pluralistic emancipatory manner. Stam calls his simultaneous deployment of 
“literary theory, media theory, and (multi)cultural studies […] a kind of 
methodological cubism” (2005b, p.15) and likewise notes that “cinema can 
literally include painting, poetry, and music or it can metaphorically evoke 
them by imitating their procedures; it can show a Picasso painting, or 
emulate cubist techniques” (2005a, p.24). For Stam, the same pluralist, 
modernist, emancipatory art movement, cubism, is applicable to both 
adaptation and adaptation studies, since it works both as a metaphor for 
methodological eclecticism, and as a potential visual style in film. Moreover, 
Stam also links this back to the broader turn which I have identified as 
facilitating the shift from radical criticism to radical texts, writing in the 
introduction to a film theory reader from the early period of adaptation 
studies’ dialogic era, “Film and Theory offers a kind of cubist collage of 
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theoretical grids” (2000b, p.xv). Adaptation studies could thereby go, in a 
short period of time, from “being stuck in the backwaters of the academy” 
(Leitch 2008, p.63) to its rightful place “at the very center of intertextual – that 
is, of textual – studies (2008, p.168). 
 
This historical context, in which I argue that dialogism’s optimistic account of 
intertextual radicalism is at least partly the product of the decline of a prior 
account of how textual hegemony might be transcended by the radical critic, 
suggests both that adapted texts might be less subversive than proponents 
of dialogism claim, and that the solution to this lies in a return to some kind of 
vanguard criticism. Dialogism’s optimism is partly derived, as already 
indicated, from broad theoretical trends. But it is also based on a particular 
inherent element of adaptation studies which is grounded in its response to, 
and critique of, fidelity analysis. The fidelity critic measures the adaptation 
against the ‘original’, which entails an understanding of the perceived 
meaning, spirit and authorial intentions of that ‘original’. In constructing its 
account of intertextual adaptation, proponents of dialogism displace the 
centrality and knowability of those ‘original’ authorial intentions. The 
theoretical background to this displacement is diverse – Stam attributes the 
Death of the Author not just to Barthes, but also to Julia Kristeva, Bakhtin, 
Gérard Genette, Derrida, Lacan and Foucault (2005a, pp.8-9). Indeed, the 
influence of these diverse approaches to authorship is appropriately dialogic 
– Pelagia Goulimari, in an apposite example of how “writing is the destruction 
of every […] point of origin” (Barthes 1995 [1967], p.125), claims that 
“Barthes’ famous critique of the author in ‘The Death of the Author’ […] 
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involves a rewriting of Bakhtinian heteroglossia” (Goulimari 2015, p.162). But 
it is worthwhile focusing on Barthes, for a moment, because the example he 
used to discuss the author’s ‘death’, Honoré de Balzac’s Sarrasine, was also 
analysed by Emile Benveniste in a work that was foundational for subject-
position theory, and which problematizes dialogism’s optimistic account of 
the absent author. 
 
Barthes’ and Benveniste’s conceptions of authorship are almost entirely 
diametrically opposed. For Barthes, erroneous accounts of the author’s 
impact on textual interpretation should be countered. Benveniste attempts 
instead to theorise the author’s articulative status. Both ask of Sarrasine the 
same question, “Who is speaking thus?” (Barthes 1995, p.125). Their 
answers, or perhaps more accurately lack of answers, could not be more 
different, however. For Barthes the question is unanswerable “for the good 
reason that writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. 
Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips 
away, the negative where all identity is lost” (1995, p.125). For Benveniste 
the question is unanswerable because “there is no longer even a narrator. 
[…] No one speaks here; events seem to tell themselves” (1970, p.241). The 
author is absent for both, but Barthes wants to reveal this absence to open 
up the text’s hermeneutic possibilities, whereas Benveniste claims that this 
absence is the concealing of partiality and constructivity. Barthes’ absent 
author is ideological because interpretative attempts are constantly made to 
uncover him or her, and in so doing define the actually indefinable authorial 
voice. Benveniste’s absent author, however, is ideological precisely because 
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(s)he is hidden and concealing his or her voice, disavowing the partiality that 
Barthes accuses the reader/viewer/interpreter of constructing. Barthes’ 
author is ‘dead’, Benveniste’s is hiding. This distinction is central to this 
thesis’ revision of adaptation studies which is necessary to facilitate the 
analysis of how diachronic socio-cultural contexts influence both academic 
theorising and filmmaking practice. It is necessary to utilise Benveniste’s 
understanding of the hidden author in order to construct an account of how 
historically developing socio-cultural contexts influence realist adaptation’s 
additional layer of anamorphic enunciation. 
 
Dialogic critiques of fidelity more frequently refer to Bakhtin than Barthes, 
partly to re-chronologise Goulimari’s assertion about Barthes’ rewriting, but 
more specifically because Bakhtin’s intertextuality offers the more optimistic 
account of textual hybridity, whereas Barthes’ distinction between ‘readerly’ 
and ‘writerly’ texts is more reminiscent of subject-position theory’s distinction 
between realism and the avant-garde, and of criticism’s vanguard role in 
articulating and exploring the distinction. Nevertheless, Bakhtin’s claim that 
‘all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces 
practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve’ (1981, 
p.428) leads proponents of dialogism to conceive of authorship in a similar 
manner to Barthes. Stam, for example, claims that “Bakhtin’s notion of author 
and character as multi-discursive and resistant to unification” means that “if 
authors are fissured, fragmented, multi-discursive, hardly ‘present’ even to 
themselves, the analyst may inquire, how can an adaptation communicate 
the ‘spirit’ or ‘self-presence’ of authorial intention?” (2005a, p.9). 
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If proponents of dialogic adaptation studies wish to optimistically celebrate 
the author’s ‘death’, a poststructuralist should instead be pessimistically wary 
of his or her hiding. But because adaptation studies only moved beyond 
fidelity criticism after subject-position theory’s apparent deposition, and 
because Barthes’ ‘dead’ author offers the clearer approach to the 
relationships between ‘original’ and ‘copy’, a Benvenistene approach to both 
adaptation and adaptation studies, rather than film studies more broadly, has 
not hitherto been adequately articulated. This gap in the literature is 
addressed in detail in the next chapter, in the form of an extensive taxonomy 
of how Shakespearean adaptation obfuscates anamorphic authorial 
enunciation. Without this taxonomy it is not possible to analyse the 
diachronic development of anamorphic authorial enunciation in filmic writing 
formations. 
 
The more specific limitations of a Bakhtinian analysis, in relation to 
adaptation’s enunciative registers, are discussed in section 4.3.1. But a 
Barthesian analysis is more conducive to elucidating how contemporary 
adaptation studies’ dis/mis-placed author contributes towards adaptation’s 
conservative ontology, partly because of the striking differences between 
Barthesian and Benvenistene authorship,30 and partly because these 
                                                          
30 Jonathan Culler, for example, discussing competing definitions of discours, 
histoire and récit, argues that “Barthes has very nearly reversed the categories 
while claiming to follow Benveniste’s example” (2002, p.233). Culler’s contention 
demonstrates the complexity and potential contradiction within this element of 
discourse. It does not explain, though, why these competing ideas enter into specific 
elements of discourse without adequate contextualization. 
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differences most clearly facilitate the visual to verbal as opposed to verbal to 
verbal translations that will be my subsequent focus (see section 4.2). 
Chapter 4 will go into some detail about the cinematic techniques that 
facilitate these translations, but an example of the relationship between some 
of these techniques and the concomitant Barthesian academic disavowal of 
the ideological operations of such techniques is provided by Catherine 
Belsey’s influential critique (1998) of Joseph L. Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar 
(1953). Belsey locates the film’s ideological context firmly within the history of 
the playtext’s interpretation, arguing that “any reading of a Shakespeare play 
which offers to define the play’s single meaning is partial in both senses of 
the word” (1998, p.61). The “play-in-performance necessarily interprets the 
text” so that the “history of Shakespearean production is thus in an obvious 
sense the history of the interpretation of Shakespeare, and this clearly does 
not exist in isolation from the history of ideas” (1998, p.61). She contrasts the 
interrogative, plural nature of the Renaissance stage with the subsequent 
development of the proscenium arch and with “film [which] is the final 
realisation of the project of perspective staging. Depth of field, the vanishing 
point holding and closing off the spectator’s gaze, offers the possibility of an 
illusion of balance between the world of the audience and the fictional world 
offered as a replica of it” (1998, p.66). 
 
The example that Belsey provides to support her argument is revealing both 
in terms of how adaptations might negotiate the potentially subversive nature 
of Shakespearean enunciation, and of how Barthesian academic criticism 
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might also work to contain that subversion. Discussing Antony’s (Marlon 
Brando) funeral oration, Belsey writes that the  
 
film’s triumph [...] is the certainty with which it clarifies an area 
left uncertain in the text. Antony pauses in his address to the 
Romans, overcome with emotion: ‘Bear with me/My heart is in 
the coffin there with Caesar. ...’ (III.ii.105-6). As he turns away, 
the camera swings round to show his calculating expression. 
The citizens, wrought to hysteria by his rhetoric, are seen as 
gullible victims of the demagogue. This reading is clearly 
possible, if partial. But it would be harder to establish on the 
stage without benefit of close-up, and virtually impossible at the 
Globe, where Antony’s expression would have had to be visible 
to an audience located on at least three sides of him, and 
possibly four. The effect of the close-up here is to produce 
ethical and political coherence, and in the process to close off 
many of the ethical and political questions left open by the text. 
(Belsey 1998 pp.62-3) 
 
In the original playtext, however, this scene ends with Antony’s brief aside, 
which is cut from the film: ‘Now let it work. Mischief, thou art afoot/Take thou 
what course thou wilt’ (3.2.253-4). The close-up of Antony’s calculating 
expression (Fig.3.11) therefore translates the verbal into the visual. Such a 
translation does not close off the playtext’s inherent plurality, as Belsey 
claims, but instead suppresses Shakespeare’s articulating presence in 
favour of a ‘seamless’ cinematic revelation, replacing discours enunciating 
with histoire unfolding. 
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Fig.3.11 
 
What is significant, both about the Shakespearean context of the 
transformation, and about this analysis in particular, is the way in which 
Belsey disavows the transformation. She not only overlooks the 
Shakespearean text from which Antony’s  manipulative expression is 
translated, but she also focuses, within the context of adaptation studies’ 
most habitual trope, fidelity (Leitch 2008), upon the manipulation of 
Shakespeare’s authorial meaning rather than upon the ways that cinema 
ideologically “obliterates all traces of the enunciation, and masquerades as 
story” (Metz 1985, p.544). Her focus is upon a Barthesian attempt to “impose 
a limit on [...] [a] text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing” 
(Barthes 1995, pp.128-9) rather than on Benvenistene “events [that] seem to 
tell themselves” (Benveniste 1970, p.241). Mankiewicz’s visual translation is 
so seamless that even a scholar who studies the scene repeatedly does not 
recognise the suppressed trace of authorial enunciation, and interprets it as 
a non-Shakespearean interpolation from without. 
 
124 
 
Indeed, Belsey’s reading of cinema’s construction of spatial and narrative 
coherence to generate meaning leads her to conclude that “[t]his (single) 
meaning is guaranteed by the transcendent subjectivity of the author, source 
and origin of the fiction itself. When the author is Shakespeare, this 
transcendence is known in advance and ensures the ‘truth’ of the fiction. In 
penetrating the depths of the fictional world, the spectator thus meets the 
gaze of Shakespeare himself” (1998, p.67). She interprets Mankiewicz’s 
transformative work as a Barthesian attempt to fix a hitherto pluralist text’s 
meaning, with that fixing justified through the invocation of the foregrounded 
Shakespearean authority, rather than as a Benvenistene suppression of 
authorial enunciation. 
 
These contrasting approaches to how adaptation negotiates authorial 
enunciation might themselves be revealing in the context of the ideological 
suppression of discours into histoire. If translating Shakespeare’s text into 
visual seamlessness works to contain potential subversion, as mentioned 
above, then an account such as Belsey’s might be doubly containing. It 
seeks to reclaim discours’ pluralism to valorise the discours’ authorial imprint, 
rather than to challenge the ways in which the discours’ translations into 
histoire might ideologically position subject-spectators. Belsey may see these 
translations as ideological limitations placed upon Shakespeare’s pluralist 
texts, but she conceives of such translations as reformulations and 
limitations of Shakespeare’s discours which foreground the authorial imprint, 
rather than as disavowals of authorial articulation into histoire. 
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Far from showing that these translations operate to ensure that “meaning is 
guaranteed by the transcendent subjectivity of the author, source and origin 
of the fiction itself” (Belsey 1998, p.67), the example that Belsey discusses 
actually does the opposite. It instead attempts to disavow the author, 
replacing discours enunciating with histoire unfolding. Constructing an 
account of this translation which (mis-)places the author within a context in 
which the author’s obliteration is central to cinema’s ideological work is 
doubly containing to the subversion potential within any presentation, no 
matter how negotiated, of Shakespearean enunciation. The following chapter 
sets out a taxonomy of the various ways that the makers of realist adaptation 
can manipulate authorial enunciation into a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the theoretical context for the elaboration, in the 
next chapter, of the characteristics of a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation. It has situated the way in which realist film adaptation both 
foregrounds and contains its authored enunciation within the context of 
academic poststructuralism’s existing approaches to other forms of cinematic 
enunciation. This chapter has also addressed the intellectual reasons why 
my understanding of authorial enunciation has not yet been articulated. It has 
discussed the reasons why adaptation studies’ current dominant paradigm, 
dialogism, inadvertently contributes towards the obfuscation of authorial 
enunciation. 
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It is next necessary to explore how these theoretical claims work in 
filmmaking practice. The next chapter, then, is a taxonomy of how a filmic 
poststructuralist writing formation can operate in realist adaptation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation in realist adaptation: 
Taxonomy 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is a taxonomy of how Shakespearean adaptation negotiates 
and thematises the theoretical premises from chapter 3, and therefore is an 
account of how a filmic poststructuralist writing formation operates in realist 
Shakespearean adaptation. The historical development of the various 
elements within this taxonomy will be explored in detail in the case study in 
chapter 6, which traces the diachronic development and evolution of filmic 
writing formations. As such, the following account in this chapter uses 
examples from a number of different adaptations so as to outline its 
arguments as clearly as possible. These disparate examples have therefore 
been selected on the basis of how well they support the clarity of the 
taxonomy’s argument, rather than on a more systematic basis that might 
allow for detailed questioning of said argument. It will be left to chapter 6 to 
apply these ideas to a detailed case study in a tighter and more rigorous 
fashion. 
 
The taxonomy addresses four distinct (though interrelated) elements of a 
filmic poststructuralist writing formation. The last three of these are dealt with 
in less detail, because they focus on elements of a filmic poststructuralist 
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writing formation which may or may not operate within realist adaptation. 
These are; shifts from perceived canonically-appropriate settings for 
Shakespearean drama into ostensibly ‘non’- Shakespearean locations 
(section 4.3); manipulations of foreknowledge which film audiences may 
have about Shakespearean narratives (section 4.4); and dramatizations of 
Shakespeare’s life (section 4.5). Each of these relates, in various ways, to 
the theoretical premises discussed in the last chapter. But the element of a 
filmic poststructuralist writing formation operating in realist adaptation 
explored below in most detail is that which engages with the last chapter’s 
theory most directly, which provides the clearest parameters for the 
diachronic analysis that will be undertaken in the case study in chapter 6, 
and which comprises a fundamentally ontological element of realist 
adaptation. This is the anamorphic translation of the verbally foregrounded 
Shakespearean into the seamless visual nature of continuity editing, and it is 
this element which I turn to first. 
 
4.2. ‘Fainomaic’ translation from verbal discours into visual histoire: 
‘Form of the thing, each word made true and good’ (Hamlet 1.2.210) 
 
The principal element of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation in realist 
adaptation is the way in which it shifts from the verbalised expression of 
constructed authorship into the visualised seamlessness of cinematic 
grammar. Section 3.4 outlined, using Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar as an 
example, the process of translating verbal discours into visual histoire, both 
in terms of cinematic techniques and concomitant academic legitimation. 
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Given a different form of translation, analysed in 4.3, I define the suppression 
of Shakespeare’s enunciating presence in favour of a ‘seamless’ cinematic 
unfolding as a ‘fainomaic’ translation. I derive this from the Ancient Greek 
verb fainomai, meaning ‘to appear’, since makes the verbal appear as the 
visual. 
 
The fainomaic translation realizes Colin MacCabe’s dictum that in realist 
cinema “the narrative discourse simply allows reality to appear and denies its 
own status as articulation” (1985, p.36), despite the adaptation’s overall 
ostensible foregrounding of that articulation. Instead of Shakespeare’s 
enunciating words challenging realist film’s conservative hierarchy of 
discourses, “[t]he camera tells us what happens – it tells the truth against 
which we can measure the discourses” (1985, p.37). Showing rather than 
verbalising even a small element of Shakespeare’s text therefore reduces at 
least the element which has been translated into histoire.  
 
The fainomaic elements of the following taxonomy all function to contain the 
foregrounding of Shakespearean enunciation, both within the film texts and 
within their attendant academic legitimisations. As such, they not only, as 
Hamlet would have it, “suit the action to the word”, but also “[suture] the 
action to the word” (3.2.17-18). 
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4.2.1 The drama of cutting 
 
At the most basic level the fainomaic translation inscribes Heath’s drama of 
vision, inherent in continuity editing, into narrative form. This is unsurprising, 
given Heath’s contention that the drama of vision is present in all realist 
cinema. In adaptation, though, the drama of vision is given two further 
specific layers of suturing masochism, firstly in terms of a Shakespearean 
context within the continuity editing, and secondly in terms of legitimising 
academic interpretations. The drama of authorship thereby extends and 
further mystifies the drama of vision. 
 
The opening scene from Zeffirelli’s Romeo and Juliet (1968) demonstrates 
this dramatization. Like the dismembered limbs in Jaws, unconscious 
narrative traces of the drama of vision (Heath 1985, p.514), Zeffirelli’s 
adaptation anatomises and fragments bodies both before (Figs.4.1 and 4.2) 
and during (Figs.4.3 and 4.4) the fight between Montagues and Capulets. 
The drama of this dialectic is inscribed into verbal narrative with Tybalt’s 
(Michael York) slightly paraphrased interpolation from Coriolanus (1.1.221),31 
as he stabs Benvolio (Bruce Robinson) in the face, “hie thee home, 
fragments!” (Fig.4.5). 
 
                                                          
31 The playtext’s line is ‘Go get you home, you fragments’. 
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Fig.4.1     Fig.4.2 
 
    
Fig.4.3      Fig.4.4 
 
 
Fig.4.5 
 
Peter Donaldson’s analysis of this scene, which conforms to many of the 
tropes of classic adaptation studies (see 3.4), locates this anatomisation 
within a Shakespearean, rather than a poststructuralist, context, and 
psychoanalyses the director rather than the medium. For Donaldson, the 
violent sexuality of the scene sums up Zeffirelli’s interpretation of the play’s 
attitudes towards patriarchy and feud, making visual the playtext’s numerous 
equations of “erect penis and sword. ‘Me they shall feel while I am able to 
stand’ (1.1.27); ‘Draw thy tool’ (1.1.31); ‘My naked weapon is out’ (1.1.33)” 
(1990, p.153). Donaldson also argues that the scene allows the perhaps 
paradoxically homosexual but conservative director’s camera to prefigure the 
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violence of phallic swordplay with a homoerotic, fetishizing gaze (1990, 
pp.154-6). Donaldson’s analysis helps explain one director’s motivations, 
and, in accordance with one of adaptation studies’ most enduring tropes, 
links original authorial intention to contemporary concerns and aesthetics. It 
does not, however, explain this scene within the context of Heath’s drama of 
vision, and it is the specific canonicity of the scene’s source material that 
prevents this from happening.32 
 
Both the director’s and academic’s use of and recourse to Shakespearean 
dialogue help seamlessly bind masochistic continuity editing and narrative, 
exploiting the dramas of both vision and authorship. Jaws has no such 
legitimating layers, and indeed, does not require any. It is enough that its 
audiences gain pleasure from the drama of vision. Adaptation’s drama of 
vision goes further, and is not merely the manifestation of suture’s 
unconscious thrill, but another level of narrative justification taken from a 
valorised canon, and an extra level of academic legitimisation. That 
adaptations, and the academic studies surrounding them, provide additional 
                                                          
32 The influence of canonicity even extends to explicitly ideological analyses of 
cutting within Shakespearean cinema. Laurie Osborne’s study of editing techniques 
in Trevor Nunn’s Twelfth Night (1996) locates the film within a specifically textual 
context identified by Alan Sinfield: “some Shakespearean dramatis personae are 
written so as to suggest, not just an intermittent, gestural, and problematic 
subjecti(vity), but a continuous or developing interiority or consciousness; and we 
should seek a way of talking about this that does not slide back into character 
criticism or essentialist humanism” (Sinfield in Osborne 2002, p.89). As the quote 
suggests, Sinfield’s focus is upon what is written rather than what is shown, and 
although Osborne applies the premise to cinematic editing her conclusion is that 
“film editing produces cinematic fragments that paradoxically ‘fill up’ the subjectivity 
of early modern characters” (p.89). Instead of interpreting these fragments as 
dramatizations of the dramas of vision and authorship, Osborne sees them as 
metadramatic musings on explicitly textual issues. 
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layers of conservative metadrama demonstrates Shakespearean cinema’s 
suturing potential. This is particularly the case since dramatizing continuity 
editing is not a unique characteristic of adaptation, but merely an inherent 
characteristic of all realist cinema that adaptation cannot help but re-
dramatize and re-legitimise. Indeed, just as Jaws’ dismembered limbs 
thematise the cutting of continuity editing, so too Romeo and Juliet’s 
anatomisation thematises the cutting out of the enunciating author, and uses 
an element of his enunciation to do this. 
 
4.2.2 Fainomaic convention 
 
Fainomaic translation is made more seamless through its interplay between 
verisimilitude and convention. For Tzvetan Todorov, verisimilitude is not 
simply what appears ‘realistic’, but also what has become conventionalised 
(1977, p.87). Section 3.4 has already discussed Belsey’s account of one 
verbal aside replaced with a visual calculating expression in Mankiewicz’s 
Julius Caesar. The subtle differences between this fainomaic translation and 
another from the same film, when the conspirators arrive at Caesar’s (Louis 
Calhern) house to take him to the Senate, demonstrate the suturing 
cinematic techniques that accompany and conventionalise the fainomai. In 
the example that Belsey does not mention, Caesar asks Trebonius (Jack 
Raine) to ‘Be near me, that I may remember you’ (2.2.123), to which 
Trebonius replies ‘Caesar, I will’ (2.2.124). In the playtext he adds, in an 
aside, ‘and so near will I be/That your best friends shall wish I had been 
134 
 
further’ (2.2.124-5). The film cuts the aside, and instead the camera zooms in 
on Trebonius’ menacing expression (Fig.4.6). 
 
 
Fig.4.6 
 
There are a number of points which differentiate this particular translation 
from the one discussed by Belsey in the funeral oration. The first is that 
Trebonius’ cut aside comes in exactly the same place as the close-up, 
instead of at the end of the scene. This might explain why Belsey mentions 
Antony’s close-up, which she interprets as a non-Shakespearean 
intervention, but not the close-up of Trebonius, which would be more difficult 
to disavow as an interpolation. The second and third points relate to the 
conventional filmic techniques used by Mankiewicz to achieve the 
translation. The camera zooms in towards Trebonius’ expression, whereas 
the shot of Antony is motionless, and is accompanied by the beginning of 
ominous non-diegetic music, whereas the funeral oration is unaccompanied 
by music. Both techniques, long conventionalised by the history of the film 
medium (see, for example, Bordwell and Thompson 2004), help to make the 
translation more seamless. As such, this seamlessness might also explain 
why Belsey focuses on one example of fainomai and not another. Gaps in 
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critical interpretation of academic legitimation might thereby reveal 
successful and unconscious suturing processes. 
 
These techniques also suggest the possible presence of a convention within 
the practice of adaptation itself. Joseph Anderson (1998) has discussed what 
he calls Branigan’s paradox, whereby cinematic techniques become 
conventionalised through repeated use, so that audiences come to accept 
that which might have once been transgressive. Therefore, “even if you 
break the diegesis, you do not thereby gain a glimpse of reality. You simply 
create another formal element in the narrative [...] or another embedded 
‘world’ within the film” (Anderson 1998, p.123). It might therefore be that the 
example of Trebonius’ close-up not only demonstrates how adaptations can 
exploit filmic conventions to create the impression of seamlessness, but how 
adaptations themselves become part of filmic convention. The containing 
effects which film applies to the potential subversion inherent in 
foregrounding the author might thus become internalized over time, as 
“another formal element in the narrative” (Anderson 1998, p.123), rather than 
a potential grammatical disruption to filmic convention.33 
 
It is also possible that the archaic nature of Shakespearean dialogue impacts 
upon convention and verisimilitude in a way that adaptation studies’ fidelity 
                                                          
33 As audiences come to recognise what might have once been transgressive 
techniques it therefore perhaps becomes increasingly less possible to reveal 
Baudry’s knowledge effect. It is striking to note this idea’s close affinities to Stephen 
Greenblatt’s new historicist paradox regarding subversion and containment: “There 
is subversion, no end of subversion, only not for us” (1994, p.45). 
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bias cannot conceive. As section 3.4 discussed, academic discourses 
presume that audiences are familiar with Shakespearean dialogue, and 
assume that this dialogue has some form of conventionality. The evidence 
provided by filmmakers’ ancillary texts is not so equivocal, however, and Baz 
Luhrmann, in attempting to bring Shakespeare to a mass audience, has 
discussed the specific importance of most people’s unfamiliarity with 
Renaissance language, particularly when juxtaposed with contemporary 
settings, in terms of challenging and manipulating conventional expectations: 
 
To keep the audience alive […] you’ve got to have a device, 
right, a distancing device, […] essentially there’s got to be 
something that keeps the whole cinematic experience 
heightened, so you don’t fall into, ever, a feeling that it’s 
somehow keyhole, that it’s psychological. […] In Romeo and 
Juliet it’s the language”         
      (Luhrmann 2011) 
 
The specific purposes of Luhrmann’s distancing device will not be elaborated 
upon for now, because they relate to other elements of adaptation’s suture 
that will be discussed in section 4.4, but it is important that he thinks of 
Shakespearean dialogue as a challenge to contemporary verisimilitude and 
seamlessness. The way that Shakespearean dialogue is fainomaically 
translated into cinematic imagery therefore impacts upon audiences’ 
conventional expectations in a number of different ways, with the 
foregrounding of the language, and the authorial enunciation inherent in it, as 
either a challenge to verisimilitude or “another formal element in the 
narrative” (Anderson 1998, p.123). 
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4.2.3 Translating verbal imagery 
 
Specific examples of Shakespearean dialogue, that involve substitution of an 
image for a description, are not the only elements that can be translated into 
visual form. Shakespeare’s dialogue also includes numerous examples of 
verbally articulated imagery. These authored articulations may also be 
seamlessly translated into filmic images.  
 
Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar demonstrates the complex relationships 
between such translations and suturing academic legitimations, specifically 
in regard to the film’s manipulation of the playtext’s imagery regarding stone 
and flesh. Belsey argues that the film’s portrayal of “statues [is] introduced to 
signify Roman-ness” (1998, p.62), and does not link them to Shakespeare’s 
imagery. But the significance of the film’s use of statues relates to themes 
taken directly from the playtext. Cassius (John Gielgud), discussing how 
Caesar ‘doth bestride the narrow world/Like a Colossus, and we petty 
men/Walk under his huge legs’ (1.2.136-8), stands beneath a ubiquitous, 
looming statue of Caesar, and contrasts this mythologised figure with the real 
man by listing his human weaknesses and faults (1.2.102-130) (Fig.4.7). He 
then touches the base of a bust of Lucius Junius Brutus, the ‘Brutus once’ 
whom he refers to as he reminds Brutus (James Mason) of his regicide 
ancestor: ‘There was a Brutus once that would have brooked/ Th’eternal 
devil to keep his state in Rome/ As easily as a king’ (1.2.160-162). This 
immutable, legendary Brutus is then contrasted with the contemporary 
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Brutus whose ‘honourable mettle may be wrought/ From that it is disposed’ 
(1.2.309-310). 
 
 
Fig.4.7 
  
Similarly, the film visualises the playtext’s imagery concerning the dialectic 
relationship between stone and blood. Men are frequently referred to as 
though they were immobile objects: the tribunes harangue the people as ‘you 
blocks, you stones, you worse than senseless things’ (1.1.35); Antony claims 
that if he reads Caesar’s will to the people it would enflame them because 
‘You are not wood, you are not stones, but men’ (3.2.143), and then tells 
them that ‘If you have tears, prepare to shed them now’ (3.2.167), as though 
their ability to cry, and therefore their humanity or stoniness, is open to 
question. Conversely, stone figures, which should be incapable of human 
feeling, seem to be active participants in the play (Fisch 1969). The 
relationship between stone and blood is established by Caesar’s recounting 
of Calphurnia’s (Greer Garson) dream, in which ‘she saw my statue/ Which 
like a fountain with an hundred spouts/ Did run pure blood’ (2.2.76-8). The 
prophesy having been fulfilled, Antony claims, in the funeral oration, that 
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‘Even at the base of Pompey’s statue/ Which all the while ran blood, great 
Caesar fell’ (3.2.186-7) (Fig.4.8), echoing the Plutarch upon which 
Shakespeare based his playtext, in which the statue seemed to take “just 
revenge of Pompey’s enemy” (1907 [C1st], p.77). Mankiewicz fainomaically 
translates this element of Shakespeare’s verbal imagery by having Antony 
prophesy his revenge on the assassins crouching next to the bloody base of 
Pompey’s statue. The use of statues thereby seamlessly visualises a subtle 
element of authorial enunciation. 
 
 
Fig.4.8 
 
Analysing translations of Shakespearean verbal thematic imagery into 
cinematic images is a longstanding preoccupation of fidelity criticism. Jack J. 
Jorgens’ influential taxonomy of Shakespearean adaptation claims that 
“many Shakespearean films successfully imitate or find analogies for his 
unions of the verbal and the visual. The richest moments in these films often 
derive from the expressive possibilities of shifting relations between words 
and images” (1977, p.17). The fidelity critic therefore studies “a translation 
(and in a sense all Shakespeare films are translations) as a creative attempt 
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to recast and reimage a work conceived in a different language and for a 
different culture” (Jorgens 1977, p.14, original emphasis). Wilson’s  analysis 
of Mankiewicz’s portrayal of statues (2000, pp.149-52) reflects this approach 
to translation. Wilson argues that the film “relies heavily on busts and statues 
to establish a compelling mise-en-scène and underscore thematic elements” 
(2000, p.149). He emphasises the relationship between this mise-en-scène 
and textual fidelity when he writes that “Mankiewicz makes us believe that 
the busts and statues are omens just as significant as lions or ‘men in fire’ 
walking the Roman streets” (2000, p.150). For both Jorgens and Wilson, 
echoing Belsey’s conception of the transcendent subjectivity of the author 
(1998, p.67), these translations of textual imagery underscore the articulation 
of Shakespeare, revealing his presence rather than, paraphrasing Antony’s 
funeral oration, burying him. The theoretical issue of such translations 
presenting a seamless disavowal of authorial enunciation is thereby 
suppressed. 
 
The relationship between translating textual imagery and translating textual 
dialogue is far from simple. Excepting those films which dispense with the 
original language entirely, all adaptations must show some traces of 
authorship in the film’s dialogue. The suppression of some of that dialogue 
into cinematic imagery may work to contain that foregrounding, as discussed 
above. A few well versed critics might notice a visual substitution for 
dialogue, as Belsey almost does in the funeral oration. Such a substitution 
may, for them, foreground authorial enunciation because it breaks up the 
otherwise smooth flow of the pre-known text. For Belsey at least, the 
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substitution means that “[i]n penetrating the depths of the fictional world, the 
spectator thus meets the gaze of Shakespeare himself” (1998, p.67). As 
noted above, though, the substitution is likely to be unnoticed by most 
transcendental subjects, as authorial enunciation is masochistically 
suppressed in favour of a seamless unfolding. 
 
Translating textual imagery may be more problematic. Those same critics 
who noticed the translation of dialogue might also detect the translation of 
textual imagery into cinematic images. For them, authorial enunciation would 
again be foregrounded. The vast majority of spectators, though, are unlikely 
to be familiar with the subtleties of Shakespearean imagery. Mankiewicz’s 
portrayal of statues, therefore, would not raise issues of authorial enunciation 
for most spectators. After all, although one critic links the film’s “busts and 
statues” with “thematic elements” (Wilson 2000, p.149), another merely 
thinks of its statues as signifiers of “Roman-ness” (Belsey 1998, p.62). The 
suppressed question of the origin of the narrative seamlessly unfolding 
before audiences is therefore not elucidated by the manipulation of 
Shakespearean imagery. Such manipulations, therefore, can only highlight 
authorial enunciation (albeit merely for a few specialists) and not assist in the 
suturing work of suppressing that enunciation. 
 
As such, translations of textual imagery might be seen as potentially 
transgressive, unlike translations of dialogue into cinematic images, which 
work to contain the transgressive potential of the original dialogue’s 
foregrounding. The results of translating textual imagery might be histoire, for 
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the majority of spectators, but the original Shakespearean imagery cannot 
really be defined as foregrounded discours because such verbal imagery is 
not so well known. 
 
4.2.4 Translating subjective viewpoints 
 
Visualisations of Shakespearean characters’ viewpoints also work in the 
context of fainomai. These subjective viewpoints are part of realist cinematic 
convention, but have a specific suturing function in relation to adaptation, 
both in terms of diegetic seamlessness and containing academic 
legitimation. 
 
The theoretical principle of subjective viewpoints assisting the seamlessness 
of cinematic diegesis is derived from Metz’s The Imaginary Signifier (2000). 
Metz drew a distinction between two types of identification. Primary 
identification is an identification with the subject’s own gaze, for whom a film 
seamlessly and pleasurably unfolds. Section 3.3 defined this theory in detail, 
and it is primary identification that constitutes the masochistic pleasure of 
suture which this taxonomy addresses in relation to adaptation. Secondary 
identification is the emotional involvement of subject spectators with 
characters within the filmic diegesis. It is defined as secondary not only 
because identification with characters is not deemed as important as 
identification with the mechanisms of cinema but also because, as Sarah 
Hatchuel puts it, “[i]dentification with a character seems to require a back-
and-forth move between a shot and a counter-shot, between the focus on a 
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character and the focus through the eyes of a character. The spectators 
must know the character before they can interiorize the character’s own 
gaze” (2004, pp.50-51). The technical mechanisms that facilitate secondary 
identification are therefore similar, and sometimes identical, to the 
mechanisms that facilitate primary identification. 
 
Secondary identification relates to adaptation, in the first instance, just as it 
relates to any other form of realist cinema. Adaptation provides further 
suturing levels of containment to the fainomaisation of Shakespearean 
character viewpoints. A number of ways in which this is done, including 
visualising character narration, flashbacks and flashforwards, direct 
address/voice-overs and interpolations will be detailed in the following 
sections. As with the adaptation’s specific suturing operations relating to 
primary identification, its manipulations of secondary identification are myriad 
and complex, and occur in numerous different elements of this taxonomy. At 
this moment it is therefore most appropriate to first outline the ways in which 
legitimating academic interpretations contain Shakespearean canonicity, and 
then look at specific examples of how subjective character viewpoints 
suppress the potential subversion inherent in adapting foregrounded 
adaptations. 
 
4.2.5 Translating character narration 
 
Fainomaic translation extends to visualisations of characters’ narrations. 
Adaptation studies frequently discuss the significance of interpolations (for 
144 
 
example, Brown 2004; Buchman 1991; Buhler 2000; Hatchuel 2004; 
Holderness 1998; Rasmus 2001; Rutter 2000; Ryle 2008), and it is often 
unclear whether this kind of translation constitutes an interpolation or not. In 
terms of the suturing potential of fainomai this is not especially relevant. 
What is more important is the way in which an authored, partial narration 
shifts into seamless cinematic imagery, and the way in which academic 
legitimations assist the suture through a focus on what such translations 
mean in terms of Shakespearean meaning, rather than film’s grammatical 
coherence. 
  
Peter Holland’s contention that “[f]ilms of Hamlet for instance find it difficult to 
have Gertrude describe the drowning of Ophelia and instead feel obliged to 
show her floating in the water” (1994, p.59) demonstrates these 
relationships. His argument that these visualisations move “attention from the 
act of narration to the act that is narrated” (1994, p.59) might suggest an 
awareness of the ideological impact of concealing Shakespeare’s act of 
narration. His approach to narration here is, though, limited to the diegetic 
register. In contending that the “choice [to visualise the drowned Ophelia] 
seems to me a mistaken response to the cinema’s need to show rather than 
say; it diminishes the fact of the narration and Gertrude’s response to the 
death she is describing” (1994, p.59), Holland understands narration as 
belonging only to a character within the narrative, rather than as the cinema’s 
arrangement of mise-en-scène, cinematography, editing etc. 
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Characters’ subjective imaginations also function as conventionalising 
fainomaic translations of diegetic narrative and Shakespearean imagery. 
Academic legitimations masochistically position such translations within a 
fidelity context that disavows the translations’ relationships to film grammar. 
Hatchuel therefore interprets Al Pacino’s Looking for Richard’s (1996) pre-
battle dream sequence as “reflexively recycling the film’s own material. […] 
Flashbacks (showing, in a distorted way, the people hurt or killed by 
Richard’s [Al Pacino] plots) and flashforwards (showing Richard’s own future 
death) are mixed together to produce a dream-like, metacinematic effect” 
(2004, p.111). A visualised disruption of realist cinematic grammar is 
understood here as a self-reflexive expression of Shakespearean drama in a 
different media, while the sequence’s “dream-like” quality is noticed but not 
focused upon in relation to filmic verisimilitude and convention. Within these 
terms, dream sequences, in which premonition and remembrance are 
presented subjectively, have become accepted by film audiences as “another 
formal element in the narrative” (Anderson 1998, p.123). 
 
With adaptation, such sequences therefore obey a diegetic logic that 
operates temporarily outside of traditional cinematic grammar, but which 
does not threaten realist film’s verisimilitude, and indeed work within the 
mechanisms of suture to momentarily destabilise audience subjectivity only 
to subsequently reinforce it. The subjective nature of these sequences, 
operating upon subjects’ secondary identification, reinforces immersion in the 
diegesis. Again, legitimating academic interpretations locate such 
masochistic translations within a disavowing Shakespearean context. 
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4.2.6 Diegesis and direct address 
 
Primary and secondary identification, as well as concomitant academic 
legitimisations, also impact on the way adaptation manipulates one of 
Shakespearean drama’s most distinguishing features, direct address. Film 
studies’ theoretical discourse concerning non-Shakespearean direct address 
can be divided into two competing approaches. On the one hand, Peter 
Wollen sees direct address in the films of Jean-Luc Godard as an example of 
anti-realist counter-cinema:  
 
the ruse of direct address breaks not only the fantasy identification 
but also the narrative surface. It raises directly the question, ‘What 
is this film for?’, superimposed on the orthodox narrative 
questions, ‘Why did that happen?’ and ‘What is going to happen 
next?’ Any form of cinema which aims to establish a dynamic 
relationship between film maker and spectator naturally has to 
consider the problem of what is technically the register of 
discourse, the content of the enunciation, as well as its 
designation, the content of the enunciate.    
       (Wollen 1985, p.503) 
 
This theory draws upon Baudry’s more general examination of cinematic 
enunciation (1985, pp.533-4), which sees cinematic realism as inherently 
ideological, and which has already been discussed (see 3.3). It is the 
revelation of cinema’s technical apparatus through Baudry’s ‘knowledge 
effect’ that Wollen identifies at work in direct address. 
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Conversely, Jane Feuer sees, in the film genre of musicals, a number of 
techniques that work to disavow the enunciation which Wollen thinks of as 
being inevitably caused by direct address: 
 
When performers in musicals turn to face us directly, we do enter 
another register, but [...] the potentially disorienting effects of the 
break in the narrative are minimized [...] by mechanisms of 
identification. Even when the break in register does throw us out of 
the narrative it’s for the purpose of praising show business, not 
burying it. [...] [W]hen the direct address comes, we’re prepared for 
it. The change from third person to first person isn’t perceived as a 
grammatical error (as it is in a Godard film).   
       (Feuer 1993, pp.36-7) 
 
One way to contain the transgressive potential of Shakespearean direct 
address is to transform soliloquies into different forms of verisimilar narrative. 
Russell Jackson gives numerous examples of soliloquies as readings from 
letters or ‘thought’ voice-overs (2000, p.25-6), and Hatchuel notes how 
“Shakespeare films have treated soliloquies with the mode of interior voice, 
or turned them into verbal and/or visual dialogues” (2004, p.75). John 
Lawson seems to demonstrate the importance of visual work in eliding 
grammatical disruption when he writes that “[s]ince it is manifestly impossible 
to translate the verbal metaphors into visual terms, a film version of a 
soliloquy must find contrasting images which take advantage of the 
contradiction between sight and sound to interpret the poetry, emphasize its 
philosophy or underline its irony” (1964, p.201). The examples these writers 
discuss all diegetise the potentially non-diegetic. 
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Nevertheless, many Shakespearean adaptations employ potentially 
transgressive direct address. In part this transgressive potential is disavowed 
through legitimating fidelity discourses. At their simplest level, soliloquies in 
adaptation are often seen to serve a narrative function, as though they 
represent just one more filmmakers’ technique to convey story arc, 
characterisation and theme. Academic discourses focus, moreover, on how 
these narrative functions explore themes deemed to be inherent in the 
playtexts, rather than on theoretical/ideological issues. Anthony Davies, for 
example, gives a detailed account linking Olivier’s use of direct address, in 
his adaptation of Richard III (1955), to the means of conveying Richard’s 
(Laurence Olivier) control over the story’s narrative, concluding that “[t]he 
narrative dimension of RICHARD III [...] is implicit in the play” (Davies 1988, 
p.68). H.R. Coursen similarly links Olivier’s Richard’s manipulation of the 
camera with the play’s mobility (2000, p.100), a point also made, in relation 
to Loncraine’s adaptation (1995), by Christopher Andrews, who argues that 
after Richard’s (Ian McKellen) coronation, and following numerous previous 
examples of direct address, “McKellen refuses to make eye contact with us, 
only reinforcing our feelings of isolation and betrayal” (2002, p.156). Indeed, 
Andrews’ emphasis on Richard’s soliloquies’ narrative choric function (2002, 
p.148-9) is echoed in Looking for Richard, in which cast member Kevin Klein 
explains to Al Pacino’s ambiguous director/Richard figure that ‘Richard’s 
always saying [...] “Here’s what I’m going to do, now watch this”, and then he 
does it [...] and he says “Was that good or what?” [...] This is fun!’" 
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That which is potentially problematic or radical in the context of cinema’s 
reality-effect can therefore be seen in a context which provides an 
interpretation without recourse to theoretical or ideological issues, or indeed 
to a more critical problematization of theatrical practice. Davies can thus 
write, of Olivier’s adaptation, that “[a]t the start of RICHARD III we are made 
aware of theatricality on the occasion of King Edward’s coronation, and the 
theatrical mode is then taken up in the long opening monologue by Richard 
as he takes us and the camera with him” (Davies 1988, p.75). Stephen M. 
Buhler similarly argues that “Olivier’s Richard does not hesitate to address 
the camera directly, reinforcing a sense of the theatrical rather than the 
cinematic” (2002, p.102). 
 
This logic has also been applied to quite specific elements of adaptation, 
such as Kathy M. Howlett’s contention, about Loncraine’s adaptation, that 
the cut from the beginning of Richard’s opening soliloquy, delivered via 
microphone to a crowd, to a direct address ending in the private space of a 
toilet, means that “[t]he camera follows the movement of Richard’s speech as 
it travels from the political and social sphere to the personalized space of the 
body [...], puncturing the boundaries of outside and inside, just as in the play 
Richard’s rhetorical asides puncture the play’s dominant rhetorical style” 
(2000, p.135). Consequently, the mixture, and potential juxtaposition, of 
soliloquy as both diegetic speech to a shown audience, complete with 
reaction shots and eye-line matches, and soliloquy as direct address, is 
explained within the context of the perceived inherent meaning of the 
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playtext and the history of theatrical performance, as though the two 
techniques best suit different elements of the same monologue.34 
 
Richard’s status as both a moral and physical outsider, the two principal 
elements of the opening soliloquy, in terms of fidelity analysis, have also 
been seen as important components of a dramatic tradition, derived from the 
history of the play’s theatrical performance, within which his screen 
soliloquies exist. Jorgens, for example, who describes the textual Richard as 
a “charming, Machiavellian, grotesque, Faustian hero [...] – a wit, a self-
conscious actor of great skill, a renaissance wolf amongst medieval sheep” 
(1977, p.136), details how Olivier’s film explores this characterisation: “His 
list to one side often makes him the most pronounced diagonal in the frame; 
the camera shows him askew in a world in which he does not belong, and 
this feeling is confirmed by his habit of staring into and confiding with the 
camera” (1977, p.143). Buhler makes a similar link between McKellen’s 
Richard, who addresses the audience directly when he spots it in the 
bathroom mirror, and the character’s physical, even sexual dysfunction 
(2000, p.45).35 
                                                          
34 This is not to say that this explanation might not reflect auteur-ial intent, but it 
investigates two contrasting approaches to direct address without reference to the 
ideological Wollen/Hatchuel discourse. 
35 The relationship between direct address and Shakespearean meaning even 
extends to the latter’s subsequent discursive history. James N. Loehlin, for example, 
discussing Loncraine’s adaptation, argues that “Richmond’s [Dominic West] final 
smirk to the camera calls into question the apparently simple relation of good and 
evil in the film’s fascist parable: will the cycle of tyranny merely begin again, 
according to Jan Kott’s [1967] cynical reading of Shakespearean history?” (2003, 
pp.180-1) 
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This interpretative link between character and appropriate forms of cinematic 
grammar extends to the perceived effects, within a fidelity context, of direct 
address upon audiences. Coursen, for example, argues that McKellen’s 
Richard  
 
notices us half-way through the [opening] speech, accusing us 
implicitly of being Toms peeping on his peeing. Unlike Olivier’s 
charming Richard, McKellen’s Richard never does ask ‘us to join 
him’ [...]. He sneers at us as he sneers at the feeble characters he 
manipulates in the film. The result is an alienation from him, as 
opposed to the fascinated emotional participation in his schemes 
and our sharing in his response to their success that Olivier’s evil 
schemer invites.       
       (Coursen 2000, p.103) 
 
These examples of fidelity direct address are situated within an overall 
aesthetic that links Shakespearean character with cinematic style. Jorgens, 
for example, argues that Olivier “stresses Richard’s power by having him 
look down on his victims from heights when they are unaware of his 
presence, and the camera consistently takes his point of view” (1977, p.143). 
Andrews also connects the textual Richard’s domination over his 
contemporaries with domination over the cinema audience through direct 
addresses and point-of-view shots – “Richard controls us by controlling our 
vision” (2002, p.151). 
 
Several writers take this further, and explicitly link Richard’s manipulation of 
the audience with the perceived inherent nature of cinema, thereby 
completely countering the Wollen thesis that direct address challenges 
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realism. Indeed, Richard’s relationship with the camera is seen as 
encouraging the voyeurism and passivity of realism. Davies writes that “the 
natural tendency of cinema towards voyeurism corresponds with the 
voyeuristic trait in Richard’s personality structure, and because they hold this 
in common, Richard and the camera become easy accomplices” (1988, 
p.69), and that “the effectiveness of the direct-address shots [...] lies in those 
special dimensions of response which Bazin noted as being peculiar to the 
cinema audience’s passivity” (1988, p.70). Andrews also connects direct 
address with realism, arguing that “[o]n film the soliloquy, when spoken in 
direct address to the camera, becomes most intimate and most successful. 
[...] It is no wonder that a play in which a villain-hero not only acts, but 
directs, manipulates, and deceives, works so well on film, a medium itself 
given to manipulation and deception” (2002, p.157). Howlett argues that “[i]t 
is entirely consistent with the methods of framing in Shakespeare’s play that 
Loncraine’s film should violate his audience’s experience of the frame 
through methods Richard employs with others, such as breaching 
boundaries in face-to-face interactions” (2000, p.15).36 
 
                                                          
36 There is an interesting distinction here in the relationship between secondary 
identification and direct address in terms of differences between Shakespearean 
adaptation and the musicals analysed by Feuer, whose paraphrasing of Antony’s 
funeral oration argues that the musical’s disruption of cinematic grammar is “for the 
purpose of praising show business, not burying it” primarily because of 
“mechanisms of identification” (1993, pp.36-7). As 4.2.4 has discussed at some 
length, these mechanisms of identification include primary, grammatical techniques 
as well as secondary, character-based mechanisms, but there is still a noticeable 
distinction between the close associations built up between spectators and musical 
characters, and academic discourses’ focus on the manipulative, scheming nature 
of Shakespearean adaptation’s direct address. 
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It is possible to see these analyses as (mis)-readings of film theory drawing 
on Belsey’s (1998) influential polemic against the possibility of pluralistic 
cinematic adaptations of Shakespearean playtexts, but they clearly 
demonstrate an aspect of discourse which sees quasi-generic conventions, 
which are specific to Shakespearean adaptation, containing the potentially 
alienating effects of direct address in a similar way to Feuer’s analysis.37 
 
Any knowledge effect caused by the alienation of direct address is also often 
conceived in terms of debates about perceived Shakespearean meaning. 
Analyses of Pacino’s semi-documentary Looking for Richard frequently 
contextualise the film’s interrogativity with an attempt to explore 
Shakespearean meaning rather than the parameters of cinematic grammar. 
Hatchuel writes that  
 
[w]hen the character of Richard woos Lady Anne [Winona Ryder] 
in a more or less realistic sequence, the diegesis is brutally 
interrupted by a surprising, extradiegetic shot of Pacino-the-actor 
uttering [, directly to camera,] a loud ironic ‘Ha!’ commenting on 
Richard’s hypocrisy and reflecting his double nature. It is as if the 
actor’s subtext and research on the character were explicitly 
revealed.        
       (Hatchuel 2004, p.103) 
 
                                                          
37 Janet Staiger has noted the potential importance of ‘misreadings’, arguing that 
“once ‘misreading’ is considered as a historical variable, then activating alternative 
reading strategies becomes a political weapon. ‘Misreadings’ may be cultivated as 
oppositional gambits in battle against hegemonic etiquette” (1992, p.34). I am not 
suggesting that these potential misreadings are counter-hegemonic, it is more likely 
that they work to conceal the workings of ideology, but they nevertheless 
demonstrate how all acts of interpretation have an impact upon discursive 
developments. 
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The disclosure of enunciation is here interpreted as a meditation upon, or a 
knowledge effect revealing, something about the relation between the 
playtext and a particular performance, rather than something about cinematic 
grammar. Buhler, similarly, discusses the film in relation to a “non-fiction 
effect” (2002, p.39), but again relates this non-realism to an investigation of 
the playtext’s perceived inherent meaning.38 
 
Suture is most clearly demonstrated in relation to direct address, when there 
is an interplay between grammatical disruption and conventional realism. 
The admixture of classical realist techniques with the potential alienation of 
direct address might actually help the disavowal of the latter. At the 
beginning of Olivier’s adaptation, for example, the opening monologue, which 
is delivered in direct address, is preceded by Edward’s (Cedric Hardwicke) 
interpolated coronation. The King is crowned to the sound of ambiguously 
diegetic trumpet flourishes – such sounds might well accompany this kind of 
ritual, but the musicians are not shown, as in Olivier’s Hamlet (1948 – 
Fig.4.9). A frontal shot of the king cuts to a side shot with the back of a head 
dominating the foreground (Fig.4.10). The head turns, and it is Richard, but 
his first glance is just to the camera’s left, (Fig.4.11), and the eye-line match 
in the next shot shows that he was looking at Buckingham (Ralph 
Richardson), who visibly recognises that he is being looked at (Fig.4.12), and 
turns to his left. The camera moves back to show Buckingham looking at 
                                                          
38 Indeed, ideological interpretations of the film’s mixing of documentary and filmed 
Shakespeare have focused upon its postcolonial “emulative practices” (Cartelli 
2003, p.194) rather than its challenge to cinematic realism. 
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Clarence (John Gielgud), who returns the looks to both Buckingham 
(Fig.4.13) and Richard (Fig.4.14). 
 
 
    
Fig.4.9     Fig.4.10 
 
    
Fig.4.11     Fig.4.12 
 
    
Fig.4.13     Fig.4.14 
 
The first two close-up shots of faces (Figs.4.11 and 4.12) almost look straight 
to camera, but this potential revelation of cinematic enunciation is resolved 
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by the subsequent shots which demonstrate that these glances are eye-line 
matches. The momentary threat of grammatical destabilisation is thereby 
sutured over by classical continuity editing that re-positions the previously 
destabilised audience position into a subjectivised, diegetic location. Allying 
these mechanisms with a subsequent disruption of realist grammar in the 
direct address soliloquy that follows soon after might then mean that, as with 
Feuer’s analysis of containment in musicals, these temporary potential 
threats to realism are not “perceived as a grammatical error” (1993, p.37). 
Richard Allen argues, relating the process of suture to Freud’s fort/da game, 
and emphasising how this process enacts and overcomes masochism, that 
“the lack upon which the subject’s relationship to cinematic discourse is 
founded [...] is elided. The spectator’s anticipation of the second image and 
recollection of the first binds the spectator into the discourse of the film” 
(1995, p.35). The blurring of the lines between realism and non-realism 
inherent in Shakespearean soliloquies can be seen to act out this 
masochistic process of disavowal, the fort of the audience’s direct address 
relationship with Richard tempered and contained by the da of the film’s 
realism. 
 
This suture also fulfils the two other inherent, interrelated elements of my 
understanding of masochistic realist adaptation. Firstly, the suture is 
thematised into narrative (the transgressive direct address mirroring of the 
playtext’s narrative arc), as with Heath’s contention that “the drama of vision 
becomes a constant reflexive fascination in films” (1985, p.514). Or, more 
accurately, since the narrative pre-exists, the suture is fitted to a plausible 
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theme within the narrative. Secondly, academic discourses legitimise and 
complete the suturing of masochism into narrative, explaining Heath’s 
reflexive fascination as a metacinematic exploration of Shakespearean 
meaning. Andrews, for example, can therefore argue that Olivier’s adaptation 
“is constructed so as to allow us opportunity to withdraw from the relationship 
which feeds upon our inherent bloodlust, return to the side of the moral and 
the just, and leave Richard alone in his despair” (2002, p.149). The fort of the 
audience’s direct address relationship with Richard is therefore not only 
tempered and contained by the da of the film’s realism, but is inscribed into a 
narrative form, the mirroring the playtext’s narrative arc, that facilitates 
legitimating academic disavowal of the suture. 
 
This interplay between grammatical disruption/containment, the inscription of 
this into narrative, and the disavowal of this inscription through academic 
fidelity analysis mean that “when the direct address comes, we’re prepared 
for it. The change from third person to first person isn’t perceived as a 
grammatical error (as it is in a Godard film)” (Feuer 1993, p.37). Moreover, 
Olivier’s pre-soliloquy eye-line matches employ realist continuity editing to 
suture over the potential grammatical threat inherent in the camera’s mobility 
(see 3.3). But when Richard delivers his first soliloquy proper the camera is 
static, framing the scene like the theatre’s proscenium arch (Fig.4.15). 
Richard, rather than the camera, moves (Fig.4.16). This not only emphasises 
the theatrical rather than the cinematic, as the legitimating academic 
discourses mentioned above claim, but also helps to keep static the fixed 
subject-position which Heath saw as being constantly under threat because 
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of the cinema camera’s mobility. So when the grammatical disruption of 
avowed authorship and direct address is foregrounded, the grammatical 
disruption of film’s inherent mobility is suppressed. When the authorial 
equivalent to Las Meninas’ (1656) painter is revealed, the cinematographic 
equivalent to The Ambassador’s (1533) skull is concealed. Olivier 
unconsciously employs these masochistic threats to grammatical realism one 
at a time, lest they overwhelm suture’s delicate balance between revealing 
and concealing cinematic enunciation.39 
 
 
    
Fig.4.15     Fig.4.16 
 
4.2.7 Metacinema 
 
Soliloquy and direct address are one element of both Shakespearean 
theatre’s diachronic development and the impact of this development upon 
film adaptation’s grammar. It shifts the explicitly Shakespearean into the 
cinematic, but does so by exploiting the self-reflexivity of the theatrical rather 
                                                          
39 Chapters 5 and 6 discuss how these levels of grammatical disruption alter within 
the diachronic development of a poststructuralist writing formation. 
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than by developing new forms of self-reflexivity inherent to cinema. This has 
been problematic in terms of the way academics have understood 
metadrama and metacinema in Shakespearean adaptation. Agnieszka 
Rasmus’ influential argument that “[i]n adapting Shakespeare to the screen, 
the filmmaker must [...] respond to the plays’ metatheatricality by either 
rejecting alienating devices or finding a cinematic counterpart to the theatre’s 
self-reflexivity” (2001, p.147) suggests a one-to-one translation of 
metatheatre to metacinema. The example of direct address soliloquy might fit 
Rasmus’ suggestion and, indeed, it is my contention (see 3.3) that the 
foregrounded artificiality of adaptation is inherently metacinematic, though 
not in the pluralistic sense in which Rasmus conceives metadrama. For 
Rasmus, the shift from metatheatre to metacinema does not consist of the 
ways in which theatrical convention might challenge realist cinematic 
convention, but new, inherently filmic ways to create entirely different 
alienating devices that stand in for the theatre’s existing alienating devices. 
 
Rasmus’ conception of metacinema is therefore not something inherent in 
the process of adapting specifically metatheatrical plays into filmic form. 
What is important, in a similar way to how adaptation fainomaically translates 
direct examples of the verbal to the visual, is the manner in which 
metacinema functions within the mechanisms of suture, both disrupting 
realist grammar and subsequently containing the disruption. This 
containment operates both in terms of how metacinema is thematised into 
narrative, and how the translation from metatheatre to metacinema is 
interpreted in a Shakespearean rather than grammatical context by 
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legitimating academic interpretation. Shakespearean metacinema is 
therefore conceptualised in a manner that sheds light upon, and explores 
themes deemed to be inherent to, the playtexts, rather than in a way which 
interrogates the ideology and grammar of cinema. Judith Buchanan, for 
example, demonstrates this bias when she argues that “[t]o be self-
referentially alive to the characteristics of the medium in which one is working 
is, of course, itself a thoroughly Shakespearean project” (2005, p.16) 
 
Non-diegetic commentary within the film is one means to incorporate 
potentially alienating metadrama. Such commentaries may begin within a 
one-to-one shift from the metatheatrical to the metacinematic, such as 
adaptations of the Chorus character in filmic Henry Vs, but the direct 
translation is often self-reflexive in purely cinematic ways that do not rely on 
prior forms of metadrama. Branagh’s Henry V (1989), for example, begins 
with a Chorus (Derek Jacobi) in a deserted film studio, surrounded by the 
cinematic apparatus. For Rothwell this constitutes a “touch of Brechtian 
alienation in its meta-cinematic concern with the mechanics of making the 
movie” (1999, p.247). The purpose of this alienation, for Rothwell, is to 
facilitate the director’s manipulation – “[a] pragmatic Branagh uses whatever 
film grammar works to his advantage” (1999, p.248) – of specifically 
Shakespearean meaning: “When he lights a match to locate the giant studio 
switchboard, the sudden spluttering and flare gives [the line] ‘Muse of fire’ 
[1.1.1] a clever spin. And the glare of the studio arc lights suggests ‘the 
brightest heaven of invention!’ [1.1.2]” (1999, p.247). 
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Hatchuel notes a link between the Chorus’ alienation effect and the reality-
effect of realist film grammar when she argues that “the Chorus speaks 
directly to the camera, then opens a huge wooden door leading to the world 
of the fiction: alienation is coupled with a powerful irruption into diegesis” 
(2004, p.121). She does not link the diegetic resolution of prior alienation 
with suture, though, but locates this metacinema within a specifically 
Shakespearean metadramatic context: “This frequent use of doors in 
Shakespeare films could, in fact, be explained by a desire to import 
metadramatic elements into the films” (2004, p.121). Shakespeare’s 
canonical nature therefore extends so far as to conservatively legitimise 
potentially radical forms of self-reflexivity. The metacinematic is not only 
contained in narrative form, as the alienating Chorus introduces the diegetic 
world of realist grammar,40 but is also contained by legitimating academic 
interpretations that locate this shift within a Shakespearean, rather than a 
grammatical, context. 
 
Even choric figures without explicit Shakespearean origins have a diegetising 
quality that locates them within a Shakespearean context. Julie Taymor’s 
Titus (1999) opens with an interpolation of a contemporary (possibly 1950s) 
boy (Osheen Jones), introduced in extreme close-up, watching television 
violence via holes cut through a paper bag over his head (Fig.4.17), and 
feeding himself through a third hole (Fig.4.18). Responding to the screen, he 
                                                          
40 Hatchuel also notes how the Chorus “invites the audience to enter the fictive 
story, and eventually becomes a participant of diegesis himself, joining the soldiers’ 
painful marches under the rain” (2004, p.121). 
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begins violently playing with toys and food. An explosion outside his kitchen 
window leads to an invasion by a grubby man (Dario D’Ambrosi) in goggles 
and smock who carries him down a long staircase and into the 
Shakespearean drama. 
 
 
Fig.4.17 
 
 
Fig.4.18 
 
The status of the boy, once within the Shakespearean diegesis, is initially 
ambiguous, but he soon begins to participate, first through action, and then 
through dialogue, where he speaks Young Lucius’ lines. An element of the 
alienating potential of this boy’s depiction is discernible within academic 
legitimation, but the masochistic suture of an alienating interloper evolving 
into a diegetic character is not. Hatchuel therefore argues that “[o]ne way of 
drawing attention to the medium is to insert a directorial or authorial figure 
into the production itself. [...] This allows for a comment that distances the 
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spectators from the show and points to its material construction” (2004, 
pp.98-9). Titus uses the “boy to duplicate a directorial figure and to represent 
the viewers themselves in the film”, which “means creating a new framing, 
another level of fiction” (Hatchuel 2004, p.101).  
 
Hatchuel’s approach to the constituency of this other level of fiction, 
however, is dominated by Shakespeare’s canonical status: “The incredible 
explosion of violence that this child creates finds a direct echo at the end of 
the film, when so many murders take place around the table of Titus’s 
[Anthony Hopkins] banquet. This first scene featuring a boy making his dolls 
fight and kill one another amid the food thus appears as a metaphor for the 
whole movie” (2004, p.101). Again, the potentially alienating disruption of 
realist grammar is contained by recourse to a Shakespearean explanation, 
moreover an explanation both rooted in Heath’s understanding of how “the 
drama of vision becomes a constant reflexive fascination in films” (1985, 
p.514, original emphasis), and by an academic who had earlier argued that 
the depiction of the boy creates “a new framing, another level of fiction” 
(Hatchuel 2004, p.101). 
 
That the boy figure becomes diegitised as the adaptation goes on adds a 
further level of suture. Hatchuel does note the boy’s movement from “mere 
observer (in which he reduplicates the audience inside the film) to active 
participant (when he movingly finds wooden hands for Lavinia [Laura 
Fraser]) and eventually to a real character in the story (where he is given the 
lines of Young Lucius)” (2004, p.101). Her Shakespearean interpretation of 
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the film’s grammatical inconsistencies leads her to explain this as a 
metaphor for the playtext/film at large, however: “At the start, it is almost as if 
the Boy’s game of violence suddenly materializes on a grand scale. By 
contrast, the end comes as a bearer of hope: the Boy is carried away 
towards the horizon as though the cycle of hatred could be stopped for ever” 
(Hatchuel 2004, pp.101-2). Yet, from the perspective of masochistic suture, 
shifting an ambiguous, interpolated character (which puzzlingly stands in for 
author, director and audience) into a diegetic, speaking Shakespearean 
character with the authorially enunciated name of Young Lucius reflects the 
containment of grammatical disruption. Just as the non-Shakespearean 
becomes Shakespearean, so too the non-diegetic becomes diegetic. 
Wollen’s question, “What is this film for?”, which arises when grammatical 
inconsistency “breaks not only the fantasy identification but also the narrative 
surface” (1985, p.503), is again answered with recourse to Shakespearean 
metaphor. If Shakespearean adaptation is not like other realist film, that is 
only because it is understood as Shakespearean rather than as non-realist. 
 
Shakespeare’s metadramatic device of dramatizing the theatre within his 
own plays is another antecedent of the translation from metatheatre to 
metacinema. Academic legitimation in relation to filming this internal drama 
demonstrates a number of suturing containments of enunciation. Firstly, 
shifting the filmed theatre to filmed cinema (a play within a play to a film 
within a film) invites a conservative comparison with the principal film itself, 
the Shakespearean adaptation. Donaldson (2006) thinks of Almereyda’s 
(2000) Hamlet’s (Ethan Hawke) self-made videos in this way. They act to 
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juxtapose the adaptation itself (which shifts feudal Elsinore to capitalist New 
York, and which both critiques the corporate system it dramatizes, and was 
created by and exists within a similar corporate culture) with Hamlet’s 
personal, anti-corporate musings. Potentially alienating levels of enunciation 
are thereby understood within the adaptation’s perceived theme. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, academic legitimation locates 
flashbacks and scenes which are subsequently shown to be fantasies within 
the context of Shakespearean metadrama. Rasmus, for example, again 
discussing Hamlet, argues that “Branagh’s numerous flashbacks are not 
mere illustrations. They are his cinematic equivalent to Shakespeare’s 
metadramatic inserts” (2001, p.161). Hatchuel also focuses on non-diegetic 
fantasy scenes rather than filmed internal plays, despite locating her 
argument within André Green’s comments on theatrical presentations of The 
Mousetrap, Hamlet’s play within the play: “[The] arrival of other actors shifts 
the status of the previous ones. The first actors are confronted with actors 
playing the parts of actors. The presence of these second-degree players 
makes us forget that the first ones were actors and brings them a semblance 
of reality, the illusion of theatre taking refuge in the Players” (Green in 
Hatchuel 2004, p.124). The examples she gives of this principle within 
adaptation, from Branagh’s (1996) and Almereyda’s Hamlets, are fantasy 
moments rather than filmed authorial enunciations. A sequence showing 
Branagh’s prince (Kenneth Branagh) stabbing Claudius (Derek Jacobi) is 
followed by a sequence showing him still hesitating; “[t]he previous images 
were just a dream, an illusory insert” (Hatchuel 2004, p.124). Almereyda’s 
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Ophelia (Kate Winslet) similarly leaps to her death in a swimming pool whilst 
her father reads Hamlet’s love letters to the King and Queen (Julie Christie), 
only for the following sequence to show Ophelia still standing by the 
poolside. For Hatchuel,  
 
These very short inserts are eminently metafilmic since they mirror 
(and duplicate) the fictive nature of cinema. Nevertheless, they 
also enhance the impression of reality given by the main action 
when the viewer is jolted back into it. In the audience’s subtle 
mechanism of belief/disbelief, if the included film is an illusion, it 
means that the including film is not, or is somewhat less. 
Therefore, in the same way as meta-theatre in Shakespeare’s 
plays both discloses illusion and, at times, gives extra reality to the 
‘master action’, meta-cinema combines enunciative disclosure 
with submersion in the narrative world. 
       (Hatchuel 2004, p.125) 
 
This account recognises that foregrounding artifice might have a containing 
effect, but only goes so far as intuiting Branigan’s paradox (Anderson 1998, 
p.123), discussed above in 4.2.2, which sees potentially alienating cinematic 
techniques as conventionalised through repeated use. Indeed, Hatchuel 
invokes Todorov’s conception of verisimilitude, which is also central to 
Branigan’s paradox, arguing that alienation in these sequences may be 
contained because “metacinematic devices attempting to circumvent realism 
in Shakespeare films may fall into verisimilitude if the viewers expect these 
devices within the bounds of the genre” (2004, p.125). Hatchuel does not 
extend this analysis into the realms of suture, though, and does not see this 
interplay of alienation and verisimilitude as part of adaptation’s ideological 
ontology. It might at first appear that in extending the analysis of the play 
within the play to flashback and fantasy sequences, rather than filmed 
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examples of internal drama, Hatchuel avoids fidelity analysis and focuses on 
adaptation’s grammatical consequences. Substituting fantasy for 
Shakespearean metadrama contains, however, at least in this instance, the 
full ideological consequences of this metacinema. Although Hatchuel does 
not give a Shakespearean explanation for these negotiations of enunciation, 
neither does she locate these negotiations within Heath’s masochistic 
context (1985, p.511). Branigan’s paradox only explains how “even if you 
break the diegesis, you do not thereby gain a glimpse of reality. You simply 
create another formal element in the narrative [...] or another embedded 
‘world’ within the film” (Anderson 1998, p.123). It does not explain how this 
other embedded world creates ideological pleasure by suturing spectators 
into constructed subject positions which masquerade as transcendental 
subject positions. 
 
Choric characters and films within the films are not the only means of 
foregrounding and then disavowing authorial enunciation in the context of 
metacinema. Literal traces of Shakespeare’s enunciation, in the form of 
written words upon the screen, can serve a similarly suturing function. These 
words frequently have a diegetic quality; writings on banners, posters, 
adverts.41 Two examples from Luhrmann’s William Shakespeare’s Romeo + 
Juliet (1996) demonstrate some of these suturing possibilities. 
 
                                                          
41 The relationship of these written forms of enunciation to loose adaptations which 
dispense with the original dialogue is discussed in 4.3.2. 
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The first example comes in the film’s opening sequence. The initial part of 
this sequence’s written enunciation is diegetic, or at least semi-diegetic. A 
news anchorwoman (Edwina Moore) delivers the playtext’s prologue from a 
television suspended in blackness, the screen’s headline emblazoned with 
Shakespeare’s ‘Star-Cross’d Lovers’ (Fig.4.19). As the prologue nears its 
end, Luhrmann cuts to rapidly edited scenes of urban violence in shots 
replete with rapid zooms and whip pans (Fig.4.20). These shots are 
accompanied by melodramatic choral music, and a repeat of the prologue in 
voice-over, this time in a deeper male voice (Pete Postlethwaite). Selected 
lines from this voice-over are shown on a black screen (Fig.4.21) amongst 
this montage, into which Luhrmann then inserts two further layers of written 
enunciation – newspaper and magazine headlines referring to the 
Montague/Capulet feud (Fig.4.22), and the names and descriptions of 
important characters next to frozen close-ups of their faces (Fig.4.23). 
 
 
Fig.4.19 
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Fig.4.20 
 
 
Fig.4.21 
 
 
Fig.4.22 
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Fig.4.23 
 
 
Juxtaposing so many forms of written enunciation contributes to what 
Courtney Lehmann refers to as the adaptation’s postmodern nature (2002a, 
p.136). It has also been conceptualised within a limitedly non-realist context, 
James N. Loehlin arguing, for example, that it “foregrounds its own status as 
a mediated representation; it […] begins and ends as a television broadcast, 
and sets several scenes in an abandoned cinema, the Sycamore Grove” 
(2000, p.123). Yet, ultimately, Loehlin’s analysis falls back on interpretation 
determined by Shakespeare’s canonical status, albeit filtered through 
Luhrmann’s ambiguous (ir)-reverence towards his source text: “This double 
presentation of the prologue, once in a cheeky pop-culture parody, once with 
grave seriousness and an earnest bow to textual authority, sums up the 
film’s divided approach to the chaotic world of Verona Beach and the 
timeless tragedy of the lovers” (2002, p.126). 
 
From the perspective of suture, the foregrounding of the source text’s fictive, 
enunciated nature, particularly when filtered through multiple forms of 
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postmodern presentation, each with different levels of artificiality, each 
juxtaposed against the other, might serve to heighten the subsequent reality-
effect of the film’s predominant realist grammar. And again, academic 
legitimation acts to disavow the grammatical disruption by answering ‘for 
exploring Shakespeare’ to Wollen’s question “What is this film for?” (1985, 
p.503). Moreover, the pleasure-giving nature of this masochistic juxtaposition 
is demonstrated by the way in which Luhrmann edits together written 
enunciation, scenes of violence and the scene’s choral soundtrack, and the 
accelerating cutting of these shots (echoing, again, Heath’s notion of the 
“drama of vision” (1985, p.514)). This acceleration builds to a staccato 
crescendo that finally cuts to the play’s opening scene of the fight between 
the Montagues and Capulets, a sequence that is filmed within a more 
conventionalised realist style. 
 
The film’s second example of literally re-enunciating Shakespeare’s words 
into re-written form comes with Romeo’s (Leonardo DiCaprio) professions of 
love. Alfredo Michel Modenessi describes these writings thus: “Act 1 of the 
film [...] presents us with a conspicuously ‘bookish’ Romeo who, in the corner 
of the proscenium of the abandoned movie-house, reads the strangely 
detached verses that we will soon notice are in his own handwriting” (2002, 
p.78). Modenessi’s explanation for this presentation of written Shakespeare 
is that Romeo’s detachment from the written verse “underscores the irony of 
a play that repeatedly tricks its protagonists into performing a predetermined 
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script for which few acting tips are provided, but where improvisation is 
impossible” (2002, p.78).42 
 
Loehlin similarly argues that “[t]he pervasive keynote of hip irony returns 
again and again throughout the film. Romeo laboriously writes out his 
Petrarchan conceits in a journal […] then impresses Benvolio [Dash Mihok] 
with his poetic romanticism by seeming to invent them extempore” (2000, 
p.126). The visualised foregrounding of the adaptation’s constructed, 
enunciated nature is thereby explained within the context of the playtext’s 
irony, or of Luhrmann’s complexly postmodern (ir)reverent ‘hip irony’ towards 
the playtext. The potentially grammatically-disruptive revelation of 
enunciation is thereby contained through recourse to Shakespearean 
canonicity.  
 
These examples of metacinematic Shakespearean adaptation act as 
fainomaic translations in the sense that they transform elements of verbal 
metadrama into visual metacinema. They have a relatively autonomous 
relationship to metatheatre somewhat like Althusser’s reworking of 
base/superstructure relations (1971, p.130). That is, they may derive from 
metatheatrical conventions, such as Chorus figures, or they may stand in for 
entirely new metadramatic devices. Either way, they operate within the 
parameters of fainomaic translation in the sense that they raise the threat of 
                                                          
42 Section 4.4 will discuss this notion of predestination and foreknowledge within 
Shakespearean adaptation in more detail. 
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grammatical disruption only to contain the threat through both diegetic and 
academic legitimisations. 
 
4.2.8 Fainomaic translation and realist adaptation’s ontology 
 
Although the preceding taxonomy has included elements of fainomaic 
adaptation that are optional, selective elements of how filmmakers might go 
about the process of adaptation, at its most basic level fainomaic translation 
is an inherent element of adapting Shakespeare to the screen, even a 
defining feature of realist adaptation’s ontology. There are also elements of 
Shakespearean adaptation that offer further possibilities for masochistic 
suture, but which are not necessary preconditions of adaptation. The next 
part of this chapter addresses these forms, beginning, in the next section, 
with a different form of translation that variously shifts location, language and 
character rather than one which translates the verbal into the visual. 
 
4.3 ‘Állagmic’ translation from the avowedly Shakespearean to 
verisimilitude: ‘[A]cted over/In states unborn and accents yet unknown’ 
(Julius Caesar 3.1.112-3) 
 
I have described the translation of the verbal to the visual as fainomaic, from 
the Ancient Greek verb fainomai, meaning ‘to appear’. This section 
addresses a different form of translation which is another possible element of 
a filmic poststructuralist writing formation in realist adaptation. Since it covers 
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shifts within location,43 language and character I define it as an állagmic 
translation, from the Ancient Greek noun állagma, meaning the process of 
‘change’ or ‘replacement’. 
 
Like all the following elements of this taxonomy, állagma is a technique that 
adaptations may employ, but which can vary greatly, or might not be used at 
all. Állagma is therefore a possibility of adaptation, rather than part of its 
ontology, or one of its preconditions. 
 
Manifestations of állagmic translation are less systematic than manifestations 
of fainomaic translation because of this inherent selective nature, as the 
following taxonomy demonstrates. Given this less ontological quality to 
állagmic translation, and because the close case study of four adaptations of 
Hamlet which follows in chapter 6 analyses állagmic translation only where it 
intersects with the fainomaic, rather than to explore the full parameters of 
állagma, the following breakdown of állagmic translation is necessarily less 
detailed than what has preceded. Állagmic translation is therefore an area for 
further research. 
 
A taxonomy is still possible, and desirable, at this stage, though, because 
many of the manifestations of állagmic translation demonstrate significant 
areas of continuity. It is particularly desirable because the continuity within 
                                                          
43 What a shift in location might exactly entail is problematic, given that any 
Shakespearean adaptation shifts location from the Renaissance stage to a greater 
or lesser extent. Specific examples which address this will be explored in more 
detail shortly, in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
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these various manifestations demonstrates the same kind of masochistic 
suture as fainomaic translation, exploiting a complex blend of foregrounding 
and disavowing artifice within film texts with a similar array of academic 
legitimisation. The following taxonomy therefore does not explore the full 
consequences of állagmic translation, but it is useful as an optional, 
attendant form of suturing translation that helps elucidate the analysis of the 
historical development of a poststructuralist writing formation in relation to 
realist adaptation’s more general, ontological and inherent fainomai which is 
conducted in 4.2. Állagma demonstrates the multifaceted potential of 
masochistic adaptation, even if it is not necessarily inherent within it. 
 
4.3.1 Shifting context(s) while keeping the Shakespearean language 
 
The principal distinction, amongst these many, which delineates different 
forms of állagmic translation, is whether adaptations employ Shakespearean 
dialogue. This taxonomy deals with those that do not presently (see 4.3.2). In 
terms of those that do use Shakespearean dialogue, the main elements of 
állagma reside in changes to setting, mise-en-scène, cinematography, 
editing and music associated with filmic styles related to the new settings into 
which the Shakespearean characters, narrative and dialogue have been 
translated. 
 
Locational shifts are a problematic concept because some form of locational 
shift is inevitable during the process of adapting into film. Shakespearean 
adaptations’ legitimating academic discourses provide a conventionalising 
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rubric for interpreting locational shifts, though, grounded, once again, in 
culturally prescribed notions of Shakespeare’s canonical status. Certain 
settings are deemed to be unproblematically ‘Shakespearean’ (for example, 
Coursen 2005, p.1; McBride 1996, p.122; Manvell 1971, p.123). Shifts out of 
these conventionalised settings, however, are understood as potentially 
alienating, as is demonstrated by Graham Holderness’ analysis of Peter 
Hall’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1968): 
 
The film opens with a deliberate disruption of naturalist film 
convention: superimposed on an English neo-classical house, 
surrounded by images of order and authority, appears the title 
‘Athens’. The assurance customarily guaranteed by film 
techniques which confirm our normal habits of perception, is 
subverted: what we see on the screen may well be deceptive. 
(Holderness 1998, p.77) 
 
Shifts in mise-en-scène, cinematography, editing and music have also been 
understood, within academic legitimation, in relation to perceived notions of 
fidelity (for example, Berlin 2002, p.35; Burnett 2000; Welsh 2007, p.105) 
and intertextual references to other films, particularly in relation to genre (for 
example, Buhler 2000; Friedman 2009; Keyishian 2000; Lanier 2006; Loehlin 
2003). The relationships between these shifts and what is kept of 
Shakespearean language, narrative and character (elements of which will be 
covered in the taxonomy’s examination of adaptations that dispense with the 
Shakespearean language in 4.3.2) are complex, but a constant amongst 
these relationships is their suturing nature. 
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Combining perceived non-Shakespearean settings, mise-en-scène, 
cinematography, editing and music with Shakespearean dialogue impacts on 
verisimilitude in complex, but always suturing, ways. Section 4.2.2 has 
already discussed Baz Luhrmann’s account of how he juxtaposed 
traditionally non-Shakespearean mise-en-scène, editing and music with the 
Shakespearean verse in William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet: 
 
To keep the audience alive […] you’ve got to have a device, 
right, a distancing device, […] essentially there’s got to be 
something that keeps the whole cinematic experience 
heightened, so you don’t fall into, ever, a feeling that it’s 
somehow keyhole, that it’s psychological. […] In Romeo and 
Juliet it’s the language”         
      (Luhrmann 2011) 
 
Michael Anderegg has noted a distinction between ways that Luhrmann 
employs this Shakespearean language. The first does not challenge 
verisimilitude: “At times, the film can simply pretend that the language and 
the ‘poetic’ diction are not alien to contemporary sensibilities. A line like ‘thy 
drugs are quick’ [5.3.120] fits easily into the drug culture of the Capulet ball 
sequence” (2003, p.60). The second emphasises a form of alienation that 
may reveal Shakespearean enunciation: 
 
At other times, the language is allowed to remain 
‘Shakespeare’ – so, for a critical example, the sonnet lines 
Romeo and Juliet [Claire Danes] recite at first meeting are 
spoken in their entirety in spite of the fact that the meaning is 
not self-evident. […] Shakespeare’s sonnet transports us 
momentarily back to the sixteenth century and in so doing 
collapses the worlds of Verona and Verona Beach. 
(Anderegg 2003, p.60) 
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Even this second, potentially alienating use of Shakespearean language 
operates in a cinematic context that ensures the language’s 
comprehensibility, Anderegg arguing that “[f]or further instance that this 
scene will ‘work’, Luhrmann […] gives us the meeting of Romeo and Juliet in 
effect several times over through time expansion and repetitive editing 
patterns, and he precedes the sonnet meeting with the fish-tank meeting 
where the exchange of glances and the matching of identities have already 
been made” (2003, pp.60-61).  
 
Here, again, is suture, the alienating challenge to verisimilitude of 
juxtaposing Shakespearean language with contemporary settings, mise-en-
scène, cinematography, editing and non-diegetic music contained by 
conventionalised, and therefore seamless, cinematic narration. Previous 
elements of this taxonomy have stressed the close relationships between 
different forms of suturing translation, and Luhrmann’s juxtaposition is a good 
example of this. The fish-tank meeting is a fainomaic translation of the 
enunciated sonnet, the foregrounded sonnet’s discours contained by the 
conventionalised histoire of cinematic narration, tied in with secondary 
identification, discussed in 4.2.4, in relation to the star value of the scene’s 
participants.44 
 
                                                          
44 Lindsay Scott (2008) has discussed teen audiences’ specularisation of Leonardo 
DiCaprio’s Romeo in relation to a reduction in Juliet’s agency compared to earlier 
adaptations. 
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Luhrmann’s somewhat ambiguous explanation that his distancing device 
functions as “something that keeps the whole cinematic experience 
heightened” (2011), is potentially clarified by Gus Van Sant, another director 
of a film that juxtaposes the conventionalised contemporary with 
Shakespearean dialogue. Van Sant explains My Own Private Idaho’s (1991) 
use of verse from the Henriad as a bid “to transcend time, to show that those 
things have always happened, everywhere” (1993, pp.xlii-xliii). In this 
context, Luhrmann’s alienated retelling of Romeo and Juliet makes the story 
not just about a specific boy and girl, but about every boy and girl. 
 
My Own Private Idaho translocates the Henriad to the streets of 
contemporary America. The film’s Falstaff-like character, Bob Pidgeon 
(William Richert), is the tutor to and exploiter of two young hustlers, Michael 
Waters (River Phoenix), the equivalent of peasant Poins, and Scott Favor 
(Keanu Reeves), the contemporary translation of Prince Hal. The film’s 
juxtaposition of the conventionalised contemporary with Shakespearean 
verse is made more complex because most of the film’s dialogue is not 
Shakespearean. The relationship between the film’s two forms of dialogue is 
interpreted, within academic legitimation, in a variety of contexts that all 
share an unconscious fidelity bias that obfuscates állagmic suture. This 
legitimisation contains the juxtaposed foregrounding of Shakespearean 
dialogue with conventionalised filmmaking and dialogue within said 
conventionalised filmmaking, and through recourse to Shakespearean 
explanations for the juxtaposition. 
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Susan Wiseman, for example, links these changes in language to a 
verbal/visual binary that, firstly, allegorises character trajectory: 
 
Shakespeare marks the text as a demand that the audience 
transfer attention to the spoken, Shakespearean word. The 
film’s contrasting of verbal and visual signifiers and sequences 
organizes, too, the differentiation of the narratives of the 
doomed Michael Waters and the rising Scott Favor; Michael’s 
past is signalled in visions, Scott’s control of the situation is 
shown in his Prince Hal-like control of dialogue and its 
placement in relation to Shakespeare. 
(Wiseman 2003, p.208) 
 
Secondly, Wiseman interprets this verbal/visual binary within a reflexive 
context, although such a context depends upon the cultural status of 
Shakespeare’s canonicity: 
 
Bob Pigeon speaks in ‘Shakespeare’ and those involved in 
prolonged conversation are drawn into it. [In contrast,] the 
desperate side of the underworld is either untouched by 
Shakespearean language or, when it is, this results in an 
annexation of the Portland hotel to Shakespeare’s scenes, not 
vice versa. The entry of ‘Shakespeare’ into the text produces, 
or emphasizes, the visual/verbal split and initiates the ‘movie 
within a movie’ effect derived as much from the way 
‘Shakespeare’ as a cultural anchor takes over the text as by the 
text’s carnivalizing or radicalizing of Shakespeare. 
(Wiseman 2003, p.209) 
 
Wiseman thinks of these juxtapositions as a manipulation of something 
inherent in the film’s relationship to the Shakespearean text, and perhaps to 
the process of adaptation more generally, arguing that “the film has a 
metarelationship to Shakespeare. Even as it thematises the struggles 
between fathers and sons, and to an extent offers a social critique of these 
issues, Idaho could be figured as in an oedipal relationship to the material 
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out of which it produces itself, particularly ‘Shakespeare’” (Wiseman 2003, 
p.208). 
 
This oedipal relationship to Shakespeare therefore explains the potential 
alienation of the film’s complex mixture of the Shakespearean and non-
Shakespearean. Its ambiguous intertextuality can be understood as 
Shakespearean, rather than as something that both foregrounds and 
disavows the artificiality of Shakespearean adaptation. Andrew Murphy can 
consequently argue that the film is 
 
perfectly well located within the broader Shakespeare tradition, 
in the sense that, just as the typical Shakespeare play provides 
an interweaving of materials drawn from other sources, so van 
Sant [sic], in fashioning his narrative, draws upon Orson 
Welles’ Chimes at Midnight, which, in its turn, draws on 
Shakespeare’s Falstaff material, supplemented by additional 
matter from Holinshead’s Chronicles, on which Shakespeare 
also, of course, relies. What van Sant [sic] offers, then, is a 
complex intertextual narrative in which the Shakespearean 
material operates within a [sic] elaborate and intertwined 
cultural referencing system. 
(Murphy 2000, pp.19-20) 
 
For Kathy Howlett this Shakespearean source to the film’s intertextuality 
facilitates a relevant reimagining of the Henriad. The combination of 
Shakespearean and non-Shakespearean dialogue can then be used to 
explain how “by writing Shakespeare’s play into the centre of his script and 
by imitating Welles’s celebrated tavern scenes, Van Sant breaks down the 
binary opposition between high and low culture to reveal the vitality of the 
Shakespearean text given an American context” (Howlett 2002, p.168). 
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The extent to which Howlett’s academic legitimation sutures the potential 
alienation of foregrounding the juxtaposition of Shakespearean dialogue with 
non-Shakespearean dialogue/filmmaking is demonstrated by the fidelity 
context in which she locates her approach to the film’s intertextuality: 
 
Such a metamorphosis is licensed within the Henriad itself 
when Poins bids Hal ‘put on two leather jerkins and aprons, 
and wait upon him [Falstaff] at his table as drawers.’ Hal 
describes his transformation as that ‘from a […] prince to a 
prentice? A low transformation! That shall be mine, for in 
everything the purpose must weigh with the folly.’ Hal’s purpose 
– to expose Falstaff – justifies the ‘low transformation,’ much as 
Van Sant’s reframing effectively subverts and exposes the 
nostalgia established in Welles’s film for ‘Merrie England’ and 
the world of Falstaff’s tavern. 
(Howlett 2002, p.165) 
 
Indeed, given the specific nature of language within the Henriad, this 
intertextual mixing of language and filmmaking is understood by Howlett as 
the only way to be faithfully Shakespearean:  
 
Van Sant degrades the carnivalesque language of the 
Shakespearean text to liberate it. […] Shakespeare’s play not 
only spoke to contemporary [Elizabethan] anxieties about the 
displaced and marginalized but spoke about it in a vulgar 
carnivalesque discourse of its time. In a very real sense the 
play offers a critique of contemporary anxieties in a degraded 
and popular guise not dissimilar to Van Sant’s own agenda. 
Yet, as Van Sant’s film implies, subversive expressions 
become absorbed by the culture that they criticize. Today the 
play’s carnivalesque language is enshrined within the ‘official’ 
linguistic codes that the play itself mocks and parodies. Within 
this context we begin to understand that Van Sant’s project in 
revisioning the language of Shakespeare’s play is, in effect, an 
attempt to bring it into accord with the energies of the ‘original 
Shakespeare’. 
(Howlett 2002, pp.178-9) 
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Alienating combinations of the Shakespearean and the non-Shakespearean 
are therefore interpreted as the only way to communicate Shakespeare’s 
original juxtaposition of the worlds of tavern and Court, rather than as an 
alienating effect that might foreground the adaptation’s constructed nature. 
Again, when grammatical inconsistency “breaks not only the fantasy 
identification but also the narrative surface”, raising Wollen’s question, “What 
is this film for?” (1985, p.503), the answer from academic legitimation is 
emphatically; ‘for exploring Shakespeare’. 
 
These shifts in language are also interpreted, within the context of an 
important turn in adaptation studies from around the beginning of the 
century, as dialogic manipulations of authorship derived from the work of 
Bakhtin (see 3.4). Such an understanding of authorship perpetuates the 
Barthesian conception, discussed in section 3.4, offering another vision of 
adaptation that, in displacing textual origins, misses key elements of its 
conservative ontology.  
 
This distinction between Benvenistene and Barthesian authorship, discussed 
in 3.4, focuses on visual translations. The distinction between Benvenistene 
and Bakhtinian authorship focuses on verbal translations, which, like other 
examples of állagma, are optional, rather than inherently ontological. At the 
broadest level the similarities between Barthes’ and Bakhtin’s authorship are 
striking. Just as for Barthes “writing is the destruction of every voice, of every 
point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our 
subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost” (1995, p.125), 
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Bakhtin’s insistence on the “primacy of context over text” means that “all 
utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces 
practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve” (1981, 
p.428). It is rather, in another display of displaced authorship, the 
interpretations of these theoretical positions within adaptation studies which 
demonstrate wider differences in definitions of authorship. Perhaps because 
of Barthes’ distinctions between readerly and writerly texts (1975), critics like 
Belsey have located attempts to “impose a limit on [...] [a] text, to furnish it 
with a final signified, to close the writing” (Barthes 1995 pp.128-9) within the 
context of one form of such writing, the (realist) cinema, at the expense of 
another, the (Elizabethan) theatre. The Bakhtinian inspired critic, however, 
working within the context of “Bakhtin’s notion of author and character as 
multi-discursive and resistant to unification” remembers that “if authors are 
fissured, fragmented, multi-discursive, hardly ‘present’ even to themselves, 
the analyst may inquire, how can an adaptation communicate the ‘spirit’ or 
‘self-presence’ of authorial intention?” (Stam 2005b, p.9), even if that 
authorial intention be interpreted by the Barthesian critic as writerly. 
Nevertheless, both the Barthesian and Bakhtinian interpretations, in 
displacing the origin point of authorship, disavow Benveniste’s distinction 
between discours and histoire with similarly ideological consequences. 
 
But the specific manifestations of these interpretations are somewhat 
different. Bakhtin’s dialogic logic is central, not only to a recent turn within 
adaptation studies which offers the insight that “[e]very age, Bakhtin 
suggested, reaccentuates in its own way the works of the past” (Stam 2005a, 
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p.28), but also to the way in which this reaccentuation may operate 
ideologically. This is because the reaccentuation disavows not only the 
canonised status of the original, as the proponents of this turn would 
advocate, for sound political and ethical reasons, but also potentially 
disavows the ideological consequences of translating an accent that is 
foregrounded as fictitious into one that is reaccentuated into something 
‘familiar’ in terms of ‘living’ dialects, and into something ‘relevant’ in terms of 
‘living’ experiences rather than closed-off and potentially distant origins. This 
reaccentuation thereby conceals the marks of its construction in relation to a 
foregrounded piece of artifice, and works within Benveniste’s context of 
“events [that] seem to tell themselves” (1970, p.241). Discours is once again 
disavowed into histoire, and as with Belsey’s appropriation of Barthesian 
authorship (see 3.4), the translation occurs both within adaptations 
themselves and within their legitimating academic interpretations. 
 
An adaptation (and its academic interpretation) of Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar, the Taviani brothers’ Cesare deve morire (Caesar Must Die) (2012), 
and Maurizio Calbi’s study thereof (2014), demonstrate this potential and 
unintended conservative use of Bakhtinian authorship. The film is an 
adaptation set in a real Italian prison, Rebibbia, charting the inmates’/actors’ 
rehearsals for a theatrical performance of the play. The two principal ways in 
which the film “reaccentuates in its own way the works of the past” (Stam 
2005a, p.28) is through its literal reaccentuation, from Shakespearean 
English to Italian and then to the cast’s regional dialects, and through the 
parallels drawn between the Shakespearean themes of honour, betrayal, 
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murder etc. and the prisoners’ own experiences. These two elements are 
combined most explicitly when the convicts’ dialects are contextualised 
within the conventions of mafia culture. 
 
The first of these two elements is the most explicitly Bakhtinian. For Calbi 
“these dialects continually shift from more formal to less formal registers; 
they refract and ‘rewrite’ each other in a kind of Bakhtinian heteroglossia” 
(2014, p.241). In so doing “the translation of Julius Caesar into a number of 
dialects bears witness to the fact that ‘Shakespeare’ does not properly 
belong; that it is an ‘entity’ […] that lends itself to an almost infinite variety of 
‘migrations’” (2014, p.240). It is perhaps an exaggeration to say that this lack 
of belonging “obliterates all traces of the enunciation” (Metz 1985, p.544) as 
surely as Belsey’s Barthesian disavowal of foregrounded enunciation, given 
the way that Calbi recognises the “uncanny survivance of this specter 
[Shakespeare]” (2014, p.248, original emphasis). Nevertheless, if this 
survivance means that enunciation cannot be fully obliterated, 
Shakespeare’s authorial voice is still, as Bakhtin would have it, “impossible to 
recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve” (1981, p.428). In Calbi’s claim 
that “[i]f it is a ‘foreign Shakespeare,’ therefore, it is ‘foreign’ more than once, 
inscribing a movement across and in-between, a rhyzomatic movement that 
frustrates – and irremediably defers – points of arrival or destination” (2014, 
p.241), the foregrounded centrality that marks Shakespearean enunciation 
as discours is dissipated. 
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The Bakhtinian critic might suggest that Benveniste’s discours is an 
unsatisfactory category, given Leitch’s claim that “the most exciting prospect 
offered by contemporary adaptation studies is not that they offer us a new 
way of understanding all films or all novels, but rather all texts as intertexts, 
all reading as rereading, all writing as rewriting” (2005, p.239), and that the 
displacement of textual origin is not inherently conservative. However, 
Cesare deve morire demonstrates adaptation’s tendency to replace 
foregrounded discours with several forms of conservative histoire, and for 
this replacement to include Bakhtinian elements. Academic interpretation, 
moreover, completes this hermeneutic circle, linking the Bakhtinian 
reaccentuations of dialect and of relevance. For Calbi, the imprisoned actors 
“explore the extent to which their real-life experiences of violence, ambition, 
and betrayal interface with the life and vicissitudes of the Shakespearean 
characters” (2014, p.236). In relation to the same scene, that of Antony’s 
funeral oration, in which Belsey located a fainomaic manipulation of 
Shakespearean language that I have characterised as the shift from discours 
to histoire, Calbi discusses another manipulation of the foregrounded 
Shakespearean language which destabilises that foregrounding: 
 
the translation of ‘honourable men’ as ‘uomini d’onore’ (in 
both Italian and dialect), an expression invariably used to 
refer to members of the mafia, and its ironic reiteration 
throughout the scene, are amongst the most emblematic 
examples of the extent to which notions of Roman honour 
resonate with the codes of honour of organised crime 
associations. 
(Calbi 2014, p.242, original emphasis) 
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Shakespearean themes are here translated into a form of relevance that is 
both dialogic and diegetic, linking the reaccentuation of the Shakespearean 
language with characters experiencing these themes personally, as well as 
in terms of their acting out a foregrounded piece of artifice. 
 
This diegetisation of the actors’ dialogic translations of language breaks 
down the potentially alienating distinction between discours and histoire as 
the cast ‘seamlessly’ experience that which loses its foregrounded artificial 
nature. Calbi claims that “the actors interpret Shakespearean roles but also 
play themselves, often stepping out of these roles, in a quasi-Brechtian 
fashion, to offer comments on the Shakespearean text” (2014, p.235). His 
analyses of the scenes in which this happens, though, are less suggestive of 
Brechtian alienation than of conservative diegetisation: 
 
Salvatore Striano [rehearsing his role as Brutus] stops acting 
as soon as he delivers the lines: ‘O that I then could strip out 
the spirit of the tyrant and not tear open his chest!’ (see the 
original’s ‘O that we could then come by Caesar’s spirit/And 
not dismember Caesar!’ 2.1.168-69), because they remind 
him of the words spoken by a friend – ‘they were different but 
the same,’ as he puts it – as the latter was about to kill a 
snitch (infame) on behalf of a local camorra boss. 
   (Calbi 2014, p.244, original emphasis) 
 
Not only is Striano’s/Brutus’ interpolation here preceded by another 
Bakhtinian reaccentuation of the foregrounded Shakespearean enunciation, 
but Striano’s response to this artifice is presented as ‘real’, and is delivered 
ex tempore, seamlessly, as opposed to enunciatively, that is as clearly 
distinguished from the rehearsing lines which the actors are still reading from 
189 
 
sheets of paper at this point. The translations in dialect and relevance 
seamlessly overlay the discours with a form of histoire that is both dialogic 
and diegetic. 
 
Bakhtinian adaptation45 and Bakhtinian academic interpretation are both 
therefore part of the process of verbal translations from discours into histoire. 
But Bakhtinian adaptation also contains elements of fainomaic translation. 
Bakhtinian academic interpretation cannot locate these within a 
Benvenistene context. It is the academic legitimation of these elements 
within a Bakhtinian context, analogous with Belsey’s legitimation within a 
Barthesian context, that is most instructive in terms of how adaptation 
transforms discours into histoire. In terms of the overriding argument here, it 
is this manipulation of discours into histoire which again demonstrates how 
adaptation produces an additional layer of anamorphic enunciation which 
can facilitate the thesis’ investigation into the diachronic impact of socio-
cultural determinants on filmic writing formations. 
 
This Bakhtinian context disavows the fainomaic translation into a dialogic or 
diegetic (in terms of relevance) translation. In terms of the latter this means 
that Calbi puts the visual metaphors for foregrounded Shakespearean 
themes into the context of relevance to the diegetic actor/prisoner, as with 
this interpretation of Striano/Brutus giving his understanding of the playtext’s 
                                                          
45 Although the Taviani brothers might not couch their adaptation in as explicitly 
theoretical terms as Calbi’s analysis thereof, they do include scenes in which their 
stand-in, the play-within-the-film’s director, encourages the prisoners to use their 
own dialects as well as their own experiences. 
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relevance a physical manifestation: “We then see him sweeping the floor 
while continuing to recite Shakespeare, with words embodying a crescendo 
of aggressivity: it is almost as if the menial task he is forced to execute as 
Striano-the-convict inexorably fed into Brutus’s desire for freedom” (2014, 
pp.241-2, original emphasis). Again, the dialogic element of both the scene 
and the interpretation is apparent here in Calbi’s recourse to Shakespeare’s 
recitation, but the accompanying fainomaic translation is understood as 
relevance between Shakespeare and the prisoners rather than a seamless 
concealment of enunciation. 
 
The film’s fainomaic link between mise-en-scène, character, dialect and 
dialogics is most clearly articulated, and most extensively disavowed, in a 
scene in which the camera tracks across the prison in long shot, before 
dissolving into a close-up of Caesar, and Calbi’s analysis thereof. Calbi 
closely links this scene’s dialogic nature, and its relevance, to both the 
playtext and its relevance to the actors/prisoners: “One of the ‘states unborn’ 
(or ‘kingdoms’) is Rebibbia prison itself, which is in many ways a ‘monstrous 
state’ (1.3.71)” (2014, p.240). He notes the camera’s visual work, but links it 
with metamorphoses of language and experience, explaining how the 
longshot pan across the prison is accompanied by the sounds, but not the 
sights, of prisoners’ private melancholy thoughts regarding their predicament: 
 
Like the ‘watch’ mentioned by Calphurnia, they see ‘horrid 
sights’ (2.2.16). One could go as far as to argue that, in the 
film, the ‘ghosts’ that ‘shriek and squeal about the streets’ 
(24) – in fact, most of the ‘prodigies’ and ‘portentous things’ 
(1.3.28,31) of Shakespeare’s play – metamorphose into the 
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haunting ‘specters’ of past and present traumatic 
experiences. And, perhaps, the camera itself is such a 
‘watch,’ taking upon itself the ethical task of recording the 
traumas triggered by the ‘monstrous state’ (71) of the prison, 
and doing so in a dream-like, almost nightmarish manner.  
(Calbi 2014 p.246) 
 
For Calbi, the camera’s task here is ethical rather than grammatical, 
objectively recording the Bakhtinian bundling of language and relevance. It is 
not entirely clear here, either, whether the camera’s ‘watch’ refers to this 
scene in particular, or to its role in the adaptation more generally, since the 
traumatic experiences that Calbi mentions extend beyond this scene. Even if 
he means to explicitly link the camerawork with the scene’s articulation of the 
prisoners’/actors’ relevance to the perceived spirit of the playtext, the 
fainomaic translation is understood as a facilitator of this bundling, rather 
than, within the Benvenistene context, as a way to express meaning without 
revealing that meaning’s foregrounded construction. 
 
When the slow pan across the prison gradually dissolves into a low angle 
shot of a purposeful Caesar (Giovanni Arcuri) en route to the Senate and to 
his death, Calbi notes the connection between these two images and the 
conflation of Shakespearean themes and the prisoners’ experiences: “for a 
few seconds, a close-up of a self-satisfied Caesar is superimposed upon the 
image of the prison building, which cogently furthers the identification of 
‘Caesar’ with a ‘monstrous’ prison system. It is a close-up that symbolically 
makes him into a target of grievances to be urgently redressed: Caesar – 
indeed – must die” (2014, p.246). The translation of foregrounded discours, 
in which Shakespeare’s words would make this link clear, as indeed Calbi 
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does in his explanation, is replaced, in the film, with seamless histoire in 
which images that are not foregrounded within the context of Shakespeare’s 
enunciated words, and indeed are separated out from and juxtaposed with 
those enunciated words, unfold. The Bakhtinian context means that the 
fainomaic translation of discours into histoire is interpreted as a manipulation 
of dialogics and relevance, rather than as a suppression of the adaptation’s 
foregrounded artifice. 
 
4.3.2 Shifting context(s) and changing the Shakespearean language 
 
Adaptations that shift context(s) more frequently change the Shakespearean 
language entirely. Their relationships to Shakespearean sources are 
therefore necessarily less clear, but they demonstrate forms of suture similar 
to those of more ‘traditional’ adaptations. Indeed, linking the elision of 
Shakespearean language with shifts to contemporary settings, mise-en-
scène, cinematography, editing and music seems to downplay the 
foregrounding of Shakespearean enunciation entirely. One strand of 
academic legitimation deems such állagmic adaptations beyond the remit of 
serious analysis, James M. Welsh arguing, for example, that “[d]erivative 
adaptations that ignore Shakespeare’s language while exploiting his plots 
and characters should be considered misguided and corrupt” (2007, p.105). 
 
Yet, more often, these adaptations are located within contexts that downplay 
Shakespearean enunciation with elements of unconscious suture. David 
Gritten, for example, refers to Richard Loncraine not mentioning the “S-word” 
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during his filming of Richard III: “‘I’m encouraging everyone working on this 
film not to think of it as Shakespeare’ says director Richard Loncraine. ‘It’s a 
terrific story and who wrote it is irrelevant’” (in Boose and Burt 1997, p.11). 
Lynda E. Boose and Richard Burt claim, of 1990s adaptations, that “the fact 
that Shakespeare is the author seems to be becoming not only increasingly 
beside the point but even a marketing liability” (1997, p.11). 
 
In part, replacing Shakespearean with contemporary dialogue erases the 
potential grammatical disruption of the former. Instead of the alienating 
juxtaposition of archaic language with contemporary settings, mise-en-scène, 
cinematography, editing and music marked as so important by Luhrmann 
(2011), Anderegg (2003, p.60) and Howlett (2002, p.168), all elements of the 
adaptation fit within conventionalised generic expectations. 
 
However, although the enunciated presence of Shakespeare in these films is 
sublimated, and indeed is entirely unnecessary, it is something that 
repeatedly resurfaces. The names of characters and locations are frequently 
either taken directly from the adapted playtexts or slightly anglicised. She’s 
the Man (Andy Fickman 2006), for example, a loose teen adaptation46 of 
Twelfth Night, features many of these sublimated references. The Isle of 
Illyria is shifted to Illyria High School, whose principal soccer rival is named 
Cornwall, after one of the play’s characters (Fig.4.24). Twelfth Night’s 
                                                          
46 There is a relatively sizeable body of academic writing on Shakespearean films in 
teen settings. See, for example, Balizet (2004); Boose and Burt 1997; Burt (1998, 
2002); Clement (2008); French (2006); Osborne (2008); Pittman (2008). 
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subtitle, What you Will, becomes Illyria’s school play (Fig.4.25). These 
Shakespearean references, furthermore, are enunciated in written form, 
demonstrating again the close link between suture and written 
Shakespearean enunciation, discussed, in relation to Luhrmann’s William 
Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet, in 4.2.7. 
 
 
Fig.4.24 
 
 
Fig.4.25 
 
Academic legitimation again acts to contain these Shakespearean 
resurfacings. Boose and Burt explain these enunciative traces thus: 
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In the wake of the present displacements of book and literary 
culture by film and video culture and the age of mechanical 
reproduction by the age of electronic reproduction, the 
traditional literary field itself has already, to some extent, been 
displaced as an object of enquiry by cultural studies. [This form 
of sublimated enunciation] enacts this displacement, invoking 
the high status literary text only to dismiss it in favor of the 
actor’s performance. 
(Boose and Burt 1997, p.10) 
 
L. Monique Pittman locates these Shakespearean traces in She’s the Man 
within a similar cultural context: “This tissue of allusions to Shakespeare and 
England imagine the playwright as a pastiche of cultural references and 
construct a subjectivity for the poet akin to postmodern understandings of the 
self as a series of intersecting and contradictory discourses” (2008, p.133). 
 
If this “tissue of allusions” were limited to postmodern adaptations then this 
argument might be persuasive. There are examples, though, of much earlier 
loose Shakespearean adaptations using contemporary dialogue and 
settings47 that also seem compelled to invoke “the high status literary text 
only to dismiss it” (Boose and Burt 1997, p.10). An Honourable Murder 
(Godfrey Grayson 1960), for example, one such adaptation of Julius Caesar 
set in the contemporary business world, precedes “postmodern 
understandings of the self as a series of intersecting and contradictory 
discourses” (Pittman 2008, p.133), and also contains both a “tissue of 
allusions” not dissimilar to those in She’s the Man, and a reflexive fascination 
with the textual origins of reworked source material much like that which I 
                                                          
47 These include, for example, A Double Life (George Cukor 1947), Kiss Me Kate 
(George Sidney 1953), Joe MacBeth (Ken Hughes 1955), and An Honourable 
Murder (Godfrey Grayson 1960). 
196 
 
discussed in relation to Luhrmann’s William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet in 
4.2.7. 
The film opens, after two title screens of the principal actors and title, with a 
written and textually foregrounded example of Shakespeare’s enunciation 
from the source play out of which the film is loosely adapted, and from which 
the latter’s title is also derived (Fig.4.26). Characters’ names are either taken 
directly from the playtext, or slightly anglicised, so there is a Brutus (Norman 
Wooland), a Cassius (Douglas Wilmer) and a Julian, rather than Julius, 
Caesar (John Longden). Moments of direct Shakespearean dialogue are 
incorporated so that, for example, Julian Caesar describes Cassius as 
having a “lean and hungry look” (1.2.195), and wishes he were instead 
surrounded by the “fat and sleek-headed” (1.2.193-4). In a similar way to 
how She’s the Man re-presented Shakespeare’s locations as rival schools, 
An Honourable Murder incorporates Shakespearean elements into the 
names of the rival companies ‘Pompey Shipping Line’ and ‘Imperial 
Petroleum Company’, the latter of which is rendered into visualized form as a 
small statue of a Roman imperial eagle on Cassius’ desk (Fig.4.27). The 
visual theme of statues representing Shakespearean enunciation also 
appears in a bust of Caesar which Antony (Philip Saville) and Caesar’s 
secretary (Elizabeth Saunders) stand beside whilst ruminating on the 
dangers to the statue’s personification (Fig.4.28). This moment is not 
dissimilar to Cassius’ juxtaposition, whilst standing beneath Caesar’s statue 
in Mankiewicz’s adaptation, discussed above in 4.2.3, of how Caesar ‘doth 
bestride the narrow world/ Like a colossus, and we petty men/ Walk under 
his huge legs’ (1.2.133-5) with the real man’s weaknesses and faults 
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(1.2.101-129) (Fig.4.7). Indeed, An Honourable Murder’s use of statues here 
is a demonstration of the fainomaic presentation of Shakespearean 
enunciation such as that discussed in relation to Mankiewicz’s adaptation in 
4.2.3, and potentially also relates to visualised forms of thematising 
foreknowledge and film’s deceptive ontology that is outlined below, in section 
4.4. 
 
 
Fig.4.26 
 
 
Fig.4.27 
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Fig.4.28 
 
The diachronic continuity between the Shakespearean “tissue of allusions” 
(Pittman 2008, p.133) and the foregrounding of Shakespeare’s written 
enunciations within An Honourable Murder, She’s the Man and William 
Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet suggest the operations of unconscious 
masochistic suture, rather than “postmodern understandings of the self as a 
series of intersecting and contradictory discourses” (Pittman 2008, p.133). 
Replacing Shakespearean with contemporary dialogue, within this form of 
állagmic adaptation, does not remove the conservative reflexivity of 
foregrounding the film’s constructed nature via barely repressed 
Shakespearean enunciation. This suggests that there is something inherent 
in this form of állagmic translation. Even though the overt signifiers of 
Shakespearean enunciation are replaced with signifiers of seamless histoire-
like verisimilitude, elements of Shakespearean discours repeatedly and 
masochistically resurface. 
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The fetishistic nature of these resurfacings, and of the written fainomisation 
of Shakespearean enunciation, is demonstrated in another loose 
contemporary adaptation, this time of Richard III, set amongst the Hispanic 
street gangs of California; The Street King (2002). The names of characters 
are here transformed, in this case into a Hispanic form; Richard himself is 
Rico (Jon Seda), King Edward is Eduardo (Timothy Paul Perez), Lady Anne 
is Anita (Tonantzín Carmelo), and her dead husband, slain once again by 
Richard/Rico is transformed from Edward into Alejandro (Adam Rodriguez), 
to distinguish him the film’s other Edward/Eduardo. After Rico woos and wins 
Anita he rips open her shirt and descends, pausing to lick and kiss the 
written enunciation, in tattoo form above the belly button, of Anita’s former 
lover whom he had earlier killed (Fig.4.29). This is an adaptation that once 
again renders its Shakespearean origins into visualised and bastardised 
form, the icon of the Bard contemporised into graffiti (Fig.4.30). The 
sexualisation of Shakespeare’s written traces, in the close-up of Rico’s 
abdominal kiss, demonstrates how adaptation not only exploits 
Shakespearean origins for narrative and thematic purposes, but does so 
masochistically. Anita’s acquiescence to Rico’s advances could certainly be 
seen as masochistic, whilst Rico’s kiss of the tattoo borders on an 
emasculating, homosexual fellatio of the usurped dead rival. It is not enough 
that Rico woos and wins Anita as the textual Richard does, he must fetishize 
both what he appropriates from the source text, and the written nature of that 
text. 
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Fig.4.29 
 
 
Fig.4.30 
 
4.3.3 Shifting gender from boy actors 
 
A final element of állagmic translation concerns shifting from boy actors 
taking female roles, as they did on the Renaissance stage, to women actors 
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playing these female roles. Having women playing female roles fits in with 
contemporary conceptions of both gender economics and verisimilitude. As 
such, boy actors do not generally threaten realist grammar because they are 
not represented. But more limited examples of presenting boy actors in 
female roles might offer a further level of disruption beyond the grammatical. 
Feminist understandings of the Renaissance stage’s structural transvestism 
stress the potential for a metadramatic disruption of patriarchal assumptions. 
Karen Newman, for example, argues that Kate’s submission in The Taming 
of the Shrew, via the “indeterminateness of the actor’s sexuality, of the 
woman/man’s body [and] the supplementarity of its titillating homoerotic play 
[...] foregrounds its artifice and therefore subverts the play’s patriarchal 
master narrative by exposing it as neither natural nor divinely ordained, but 
culturally constructed” (1987, p.145). For Belsey this means that boy actors 
could undermine patriarchy, “calling it into question by indicating that it is 
possible, at least in fiction, to speak from a position which is not that of a full, 
unified, gendered subject” (1985, p.180). In this sense, Renaissance boy 
actors have been understood as metadramatic and, given academic 
legitimation’s focus on how “[i]n adapting Shakespeare to the screen, the 
filmmaker must [...] respond to the plays’ metatheatricality by either rejecting 
alienating devices or finding a cinematic counterpart to the theatre’s self-
reflexivity” (Rasmus 2001, p.147), it is possible to chart reflexive responses 
to this specific form of metatheatricality. 
 
This taxonomy has already addressed adaptations that focus on narrative 
examples of transvestitism, such as She’s the Man, loosely adapted from 
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Twelfth Night, which feature diegetic characters diegetically crossdressing. 
This diegetic nature to their crossdressing both prevents grammatical 
disruption and severely limits the kind of critique of monolithic gender 
positions discussed by Newman and Belsey. It also facilitates a rigid and 
conservative policing of gender roles rather than exposing them “as neither 
natural nor divinely ordained, but culturally constructed” (Newman 1987, 
p.145). For Jennifer Clement, “although She’s the Man employs the cross-
dressing plot of Twelfth Night, it carefully reinforces ‘conventional 
expectations’ about gender and sexuality by constantly reminding us that 
Viola is in fact female, through flaws in her performance of masculinity and 
through scenes in which she is dressed as a properly feminine girl” (2008, 
p.9, my pagination). Clement argues that these distinctions are employed to 
locate Viola’s crossdressing within a conservative approach to feminism as 
an angry and dysfunctional character flaw or misguided adolescent phase to 
be overcome: “the principles and victories of second-wave feminism are 
portrayed as irrelevant to the current generation of girls, and third-wave 
feminism is reduced to being able to play with the boys while also remaining 
attractively girlish enough to guarantee romantic male attention” (2008, p.12, 
my pagination). 
 
More potentially anti-realist are those few examples that present boy actors 
playing female stage roles within the narrative. The potential disruption is 
contained, though, by locating this transvestism within the specific context of 
the Renaissance stage, against which the overall seamlessness of the 
cinema is juxtaposed. Olivier’s Henry V (1944) opens and ends with a 
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presentation of the Renaissance stage which surrounds and contrasts with 
the majority of the seamless film. The conclusion of this process features a 
cut from the diegetic, cinematic world that has been the bulk of the 
adaptation, back to the presentation of the Renaissance stage on which it 
began. The subject of this cut is Henry (Laurence Olivier) and Katherine 
(Renee Asherson), the French princess whom the King has just wooed, and 
the juxtaposition of the semiotic contexts from cinematic to theatrical means 
that Katherine shifts from being a woman to being a boy (George Cole) 
dressed as, and acting as, a woman. The completely (or perhaps double-) 
diegetic couple are only shown together from behind, as they walk towards 
an altar to be married (Fig.4.31). When they turn they are shown individually 
in close-ups (Figs.4.32 and 4.33). The cut from the doubly-female Katherine 
is to a shot of the couple with a boy now acting Katherine’s role (Fig.4.34) 
and, as is revealed as the camera zooms out, upon an Elizabethan stage 
with a curtain behind which the Chorus conceals the acting couple (Fig.4.35). 
To further enmesh these levels of diegesis, applause begins with the close-
up of Henry and continues to the end – this is the applause of both the 
wedding congregation and the Elizabethan theatre’s audience. Such a shift 
has the potential towards a homoerotic critique of monolithic gender 
positions such as is discussed by Newman (1987) and Belsey (1985). Both 
the containing mechanisms of academic legitimation and filmmaking practice 
mean, though, that the threat to cinematic grammar is minimised. 
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Fig.4.31 
 
 
Fig.4.32 
 
205 
 
 
Fig.4.33 
 
 
Fig.4.34 
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Fig.4.35 
 
In terms of academic legitimation, the shift can be located within canonical 
contexts. Hatchuel argues, for example, that 
 
Olivier’s filmic interpretation […] points in two directions, 
preserving the ambivalence present in the original text. […] 
While Henry is still played by Olivier, Katherine is now played 
by a boy actor, thus following the Elizabethan convention. By 
disclosing the conditions of performance, Olivier nostalgically 
calls attention to Shakespeare’s original staging at the Globe, 
while constructing the wooing scene as play-acting in every 
sense. Henry would only be a performer in a play about 
performance. 
   (Hatchuel 2004, p.173, my emphasis) 
 
This analysis focuses on the ambivalence of the ‘original’ text, nostalgia for 
Elizabethan convention, and the way in which the cut metacinematically 
reimagines a theme already present within the play’s perceived meaning. Yet 
these considerations demonstrate the close link between the twin containing 
agents of academic legitimation and állagmic translation. In terms of the 
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latter it is clear that Hatchuel’s analysis, although it does not locate this cut 
within the context of suture, is right to focus on fidelity contexts in the sense 
that these seem to be elements of Olivier’s conservatively reflexive állagma. 
Foregrounding artifice is safe if it done within the confines of the theatrical. 
Instead of contaminating the cinematic, theatrical artificiality might enhance 
filmic histoire through juxtaposition. Heath’s understanding of the pleasure-
giving masochistic relationship between presenting and containing 
grammatical inconsistency (1985, p.514) can apply to this juxtaposition of 
theatrical transvestism and cinematic heteronormativity, and explains why 
the unnecessarily non-verisimilar resurfaces as a “reflexive fascination in 
films” (Heath 1985, p.514). 
 
4.4 The drama of foreknowledge: ‘[T]he end is known’ (Julius Caesar 
5.1.126) 
 
Sections 4.2.8 and 4.3 have established that fainomaic translation is inherent 
and even ontological to realist adaptation, whereas állagmic translation is 
relatively optional. This section focuses on an element of adaptation that falls 
somewhere between these two poles. There is, furthermore, a degree of 
variance within the ways in which the foreknown nature of Shakespearean 
narratives, characters, themes and dialogue is foregrounded. Állagmic 
adaptations that suppress traces of Shakespearean enunciation and are 
marketed at teen audiences do not necessarily carry overt traces of 
foreknowledge. Adaptations that contain clearer signifiers of Shakespearean 
enunciation more necessarily negotiate the fact that (some) audiences might 
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have (some) foreknowledge of the films’ narratives, characters, themes and 
dialogue. 
 
As with the two forms of translation outlined above, foreknowledge works 
within the mechanisms of masochistic suture. The principle of Benveniste’s 
histoire (Metz 1985, p.544) is that film passes itself off as a seamless un-
authored unfolding which obfuscates its constructed nature. As with my 
account of fainomaic translation outlined in section 4.2, this seamless histoire 
is potentially foregrounded as partial, constructed discours because the films’ 
narratives, characters, themes and dialogue may already be known to 
audiences. The relationship between these forms of histoire and discours, in 
terms of foreknowledge, is similar to their relationship in terms of fainomaic 
translation in two key ways. Firstly, suture is in operation when the discours 
is first presented, and subsequently contained into histoire. Just as Heath 
identified the disruption and subsequent containment of realist grammar as 
something inscribed into narrative as the “drama of vision” (Heath 1985, 
p.514), so too the masochistic exploitation and thematisation of what is 
already known about Shakespearean texts can be understood as the drama 
of foreknowledge. Secondly, academic legitimation locates this containment 
within the context of fidelity analysis. 
 
Many of the examples discussed above demonstrate the link between 
fainomaic translation and suturing foreknowledge. Section 4.2.3 discussed 
Wilson’s analysis of Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar’s portrayal of statues (2000, 
pp.149-52). Wilson claims that the film “relies heavily on busts and statues to 
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establish a compelling mise-en-scène and underscore thematic elements” 
(2000, p.149). He links this mise-en-scène with perceived Shakespearean 
meaning when he argues that “Mankiewicz makes us believe that the busts 
and statues are omens just as significant as lions or ‘men in fire’ walking the 
Roman streets” (2000, p.150). This fainomaic translation of textual imagery 
foregrounds Shakespearean enunciation. 
 
Fainomaic translation requires a degree of foreknowledge in terms of 
audiences knowing that they are watching foregrounded authored discours 
rather than seamless un-authored histoire, so even if audiences are 
unfamiliar with the details of the adaptations’ plots, they are still aware on 
some level that they are watching the cultural signifier ‘Shakespeare’. But 
foreknowledge of the way in which narrative will develop is somewhat 
different, and is the focus of this section. It is not only Shakespeare’s 
dialogue that is rendered into visual form. The outcome of that which unfolds 
before audiences is already (potentially) somewhat foreknown. The way in 
which adaptation thematises the inherently suturing nature of foregrounded 
authorial enunciation, and the role of academic criticism in perpetuating this 
relationship, is demonstrated in the way in which Wilson connects 
Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar’s presentation of statues with foreknowledge. 
This foreknowledge allegorises both the playtext’s use of omens and, 
crucially, adaptation’s inherent presentation of authorial enunciation and 
foreknowledge. Wilson only discusses the former. Focusing on the 
competing interpretations of Calphurnia’s dream about Caesar’s bleeding 
statue, he writes that “[i]n a play that tests men’s judgment and their ability to 
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decipher and use omens and signs to their best advantage, marble statues 
deliver crucial ‘speeches’ to those who will listen. Caesar proves deaf to this 
warning” (2000, p.150). The way in which statues’ prophesies thematise the 
inherent foreknowledge of presenting authorial enunciation is entirely elided. 
Instead, within the tradition of fidelity criticism, the focus on the film’s 
allegorisation of a playtextual theme disavows the film’s unconscious 
manipulation and ideological thematisation of a grammatical/theoretical 
issue. 
 
Famous foreknown Shakespearean quotations, when delivered within an 
állagmic adaptation that more generally uses contemporary dialogue, can 
have a number of possible effects. Firstly, they can cause something of an 
alienation effect, such as that discussed by Baz Luhrmann in his 
juxtaposition of contemporary mise-en-scène with Shakespearean verse 
(see 4.2.2). Secondly, they can act as a complex mediation on different 
layers of articulation (such as in relation to My Own Private Idaho, discussed 
in 4.3.1). Thirdly, they can temporarily foreground the constructed nature of 
that which otherwise passes itself off as seamless un-authored histoire, such 
as appears in An Honourable Murder (see 4.3.2). 
 
The close links between fainomaic translation and suturing foreknowledge 
are demonstrated in the opening scene of Zeffirelli’s Romeo and Juliet. As 
has already been established, this scene unconsciously links the camera’s 
anatomisation of male bodies and the cutting processes of continuity editing. 
Peter Donaldson’s analysis of this scene links the camera’s anatomisation 
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with the ensuing street fights. The temporal link between these elements, 
and the foreknowledge inherent in this link, is demonstrated in Donaldson’s 
description of how “[t]he male body is ‘anatomized’ here, […] zooms show us 
parts of bodies, not only displaying them to the gaze but also, disquietingly, 
prefiguring the danger and terror of the street fights that quickly follow. […] 
The spectator cannot see exactly what is occurring; bodies appear in pieces 
even as the swords of the youths threaten to cut them in pieces” (1990, 
p.154, my emphasis). The director thematises the audience’s foreknowledge 
of how the narrative will unfold within the camerawork and editing, while the 
academic critic locates this manipulation within a canonical context: “A 
central feature of the sex-gender system in place in Shakespeare’s text is the 
obsessive verbal equation of erect penis and sword” (Donaldson 1990, 
p.153); “The motif of the body in pieces as it is used in the opening scenes of 
[the film] draws attention to the phallic character of the feud” (1990, p.154). 
 
The directorial motivation of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation is 
difficult to discern within scenes such as these, but an interview with Baz 
Luhrmann (2011) demonstrates some compelling evidence about the 
grammatical and ideological motivations of the manipulation of 
foreknowledge. His discussion of William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet 
(1996), an adaptation from another playtext in which foreknowledge is 
explicitly foregrounded (Prologue 1-14), may illustrate how unconscious 
directorial motivation exploits the suturing potential of foregrounded authorial 
enunciation. 
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Luhrmann establishes the foreknowledge principle of Shakespearean 
enunciation, and the need for such enunciation to be negotiated so that 
cinematic pleasure is not threatened, and indeed, can be heightened: 
 
The audience know this is gonna happen. How can it happen in 
a way in which their delicious expectation and enjoyment of ‘it’s 
gonna happen’ can be suspended so that when it happens it’s a 
surprise that they knew was gonna happen? Romeo and Juliet 
opens with something like ‘Doth with their death bury their 
parent’s strife’. You are told right up front that the lovers, or a 
lover, is going to die […], you know where it’s going to conclude.  
       (Luhrmann 2011) 
 
This quote suggests, unconsciously, the potential for the significance of the 
suturing relationship between subversion and containment in terms 
reminiscent of Heath’s account of how “film is the constant process of a 
phasing-in of vision, the pleasure of that process” (1985, p.514). Luhrmann 
does not discuss the theoretical context of how foregrounded narrative 
discours threatens cinema’s reality-effect, but he does seem to recognise 
that for an audience to experience cinematic pleasure he needs to employ a 
technique “in which their delicious expectation and enjoyment of ‘it’s gonna 
happen’ can be suspended so that when it happens it’s a surprise that they 
knew was gonna happen” (2011). Crucially, his intentions are not to exploit 
foreknowledge for any subversive, anti-grammatical purpose, but to create 
“delicious expectation and enjoyment”. Spectators can thereby be 
masochistically sutured into an ideological position of passivity by the 
presentation and subsequent disavowal of grammatical transgression which 
is inherent in foregrounding authorial enunciation. 
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The close link between thematising foreknowledge and fainomaic translation 
is demonstrated in Luhrmann’s handling of the prophetic prologue. That 
which tells the audience how the narrative will unfold is narrated twice over, 
and twice rendered into written form (Fig.4.36 and Fig.4.37). The discours-
like nature of Shakespearean enunciation operates here on the levels of both 
fainomai (literally enunciating the constructed nature of that which appears) 
and foreknowledge, conflating two elements of potentially alienating 
grammatical disruption for the purposes of audience pleasure. The climatic 
conclusion to this opening, discussed in section 4.2.7, not only builds 
momentum through scenes of violence and rising choral music, but also 
through the way in which the rapid montage includes scenes from the play’s 
and film’s inevitable ending, showing the lovers’ families mourning at the 
death scene (Fig.4.38) and Romeo’s point-of-view shot of the cathedral 
interior where Juliet lies (Fig.4.39). Luhrmann’s “delicious expectation and 
enjoyment of ‘it’s gonna happen’” (2011) is further emphasised through 
images suggesting an orgasmic context to the montage’s climax. Exploding 
fireworks (Fig.4.40) and an open-mouthed, eyes-closed-in-ecstasy 
transcendent choirboy (Fig.4.41), who is accompanied by an odd moaning 
on the soundtrack, synthesise with the accelerating scenes of violence and 
foreknowledge. Romeo’s view of the cathedral interior (Fig.4.39), 
furthermore, is partial in both senses of the word, as the lead only begins to 
open the door, not yet revealing the horror awaiting within, teasing towards 
how Luhrmann’s “delicious expectation and enjoyment of ‘it’s gonna happen’ 
can be suspended so that when it happens it’s a surprise that they knew was 
gonna happen” (2011). 
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Fig.4.36 
 
 
Fig.4.37 
 
 
Fig.4.38 
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Fig.4.39 
 
 
Fig.4.40 
 
 
Fig.4.41 
 
Luhrmann’s delicious pleasures, here, combine a number of examples of 
suture. Heath’s “drama of vision” (1985, p.514) is present in the rapid cutting. 
Transcendent eroticism is present in the accelerating, climactic pacing of this 
cutting, and in elements of its subject matter. The drama of authorship is 
present in the fainomaic presentation of Shakespearean enunciation, and in 
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a heightened state when this enunciation is in written form. And finally, the 
linking of these elements with the presented and foregrounded inevitability of 
that which will unfold represents the drama of foreknowledge. The 
intersection of these masochistic dramas demonstrates the extent to which 
adaptation facilitates the re-inscription of realist cinema’s ideological 
processes, providing additional layers of suture which are available elements 
of a poststructuralist writing formation, and which are understood, contained 
and completed within legitimating fidelity contexts. 
 
The foreknowledge and repetition inherent in Shakespearean adaptation is 
also a manipulation of a more fundamental disavowal of film’s own 
constructed-ness; the impression of a moving image caused by the swift 
succession of single frames. In asking how suspense can be generated in 
repeat viewings, or in films based on famous real-life events, David Bordwell 
borrows ideas from cognitive psychology. He applies Richard Gerrig’s notion 
of ‘anomalous suspense’ and Jerry Fodor’s concept of that which is 
‘cognitively impenetrable’ to argue that, because the human mind evolved to 
cope with an unpredictable real world, “lower-level perceptual activities are 
modular” (2007, p.3, my pagination, original emphasis), with a firewall that 
prevents us from responding without suspense even though we have a 
memory about what we’re seeing. Although Bordwell does not relate these 
ideas to adaptation, the way in which he defines camerawork and ominous 
music as “very gross cues to our perceptual uptake” (2007, p.4, my 
pagination) has affinities with the kind of seamless manipulations involved in 
Shakespearean adaptation. But what potentially links these ideas with a 
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suturing thematisation of film’s constructed nature (although the cognitivist 
Bordwell would not agree with this himself) is the link drawn between the 
brain’s modular response to repeated suspense and film’s ontology: “As 
students of cinema, we’re familiar with the fact that vision can be cognitively 
impenetrable. We know that movies consist of single frames, but we can’t 
see them in projection; we see a moving image” (Bordwell 2007, p.4, my 
pagination). As such, adaptation not only allegorises the disavowal of 
authorial enunciation, but also the disavowal of cinema’s most basic and 
most ontological visual processes. 
 
Depictions of statues, discussed above in sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.2, can 
actually be a narrativisation of both cinema’s cognitive impenetrability and of 
Shakespearean foreknowledge, particularly in a loose adaptation such as 
Gnomeo and Juliet (Kelly Asbury 2011) which thematises both the disruption 
of foreknown narratives and the mobility of that which should be immobile. 
Drawing inspiration from the Toy Story franchise (Toy Story, John Lasseter 
1995; Toy Story 2, John Lasseter, Ash Brannon and Lee Unkrich 1999; Toy 
Story 3, Lee Unkrich 2010), this animated adaptation shifts from Verona to 
two rival contemporary suburban gardens where the protagonists are garden 
gnomes and other related anthropomorphic objects. As with Toy Story the 
objects are actually ‘alive’, although they act inanimate when humans are 
around. All of these films reflexively manipulate this idea of animation. Just 
as individual still images are animated, so too the supposedly inanimate 
toys/objects become animated. As Bordwell has noted (2007, p.4, my 
pagination), the illusionism of moving images is ontological to all film, but live 
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action film stages moving pro-filmic events that are turned into still images 
which are then given the impression of movement via projection. Animation 
dispenses with the moving pro-filmic, and the artifice of the process is 
inscribed into the title of the medium/genre. Gnomeo and Juliet and the Toy 
Story series reflexively exploit this element of animation’s ontology when 
they animate a non-animate diegetic object along with a series of still 
images. These diegetic objects are therefore doubly animated.  
 
Combining these premises with a foreknown Shakespearean narrative 
suggests something interesting about the relationships between anomalous 
suspense and the cognitive impenetrability of single frames appearing as a 
moving image. Cinema can make both these single frames and the 
inanimate gnomes appear to move. When the audience (or at least some 
members of the audience) know how the narrative will unfold then Bordwell’s 
relationship between cinema’s cognitive impenetrability and suspense at 
something audiences know will happen is tightly integrated. 
 
In a similar way to how Heath understood that “the drama of vision becomes 
a constant reflexive fascination in films” (1985, p.514), this integration is 
allegorised into the realms of reflexive masochistic suture when the 
adaptation inscribes foreknowledge into its narrative. At its most basic level 
this consists of a pig statue on a weathervane animating itself (/being 
animated) to signal the return of humans to the garden inhabitants (Fig.4.42). 
At a more complex level this consists of a narrativised problematization of 
the way adaptation appropriates source plots. When Gnomeo (James 
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McAvoy) is swept away from the gardens in a mid-film fight with his Capulet-
coded rivals he is transported to a park. There he talks to a giant statue, 
introduced through a close-up of its written enunciation (Fig.4.43), of 
Shakespeare (Fig.4.44). As in the Montague- and Capulet-coded gardens, in 
the park the inanimate becomes animate. Voiced by the Shakespearean-
coded voice of Patrick Stewart, the Bard remarks that Gnomeo’s problems 
are reminiscent of one of his plays, which ends in tragedy. Gnomeo argues 
that he is sure all will work out, but a plastic flamingo from his garden 
suddenly arrives to tell him that ‘Juliet’s [Emily Blunt] in danger.’ ‘Told you 
so’, says Shakespeare, sure that his foreknowledge of this adaptation will 
come to fruition. To Gnomeo’s declaration ‘I’ve got to get back to Juliet and 
save her’, Shakespeare delivers the foreknown and discours-like riposte 
‘that’s what he said, but she was dead before he got home’. But this is a 
children’s animation, and the defiant Gnomeo expresses the seamlessness 
of cinema’s unknown histoire with a dramatic ‘we’ll see about that’. 
 
 
Fig.4.42 
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Fig.4.43 
 
 
Fig.4.44 
 
This tension between foreknown discours and unknown histoire will 
eventually be resolved, but not before an explosion in the gardens produces 
a cut to the statue of Shakespeare in the park, who looks over his shoulder 
at the distant mushroom cloud and repeats his enunciating statement, ‘told 
you so’ (Fig.4.45). Yet, as with all the mechanisms of suture explored in this 
taxonomy, discours is eventually masochistically contained into histoire. 
Gnomeo and Juliet survive and succeed in burying their parents’ strife. As 
the couple are transported towards a heart-shaped arch of hedge Gnomeo 
again expresses the pleasures of histoire’s seamless triumph over the 
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foreknown; ‘I don’t know about you, but I think this ending is much better’ 
(Fig.4.46). 
 
 
Fig.4.45 
 
 
Fig.4.46 
 
Linking these manipulations of foreknowledge with the mobility of the doubly 
immobile directly thematises not only the ways in which the foreknown nature 
of Shakespearean narrative is contained through fainomaic techniques, but 
also suggests the allegorisation of cinema’s most basic ontological 
processes. For Bordwell, Gerrig’s notion of ‘anomalous suspense’ and 
Fodor’s concept of that which is ‘cognitively impenetrable’ mean that “lower-
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level perceptual activities are modular” (2007, p.3, my pagination, original 
emphasis). Even if humans have a memory of having seen something before 
we are still physiologically hardwired to respond with feelings of suspense 
under the right conditions. The same applies to cinematic vision, which 
“consist[s] of single frames, but we can’t see them in projection; we see a 
moving image” (Bordwell 2007, p.4, my pagination). Manipulating the 
inanimateness, or otherwise, of statues echoes the visual trick of projecting 
static images, and the same visual trick applies to the way the human brain 
processes the foreknown. Gnomeo and Juliet masochistically exploits these 
two allied elements of cognitive impenetrability, pleasurably disavowing 
cinema’s most basic and most ontological visual processes. Just as Heath 
saw the suturing manipulation of grammatical disruption and continuity 
editing as the “drama of vision [which] becomes a constant reflexive 
fascination in films” (1985, p.514), so too the ideological ‘drama of 
foreknowledge’ is inscribed into narrative and visual form within adaptation. 
 
The suturing exploitation of foreknowledge can also be used to manipulate 
prior forms of diachronic adaptation or of theatrical convention. There is a 
clear link between how this works and Heath’s account of the pleasure-giving 
suturing relationship between the problematically attributed viewpoint of the 
shark in Jaws and the continuity editing that contains this prior alienation: 
The shark’s point-of-view movement “sets off a number of other series which 
knot together as figures over the film. [...] [T]he underwater shot is then used 
in the first part of the film to signify the imminence of attack. [...] Once 
systematized, it can be used to cheat: it occurs to confirm the second day-
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time beach attack, but this is only two boys with an imitation fin” (Heath 1985, 
pp.512-3, my emphasis). Adaptation may cheat in a similar way, presenting a 
conventionalised collection of images and camerawork which can then be 
refashioned in a similar, masochistic pleasure-giving manner. Furthermore, 
and in keeping with the final containing of adaptation within written discourse, 
academic legitimation disavows this potential threat to cinematic 
seamlessness in favour of fidelity analysis. Loehlin’s account of Luhrmann’s 
Romeo + Juliet’s balcony scene is an example of how these elements come 
together: 
 
The balcony scene begins with a witty parody of Zeffirelli, 
playing on the audience’s conventional expectations for the 
scene. In mid-long shot, Romeo emerges from the foliage into a 
dreamy, moonlit Renaissance courtyard; the camera angle, 
lighting and mood match Zeffirelli’s treatment of the scene 
exactly. Suddenly the courtyard is bathed in searchlights: 
Romeo has set off the security system’s motion detector, and 
he trips over the poolside furniture in a clumsy panic. Collecting 
himself, Romeo climbs a trellis toward Juliet’s balcony, where a 
shadowy form appears on the illuminated curtains. No sooner 
has Romeo intoned, ‘It is the east and Juliet is the sun!’ (II.ii.3), 
than the windows are flung open to reveal the portly middle-
aged Nurse [Miriam Margolyes]; meanwhile, Juliet walks out of 
an elevator next to the swimming pool. Romeo’s approach to 
the startled Juliet ends up tumbling both of them into the pool, 
where Romeo must hide underwater while Juliet smiles 
winningly at a bemused security guard who comes to 
investigate. 
      (Loehlin 2000, p.127) 
 
Loehlin is eloquent in expressing the comedy potential of this juxtaposition of 
expectation and a very limited kind of subversion. Academic legitimation’s 
broader context for such a juxtaposition resides in Emma French’s (2006) 
argument that this clash between high and popular culture helps construct a 
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genre which appeals to teenagers because such adaptations treat 
irreverently that which the target audiences had hitherto been taught to treat 
reverently. More specifically, Loehlin gives the juxtaposition of 
convention/subversion and reverence/irreverence a specific (anti-)canonical 
context, so that the “parodic comedy of the first part of the scene frees the 
young actors from expectations of grand and lyrical passion. Having invoked 
and discarded the traditional trappings of the famous love duet, Luhrmann 
can film an appealing scene about two wide-eyed kids in a swimming pool” 
(2000, p.128). An understanding of the pleasure-giving process of 
manipulating foreknown narratives and conventions “knot[ted]  together as 
figures over [adaptations that once] systematized, [...] can be used to cheat” 
(Heath 1985, pp.512-3) is replaced with a fidelity context. Furthermore, both 
the filmed manipulation and the academic legitimisation exist within the 
context of fainomaic translation; the foregrounded, conventionalised, pre-
known Shakespearean dialogue of the balcony scene is replaced with a 
seamless unfolding: “They communicate their desire not with their 
[Shakespeare’s] words but with their eyes, which appear huge and shining in 
the surreal light from the pool” (Loehlin 2000, p.128). 
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4.5 The drama of Shakespeare: ‘I’ll play the orator as well as 
Nestor/Deceive more slily than Ulysses could’ (3 Henry VI 3.2.188-9)48 
 
The final (and, like állagmic translation and foreknowledge, optional) element 
of this taxonomy of how a filmic poststructuralist writing formation may 
operate in realist adaptation relates to the presentation of authorial 
enunciation through narrativising the writer’s life. As with all the other 
elements of the taxonomy, the dramatization of Shakespeare’s life operates 
according to the mechanisms of suture, with academic legitimation 
completing the masochistic cycle. The dramatization of the author’s life 
relates particularly to the ways in which Barthes’ and Benveniste’s definitions 
of authorship, discussed in section 3.4, have been used in academic 
discourse. Films in which the author is himself a character are those in which 
the contested authorial absence inherent to both Barthes and Benveniste are 
most clearly allegorised. 
 
Jane E. Kingsley-Smith, for example, demonstrates the influence of Barthes’ 
theory of authorship, arguing that Shakespeare in Love (John Madden 1998) 
“respond[s] to an authorial absence created by adaptation […] enacting a 
comic ritual in which the death of the Author is threatened but finally averted” 
(2002, p.158, original emphasis). Kingsley-Smith interprets the film’s 
Shakespeare (Joseph Fiennes) agonising over how to write his signature, and 
repeatedly inscribing his name, as an atavistic riposte to Barthes’s The Death 
                                                          
48 Substantial elements of this section appear in Geal 2014. 
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of the Author that “evoke[s] a Romantic conception of authorship by privileging 
such scenes of writing” (Kingsley-Smith 2002, p.159). The act of “writing his 
name over and over again—a joke that Barthes might have appreciated” 
(2002, p.161) is understood as the triumph of the Barthesian author’s return 
(2002, p.159). 
 
Applying Barthes’ definition of authorship to Shakespeare in Love does allow 
for a critique of the film’s conservatism, and explains how “the author emerges 
triumphant, more formidable after its encounter with the giant-killers of 
poststructuralism” (Kingsley-Smith 2002, p.162).49 What it does not do is 
question what these presentations of authorship mean in terms of film’s 
enunciative qualities, and the degree to which such depictions problematize 
cinema’s conventional seamlessness. Authorship is understood only within the 
parameters of challenging authorial intention, rather than as a heightened 
example of cinema’s inherent, and ideologically problematic, enunciative 
traces. The extent to which the different interpretations of Barthes and 
Benveniste meet in Shakespeare in Love is demonstrated by Todd F. Davis 
and Kenneth Womack’s argument that “the film continually reminds us that we 
are witnessing the construction of narrative” (2004, p.155), which they interpret 
as evidence for a conservative presentation of pre-Barthesian, Romantic 
authorship. But applying Benveniste’s definition of authorship could suggest 
that this reminder might be potentially transgressive, with the thematisation of 
                                                          
49 It also facilitates an exploration of the ways in which the privileging of authorship 
intersects with the culture industry. Courtney Lehmann, for example, argues that 
Shakespeare in Love’s romantic (in the contexts of both the Romantic author and 
the romantic film hero) lead’s “corpus, in all its incarnations – bodily, textual, 
commercial and critical – returns from the dead to implore us not to love but, rather, 
to enjoy” (2002b, p.214). 
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“the construction of narrative” a threat to the illusionism of cinematic 
seamlessness. 
 
The specific link between un-authored Benvenistene seamlessness, “events 
[that] seem to tell themselves” (Benveniste 1970, p.241), and Barthes’s 
alternate authorial absence is demonstrated by Kingsley-Smith’s argument 
that “by suggesting that what has been already spoken and written finds its 
way unconsciously into Shakespeare’s text, the film alludes to theories of 
intertextuality that might challenge its whole conception of the author. 
Barthes’s […] authorial absence is predicated upon the theory of 
intertextuality” (2002, p.161). Privileging Barthes’s over Benveniste’s 
understanding of authorial absence here means interpreting the film’s 
translation of authored discours into seamless histoire as an atavistic 
challenge to the author’s death, rather than as the ideological disavowal of his 
presence. 
 
Richard Burt interprets the montage of Will and Viola’s (Gwyneth Paltrow) 
impromptu creation of lines of dialogue while in bed together, which then 
appear as the text of Romeo and Juliet in dress rehearsals for the play’s 
performance, in this Barthesian context. The scene’s potential translation of 
histoire (conversation that seamlessly unfolds between two lovers) into 
discours (a foregrounded piece of writing) is thereby interpreted, not in the 
context of cinema’s ideological transformative work, but “as an effect which 
naturalizes the film’s character as the historical truth of the work’s genesis” 
(Burt 2000, p.220). 
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It is revealing, in fact, that the specific nature of this authorial act resides in a 
Barthesian form of intertextuality that relies on ‘real,’ seamlessly shown events 
rather than on a prior act of authorship. Kingsley-Smith notes that no mention 
is ever made, in the film, of Shakespeare culling his plots from anything that 
had been previously written (2002, p.161). From a Benvenistene perspective 
this means that the montage depicting the creation of Romeo and Juliet’s text 
shows histoire shaped into discours, but not discours reworked as another 
form of discours. As such, the transformation of seamless histoire into 
authored discours reinforces cinema’s ideological illusionism and contains the 
potential transgression of foregrounding the created nature of discours. 
Presenting the manipulation of one form of discours into another would not 
have the same ideological effect. Kingsley-Smith, however, states that the 
film’s “disregard for the book is dictated by the visual demands of cinema, or 
perhaps by the power struggle between text and image that goes on in 
Shakespeare films” (2002, p.161). She then problematizes this interpretation, 
by contrasting the way in which Peter Greenaway’s Prospero’s Books (1991) 
dramatizes books (2002, pp.161-62), without providing an alternate account 
(such as favouring Benveniste’s conception of authorship) for Shakespeare in 
Love’s privileging of intertextuality between people over intertextuality between 
texts. Depicting Shakespeare taking ideas from a book, a site of authored 
discours, as opposed to an ‘everyday’ site in which “events seem to tell 
themselves” (Benveniste 1970, p.241), would present an authored account of 
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cinema much more transgressive than a diegetic world in which even the most 
foregrounded authorship is initiated in a seamless unfolding.50 
 
This Barthesian dominance of the critical discourse perhaps explains the focus 
on Shakespeare’s authorial ‘return’ in Shakespeare in Love. It may be telling, 
for example, that Burt, discussing this return in the context of the authorship 
controversy between Stratfordians and Oxfordians, writes, “[t]hough an 
Oxfordian website set up a page entitled ‘Shakespeare in Love: the True 
Story,’ I doubt that we can expect a film entitled Oxford in Love to be released 
anytime in the near future” (2000, p.222). Titling a film thus would indeed 
emphasise the old Stratfordian/Oxfordian debate, and constitute a lapse into 
pre-Barthesian Romanticism not dissimilar to that worked into Shakespeare in 
Love. Titling a film about Oxford’s writing of the Shakespearean canon 
Anonymous (Roland Emmerich 2011), however, suggests a more interesting 
exploration of authorship, and one that directly allegorises cinema’s inherent 
un-authored seamlessness, even in a film that thematises authorship. 
 
                                                          
50 This focus on the author’s return extends even to Katherine E. Kelly’s analysis of 
Tom Stoppard’s role as Shakespeare in Love’s screenplay writer. Based upon a 
Barthesian understanding of how Stoppard “uses others’ texts irreverently and […] 
views all texts as shifting and unstable grounds of meaning,” Kelly argues that such 
approaches to canonical texts, which “bear directly on Stoppard’s varied used uses 
of Shakespeare,” encourage a Barthesian challenge to canonicity that “provoke[s] 
the spectator to reconsider the monumentality of Shakespeare-the-icon” (2001, 
p.18). Kelly’s interpretation of the impact of Barthesian authorship upon 
Shakespeare in Love may be diametrically opposed to Kingsley-Smith’s, Davis and 
Womack’s, or Burt’s, but it is motivated by the same theoretical bias, and likewise 
disregards the impact of either Stoppard’s or Shakespeare’s enunciative traces on 
the film’s transformative work. 
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Anonymous is a film in which the contested identity of the author overwrites 
Shakespeare’s enunciation while simultaneously foregrounding an alternate 
authorial articulation. Shakespeare himself may be obliterated, but authorship 
is narrativised. Not only are the plays’ scripted nature foregrounded, but the 
writing process is fetishized. These fetishizations serve to raise the issue of 
authorship only to mythologise it, allegorising the masochistic fort/da-like 
dialectic of presenting and then disavowing cinematic enunciation. Oxford’s 
(Rhys Ifans) inscription of Shakespeare’s (Rafe Spall) name onto his plays is 
the film’s epitome of this mythologization of enunciation. As I discussed above, 
Shakespeare in Love also showed the author writing the name ‘William 
Shakespeare’, a presentation interpreted by Kingsley-Smith as “a joke that 
Barthes might have appreciated” (2002, 9.161), and in the context of the film’s 
“encounter with the giant-killers of poststructuralism” (2002, p.162), by which 
she means Barthes. But in Anonymous this act of writing has a more apt 
Benvenistene connotation. Clearly, as Barthes argued, with this signature the 
film presents “that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips 
away, the negative where all identity is lost” (1995, p.105). It also presents, 
though, Benveniste’s premise that “[n]o one speaks here; events seem to tell 
themselves” (1970, p.241), since the foregrounding of authorial enunciation 
inherent in a man writing the two words ‘William Shakespeare’ is 
simultaneously disavowed by the film’s claim that not only were the plays 
written by a man with another name, but that the plays’ true author could never 
be revealed. Mythologizing the plays’ origins in this way obfuscates the status 
of authorial enunciation in film as well as in the film, making a conservative 
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virtue out of the potentially transgressive nature of obliquely addressing 
cinema’s constructed nature. 
 
The paradoxical nature of these signatures, simultaneously valorisations of 
Romantic authorship, in a Barthesian context, and traces of transformative 
work, in a Benvenistene context, aptly demonstrates the importance of 
academic traditions to understandings of adaptation’s ideological possibilities. 
Derrida’s approach to the written signature echoes the paradox. The signature 
not only “implies the empirical nonpresence of the signer,”51 a situation that 
requires, in order to tether the signature to its source, “the absolute singularity 
of a signature-event and a signature-form: the pure reproducibility of a pure 
event” (Derrida 1988, p.20). It also requires that “to be readable […] it must be 
able to be detached from the present and singular intention of its production” 
(1988, p.20, my emphasis). This decoupling of the written expression of 
subjectivity from a presumed authorial intention is strikingly reminiscent of 
Barthes’s rejection of the knowability and relevance of these intentions. 
 
It is also echoed by Andrew’s and André Bazin’s analyses of written 
enunciative traces in film adaptations. Andrew interprets Emile Zola’s 
signature at the beginning of Jean Renoir’s La Bête humaine (1938) as 
“authentic and authenticating. […] Zola addresses us through this film” 
(Andrew 1995, p.307). Andrew presumes that the auteur-ial intention behind 
                                                          
51 There is a striking similarity here between Derrida’s paradoxically absent 
enunciating subject and Metz’s explanation of how cinematic images are “made 
present in the mode of absence” (Metz 2000 [1982], p.410) 
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this authentication is an attempt to link foreknowledge of the novel’s 
prophesies with the pessimistic social context at the time of the adaptation, 
arguing that Zola’s “visage wants to hover over the movie, spelling doom for its 
characters, and for the Third Republic that received its tainted start at the 
close of the novel” (1995, p.307). Andrew interprets neither foreknowledge of 
the film’s conclusion, nor the foregrounding of enunciative construction 
inherent in the presentation of Zola’s signature, as traces of the film’s 
transformative work. Authored discours is translated into seamless histoire 
despite the presentation of authored enunciation in textual form. 
 
Bazin analyses the written presentation of the diary in Robert Bresson’s 
adaptation (1951) of Georges Bernanos’s Journal d’un Curé de Campagne 
(Diary of a Country Priest) in a similar manner. He argues that Bresson not 
only renders the curé’s (Claude Laydu) diary in written form because “the 
mental and emotional impact of a line that is merely read is very different from 
that of a spoken line” (Bazin 2009 [1951], p.128), so that the film therefore 
“includes all that the novel has to offer plus, in addition, its refraction in the 
cinema” (2009, p.143), but also claims, in a pre-Barthesian manner, that 
“acknowledgement for [the film’s artistic pleasure] must go to the genius of 
Bernanos” (2009, p.143). Kingsley-Smith, Andrew, Bazin and Derrida all apply 
a loosely Barthesian interpretation to the signature, examining the 
writer’s/director’s intentions, rather than the ways in which the signature 
foregrounds the transformative work of enunciation. 
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Anonymous’ Shakespearean signature allegorises these paradoxes. Instead 
of Shakespeare in Love’s “effect which naturalizes the film’s character as the 
historical truth of the work’s genesis” (Burt 2000, p.220), or La Bête humaine’s 
“authentic and authenticating” (Andrew 1995, p.307) articulation, Anonymous 
presents the Shakespearean signature as a performative lie, as the suturing 
manifestation of the transformative work inherent in the foregrounding of 
authorial enunciation. 
 
The film also raises its conception of this enunciation to a pathological, almost 
de-humanised level. When his wife (Helen Baxendale) demands to know 
whether he is writing again, Oxford equates his work with madness or 
demonic possession. This account of authorship mystifies the writing of 
Shakespeare’s plays into a process that only a superhuman or an idiot savant 
could execute, foregrounding a mythic conception of authorship while 
simultaneously denying the true author. 
 
That the film’s plays are the written, sole discours-like possession of this 
mythologised author, rather than the collaborative creation of a playwright and 
acting troupe, is demonstrated by the way that Ben Jonson (Sebastian 
Armesto), who is entrusted custody of Oxford’s manuscripts, buries them 
under the Rose Theatre’s stage when pursued by Robert Cecil’s (Edward 
Hogg) henchmen. Although these soldiers burn the theatre down Jonson 
returns to uncover the texts from a sturdy box, lovingly handling their slightly 
charred pages. (Fig.4.47) Authorial enunciation is thereby simultaneously 
fetishized and disavowed. Just as Heath argued that “the drama of vision 
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becomes a constant reflexive fascination in films” (1985, p.514, original 
emphasis), so too Oxford’s charred manuscripts are part of the reflexive 
fascination of the drama of authorship. They are presented as the fragile fonts 
of originality and genius narrowly saved from oblivion within a medium in 
which authorship is mythologised so that it can be simultaneously exhibited 
and disavowed. 
 
 
Fig.4.47 
 
As with Shakespeare in Love, Anonymous seamlessly translates elements of 
the plays into ‘real’ events. Narrativising moments from Shakespeare’s plays 
into events from Oxford’s life is one way in which writing is disavowed into that 
which seamlessly unfolds, as though it simply happened. The young Oxford’s 
(Jamie Campbell Bower) reaction to being spied upon, for example, is to stab 
blindly through a curtain, so that he prefigures a Shakespearean narrative. 
Hamlet’s closet scene is thereby turned into histoire, story, third-person 
narration, which passive subjects might appear to seamlessly produce before 
their own eyes, rather than as discours, a partial, foregrounded constructed 
piece of writing. The fact that many audience members will recognize the 
Shakespearean enunciation behind Oxford’s reaction, however, foregrounds 
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the very act of authorship that the scene seems to obliterate. When the scene 
from Hamlet in which Polonius is slain in the same manner is later shown 
onstage, the film narrativises the masochistic interplay of presenting and 
disavowing this enunciation. 
 
This dialectic between authored theatre and seamless cinema is central to 
how the film negotiates suture. When Henry V is shown playing at the Rose, 
the Chorus’ (Mark Rylance) plea for the audience to ‘Think, when we talk of 
horses, that you see them’ (Prologue 26) intermittently cuts to scenes of the 
Earl of Southampton (Xavier Samuel) and his men riding off to war, as though 
they were about to fight at Agincourt. The Chorus’ anti-realist stress, to the 
theatre’s audience, that it is ‘your thoughts,’ with these first two words 
repeated, ‘your thoughts, that must deck our kings’ (Prologue 28), is 
immediately followed by the work of computer-generated imagery and mobile 
camera, decking the kings without the need for subjects to employ their 
‘imaginary forces’ (Prologue 18). The constructed, collaborative, anti-realist 
theatre,52 with the author looking on, almost like the Brechtian director at the 
side of the stage (Brecht 1965), is here juxtaposed with seamless cinematic 
diegesis. 
 
The theatre’s backstage apparatus is similarly revealed in a way that 
emphasises the disavowal of the cinematic apparatus’ transformative work. 
                                                          
52 Catherine Belsey’s influential critique of the possibility of exploring 
Shakespearean pluralism in film, discussed in section 3.4, contrasts realist cinema’s 
monocular perspective with “the conditions of Elizabethan staging that emphasise a 
specific kind of plurality” (1998, pp.61-2). 
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The film’s opening scene shows a narrator (Derek Jacobi) on a contemporary 
proscenium stage outlining the Oxfordian theory of Shakespeare authorship 
(Fig.4.48). In the wings, actors who will play Jonson (Fig.4.49) and Robert 
Cecil’s soldiers (Fig.4.50) are shown preparing for their cues. They do not 
enter onto the boards though, but straight and seamlessly into the cinematic 
diegesis, sutured directly into an entirely different semiotic environment 
(Fig.4.51). The artificial status of these characters is foregrounded while they 
are shown within the confines of the theatrical world, but they slip effortlessly 
into unquestioned artifice once they enter the histoire-like realm of the purely 
cinematic. 
 
 
Fig.4.48 
 
 
Fig.4.49 
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Fig.4.50 
 
 
Fig.4.51 
 
In the same scene the theatrical mechanics of the dramatic effect of lightning 
and rain pouring upon the narrator are revealed (Figs.4.52-4.55). Later in the 
film there are further weather effects, but these are presented seamlessly, as 
the heavens’ punctuations of key emotional moments. Rain begins to fall 
during the performance, on the Rose’s outdoor stage, of Hamlet’s ‘to be or not 
to be’ (3.1.58) speech, showering the mood with a seemingly ‘natural’ 
commentary beyond the will of any of the film’s characters. At this moment 
even the Renaissance stage, hitherto presented as an anti-realist space, falls 
under the diegetic logic of a seamless coming together of word, action, and 
third-person metaphor. 
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Fig.4.52 
 
 
Fig.4.53 
 
 
Fig.4.54 
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Fig.4.55 
 
Likewise, when the Earl of Essex leads his rebellion to ruination, Oxford is 
shown gazing through a window at his friend’s failure, the camera zooming in 
to a close-up as rain begins to fall upon the panes with what would be, outside 
of cinema’s artificial seamlessness, impeccable dramatic timing. This scene 
culminates with Oxford’s nemesis, Robert Cecil, telling the film’s protagonist 
that his childhood under the wardship of William Cecil (David Thewlis) was 
part of an elaborate scheme to manipulate Queen Elizabeth’s (Vanessa 
Redgrave) succession. Robert Cecil’s claim that the plan would have 
succeeded were it not for Oxford’s neglect of his duties ‘all to write … poetry’, 
is followed by an ominous rumble of thunder. Cecil’s dramatic pause and its 
seamless counterpointing imparted by the thunder again highlight the film’s 
fetishization of writing. 
 
Each of these weather effects, taken in isolation, would merely be part of 
cinema’s overall reality-effect, an element of verisimilitude so conventionalised 
as to be unrecognisable. Juxtaposing, however, these effects’ seamlessness 
with a prior foregrounding of their artificiality, in the preceding presentation of 
the contemporary theatre, again demonstrates the masochistic dialectic of 
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suture. That the last of these examples punctuates Cecil’s melodramatic 
denunciation, ‘all to write … poetry’, underscores the link between 
Anonymous’ fetishization of authorship and its accompanying disavowal. 
 
A Barthesian reading of these scenes would, as with the interpretations of 
Shakespeare in Love analysed above, make a useful critique of the 
Anonymous’ atavistic valorisation of Romantic authorial genius. But it would 
not be able to understand the film in the context of cinema’s inherent 
masochism and, given that the film’s obfuscation of authorship directly 
allegorises the cinema’s transformative work, does therefore not address that 
which is most ideological about Anonymous. As such, the Barthesian reading 
can only study film’s content rather than what Heath calls its “specific 
signifying practice” (1985, p.511). As Heath has argued, “to remain at the level 
of a content analysis in these terms is to fail to engage with the ideological 
operation of the film” (1985, p.511, original emphasis). Anonymous’ 
thematisation of authorship acts as a disavowal of the issue of authorship, and 
academic legitimation’s Barthesian understandings of authorship completes 
the masochistic suture. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given an extensive taxonomy of various elements of how a 
filmic poststructuralist writing formation can operate in realist adaptation. 
 
As the first two chapters established, this thesis’ primary aim is to chart the 
impact of shared socio-cultural determinants on two related but “relatively 
autonomous” (Althusser 1971, p.130) superstructural contexts; academic 
theorising and filmmaking practice. A filmic poststructuralist writing formation 
is a central element of these relationships. As explained (in chapter 1 and in 
more detail in section 2.3.3), the best set of diachronic film (and non-film) 
texts to conduct this analysis are Shakespearean adaptations. These films 
further complicate the construction of a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation, however, because of their additional potential layer of 
foregrounded artifice, and this chapter and the one preceding it have set out 
to account for a theoretical basis for, and taxonomy of, how a filmic 
poststructuralist writing formation operates in relation to the authorial 
enunciation ontological within realist adaptation. 
 
Realist film’s masochism is, for Heath, so pleasurable and so complete, that 
the “drama of vision becomes a constant reflexive fascination in films” (1985, 
p.514, original emphasis). Just as audiences unconsciously thrill to the 
momentary disruption of cinematic coherence, so too filmmakers 
unconsciously inscribe this disruption into narrative and visual form. It is in 
this sense that they operate within the parameters of what I call a filmic 
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poststructuralist writing formation. Realist film narrative stages the dialectic 
juxtaposition of alienating grammatical incoherence and the deferred 
pleasures of grammatical consistency’s resolution. 
 
Realist adaptation allegorises this reflexive process one stage further. Its 
drama of vision is accompanied by a drama of authorship, inscribing an 
additional layer of foregrounded artifice that can be pleasurably subsumed 
within suture’s ideological logic. The temporary revelation of adaptation as 
authored and thereby constructed discours achieves its pleasurable 
ideological function when that revelation is subsumed into the seamless logic 
of realist cinematic grammar. Adaptation thereby facilitates filmmakers’ 
unconscious desire to manipulate cinematic grammar for a pleasurably 
masochistic audience effect. A filmic poststructuralist writing formation in 
realist adaptation exploits foregrounded authorial enunciation for a heightened 
masochistic effect. 
 
The case study in chapter 6 is not able to analyse the historic development of 
every aspect of the above taxonomy, partly because of word limitations, and 
partly because, as 2.3.3 and 6.2 discuss, the elaboration of filmic writing 
formations requires the analysis of filmmakers’ unconscious parapractic 
statements made outside of film texts, and these are more available in relation 
to some aspects of the taxonomy than others. 
 
Before this case study can be undertaken it is necessary to outline one final 
element of how filmic writing formations can operate in realist adaptation. That 
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is a cognitivist writing formation, and the next chapter is partly devoted to 
articulating how this operates. This next chapter, though, does not theorise 
and give examples of a filmic cognitivist writing formation in a similar way to 
how the last chapter theorised, and this chapter taxonomised, a filmic 
poststructuralist writing formation. This is because, as I address in more detail 
at the beginning of the next chapter, academic cognitivism conceptualises the 
motivations of filmmakers and spectators in rational, conscious terms. As I will 
explain in the next chapter, these motivations have already been extensively 
accounted for at the academic level, unlike the theoretical context for, and 
taxonomy of, a filmic poststructuralist writing formation which I have just 
completed. The next chapter, then, does not need to create new theories and 
taxonomies of how filmmakers might rationally engage with their audiences. It 
does, however, need to clearly articulate the ways in which such motivations 
might operate within the context of a filmic writing formation. The next chapter 
also needs to address the historical development of filmic writing formations, 
since I have argued in section 2.3.2 that my analysis of the impact of socio-
cultural determinants on academic theorising and on filmmaking practice 
requires the exploration of two historically distinct forms of filmic 
poststructuralist writing formations (proto- and post- poststructuralist writing 
formations) that demonstrate a relationship with the historical development of 
academic poststructuralism. Only then can the case study in chapter 6 explore 
the details of this historical development. The first task of the next chapter, 
then, is to address filmic writing formations in a historical context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Filmic writing formations’ 
diachronic development: Theory 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In order for the thesis to demonstrate that academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice share related socio-cultural determinants it has been 
necessary to construct the characteristics of filmic writing formations which 
demonstrate that filmmaking practice responds to the same socio-cultural 
contexts that determine academic theorising. Thus far it has not been 
possible to position filmic writing formations within a diachronic framework 
which can trace historical developments in academic theorising alongside 
developments in filmmaking practice. This will follow in the next chapter. This 
chapter is the final part of the theoretical scaffolding required to support this 
historical analysis. Following on from my previous theorisation and 
taxonomisation of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation in chapters 3 and 
4, this chapter contributes two important elements to the subsequent case 
study. Firstly, it positions academic theorising and filmic writing formations in 
a historical context, so that these two forms of cultural activity can be gridded 
onto one another diachronically, and secondly it explains exactly how the 
premises which proponents of theoretical paradigms conceptualise as 
operating in film can be understood as elements of filmmaking practice. 
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5.2 Academic theory’s historic contingency and/or essentialism 
 
I have claimed, in section 2.3.2, that rational spectatorial activities which 
filmmakers might wish to manipulate, within the context of a filmic cognitivist 
writing formation, exist outside of particular socio-cultural contexts. This 
section addresses this claim in more detail, and juxtaposes the ahistoric 
nature of a filmic cognitivist writing formation with the historically specific and 
distinct delineations between those forms of a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation which precede and follow after the advent of academic 
poststructuralism. 
 
Academic proponents of both cognitivism and poststructuralism make claims, 
in part at least, that the human mind works in ways which are outside specific 
historical, cultural and social circumstances. Sections 1.3 and 2.3.2 have 
already discussed some of the ways in which material relations and historical 
events impact on academic theoretical thinking. The following paragraphs 
explore how rival academic paradigms can be understood in terms of the 
way that both academic theorising and filmmaking practice relate to the 
same socio-cultural determinants. Although academic poststructuralism is 
explicitly located within a particular historical moment (see 2.3.2) it employs, 
in part, a psychoanalytic methodology which is, at least according to critics 
(for example, Kepley 1996, p.546), ahistorical. Proponents of cognitivism, 
despite attempts to argue against the “assertion […] based on ignorance” 
that “[c]ognitive theory is essentialist, and therefore is insensitive to historical 
and cultural context” (Peterson 1996, p.120), make substantial claims which 
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“rest upon a general theory of perception and cognition” (Bordwell 1985a, 
p.30) in which human interpretation is as ahistorical and biological as that of 
non-humans: “Sensory stimuli alone cannot determine a percept, since they 
are incomplete and ambiguous. The organism constructs a perceptual 
judgement on the basis of nonconscious inferences” (Bordwell 1985a, p.31, 
my emphasis). 
 
This (self-)conception of cognitivism means that particular developments in 
academic cognitivism need not necessarily stem from specific developments 
in socio-cultural determinants which would also impact on a filmic cognitivist 
writing formation.53 As previously discussed (in sections 1.4 and 2.3.2), there 
is a distinct difference between the way that Cartesian subjectivity, and the 
revelation that such subjectivity exposes limitations in Lacan’s Symbolic 
Order, operates in temporal terms. In the Early Modern period, when a 
particular socio-cultural context facilitated Cartesian subjectivity, the concept 
could be articulated in both precise verbal terms (cogito ergo sum) and in 
aesthetic terms (perspectival painting). The revelation that this subjectivity 
exposes limitations in the Symbolic Order could be intuited at the aesthetic 
level (Holbein’s anamorphic skull), but could not yet be articulated in precise 
verbal terms. Only with Lacan’s après-coup re-reading of anamorphism could 
the limitations of Cartesian subjectivity be precisely verbally articulated. 
Academic cognitivism does not require any such form of après-coup thinking 
                                                          
53 Bordwell would most likely reject the term writing formation because of 
cognitivism’s broad rejection of structuralism’s linguistic model. He does “not treat 
the spectator’s operations as necessarily modelled upon linguistic activity” (1985a, 
p.30). 
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– the filmmaker and spectator is always (at least from the Early Modern 
period, and within a culture dominated by this specific form of thinking, 
onwards) conceived of as applying his or her rational Cartesian subjectivity. 
For at least as long as the history of the film medium, filmmakers and 
spectators functioning within a cognitivist context operate in a universal and 
ahistoric manner which does not respond to socio-cultural developments. 
Take Bordwell’s account of  
 
how films, in their formal and stylistic operations, solicit story-
constructing and story-comprehending activities from spectators. 
[…] There is the goal-directed spectator, equipped with schemata 
and ready to make assumptions, form expectations, motivate 
material, recall information, and project hypotheses. There are the 
formal features of the film itself: first, syuzhet tactics that cue the 
spectator to execute inferential moves; second, qualities of 
knowledgeability, communicativeness, self-consciousness, and 
tone that shape the spectator’s evolving story construct. 
        (Bordwell 1985a, p.335) 
 
There is nothing in Bordwell’s account that conceptualises developments in 
perception, computation and understanding as being influenced by socio-
cultural contexts. 
 
Indeed, elsewhere Bordwell explicitly rejects what he calls “the ‘history of 
vision’ approach” which claims that the “history of style […] could be 
explained by conceiving the history of vision as at least partly social” (1997 
p.141). He does not consider filmmaking’s stylistic development as a 
manifestation of underlying socio-cultural contexts. Instead, he claims that 
the film historian should think of a “stylistic norm […] as a coherent set of 
248 
 
alternatives, weighted choices, preferred schemas that can be replicated or 
modified in fresh situations” (1997, p.156). He argues that 
 
[c]ulture or social context will not be the source of every plausible 
explanation for a stylistic choice. It is perfectly possible that the 
distinctive qualities of French or Swedish society leave no trace 
on, say, the staging practices of Feuillade or Sjöström. It is more 
likely that, as directors who were asked questions all day, they hit 
upon sound answers through craft wisdom, trial and error, and a 
sensitivity to some of the transcultural appeals that shape viewers’ 
experience of cinema.  
(Bordwell 1997, p.157) 
 
This recourse to filmmakers’ problem-solving practice, and specifically 
Bordwell’s characterisation of directors as being “asked questions all day”, is 
a mirroring of the cognitivist perception of film narratives as erotetic (Carroll 
1990, p.130) question-and-answer structures, as I discussed in section 1.2, 
and I address in more detail in the following section, 5.3. 
 
Bordwell’s account of film style is made more problematic by the fact that he 
locates academic attempts to investigate film history within a diachronic 
context: “Each of the research programs I’ve been considering was shaped 
by its intellectual milieu” (1997, p.139). He therefore conceptualises making 
and studying films as very different activities; the former divorced from 
cultural norms, the latter shaped by them. As sections 1.4 and 2.3.2 make 
clear, I aim, in this thesis, to demonstrate that the two are much more 
dialectically related than that. But Bordwell’s characterisation of the 
“intellectual milieu” which shapes the study of film fits in with cognitivism’s 
de-politicised conception of intellectual activity that I problematized in 2.2.2. 
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He discounts the ideologically informed ‘history of vision’ approach, which 
links the material conditions of “the expansion of industrial capitalism” with 
the superstructural, as the “experience of the capitalist city – its velocities 
and jolts, its ephemeral stimuli, its fragmentation of experience – created a 
new perceptual ‘mode’ specific to modernity” (1997, p.142). Instead, his 
cognitivist approach to developing intellectual milieu effaces material 
relations – “intellectuals were trying to show that cinema could be a distinct 
art form; […] a period in which the French intelligentsia fell under the sway of 
Hegelian modes of thinking; […] when left-wing writers embraced notions of 
‘counter-cinema’; […r]evision is a product of the professionalization of film 
research” (1997, p.139). So, when either filmmakers or film scholars develop 
their practice diachronically, this cognitivist approach perceives them as 
doing so within the parameters of rational agency, beyond the strictures of 
material and/or unconscious forces. 
 
Bioculturalism is a relatively recent variant of cognitivist theory that “shows 
how key features of various film genres and narrative forms can be explained 
within an evolutionary-biological framework” (Grodal 2009, p.4). Its 
proponents also have an approach to the relationships between film and 
diachronic context which, if not exactly ahistorical, has an approach to history 
that is so wide as to exclude the kind of specific developments of cognitivist 
and poststructuralist writing formations that I am interested in, and which 
might appear as insignificant variations on its vast evolutionary scale: “The 
biocultural approach to culture does not contradict a historicist approach; on 
the contrary, it offers a radically historical and constructivist view, describing 
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the evolutionary processes and functional concerns that have led to our 
present human ways of thinking and representing” (Grodal 2009, p.5). 
Bioculturalists too, then, think of filmmaking and film viewing as experiences 
beyond specific social contexts like film theory. Instead, film’s evolutionary 
“dramas appeal to fundamental, innate dispositions in us” (Grodal 2009, p.8). 
 
These cognitivist approaches offer an explanation after the event. 
Filmmaking has certain effects that have no relationship to particular 
historically specific socio-cultural modes of thinking and perceiving. The 
poststructuralist approach is somewhat more complex. I have claimed, in 
chapters 3 and 4, that certain elements of adaptation’s ontology (derived 
from a broader conception of realist film’s ontology) operate in contexts that 
can only be explained by poststructuralist theory. But that is not the same as 
saying that that which is explained by poststructuralism could not take place 
prior to that explanation. Indeed, the examples I use in chapters 3 and 4 
often chronologically precede poststructuralism’s academic articulation. But 
these caveats do not necessarily mean that the socio-cultural contexts which 
informed academic poststructuralism have no corresponding impact on filmic 
writing formations. It is not yet clear, however, whether filmmakers’ 
unconscious manipulations of dramas which academic poststructuralism can 
verbally explain from a particular historical moment onwards are themselves 
historically specific. As I discussed in sections 1.4 and 2.3.2, film theories 
relate to modes of thinking that are in part inherent/ahistoric/evolutionary, 
and in part formulated by specific cultural conditions. Chapter 6’s case study 
will tease out the subtleties of this process. 
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My approach to the following case study accepts, then, that there are not 
simple or clear distinctions between one filmic writing formation and another, 
or that one will be found exclusively in one time period, to be inevitably 
supplanted by another. It is clear from academic theory’s historical 
development, discussed in chapter 2, that contesting ideas diachronically 
overlap and co-exist. The case study charts, then, subtle historical 
distinctions and delineations, rather than all-conquering intellectual regimes. 
In order to address the thesis’ primary research question it therefore asks the 
following supplementary questions: Do the complex influences of particular 
socio-cultural contexts on filmmaking practice and academic discourse 
facilitate certain writing formations at certain times? What are the elements of 
continuity between historically disparate adaptations, and what are the 
elements of diachronic development? 
 
One of the limitations of comparing theories has been the way that the 
textual object can be successfully interpreted along mutually-exclusive lines 
(see sections 1.2 and 2.2.2). Carroll’s account of contrasting theoretical 
claims, for example, demonstrates both this current incommensurability 
between paradigms’ rival interpretations, and the way forward that my 
comparative method here proposes: 
 
Psychoanalytic theories face a special burden of proof when 
confronting cognitivist theories. For a psychoanalytic theory to 
reenter the debate, it must be demonstrated that there is 
something about the data of which given cognitivist (or organic) 
explanations can give no adequate account. […] I have no 
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argument to prove conclusively that no psychoanalytic theory will 
ever be able to cross this hurdle. But, at the same time, I think it 
also fair to say that psychoanalytic film theorists behave as though 
they are unaware of this obstacle. 
(Carroll 1996, p.65) 
 
A detailed investigation of the complex influences of historically developing 
socio-cultural contexts on both academic theorising and filmmaking practice 
may be able to cross the hurdle that Carroll refers to, and find evidence for 
that which “cognitivist (or organic) explanations can give no adequate 
account” (1996, p.65). One brief example from the case study which follows 
in chapter 6 demonstrates how two theoretical interpretations can be 
weighed against one another. Branagh has discussed his adaptation of 
Hamlet in the following terms: 
 
[T]here was also the sense of futility, if you like, of a four-hour film 
(that was obviously language-based) possibly finding an audience 
at the end of the twentieth century. And yet the love of the 
endeavour. […] But it was more to do with having fun, and in a 
way having fun at my own expense, and indeed cinematically, in a 
way I hoped was not going to be indulgent. […] I thought that was 
a sort of Hamletian thing to do. 
    (Branagh in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.171) 
 
Both a cognitivist and a poststructuralist interpretation of this statement 
would make self-contained sense. For the cognitivist, Branagh expresses a 
reticence that the length and complexity of his film might mean that the “goal-
directed spectator, equipped with schemata and ready to make assumptions, 
form expectations, motivate material, recall information, and project 
hypotheses” would not be able to understand “the formal features of the film 
itself: first, syuzhet tactics that cue the spectator to execute inferential 
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moves; second, qualities of knowledgeability, communicativeness, self-
consciousness, and tone that shape the spectator’s evolving story construct” 
(Bordwell 1985a, p.335). For the poststructuralist, Branagh expresses the 
pleasures of suture (“having fun […] cinematically”), its masochism (“the 
sense of futility. […] And yet the love of the endeavour”), the director’s own 
masochism (“fun at my own expense”), the medium’s fainomaic translation 
(see section 4.2) into cinematic seamlessness (“in a way I hoped was not 
going to be indulgent”), the potential alienation and subsequent cathartic 
resolution inherent in foregrounding discours (“obviously language-based”), 
and adaptation studies’ legitimating role in adaptation’s suture (“I thought it 
was a sort of Hamletian thing to do” (Branagh in Wray and Burnett 2000, 
p.171)). 
 
Each explanation makes sense within the bounds of its own methodology. 
Each is, if not necessarily entirely mutually exclusive, then certainly 
uncomfortable with the other explanation. Where the poststructuralist sees 
unconscious masochism the cognitivist sees modesty, or a genuine love of 
the source text. Where the cognitivist sees a concern with intelligibility, the 
poststructuralist sees the obfuscation of authorial enunciation. Branagh’s 
single ancillary text, here, cannot in itself suggest which of these 
interpretations is the more valid. But if it is compared and contrasted with 
other relative texts from different historical periods then some conclusions 
can be drawn about the ways in which particular socio-cultural developments 
impact on both academic theorising and on filmmaking practice. There is at 
least some sense in which Branagh here seems to be unconsciously 
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articulating Heath’s account of masochism (1985) and Metz’s distinction 
between cinematic discours and histoire (1985). But a wider historical survey 
is needed to demonstrate how this articulation contrasts with other 
filmmakers’ articulations from different historic periods. 
 
5.3 The characteristics of different filmic writing formations 
 
Before embarking on this detailed case study, it is necessary to explore the 
ways in which academic thought and aesthetic practice can relate to shared 
socio-cultural determinants. In sections 1.3 and 3.2, I positioned my claims 
about these relationships within the contexts of Marx’s base/superstructure 
model (1970a), Althusser’s revision of this model and his concept of 
interpellation (1971), and Heath’s theory of the ‘dialectic of the subject’ 
(1975/6). The dialectic subjectivities involved in any form of superstructural 
activity, such as either filmmaking practice or academic theorising, are 
influenced by developments in the socio-cultural base (and other elements of 
the superstructure) across time. There is therefore some kind of relationship 
between certain forms of aesthetic and intellectual activity responding to the 
same socio-cultural contexts. But there are also existing arguments about 
the relationships between cultural ideas and aesthetic practice that are worth 
addressing here for two reasons. The first reason is related to some of the 
conclusions that I derive from the case study (see 6.4 and 7.3), which I will 
pass over for now. The second reason is because these arguments come 
from both broad academic poststructuralist and cognitivist contexts, and 
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therefore suggest that my methodology holds some legitimacy for 
proponents of both paradigms. 
 
The broadest of these arguments is Foucault’s concept of epistemes (1974), 
which has already been discussed in relation to his analysis of Velázquez’s 
Las Meninas (1656) (see 3.3), and which are the historical conditions which 
constrain and facilitate knowledge, discourse and aesthetic styles. Richard 
Dawkins’ concept of the meme (1989), a unit which transmits culture in an 
evolutionary manner analogous to genes, is also a useful, if partial (in both 
senses of the word) concept to help explain the dissemination of cultural 
ideas into aesthetic practice. It is partial in two senses. First, the meme is 
seen by semiotic critics such as Terrence Deacon (1999) as a degenerate 
transformation of the sign which loses the latter’s triadic structure and is 
therefore, for John Hartley and Jason Potts, “semiology with the most 
analytically and empirically interesting bits discarded” (2014, p.139). Second, 
as Howard Kaye has argued, Dawkins’ claims are “not ‘objective science’ but 
[his] own metaphysical assumptions, philosophical positions, and social 
visions” (2009, p.138). This element of Dawkins’ partiality is useful here, 
however, because it supports the claims, which will be explored in more 
detail shortly, that ideas for conceptualising the non-conscious dissemination 
of cultural ideas into aesthetic practice can coalesce with the theoretical 
contexts of various different paradigms that agree on little else. The meme is 
also useful here because it stresses how ideas are transformed through the 
process of dissemination, in a manner that for Dawkins is analogous to the 
variation, mutation and evolution undergone through the biological 
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transmission of genes (1989, p.352). As chapter 6’s case study, and 
particularly its conclusion, section 6.4, will discuss, the diffusion of cultural 
ideas into aesthetic practice certainly demonstrates variation and mutation 
from the original intentions of theoretical discourse. 
 
More specific than this is the context inherent in Wollen’s notion “of a film 
auteur as an unconscious catalyst” in whose work it  
 
is possible to decipher, not a coherent message or world-
view, but a structure which underlies the film and shapes it. 
[...] The structure is associated with a single director, an 
individual, not because he has played the role of artist, 
expressing himself or his own vision in the film, but because 
it is through the force of his preoccupations that an 
unconscious, unintended meaning can be decoded in the 
film, usually to the surprise of the individual involved. The 
film is not a communication, but an artefact which is 
unconsciously structured in a certain way.   
  
(Wollen 1972, pp.167-8) 
 
Wollen’s account of this process is unclear about the historic and cultural 
specificity of how “unintended meaning” (1972, pp. 167-8) unconsciously 
works its way through the filmmaker, but it does separate out ideas and 
those who communicate those ideas in a way that facilitates my investigation 
into how socio-cultural determinants impact on both academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice. 
 
An even more specific existing academic context for my link between 
discourse and artistic practice is provided by new historicism’s focus on the 
relationships between cultural knowledge and the drama which results from 
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that knowledge without there being any need for specific individual evidence 
connecting the two. Thus, as Lisa Hopkins puts it, “what matters is not 
whether Shakespeare is definitely known to have read something or not, 
which is a sine qua non of source study, but whether a given idea was 
‘circulating’ in a particular culture at a particular time” (2005, pp.63-4). My 
subsequent analysis, similarly, will not attempt to find corroborative evidence 
that filmmakers have read certain academic theoretical texts, but will instead 
make links between their work “as an artefact which is unconsciously 
structured in a certain way” (Wollen 1972, p.168) and their relevant and 
conditional “given idea[s] ‘circulating’” (Hopkins 2005, p.64). There may be 
many more ideas circulating in our hyper-mediated postmodern culture than 
in Early Modern Europe, so an idea’s circulation is not as likely to impact on 
various forms of writing as much as it might have in Shakespeare’s time. But, 
given the complex dialectic connections that I am claiming exist between 
filmmaking practice and academic theorising, certain circulating ideas might 
have unconscious impacts similar to those claimed by new historicism. 
 
This kind of conception of the relationships between cultural ideas and 
aesthetic practice, and indeed, of the complex relationship between the two, 
is also something that is accepted from a cognitivist position. Carroll’s 
analysis of the effects of horror will be important to my subsequent definition 
of a cognitivist writing formation, but it also demonstrates close affinities with 
Hopkins’ new historicist approach to ideas and artistic practice. Carroll 
argues that  
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the emergence of the horror genre […] overlaps with the period 
that cultural historians call the ‘Enlightenment’ [which] is thought to 
span the eighteenth century and […] is marked by the 
dissemination of the ideas of a narrow group of seventeenth-
century thinkers – such as Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, and 
Newton – to a relatively broad, reading public. In  general, it 
seems fair to presume that the reading public did not directly 
assimilate their knowledge of these seventeenth-century thinkers 
from original sources but learned of them through the work of 
people whom Crane Brinton describes as ‘what you would now 
call “popularizers” – journalists, men of letters, the bright young 
talkers of the salons’. 
(Carroll 1990, p.55) 
 
My understanding of filmmakers’ unconscious poststructuralist ideas shares 
the presumption that they “did not directly assimilate their knowledge of 
[poststructuralist] thinkers from original sources but learned of them through 
the work of […] popularizers” (Carroll 1990, p.55). More detail about what 
might constitute such ‘popularizers’ will follow in the case study, but one 
more quote from Carroll’s argument reveals both the ambiguous pervasive 
nature of ideas’ dissemination, and also demonstrates that cognitivism can 
conceive of this pervasion as something which has an impact on artistic 
practice as well as artistic reception: 
 
One would not wish to claim that the readers and writers of 
Gothics specifically and horror generally were uniformly believers 
in the Enlightenment. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment 
perspective on that which scientific reality encompasses and on 
what counts as superstition was widely abroad. Readers and 
writers at the turn of the eighteenth century probably did not have 
a working view of science, nor did they necessarily accept 
everything that science proclaimed. However, like readers today, 
who are generally not on top of scientific breakthroughs, they 
probably had enough of a glimmering of that viewpoint to be able 
to identify, in the extremely broad way that art-horror assumes, 
that which science counts as a superstitious belief. 
(Carroll 1990, p.57, my emphasis) 
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The following revision of this quote sums up my understanding of the 
relationships between academic theorising and filmmaking practice: 
 
One would not wish to claim that [filmmakers are] uniformly 
believers in [poststructuralism]. Nevertheless, [poststructuralist] 
perspective[s are] widely abroad. [Spectators and filmmakers] 
probably [do] not have a working view of [poststructuralism], nor 
d[o] they necessarily accept everything that [poststructuralism] 
proclaim[s]. However, like [spectators] today, who are generally 
not on top of [poststructuralist discourse], they probably ha[ve] 
enough of a glimmering of that viewpoint to be able to identify […] 
that which [poststructuralism] counts as [the drama of 
vision/authorship]. 
(Carroll 1990, p.57) 
 
The relationships between reflexivity, filmmaking and theory are 
diachronically delineated, in the following case study, into two forms of filmic 
poststructuralist writing formations – a pre-academically articulated filmic 
poststructuralist writing formation, which manipulates the inherent, 
essentialist nature of the masochistic dramas of vision  and authorship (see 
section 3.3), and a post-academically articulated filmic poststructuralist 
writing formation, which extends this essentialist masochism to a culturally-
specific form of reflexivity that reflects the same historically developing socio-
cultural contexts which also influenced discursive developments within 
academic hermeneutic culture. These are filmic proto-poststructuralist and 
post-poststructuralist writing formations. A filmic proto-poststructuralist 
writing formation operates in those films which unconsciously manipulate the 
inherent masochism of cinematic suture. A filmic post-poststructuralist writing 
formation is an unconsciously extended internalisation and exploitation of 
realist film’s reflexive dramatization of the drama of vision (and, in terms of 
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realist adaptation, of the drama of authorship). It is a form of filmmaking that 
further stages and manipulates potential threats to the transcendent 
subjectivity of realist grammar in order to cathartically subsume those threats 
into suture’s masochistic pleasures. 
 
But, beyond brief discussions about how a cognitivist writing formation can 
exist prior to the articulation of academic cognitivism (see 5.2), and about 
cognitivism’s rational conception of filmmaking and film viewing (see 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2), I have not yet set out a more detailed account of the kind of 
cognitivist writing formation that one might expect to see within the case 
study films. As I have already established (see 5.2), unlike a post-
poststructuralist writing formation, which feeds to some extent off the same 
socio-cultural developments which also informed the articulation of academic 
poststructuralism, a cognitivist writing formation does not have a comparable 
relationship with socio-cultural developments that influenced academic 
cognitivism. Rather, cognitivist filmmakers’ erotetic historical problem-solving 
activities, for Bordwell, “hit upon sound answers through craft wisdom, trial 
and error, and a sensitivity to some of the transcultural appeals that shape 
viewers’ experience of cinema” (1997, p.157). And, as I have already 
established (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), a filmic cognitivist writing formation, unlike 
both filmic proto- and post- poststructuralist writing formations’ attempts to 
masochistically manipulate audiences, seeks to rationally “solicit story-
constructing and story-comprehending activities from spectators” (Bordwell 
1985a, p.335). 
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A filmic cognitivist writing formation’s approach to what academic 
poststructuralism defines as the dramas of authorship and of vision is 
therefore very different to a filmic poststructuralist writing formation’s 
approach. In terms of the drama of authorship, the suturing manipulations 
outlined throughout chapter 4, and which the following case study identifies 
within filmmaking practice, are elements of a filmic poststructuralist writing 
formation. A filmic cognitivist writing formation’s approach to authorial 
enunciation focuses instead on ensuring the complex language’s 
intelligibility, and on facilitating “story-comprehending activities from 
spectators” (Bordwell 1985a, p.335). 
 
A filmic cognitivist writing formation’s approach to what academic 
poststructuralism defines as the drama of vision is more complex, however. 
Heath’s ideological oscillation from “movement and fixity and movement 
again, from fragment […] to totality (the jubilation of the final image)” (1985, 
p.514) is understood by academic cognitivism as a far more rational, erotetic 
process. Carroll, therefore, claims that  
 
scenes, situations, and events that appear earlier in the order of 
exposition in a story are related to later scenes, situations, and 
events in the story, as questions are related to answers. Call this 
erotetic narration. Such narration, which is at the core of popular 
narration, proceeds by generating a series of questions that the 
plot then goes on to answer. 
(Carroll 1990, p.130) 
 
So, instead of Jaws’ opening shark point-of-view being reflexively structured 
as the fort to a deferred da (see section 3.3), Carroll interprets this film’s 
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opening scene as the initial element, in horror films,54 of a “plot structure 
[which] has four essential movements or functions. They are: onset, 
discovery, confirmation, and confrontation. The first function […] is onset. 
Here the monster’s presence is established for the audience. For example, in 
the film Jaws, we see the shark attack. We know the monster is abroad” 
(1990, p.99, original emphasis). 
 
In part, Carroll’s model here conflates two elements of Heath’s account into a 
single plot function; Heath understands the initial shark attack as a 
continuation of grammatical inconsistency (in contradistinction to the beach 
scene which divides the opening shark point-of-view shot from the first 
attack), albeit a continuation that diegetises the previously ambiguously 
attributed point-of-view shot. The genuine status of the shark’s 
representation, then, is actually somewhere between the two of Carroll’s 
claims, that a plot “may begin in the manner of a thriller, by immediately 
revealing the identity of the monster to the audience (e.g., Jaws […]); or in 
the manner of a mystery, by only showing us the dastardly effects of the 
                                                          
54 The following definition of a filmic cognitivist writing formation relies mainly 
on academic cognitivist (and biocultural) approaches to horror, but I would 
not want to suggest that they are applicable only to this genre. The reason 
why I am building up my definition of a filmic cognitivist writing formation on 
the foundations of these approaches to horror is that they provide cognitivist 
explanations for the key elements of the drama of vision (such as 
anticipation, suspense, shock, and unattributed/ambiguously attributed 
camera movements) which are so central to the case study’s subsequent 
comparative analysis. This analysis of academic cognitivist approaches to 
what academic poststructuralism understands as the drama of vision is not 
intended, therefore, as a definitive account of contending interpretations of 
the horror genre. 
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monster” (1990, p.99). The difference in analysis here, though, is indicative 
of the two different interpretative strategies, and of the conflicting writing 
formations at play in the film. Instead of attempting to exploit the audience’s 
masochistic psychological predispositions, the cognitivist writing formation 
threatens the security of vision in the name of intelligibility: 
 
The onset of the creature, attended by mayhem or other disturbing 
effects, raises the question of whether the human characters in 
the story will be able to uncover the source, the identity and nature 
of these untoward and perplexing happenings. This question is 
answered in the second movement or function in the kind of plot 
we are discussing; I call it discovery. 
(Carroll 1990, p.100, original emphasis) 
 
Poststructuralism’s oscillating grammatical inconsistency/consistency is 
therefore, for cognitivism, a movement from unknowing to knowing. Rather 
than being the unpleasure required for a subsequent cathartic resolution, 
“[s]uspense in fictional narratives is generated as an emotional concomitant 
of a narrative question that has been raised by earlier scenes and events in a 
story” (Carroll 1990, p.137). The temporary concealment and revelation of 
vision/information is also understood along these suturing/intelligibility lines; 
for Heath there is a “constant process of a phasing-in of vision, the pleasure 
of that process – movement and fixity and movement again, from fragment 
[…] to totality (the jubilation of the final image)” (1985, p.514, my emphasis), 
whereas for Carroll  
 
many horror stories employ what might be called phasing in the 
development of their onset movement. That is, the audience may 
put together what is going on in advance of the characters in the 
story; the identification of the monsters by the characters is 
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phased in after the prior realizations of the audience. That the 
audience possesses this knowledge, of course, quickens its 
anticipation. 
(Carroll 1990, p.100, my emphasis) 
 
Carroll’s conception of ‘anticipation’ here is closely linked to ‘knowledge’. His 
conception of the pleasures of the erotetic process thinks of the deferred, 
potentially alienating nature of the drama of vision in the following terms: “a 
scene may also merely sustain an ongoing question posed earlier in the tale. 
For example, as the body count keeps mounting in Jaws in scene after 
scene, the question of what is killing them is intensified or sustained, rather 
than posing a new question or answering the presiding one” (1990, p.134). 
Although I have said that the thesis does not explicitly weigh one theory 
against another it should be noted that Carroll’s analysis here seems to be a 
misreading. Although, “as the body count keeps mounting” Jaws maintains a 
degree of uncertainty regarding “the question of what is killing” by nurturing 
doubt as to whether the smaller caught shark could have been responsible, 
and by continuing to withhold a sustained glimpse of the culpable beast, the 
killer’s status is not unknown, contrary to Carroll’s claims. In making his point 
about “sustain[ing] an ongoing question”, in a book devoted to the entire 
genre of horror across different media, Carroll could surely have found an 
example that is consistent with his argument about an “intensified or 
sustained” question, particularly as he discounts many forms of putative 
horror because to be categorised as such, “it is crucial that two evaluative 
components come into play: that the monster is regarded as threatening and 
impure” (1990, p.28). Jaws is therefore potentially disqualified from the genre 
that he is analysing. Nevertheless, Carroll’s misreading of Jaws may still 
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constitute a possible element of a cognitivist writing formation, as chapter 6’s 
case study demonstrates. And, as the following discussion shows, the 
problematic nature of this reading of Jaws’ deferred answer suggests that 
this particular element of academic cognitivism does not work especially well 
within the pragmatics of a filmic cognitivist writing formation, and that 
sustaining grammatical inconsistency after the answering of the question 
which that inconsistency originally posed, is a technique more conducive to a 
filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation. 
 
The ambiguity about vision, which academic poststructuralism thinks of as 
the drama of vision, is understood by academic cognitivism more as 
ambiguity about knowledge, which I will call the drama of knowledge. Several 
examples (see in particular 6.3.2 and 6.3.3) in the subsequent case study 
explore the notion, discussed by Heath in relation to Jaws, that the drama of 
vision “sets off a number of other series which knot together as figures over 
the film. [...] [T]he underwater shot is then used in the first part of the film to 
signify the imminence of attack. [...] Once systematized, it can be used to 
cheat: it occurs to confirm the second day-time beach attack, but this is only 
two boys with an imitation fin” (1985, pp.512-3, my emphasis). Proponents of 
the dramas of vision and knowledge have very different approaches to this 
repetitive form of ‘cheating’. Robert Baird’s broadly poststructuralist approach 
to the relationships between violent irruptions in the movement/fixity 
oscillation, and those cheats which exploit audience’s nervous expectations, 
is as follows: 
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We can pinpoint the frames in Cat People ([Jacques Tourneur] 
1942) where one of film’s first startles – a public bus of all things – 
bursts into frame; we can study the exact moment in Jaws (1975) 
when Hooper [Richard Dreyfuss], while scuba diving, is startled by 
a corpse popping through a shattered boat hull. […] My study of 
over 100 American horror and thriller films from the early 30s to 
the present reveals formal refinements and increased usage of 
this effect. For instance, 1942’s Cat People deploys two startle 
effects, while Paul Schrader’s 1982 remake offers eight, a typical 
example of the hypersensationalization of the post-Psycho 
horror/thriller film. 
(Baird 2000, p.13) 
 
Baird’s charting of the “formal refinements and increased usage” of the 
violent movement/fixity oscillation suggests something about the possible 
diachronic relationships between academic theorising and filmic writing 
formations. And Brigid Cherry draws attention to the potentially reflexive 
cheating element of the process: 
 
[With] the revelation that the build-up of tension was a bluff, the 
viewer will experience a moment of respite in the tension – and it 
is at this point that the shock cut will provide an effective jump. 
The classic example of this is in Cat People when Alice [Jane 
Randolph] is walking in the underpass, followed by Irena [Simone 
Simon] whom it is suggested by the sound effects has 
transformed into a cat. As she comes out of the tunnel, nervously 
looking around, there is a shock cut accompanied by a screech – 
but it is merely a bus. 
(Cherry 2009, p.87) 
 
Dennis Fischer notes that “[t]his type of scene with a slow buildup and 
sudden release became known as a ‘bus’” (1991, p.666), because of Cat 
People. Carroll’s analysis of the same scene stresses the drama of 
knowledge rather than a reflexive, ‘cheating’, exploitation of the drama of 
vision: 
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when we hear what we think is Irena growling, a bus pulls 
onscreen so as to introduce the possibility that what we thought 
was a growl might have been the sound of the bus’s door opening. 
We are pretty sure it was a growl; but we realize that if were we, 
for instance, in a courtroom, our perception here could be 
challenged. [Visual and aural ambiguity] occurs in the context 
where a naturalistic explanation of Irena’s anxiety is being 
advanced by the somewhat slimy psychiatrist [Tom Conway]. 
[…B]y the end of the film, the case for the supernatural 
interpretation is secure. However, the drama of the film has been 
built around prolonging the moment when the spectator feels 
confident that the supernatural case is incontestable. 
(Carroll 1990, p.153) 
 
Therefore, a cognitivist writing formation attempts to dramatize knowledge 
rather than vision: “What films like Cat People exploit in order to generate 
hesitation over embracing a supernatural explanation is the criteria, used in 
our culture by such practices as the law, for knowledge by observation” 
(Carroll 1990, p.154, my emphasis). 
 
Carroll recognises that the oscillation of movement/fixity can produce shock, 
but does not locate this within poststructuralism’s masochistic context:  
 
I would not want to deny that shock is often involved in tandem 
with art-horror, especially in theater and cinema. Just before the 
monster appears, the music shoots up, or there is a startling 
noise, or we see an unexpected, fast movement start out from 
‘nowhere.’ […] This variety of shock does not seem to me to be an 
emotion at all, but rather a reflex, though, of course, it is a reflex 
that is often linked with the provocation of art-horror by the 
artisans of monster spectacles. 
(Carroll 1990, p.36). 
 
In this statement Carroll somewhat struggles to explain the pleasures of 
shock. He links it “with the provocation of art-horror by the artisans of 
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monster spectacles” without explaining their motivation, or how it fits in with 
his more definitive erotetic explanation of horror’s pleasure: 
 
the horror story is driven explicitly by curiosity. It engages its 
audience by being involved in processes of disclosure, discovery, 
proof, explanation, hypothesis, and confirmation. Doubt, 
skepticism, and the fear that belief in the existence of the monster 
is a form of insanity are predictable foils to the revelation (to the 
audience or to the characters or both) of the existence of the 
monster. 
(Carroll 1990, p.182) 
 
Shock may provide an answer to the question of what menace is being built 
up towards, but there are other ways to provide the same answer, and the 
shock is not reducible to the erotetic. Indeed, Carroll seems more interested 
in using the existence of shock as a means to critique poststructuralism: 
 
it strikes me as incontrovertible that film-makers often play upon 
what psychologists call the ‘startle response,’ an innate human 
tendency to ‘jump’ at loud noises and to re-coil at fast movements. 
This tendency is, as they say, impenetrable to belief; that is, our 
beliefs won't change the response. It is hardwired and involuntary. 
Awareness of this response enables theorists like me to explain 
the presence of certain audiovisual patterns and effects in horror 
films, without reference to politics and ideology. Indeed, insofar as 
the startle response is impenetrable to belief, it could be said to 
be, in certain respects, beyond politics and ideology. Moreover, 
such examples indicate that there is a stratum of theoretical 
investigation at the level of cognitive architecture that can proceed 
while bracketing questions of ideology. 
(Carroll 1996, p.60) 
 
A more persuasive account of shock’s cognitive impact may be provided by 
bioculturalism, as will be discussed shortly. But before that, there is one 
more part of Carroll’s account of horror that explains a possible element of a 
filmic cognitivist writing formation’s motivation for what academic 
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poststructuralism understands as another example of grammatical 
inconsistency; unattributed camera movements. Carroll claims that a 
 
device that cinema has for engendering the suspicion of the 
supernatural while refraining to corroborate it is what I call 
unassigned camera movement. In The Changeling [Peter Medak, 
1980], for instance, the camera begins to move around George C. 
Scott in his study. It is not supplying new narrative information nor 
is its movement explicitly correlated within the scene to the 
movement of any specific character. It has no assignment either in 
terms of narrative or characterological function. But it does call 
attention to itself. The audience sees it. And the audience cannot 
help postulating that the camera movement might represent the 
presence of some unseen, supernatural force that is observing 
Scott for devilish purposes. The audience cannot know this for 
sure; but the point of the camera movement is to prompt the 
spectator into a state of uncertainty in which she is tempted 
toward a supernatural account, which can nevertheless not be 
embraced outright because she lacks the kind of eyewitness 
certainty discussed above. 
(Carroll 1990, p.155, original emphasis) 
 
This account gives a diegetic explanation for an ambiguously attributed 
camera. Heath’s poststructuralist account of Jaws’ ambiguously attributed 
camera movement also recognises the camera’s eventual diegetisation. The 
principal difference between the two accounts, and between the two potential 
writing formations, is in the motivation for the movement from unattribution to 
diegetised attribution. Heath claims that the inconsistencies of the drama of 
vision come first – that is, that they are inherent to the anamorphic nature of 
cinema – and that they are narrativised and diegetised as they become “a 
constant reflexive fascination in films” (1985, p.514, original emphasis). For 
Carroll the ambiguity of the grammatically inconsistent unattributed camera is 
not about vision but about knowledge; his claim that the spectator’s 
supernatural account can “not be embraced outright” (1990, p.155) exists in 
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the erotetic temporal context which will eventually, diegetically and 
conclusively (grammatically consistently) conclude the temporary ambiguity. 
 
Very different motivations are attributed to the filmmakers by these two 
accounts. For both, there is an element of deferral to the motivated 
conclusion of the ambiguous camera movements. The deferrals, however, 
have not only different motivations but also different effects deriving from 
these different motivations. Carroll’s account stresses that the ambiguous 
camera position always has a potential diegetic grounding – “the audience 
cannot help postulating that the camera movement might represent the 
presence of some unseen, supernatural force” (1990, p.155, original 
emphasis). The same can be assumed, initially, of Heath’s account, but the 
filmic poststructuralist writing formation repeats and exploits the ambiguous 
attribution even after it has been erotetically answered (“the underwater shot 
is then used in the first part of the film to signify the imminence of attack” 
(1985, pp.512-3). Audiences don’t think that Jaws’ underwater point-of-view 
shots “might represent the presence of some unseen […] force” (Carroll 
1990, p.155, original emphasis), after the first example of the shark’s attack, 
because the question as to who or what’s viewpoint is being shown has 
already been answered, despite Carroll’s claims to the contrary (1990, 
p.134). The filmic poststructuralist writing formation, then, employs potentially 
alienating grammatical inconsistency even when the erotetic justification for 
that inconsistency has already been answered, and the deferred resolution to 
that inconsistency is not an answer, as in a filmic cognitivist writing 
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formation’s resolution of grammatical inconsistency, but a form of 
masochistic catharsis. 
 
Carroll’s understanding of this particular example of grammatical 
inconsistency reflects a wider academic cognitivist conception of how non-
classical or non-grammatical narration still operates within motivational and 
communicative contexts remarkably similar to classical or grammatical 
narration. Bordwell claims that “[a]rt-cinema narration self-consciously points 
to its own interventions, but the aim is still to tell a discernible story in a 
certain way” (1985a, p.233). The case study’s distinctions between evidence 
for filmic cognitivist and poststructuralist writing formations will need to be 
mindful, therefore, that grammatical inconsistency need not necessarily be 
evidence for the latter mode of filmmaking. 
 
There is one further element of a filmic cognitivist writing formation that 
needs outlining, particularly as it addresses an element that was left 
somewhat unclear above – Carroll’s approach to the shock of what Heath 
understands as the drama of vision’s violent irruptions in the oscillation 
between movement and fixity (Heath 1985, p.514). Exponents of 
bioculturalism conceive of shock in a similar way to Carroll’s more rational 
form of cognitivism. Grodal, in this manner, writes that “[i]f we suddenly see 
or hear something, we may experience a shock although we may find out 
after a short analysis that there is no reason to be alarmed. […] The 
perceptual impact is caused by inferior, automated, and non-conscious 
processes that register strong changes of stimuli” (1997, p.32). The 
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motivation behind the enjoyment of these processes, which goes beyond 
Carroll’s account, is the following evolutionary context: 
 
many young mammals, including human children, play games 
involving a chase or hide-and-seek, because these games offer 
good practice in avoiding predators or in hunting prey. […] The 
development of social intelligence, the ability to understand other 
minds, supported the ability to understand the minds of possible 
prey, and the development of more sophisticated hunting 
practices was a key element of the formation of modern humans. 
[…] The reason so many film and television viewers choose to 
watch endless crime, horror, or hide-and-seek action dramas is 
not only that they have been accustomed to such fictions through 
long exposure. The reason is also that these dramas appeal to 
fundamental, innate dispositions in us. 
(Grodal 2009, p.8) 
 
Bioculturalism can thereby account for the pleasures of audience responses 
to the second, violently irruptive, element of the poststructuralist drama of 
vision, and the reasons why filmmakers might inscribe these pleasures into a 
filmic writing formation, in a way that cannot be explained by more rational 
cognitivism’s focus on the erotetic nature of the first element of the 
poststructuralist drama of vision, the non-grammatical build-up of 
interrogative suspense. 
 
In part, then, a filmic cognitivist writing formation relies on both rational 
cognitivism and on bioculturalism to explain the pleasures of the 
poststructuralist drama of vision. But bioculturalism also has a convincing 
explanation for the drama of vision’s interplay between Heath’s “play on the 
unseen and the unforeseeable […] and the moments of violent irruption” 
(1985, p.514). Plantinga gives an evolutionary account of this interplay: 
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when we say we are interested in a film, this interest stems not 
from a single emotion but from a variety of sources, including 
global, long-lasting emotions (suspense, curiosity, anticipation), 
local emotions (fear, surprise, disgust), desires, aversions, 
pleasures, and what have you. […] Local emotions are brief, their 
function confined to specific segments of the viewing process. […] 
When viewing a film such as Alien ([Ridley Scott] 1979), surprise 
and shock often accompany the sudden appearance of the 
threatening alien, but such emotions do not last long. Indeed, their 
intensity precludes duration, if the filmmakers expect viewers to 
endure such a film. Global emotions such as suspense, 
anticipation, and curiosity, on the other hand, are longer in 
duration and serve to focus spectator attention over time. 
Suspense and anticipation play a major role in Alien when the 
spectator begins to suspect that the alien’s attacks are both 
imminent and unpredictable. Thus anxious anticipation motivates 
the spectator, through much of the film, to be on guard and to 
watch for the alien’s next appearance. The global and local 
emotions also mutually reinforce one another. In the case of Alien, 
the viewer’s suspense and anticipation are fed by periodic shocks 
and surprises, and both long- and short-term emotions work 
together to create the contours of the particular experience offered 
by the film. 
(Plantinga 2009 p.70, my emphasis) 
 
Plantinga accounts here for filmmaking intent and for the interplay of different 
forms of cognition that explain, without recourse to the psychoanalytic or 
ideological, the pleasures of anticipation, suspense and shock. If the rational 
cognitivist drama of knowledge satisfactorily offers an alternative explanation 
for one half of the drama of vision (its “play on the unseen and the 
unforeseeable”, rather than its “moments of violent irruption” (Heath 1985, 
p.514)), then what I will call the biocultural drama of survival gives a 
convincing cognitivist explanation for the pleasures of both elements of the 
drama of vision. A filmic cognitivist writing formation can, then, include 
elements of both the dramas of knowledge and of survival, and, as Plantinga 
points towards, these dramas can “also mutually reinforce one another” 
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(2009, p.70). It is important, also, that both these dramas can contribute to a 
filmic writing formation that operates relatively outside the constraining 
strictures of specific social and cultural norms – that, as Grodal puts it, neatly 
synthesising the relative cultural hermeticity of the underlying approach to 
the human mind within these two elements of cognitivism, “[w]hen Bordwell 
treats different ‘formulas’ in connection with their historical first or most 
significant appearance [...] this does not exclude the possibility that their key 
representational devices are not just historical styles, but relate to 
fundamental formulas of consciousness” (1997, p.8). 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
As already stated, it is not the intention of this thesis to make judgements 
about the theoretical validity of these competing explanations for filmmaking 
and spectatorial motivations. It instead explores relationships between the 
socio-cultural contexts which condition these explanations and filmic writing 
formations which manipulate the processes informing those explanations. 
These explanations of two different filmic writing formations have already 
begun to suggest ways in which filmmaking operates, with numerous 
theoretical mentions about how filmmakers attempt to align spectatorial 
responses to their own motivations (even if those motivations are partly 
unconscious). The following case study analyses how these filmmaking 
attempts have a history which can be mapped alongside developing 
academic explanations of these filmmaking attempts, with both cultural 
activities influenced by the same diachronic socio-cultural developments. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Filmic writing formations’ 
diachronic development: Case 
Study (Four adaptations of Hamlet) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have established that academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice share the same socio-cultural determinants. The dialectic 
subjects involved in both making, and theorising about, films are influenced 
by historically and socio-culturally specific forms of thinking. I call the ways in 
which these dialectic subjects engage with those forms of thinking, writing 
formations. A writing formation is a specific cluster of ideas which are 
activated in particular ways. Academic writing formations interpret filmmaking 
according to one of these specific clusters of ideas. Filmic writing formations 
manipulate (often unconsciously) one of these specific clusters of ideas into 
aesthetic form. The relationships between academic and filmic writing 
formations can be traced by looking for how the historical development of 
one corresponds to the historical development of the other. This chapter 
traces this diachronic relationship by examining the ways in which filmic 
poststructuralist writing formations in four adaptations of Hamlet55 develop in 
relation to the historical emergence of academic poststructuralism after 1968 
(see section 2.3.2). 
                                                          
55 This analysis is also supported by shorter investigations into Orson Welles’ 
filmmaking. The rationale for this is discussed on pages 278-9. 
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The chapter comprises a rationale for selecting these particular films for 
analysis. It is broken down into two main sections. The first (6.2) analyses 
filmmakers’ ancillary discourses to trace the ways in which the socio-cultural 
determinants impacting on academic theoretical discourse produce 
analogous approaches to filmmaking practice. These ancillary discourses 
can provide important evidence about the filmmakers’ unconscious 
motivations, in a process somewhat like Freud’s analysis of parapraxis, 
namely those statements and activities, such as a Freudian slip which, for 
Freud, mean that  “one is justified in inferring from [parapraxes] the presence 
of restrained or repressed impulses and intentions” (1978, pp.46-7).The 
second (6.3) is a detailed examination of the four films’ opening scenes, 
including both film textual analysis and the exploration of ancillary discourses 
relating to the scenes. The chapter delineates the ways that the films’ writing 
formations manipulate authorial enunciation into realist continuity into two 
categories; those which demonstrate similar approaches across time, and 
those which demonstrate areas of diachronic development. The case study 
is followed by some conclusions about the diachronic development of filmic 
writing formations which it suggests. 
 
The case study is comprised of four adaptations of Hamlet, directed by 
Olivier (1948), Zeffirelli (1990), Branagh (1996) and Almereyda (2000). 
These films offer extensive examples of the ways that filmmaking relates to 
academic claims about film from two different time periods. The films are 
also comparable because they represent the same broad realist style which 
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Burch characterised as the ‘institutional mode of representation’ (1973). 
Although the case study only analyses films from two historic periods, and 
from a single broad cultural position, it should not be supposed that the 
choice in regard to this is arbitrary, or that the snapshot which the case study 
offers is not helpful in terms of understanding the relationships between 
academic theory and filmmaking practice. The case study films represent a 
culture and two historical periods that are of continuing importance for film 
studies as a discipline. The periodic and cultural distinctions I have made 
facilitate an investigation of the temporally- and culturally-specific 
relationships between academic theorising and filmmaking practice which I 
have set out to analyse. 
 
Zeffirelli’s, Branagh’s and Almereyda’s adaptations give a relatively broad 
picture of a post-poststructuralist writing formation covering ten years. An 
academic cognitivist criticism of the definition of these films as examples of a 
post-poststructuralist writing formation would claim that any comparative 
features identified in them represent a specific historical and cultural style 
(Bordwell 1997), rather than the presence of a filmic writing formation. But, 
as I demonstrate below, there is evidence that this historical/cultural style 
unconsciously relates to coterminous developments in academic theorising. 
A potential criticism of identifying Olivier’s adaptation as an example of a 
proto-poststructuralist writing formation is that this single film might be an 
exception rather than the rule, or that his filmmaking might be an example of 
auteur-ial, rather than grammatical, specificities. Looking at the evidence of 
Olivier’s other Shakespearean adaptations would not address this latter 
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criticism. Other potential examples of proto-poststructuralist adaptations of 
Hamlet all fail either the cultural or temporal tests. Films of the relevant 
period such as Khoon ka khoon (Sohrab Modi 1935) and Hamlet (Kishore 
Sahu 1954) are not part of the same Anglo-American (or even broader 
Western) culture, and cannot therefore be expected to operate within the 
context of a proto-poststructuralist culture. Analysing the filmic writing 
formations within these adaptations would no doubt yield interesting results, 
but they are beyond the remit of this thesis. Films within the relevant cultural 
context seem to cluster at certain times, happily in the case of those I have 
identified as post-poststructuralist, but less happily in terms of the early silent 
adaptations of Hamlet such as those of Hay Plumb (1913), Eleuterio Rodolfi 
(1917) and Sven Gade and Heinz Schall (1920), whose distinctions from the 
later examples I analyse might more usefully be described within the 
contexts of academic cognitivism’s development of historical style (Bordwell 
1997). The same is true  of a cluster of films such as Tony Richardson’s 
(1969) and Celestino Coronado’s (1976) adaptations, and  Quella sporca 
storia nel west (Johnny Hamlet) (Enzo G. Castellari 1968), which are roughly 
contemporaneous with the development of academic poststructuralism, and 
therefore difficult to analyse in relation to the wider diffusion of the socio-
cultural determinants with inform those academic ideas. The solution to this 
problem which I employ is to support the analysis of Olivier’s ancillary 
comments and film text with diachronically appropriate ancillary comments 
and a film text from a director of contemporaneous Anglo-American 
Shakespearean adaptations, Orson Welles. Ancillary comments relating to 
Welles’ work are included in footnotes throughout section 6.2, and there is a 
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relatively detailed analysis of his handling of a scene similar to the opening 
sequences analysed, his Macbeth’s (1948) ghost scene, Act 3 Scene 4. 
Although the ancillary evidence relating to Welles’ work is insufficiently 
substantive to support incontrovertibly the Olivier example, and although 
using an adaptation of a different source text slightly disrupts the laboratory 
conditions which constitute the case study more broadly, these additional 
pieces of analysis do demonstrate strong similarities with Olivier’s 
filmmaking, and do suggest that Olivier’s adaptation is not unrepresentative 
of a proto-poststructuralist writing formation. 
 
The case study also, as was discussed during the concluding remarks about 
the taxonomy in section 4.6, focuses on certain elements of that taxonomy at 
the expense of others. This is partly due to word constraints, but also 
because certain elements of the taxonomy are optional, and may or may not 
be employed by filmmakers, whereas other elements are ontological within 
realist adaptations. The case study focuses on these ontological elements, 
although there are other elements of the films selected which touch upon 
other areas of the taxonomy. It is important to state, however, that the 
necessary film and ancillary texts are available to conduct future research by 
extending the kind of analysis I undertake in the following case study to the 
other areas of the taxonomy at a later date. 
 
The case study is broken down into two principal sections. The first of these 
(6.2) is an analysis of the adaptations’ ancillary accounts of filmmaking 
practice, which traces parapractic elements of both continuity and diachronic 
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development in terms of how the films manipulate the dramas of knowledge, 
vision, authorship and survival discussed above. The second principal 
section (6.3) applies this relatively broad analysis to the opening scenes of 
each film, and allies the investigation of ancillary evidence of filmmaking 
practice with textual analysis evidence. 
 
6.2 Filmmakers’ parapractic ancillary discourses 
 
The adaptations’ ancillary accounts of the filmmakers’ motivations 
demonstrate both continuity and historically specific development in terms of 
how filmmakers relate to the various dramas which constitute filmic 
cognitivist and poststructuralist writing formations. 
 
These accounts demonstrate continuity in terms of the kind of concerns 
about intelligibility that can be described as a filmic cognitive writing 
formation, particularly in the way that filmmakers express the reasons for 
cutting certain verbal elements.56 Olivier writes that  
 
the same basic problems remain, of reducing the length, 
elucidating the plot, unravelling irrelevancies, and relating the 
result to the type of audience. And although I expect many honest 
differences of opinion and expressions of regret at the non-
                                                          
56 The translation of these cut elements into visual form, which is discussed on 
pages 284-6, is more conducive to a poststructuralist writing formation. 
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inclusion of this or that, I hope it will be admitted that in the main 
we have tried to make a good, sensible job of it. 
(Olivier 1948, p.3, my pagination) 
 
Zeffirelli claims that “if the audience doesn’t understand the dialogue, you 
must cut it” (1998, p.49), and Branagh that it must “be understood in direct, 
accessible relation to modern life” (1996, p.viii). 
 
Branagh’s point demonstrates the close links, however, between intelligibility 
and cinema’s seamless ideological reality-effect. This should be no surprise, 
since I claimed in section 4.2.8 that fainomaic translation is an inherently 
ontological element of adaptation. But there is a difference between his and 
Olivier’s statements about relating between film and audience. Olivier’s 
motivations focus on the film’s negotiations with the Shakespearean text – by 
“reducing the length, elucidating the plot, unravelling irrelevancies […] the 
result” can be related “to the type of audience” (1948, p.3, my emphasis and 
pagination). Branagh’s motivations focus less on the film’s negotiations with 
the Shakespearean text – even his “commitment to a speaking style that is 
as realistic as a proper adherence to the structure of the language will allow; 
[and to] a period setting that attempts to set the story in a historical context 
that is resonant for a modern audience but allows a heightened language to 
sit comfortably” (1996, p.vii) is designed to facilitate a suturing relationship 
between verisimilitude and foregrounded authorial enunciation. And these 
point to the telos of Branagh’s motivations – “Above all, we have asked for a 
full emotional commitment to the characters, springing from a belief that they 
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can be understood in direct, accessible relation to modern life” (1996, pp.vii-
viii). The intelligibility of Branagh’s communication of Shakespearean 
language, theme, characters etc. is subordinate to this accessibility to the 
audience’s external, modern world. He is more concerned that his film seems 
verisimilar, than that it is intelligible, or he at least thinks of the latter element 
as a prerequisite for the more important former. In linking intelligibility and 
seamlessness, Branagh points towards an understanding of intelligibility that 
is not focused on cognitivism’s rational “goal-directed spectator, equipped 
with schemata and ready to make assumptions, form expectations, motivate 
material, recall information, and project hypotheses” (Bordwell 1985a, p.335), 
but on how realist cinema constructs and confirms culturally specific 
subjectivities that pass themselves off as natural and inevitable. 
 
The adaptations’ ancillary discourses suggest that the diachronic 
development of this more poststructuralist linking of intelligibility and 
seamlessness goes back, at least in part, as far as Olivier’s adaptation. Even 
at this early stage, preceding the articulation of poststructuralism as an 
academic discourse, it is couched in fainomaic terms. Alan Dent, Olivier’s 
text editor, writes 
 
[a] stage-play that is to be turned into a film worthy of the name 
has to be far more drastically treated than any novel or short-story 
on which similar execution is contemplated. Its plot has to be re-
told in terms not of the play-house but of the cinema. This may or 
may not involve modification of the dialogue (it usually does). But 
it most invariably involves modification of, and a far greater 
mobility in, the action. 
(Dent 1948, p.8, my pagination) 
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Desmond Dickinson, Olivier’s director of photography, writes that “[a]ll the 
soliloquies were planned to a great deal of movement, so that audiences 
listening to an uninterrupted speech would not become restive, since the 
screen would be taken up with all kinds of action to hold their attention. If the 
actors were not moving around, then the camera was” (1948, p.33). Although 
Dickinson does not explain exactly why audiences might become restive, he 
does, like Dent, see the necessity for translation from the verbal to the visual. 
And his concern is couched in quite stark terms – the restive audience is the 
outcome of the overly verbal. Too much foregrounded Shakespearean 
discours, and too little seamless histoire, is thought to have a negative effect, 
although these academic terms are not used. However, there is also some 
suggestion that the camera’s movement here might be motivated by a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation, in the sense that the camera movement’s 
ultimate aim is to ensure intelligibility – to “hold [the] attention” of “audiences 
listening to an uninterrupted speech”. But there is also some suggestion 
about the use of a simple filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation, 
through the manipulation of the mobile camera’s drama of vision. 
 
The imprecision with which Dent and Dickinson express these issues 
suggests two important things. Firstly, their concerns about foregrounded 
authorial enunciation are vague. In stating “[b]ut why cut at all? – says the 
purist. The immediate answer is that time and the hour call for drastic 
reduction” (1948, p.8, my emphasis and pagination), Dent suggests that 
there is something beyond this immediacy, and perhaps even beyond the 
vague apprehension about foregrounding the verbal. This leads to the 
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second suggestion – their concerns are vague in the same way that 
poststructuralism had not yet been articulated at the academic theoretical 
level. The other adaptations follow after this academic articulation, and after 
the socio-cultural contexts determining this academic articulation have 
shifted to facilitate a more anamorphic form of filmmaking, and suggest quite 
different approaches to fainomaic translation which are more consistent with 
a filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation. 
 
Zeffirelli’s discussion about the challenges of bringing Shakespeare to a 
1990s audience makes this clear: 
 
I think it’s making the language acceptable, that you can 
understand it, that it’s almost colloquial. […] I think our actors have 
done this miracle. They have to speak a language that is beautiful, 
yes, but more ‘primitive’ and spare, in a way. Look at the scenes 
with Paul Scofield. You’re not aware of a ‘classical’ barrier 
between you and him. He speaks in a way that you understand 
every word. And Mel [Gibson], for all his realism, he makes ‘To be 
or not to be’ not a poetic aria, but a real suffering and a real 
problem that you understand. People who are not familiar at all 
with the speeches tell me that for the first time they understand it. 
(Zeffirelli in Tibbetts 1994, p.138) 
 
Here Zeffirelli demonstrates the fine line between intelligibility and cinema’s 
seamless reality-effect. In order to achieve this intelligibility his film needs to 
be “acceptable, […] almost colloquial”. Via the fetishized “miracle” of 
“realism”, though meant in a colloquial rather than academic sense, 
Shakespeare’s words can become “a real suffering and a real problem that 
you understand”. 
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Branagh, too, seeks to employ “a speaking style that is as realistic as a 
proper adherence to the structure of the language will allow” (1996, p.vii, my 
emphasis). There may well be more than a mere semantic difference 
between these directors’ use of the term realism/realistic, and Olivier’s 
contrasting use of the word “sensible” (1948, p.3, my pagination). In answer 
to a question about why he decided to film a full-length version of Hamlet, 
Branagh responded  
 
I believe that’s a great way to see it; it’s easier to follow. I think it’s 
much quicker that way. There are numerous short versions of 
Hamlet which play much longer – I’ve seen many one and a half 
hour films that have seemed much longer. […] [W]hen it’s 
shortened, I feel as though the intensity is constantly in there and 
it’s hard to absorb – the actors are actually much slower. [With a 
full-length version p]eople are prepared to sort of throw things 
away a little more. There was a healthy, casual quality to some of 
the dialogue. It meant that not everybody was playing every 
moment as ‘art’. 
(Branagh in Feldman no date, my emphasis) 
 
Both Zeffirelli and Branagh claim, moreover, that this “healthy, casual quality 
to some of the dialogue” can be facilitated via fainomai. The functions of 
fainomaic translation go from intelligibility in Zeffirelli’s argument that 
“[a]daptation is […] inevitable, a necessity that no one can escape. Not just 
cutting lines, which is automatic, because, if the audience doesn’t 
understand the dialog, you must cut it or find other solutions” (1998, p.49), 
towards the suturing achievement of cinematic seamlessness, in Branagh’s 
rhetorical question; “what does the language do and what does its subject 
matter add […] to Shakespeare’s theme or essay here, and is there anything, 
in relation to our cinematic presentation, that we can replace it with that 
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would be relevant or organic” (in Wray and Burnett 2000, pp.172-3, my 
emphasis). 
 
These approaches to fainomaic translation can be contrasted with Olivier’s 
earlier claim that “[i]f you are going to cut a Shakespeare play, there is only 
one thing to do – lift out scenes. If you cut the lines down merely to keep all 
the characters in, you end up with a mass of short ends” (in Manvell 1971, 
p.48). He does not seek, like Zeffirelli, to “find other solutions” (1998, p.49), 
or, like Branagh, to “replace [dialogue with something] relevant or organic” (in 
Wray and Burnett 2000, p.173). He instead aims to remove discreet 
elements of the playtext, whilst keeping other elements ostensibly intact. 
Filmmakers working after the socio-cultural developments which facilitated 
the articulation of academic poststructuralism seem to be able to 
conceptualise a different conception of verisimilitude, which is not located 
solely in the coherence of the Shakespearean verse, but in a coherence of 
cinematic seamlessness. It is not enough to say merely that the earlier 
filmmaking is more deferential to the text and less willing to cut dialogue. 
Olivier accepts the necessity of cutting dialogue, but sees it as the removal of 
certain self-contained elements of the playtext that leave the remainder 
somewhat undisturbed. Zeffirelli and Branagh are more willing to make 
whichever translations suit cinema’s reality-effect. 
 
This unconscious, parapractic semantic tone (for ‘organic’ read ‘seamless’) 
to these later expressions about filmmaking, is extended in Almereyda’s 
account of ways in which his adaptation explores Shakespearean themes. 
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His use of surveillance technologies “seemed like a natural way of mirroring 
things that were going on in Shakespeare’s text” (Almereyda in Fuchs no 
date, my emphasis). Shifting to a corporate setting “seemed like a natural 
way of talking about contemporary power” (Almereyda in Fuchs no date, my 
emphasis). Surrounding the characters with images of product placements, 
demonstrating “how our lives are cluttered with all these names and logos 
and announcements and seductive images of how we’re supposed to be 
enjoying our lives if we owned these things […] seemed like a natural 
corollary to Hamlet’s troubles” (Almereyda in Anderson 2000, my emphasis). 
Within the duel scene, because “[c]ontemporary fencing involves a wire 
linked from the swords through the fencers’ outfits, and a pulley system, so 
they’re literally linked on the same wire, [the] electricity that connects them 
seems like a natural metaphor for the violence that connects them” (in Fuchs 
no date, my emphasis). In terms of his restaging of key scenes Almereyda 
claims that “[m]ost of it was kind of natural” (in Fuchs no date, my emphasis). 
The resulting adaptation is one that he claims to be “proud of, because it 
feels very natural and direct” (in Fuchs no date, my emphasis). He claims 
that “[g]iven the story’s familiarity, it seemed altogether natural to locate a 
new ‘Hamlet’ in the immediate present, to translate the Danish kingdom into 
a multimedia corporation, and to watch the story unfold in penthouse hotel 
rooms, sky-level office corridors, a coffee shop, an airplane, the Guggenheim 
Museum” (Almereyda 2000, pp.viii-ix, my emphasis). There is no reference 
to understanding or intelligibility amongst these seven mentions of the word 
‘natural’, for which one might, again, read ‘seamless’, particularly when this 
last quote is accompanied by Almereyda’s intention that this naturalness 
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would enable audiences “to watch the story unfold” (Almereyda 2000, pp.viii-
ix). 
 
Almereyda goes on to explain how this ‘natural’ approach works in 
specifically fainomaic terms: 
 
‘Denmark is a prison,’ Hamlet declares early on, and if you 
consider this in terms of contemporary consumer culture, the bars 
of the cage are defined by advertising, by all the hectic 
distractions, brand names, announcements and ads that crowd 
our waking hours. And when, in this independent film, the ghost of 
Hamlet’s father [Sam Shepard] vanishes into a Pepsi machine, or 
Hamlet finds himself questioning the nature of existence in the 
‘Action’ aisles of a Blockbuster video store, or Shakespeare’s lines 
are overwhelmed by the roar of a plane passing overhead – it’s 
meant as something more than casual irony. It’s another way to 
touch the core of Hamlet’s anguish, to recognize the frailty of 
spiritual values in a material world, and to get a whiff of something 
rotten in Denmark on the threshold of our self-congratulatory new 
century. 
       (Almereyda 2000, p.xi) 
 
Almereyda unconsciously expresses several elements of fainomai’s 
academic context. It is “another way to touch the core of Hamlet’s anguish” 
(my emphasis), stressing the translation from one enunciative code to 
another. It establishes the potential discours of “Hamlet’s anguish” and the 
histoire-like communicable relevance of expressing this as “the frailty of 
spiritual values in a material world”. Adaptation’s ontological masochistic 
oscillation between these two enunciative registers is suggested in his 
synthesis of “something rotten in Denmark on the threshold of our self-
congratulatory new century” (Almereyda 2000, p.xi). And these 
manipulations of authorial enunciation are couched in fainomaic terms, the 
289 
 
visual images of the ghost and the Pepsi machine, and Hamlet amongst the 
verbal signifiers of the ‘action’ film genre. 
 
Zeffirelli, too, discusses the importance of the visual in terms of shifting the 
emphasis from foregrounded authored performance to verisimilitude, in 
relation to set design: “Everything was always researched to a point far 
beyond the needs of the actual scene. You immersed yourself in the period, 
the place, its culture, so that even though the audience might not take in 
every detail they would be absolutely convinced of its essential ‘rightness’” 
(1986, pp.85-6). Indeed, Zeffirelli’s account of his use of colour in Hamlet 
goes beyond the articulation, hitherto accounted for, of the ‘realistic’ or 
‘organic’ or ‘natural’, and suggests something about the oscillation between 
the verisimilar and the alienating that confirms Heath’s claim about how 
suture becomes “a constant reflexive fascination in films” (Heath 1985, 
p.514): 
Color is devastating here, but in this way: I keyed the whole movie 
to mostly grays and ash colors, a ‘medieval-primitive’ look, the 
look of a society that is brutal and made of stone. Whenever a few 
rich colors do come out, the effect is even more vivid. In that 
sense, this is one of the most colorful films I’ve ever done – but 
only because the few rich colors stand out so much from the 
grays. That way, you become inebriated by those colors. 
(Zeffirelli in Tibbetts 1994, p.139, original emphasis) 
 
The sense of inebriation that Zeffirelli mentions here is reminiscent of 
suture’s powerful masochistic effect. But what is most striking, in terms of my 
understanding of how adaptation foregrounds and then subsumes authorial 
enunciation, is his account of how, despite the film’s overall lack of colour, he 
perceives it as “one of the most colorful films I’ve ever done”. The 
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juxtaposition of lack of colour with subsequent colour is much like Heath’s 
account of “the pleasure of [suture’s] process – movement and fixity and 
movement again, from fragment […] to totality (the jubilation of the final 
image)” (1985, p.514). Zeffirelli certainly thinks of his manipulation of colour 
in this way, with an inebriating effect (Heath’s “jubilation” (1985, p.514)). And, 
if he thinks of a film with very little colour that suddenly erupts into brief 
moments of colour as “one of the most colorful films I’ve ever done” (in 
Tibbetts 1994, p.139) then one could argue that he might also think of a film 
in which authorial enunciation is foregrounded and subsequently subsumed 
into the logic of cinema’s reality-effect as one of the most realist films that he 
has ever done. 
 
Olivier, on the other hand, thinks of his use of colour in Hamlet very 
differently. He writes that he “did at one time examine the notion of filming it 
in subdued colour – blacks, greys and sepias. But on further consideration, I 
felt that the final effect would not really have justified the extra problems 
which use of the Technicolor camera always involves” (in Manvell 1971, 
p.45). The use of colour that Olivier did consider, here, is much like Zeffirelli’s 
“grays and ash colors, a ‘medieval-primitive’ look, the look of a society that is 
brutal and made of stone” (in Tibbetts 1994, p.139). But whether he 
employed these subdued colours or the black and white that he eventually 
used Olivier has no desire to create Zeffirelli’s “inebriat[ing]” (in Tibbetts 
1994, p.139) colourful juxtapositions. Indeed, Olivier claims that he didn’t 
want Technicolor’s vivid “tangerine and apricot faces […] to haunt [his] 
melancholy Hamlet” (1986, p.286). Zeffirelli seems to understand the 
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suturing potential of juxtaposing colours in a way that is not conceivable to 
Olivier. 
 
This analysis of these statements, however, does not yet offer any insight 
into how the filmmakers’ unconscious writing formations relate to diachronic 
socio-cultural contexts. It is the filmmakers’ discussions about their 
relationships to academia that can offer some answer to this problem. In 
response to the question “how do you regard the relationship between 
yourself as a Shakespearean filmmaker and the academic Shakespeare 
establishment?” Branagh says 
 
Well, as you probably know, a great friend of mine and a 
collaborator on the films, is Russell [Jackson57], and I feel as 
though he’s my link to what’s going on. I’m interested in all things 
Shakespearean. I read quite a lot. I read the various newsletters 
and quarterlies, and find all that very interesting. I keep my 
distance a bit, and sometimes I’m amused and sometimes 
enraged by the passionate debates or heated arguments about 
certain moments or decisions we’ve chosen to take, but I’ve been 
very encouraged by the liveliness with which the academic 
Shakespeare community has responded to this last seven/eight 
years of Shakespearean filmmaking. It’s a lively moment. It’s an 
exciting moment. It’s reinvented things a little, and, even if people 
have been against some of this work, they have been passionate, 
and there’s been interesting new writing, I think. Certainly I always 
enjoy discussing it with academics. But I resist getting too drawn 
in. The practitioner in me says: ‘Don’t get too theoretical!’ I’m an 
intuitive filmmaker, so a lot of times I’m just following my guts. 
(Branagh in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.178) 
 
Although being “interested in all things Shakespearean” and reading “the 
various newsletters and quarterlies” most likely means far more engagement 
                                                          
57 The Allardyce Nicoll Chair in Drama at the University of Birmingham, editor of The 
Cambridge companion to Shakespeare on film (2007). 
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with fidelity criticism than it does with theoretical discourse, Branagh 
nevertheless positions his work against academic interpretation. There is an 
element of masochism to his response – he is sometimes “amused and 
sometimes enraged” by academic interpretation of his work, with “enraged” 
here standing for a perceived sleight, and “amused” standing as a disavowal 
of that rage. Interestingly, Branagh’s parapractic reflex positions the 
disavowal before that which is disavowed. He masochistically notes that 
even amongst this criticism, and “even if people have been against some of 
this work”, he still “always enjoy[s] discussing it with academics”. 
 
It is the conclusion, however, of Branagh’s conflicting responses to academic 
interpretation that is most striking. Partly continuing the disavowal of his 
“amused” response to criticism, Branagh “resist[s] getting too drawn in”. But 
the telos of this resistance goes beyond a rejection of adverse criticism. In 
claiming that “I’m an intuitive filmmaker, so a lot of times I’m just following my 
guts,” Branagh does more than just express his own directorial vision. He 
establishes a very specific aspect to his filmmaking – “‘Don’t get too 
theoretical!’” Instead of a style of filmmaking couched in academic or 
theoretical terms, Branagh advocates intuitive filmmaking, for which one 
might substitute any of the other adjectives that he, Zeffirelli or Almereyda 
employ to colloquially express cinema’s reality-effect (‘organic’, ‘realistic’, 
‘natural’). The fact that he is discussing Shakespearean adaptation is, for 
once, in this instance complicating matters rather than clarifying them, 
because it is not altogether clear exactly to what academic discourses he is 
referring. Indeed, he is focused on how “the academic Shakespeare 
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community has responded to this last seven/eight years of Shakespearean 
filmmaking” rather than on film grammar. But this still does not explain 
exactly what he means by “‘Don’t get too theoretical!’” Adaptation studies of 
the 1990s is, after all, as section 3.4 discussed, potentially a period of under-
theorised academic discourse. It is also, conversely, unreasonable to 
suggest that by “theoretical” Branagh means academic theory. What might 
be the case, however, particularly given the way that he juxtaposes the 
“theoretical” with the “intuitive”, is that Branagh unconsciously recognises a 
distinction between reflexive and realist filmmaking, and between 
“theoretical” discours and “intuitive” histoire. One can then think of Branagh’s 
claim that he is “an intuitive filmmaker” within the context of Wollen’s 
conception of the “auteur as an unconscious catalyst” who creates meaning 
“not because he has played the role of artist, expressing himself or his own 
vision in the film, but because it is through the force of his preoccupations 
that an unconscious, unintended meaning can be decoded in the film” (1972, 
p.167-8). 
 
Zeffirelli makes this distinction between the academic and the seamless even 
more explicit. He couches his adaptation endeavours in (potentially 
somewhat patronising) democratic terms – “you have to make up your mind 
whether you do a film for a small number of people who know it all […] or 
really make some sacrifices and compromises but bring culture to a mass 
audience” (1990, p.244). And he explicitly links these binaries to the 
academic and the emotional: 
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It’s important to respect the musicality in verse, so if someone 
speaks in a poetic form, you have to respect certain rules. But 
what matters in the end is to make that verse, those lines, become 
real and touch the hearts and minds of a contemporary audience. 
[…] They don’t come for an academic exercise. The author’s 
intention was to get to their heart, their mind, so we must try to 
achieve the same purpose. 
(Zeffirelli 1998, p.51) 
 
Again, Zeffirelli uses the word ‘real’ to describe his intended impact, and links 
this to an emotional effect that will “touch the hearts and minds of a 
contemporary audience”. But here he explicitly contrasts this intention with 
“an academic exercise”. Somewhat like Branagh, this “academic exercise” is 
not necessarily the same thing as film theory, given the broad cultural 
understanding, which Zeffirelli recognises and attempts to overcome, that 
Shakespeare is frequently interpreted in quasi-academic terms. Years before 
he adapted Hamlet, Zeffirelli had claimed that “I have always felt sure I could 
break the myth that Shakespeare on stage and screen is only an exercise for 
the intellectual. I want his plays to be enjoyed by ordinary people” (in Lucas 
1967, p.94). There is an element of cognitivist intelligibility to this claim. But, 
both Branagh and Zeffirelli juxtapose their vaguer conception of the 
academic/theoretical with a broadly realist conception of an immersive, 
seamless experience. Zeffirelli can therefore say that, wary of “parting 
company with the audience and asking them to contribute the kind of 
attention which comes through the brain” (1990, p.244), he attempts to “to 
make the thing really happen for the audience today – to make the audience 
understand that the classics are living flesh” (1990, p.252). Zeffirelli seems 
reticent about the focus on intelligibility inherent in a filmic cognitivist writing 
formation. He does not want his audience to “contribute the kind of attention 
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which comes through the brain” (1990, p.244). Rather than operate within a 
writing formation concerned with a “goal-directed spectator, equipped with 
schemata and ready to make assumptions, form expectations, motivate 
material, recall information, and project hypotheses” (Bordwell 1985a, p.335), 
Zeffirelli would rather exploit the drama of a filmic writing formation 
concerned with the seamless intention “to make the thing really happen for 
the audience today” (1990, p.252). 
 
These filmmakers’ articulations of the academic context to their attempted 
reality-effect may not make direct reference to film theory. But the academic 
context that they vaguely envision is nevertheless not dissimilar to that 
discussed by Baudry: 
 
is the work made evident, does consumption of the product bring 
about a ‘knowledge effect’, or is the work concealed? […] In 
which case, concealment of the technical base will also bring 
about an inevitable ideological effect. Its inscription, its 
manifestation as such, on the other hand, would produce a 
knowledge effect, an actualisation of the work process, as 
denunciation of ideology. 
(Baudry 1985, pp.533-4) 
 
Zeffirelli and Branagh link both academic filmmaking to “an actualisation of 
the work process”, and their own realistic/organic/intuitive/living filmmaking to 
a seamlessness which dispenses with the necessity of this actualisation, 
although they do not recognise that “concealment of the technical base will 
also bring about an inevitable ideological effect” (Baudry 1985, pp.533-4). 
For Zeffirelli the “actualisation of the work process” (Baudry 1985, p.533) 
would mean “parting company with the audience and asking them to 
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contribute the kind of attention which comes through the brain” (Zeffirelli 
1990, p.244), because the difficulty of engaging with the Shakespearean text 
as of itself would involve foregrounding its authorial construction, while the 
process by which “the work [is] concealed” (Baudry 1985, p.533) facilitates a 
verisimilitude that “make[s] the audience be there with their guts and heart” 
(Zeffirelli 1990, p.262). Branagh similarly juxtaposes the “theoretical” with the 
“intuitive”, which he too associates with his “guts” (in Wray and Burnett 2000, 
p.178). 
 
Almereyda also seems to unconsciously acknowledge and reject 
simultaneously Baudry’s binary opposites: “I rummaged through books of 
critical theory but, more to the point, I never stopped reading the play, which 
carries the best advice for any director: ‘Suit the action to the word, the word 
to the action.’ This is so smart and simple it’s almost stupefying” (Almereyda 
2000, p.x). The re-expression, here, of Hamlet’s potentially fainomaic 
statement, ‘Suit the action to the word, the word to the action’, again 
facilitates realist filmmaking in contradistinction to Baudry’s “actualisation of 
the work process” (1985, p.533). And Almereyda’s invocation of these 
binaries in the same sentence, and his valorisation of one at the expense of 
the other (with Baudry’s reality-effect relegated to rummaging as opposed to 
how Almereyda “never stopped reading the play” (2000, p.x)), again 
suggests filmmakers’ reflexive internalisation of these poststructuralist 
concepts, once the socio-cultural contexts which determine academic 
poststructuralism have developed. 
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Almereyda goes on to appropriate specific elements of quasi-theoretical 
language. His published script describes Ophelia’s (Julia Styles) response to 
Polonius (Bill Murray) revealing Hamlet’s love for her to the King (Kyle 
MacLachlan) and Queen (Diana Venora) as follows: 
 
Ophelia, ashamed, humiliated, moves to the pool’s deep end, 
looking down at her refracting reflection. […] 
 
Ophelia jumps into the pool, crashing into the water, fully dressed. 
 
JUMP CUT: 
 
Ophelia blinks. She’s still standing by the pool. The jump only 
occurred in her mind. 
          
       (Almereyda 2000, p.48) 
 
It is unlikely that Almereyda ever meant this scene to actually occur within 
the context of a jump cut, because his filmed version certainly does no such 
thing, and suggests instead that Almereyda misunderstands what is meant 
by a jump cut. Bordwell and Thompson define a jump cut thus:  
 
When two shots of the same subject are cut together but are not 
sufficiently different in camera distance and angle, there will be a 
noticeable jump on the screen. Classical continuity avoids such 
jumps by generous use of shot/reverse shot and by the ‘30° rule’ 
(advising that every camera position should be varied by at least 
30° from the previous one. 
(Bordwell and Thompson 2001, p.281) 
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Taking their cue from Wollen’s analysis of Godard’s ‘counter-cinema’, they 
note that in À bout de souffle (1960), “[f]ar from flowing unnoticeably, such 
cuts are very visible, and they disorient the spectator” (Bordwell and 
Thompson 2001, p.281). The invocation of Godard here is interesting 
because of his close links between the theoretical, such as his writing for 
Cahiers du Cinéma, and his own filmmaking practice. His counter-cinema, 
for Wollen, “aims to establish a dynamic relationship between film maker and 
spectator” (1985, p.503). For Bordwell, Godard’s jump cuts are perfectly 
containable within the logic of narrative which can extend beyond the 
conventions of classical grammatical consistency, since “[a]rt-cinema 
narration self-consciously points to its own interventions, but the aim is still to 
tell a discernible story in a certain way” (1985a, p.233). A jump cut can 
therefore operate within a filmic cognitivist writing formation as well as a 
poststructuralist one.  
 
Almereyda’s scene of Ophelia jumping into the pool does not have a 
shot/reverse shot structure, as such, as she does not converse with another 
character. But the sequence does conform to the 30° rule. She is shown in a 
rear view medium shot (Fig.6.1), before a cut to a low-angle underwater long 
shot is directed up at her (Fig.6.2). In both of these shots she stares into the 
water. The camera cuts back to the rear view medium shot, and zooms in 
closer to her as she contemplates the jump (Fig.6.3), before showing the 
beginning of that jump from this same position (Fig.6.4), and then cutting 
back to the same low-angle underwater position into which she jumps 
(Fig.6.5). The cut back to behind her on the poolside (Fig.6.6), which reveals 
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that she did not jump, is in the same position as the previous pre-jump shot 
(Fig.6.3). 
 
 
Fig.6.1 
 
 
Fig.6.2 
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Fig.6.3 
 
 
Fig.6.4 
 
 
Fig.6.5 
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Fig.6.6 
 
This sequence, then, conforms to the 30° rule. The cut back to Ophelia on 
the pool side is therefore not, despite Almereyda’s claims, a jump cut in the 
sense understood by Godard, Wollen or Bordwell and Thompson. It does not 
threaten seamless realist grammar, and thereby “disorient the spectator” 
(Bordwell and Thompson 2001, p.281). The cut back to Ophelia is 
completely diegetic. Even if the leap into the pool “only occurred in her mind” 
(Almereyda 2000, p.48, original emphasis), the imagined shot comes from a 
character within the diegesis, and functions both to express her emotions in 
a relatable fainomaic context, and to exploit the audience’s foreknowledge 
about her fate (see section 4.4). All of this operates as seamless realism, 
without an attempt to establish “a dynamic relationship between film maker 
and spectator” (Wollen 1985, p.503). Indeed, the patterning of the shots here 
is extremely regimented, with each cut roughly 180°, as within a shot/reverse 
shot structure, and with the transition from behind to front repeated in an 
ABAB formation. The zoom in towards Ophelia as she contemplates jumping 
brings the spectatorial position closer to hers, the camera movement 
prefiguring her own movement. These are elements of seamless continuity 
302 
 
editing rather than an attempt to “disorient the spectator” (Bordwell and 
Thompson 2001, p.281). In exploring the language and technique of quasi-
theoretical counter-cinema, Almereyda’s filmmaking merely produces a 
diegetic reality-effect. 
 
These kinds of reflexive internalisations of academic theoretical premises 
can even extend to parapractic expressions about suture’s masochism. I 
discussed, in section 5.2, Branagh’s mention of “the sense of futility, if you 
like, of a four-hour film (that was obviously language-based) possibly finding 
an audience at the end of the twentieth century. And yet the love of the 
endeavour” (in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.171). Branagh seems here to 
express discours’ potential threat to realist grammar, and the pleasurable 
catharsis of the return to histoire. In discussing how the project entailed 
“having fun at my own expense” (in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.171) Branagh 
also seems to express a personal element to filmmaking masochism. He 
goes a stage further towards expressing the pleasurable aspect of his 
masochistic filmmaking, when he claims that 
 
it’s been an experiment or an exploration, and with Hamlet, aside 
from feeling that it would be fascinating to see all of that text 
played out in a film, I also wanted to see how much an audience 
might be encouraged to take it or to sit through it – what reaction 
there would be to that amount of dialogue. 
(Branagh in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.172) 
 
Filmmakers’ reservations about the extent to which audiences might 
understand foregrounded Shakespearean dialogue (which have been 
discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), and which can in themselves be 
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examples of a filmic cognitivist writing formation’s concern with intelligibility, 
are here expressed in strikingly masochistic terms, as a challenge to be 
overcome, or indeed, to be failed. Branagh seems to wish to push the 
oscillation between Shakespearean discours and his organic, realist form of 
histoire-like filmmaking to the absolute reflexive limits. 
 
Branagh also positions this masochistic project within the context of realist 
cinema’s oscillations between alienating actualisation and verisimilar 
concealment. He therefore sees his Hamlet as a project 
 
Where we are trying to find a marriage between something that is 
cinematic, but that also values words, where speaking of the 
Shakespeare observes very technical and linguistic demands, but 
also seems effortless. And of course to make that kind of thing 
seem effortless requires a great deal of effort, a great deal of 
energy and investigative work – you've got to work very hard, 
you've got to be fit for it. 
(Branagh in Billington 1999) 
 
Branagh’s use of the word “effortless”, here, might be added to the list of 
other post-poststructuralist colloquial expressions of cinema’s reality-effect 
(organic, realistic, natural, living). His desire “to make that kind of thing seem 
effortless” is reminiscent of Baudry’s contention that realist film’s aim is to 
obfuscate so that “the work [is] concealed” (1985, p.533). But in claiming that 
“to make that kind of thing seem effortless requires a great deal of effort” (in 
Billington 1999) Branagh goes further than Baudry’s binary. He wants to 
foreground, within the parameters of this piece of ancillary discourse, 
Baudry’s “actualisation of the work process” (1985, p.533), and then, within 
the parameters of the film itself, he wants this “great deal of effort” to “seem 
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effortless” (Branagh in Billington 1999), so that, as Baudry would have it, “the 
work [is] concealed” (1985, p.533). The relationship between these two 
oscillating elements echoes Heath’s “constant process of a phasing-in of 
vision, the pleasure of that process – movement and fixity and movement 
again, from fragment […] to totality (the jubilation of the final image) (1985, 
p.514), only here, Branagh envisions a constant process of a phasing-in of 
foregrounded authorship. And, like Heath’s account of the jubilation within 
this process, Branagh expresses pride in his “marriage” of these elements – 
“you've got to work very hard, you've got to be fit for it” (in Billington 1999). In 
stating that “it’s the effort to be effortless that I’m engaged in” (in Billington 
1999), Branagh seems to demonstrate pleasure in a reflexive conception of 
realism’s pleasurable obfuscatory masochism. 
 
In contrast, Olivier’s account of his manipulation of foregrounded authorship, 
which precedes the socio-cultural developments which facilitated academic 
articulation of realism’s masochism, has no access to the same kind of 
language or ideas. He contextualizes his own manipulation as follows: 
 
Hamlet is probably the best known of all the great plays. We are 
only too aware […] that […] we shall receive dozens of letters, 
mainly abusive, telling us what we already know, namely that this 
or that famous passage has been omitted. Here, the mere fact 
that the play is so well known helps to put this matter in 
perspective. For one thing it means that we have had to do our 
work, as it were, in the open, because we knew that no careless 
emendation or sleight-of-hand would pass unnoticed or be 
tolerated. 
(Olivier 1948, p.2, my pagination) 
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Olivier’s tone is apologetic rather than masochistically celebratory. He does 
not think of his filmmaking, as Branagh does, as a complex behind-the-
scenes process. Rather, “we have had to do our work, as it were, in the 
open, because we knew that no careless emendation or sleight-of-hand 
would pass unnoticed or be tolerated” (Olivier 1948, p.2, my pagination). 
Indeed, Branagh’s focus on “the effort be effortless” (in Billington 1999) is 
almost diametrically opposite to Olivier’s claim “that no careless emendation 
or sleight-of-hand would pass unnoticed or be tolerated” (1948, p.2, my 
pagination) – Branagh almost fetishizes his own emendations and sleights-
of-hand.58 
 
Because Olivier’s filmmaking precedes the socio-cultural developments 
which facilitated the articulation of academic poststructuralism he does not 
have access to the same ideas that Branagh does. Although Dent and 
Dickinson express the kind of cinematic mobility (Dent 1948, p.8, my 
pagination; Dickinson 1948, p.33) that might facilitate masochistic suture in a 
                                                          
58 Welles’ own apologetic tone seems to support the suggestion that prior to the 
socio-cultural developments which facilitated the articulation of academic 
poststructuralism the manipulation of realism’s masochism is downplayed by 
filmmakers rather than fetishized. Asked, by Peter Bogdanovich, “[w]hy did you 
decide to begin Othello [1952] with a funeral?” Welles responds 
OW: Why not? (laughs.) I don’t know. Have another drink. […] [It] just 
shows a certain weakness of invention on the part of the filmmaker. 
PB: You can give me a better answer than that. 
OW: Peter, I’m no good at this sort of stuff. I either go cryptic or 
philistine. All I can say is, I thought it was a good idea; whether you get 
me in the morning or evening, I’m going to say that (laughs). 
    (Welles  and Bogdanovich 1998, p.229) 
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limited proto-poststructuralist manner, it is not yet possible for them, or for 
Olivier, to express that in the same parapractically theoretical terms that 
Branagh does. Branagh’s later reflexive expressions of this theory, like 
Zeffirelli’s account of his oscillating manipulation of colour, or Almereyda’s 
seamless ‘jump cut’, suggest that, after the advent of the socio-cultural 
developments which facilitated academic poststructuralism, filmmaking is 
able to more effectively exploit suture’s masochistic potential because it has 
become more aware of how suture operates. Fainomaic translation is 
reflexively manifested in Olivier’s film, but at that historical moment it cannot 
yet be exploited to the same extent as those later examples of filmmaking 
practice which have been able to internalise that which, by then, has been 
extensively expressed in academic discourse due to development of the 
socio-cultural determinants which influenced both academic theorising and 
filmmaking practice.59 
                                                          
59 Welles’ approach again suggests that reflexive manipulations of poststructuralism 
cannot be exploited as extensively prior to the socio-cultural developments which 
facilitated the articulation of academic poststructuralism. Keith Baxter, who played 
Prince Hal in Welles’ adaptation of the Henriad, Chimes at Midnight (1965), wrote 
that 
Orson realized, halfway through the shooting, that this was a very sad 
film, much sadder than he had intended it to be. But what he himself 
was and what the film expressed about him had taken over. 
Subconsciously, he was always projecting the end of the film onto the 
beginning. He wanted the moment in the tavern when I say ‘I do, I will’ to 
be a signal. It was a much more potent signal than he realized, because 
the film had begun to take on a darker texture. 
(Baxter in Lyons 1988, pp.272-3) 
Baxter’s comments suggests that the film’s approach to foreknowledge (see 4.4) 
was an unintended consequence of Welles’ unconscious auteur function, rather 
than a parapractic attempt to extensively exploit an element of potential grammatical 
inconsistency to manipulate the drama of vision. Welles’ comments about the 
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These various, historically specific forms of conservative reflexivity make use 
of complex admixtures of the dramas of vision, of authorship, and of 
knowledge, making strict delineations between these dramas difficult. A 
close comparison of adaptations of the playtext’s opening scene, shortly, will 
demonstrate the historical development of these admixtures, but a brief 
comparison between Olivier’s and Branagh’s approaches to the drama of 
vision will help to contextualise the following analysis. 
 
Olivier approaches Heath’s drama of vision with the same kind of trepidation 
he applied to cutting out scenes, specifically in regards to editorial cutting. 
Dickinson, Olivier’s director of photography, claims that 
 
[o]ne of the main assets of deep focus photography is not in any 
revolutionary kind of shot, but in the greater illusion of reality that it 
supports. Normal camera work in a shot which includes figures in 
the foreground and in the background is ordinarily done by making 
the scene in cuts, and photographing each part separately. The 
various sections of the scene are then joined together in the 
cutting room, and for any normal film this is the procedure used. 
Laurence Olivier decided that for ‘Hamlet’ he would like to make 
the scenes without so much cutting from shot to shot. 
(Dickinson 1948, p.30) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
witches in his Macbeth make a similar suggestion about how this unconscious 
approach to potential anamorphism can be described more accurately as proto-
poststructuralist rather than post-poststructuralist. He claims that “it’s really 
important that the witches don’t really prophesy – they give Macbeth ideas which 
make things happen. […] They aren’t foretelling the future, they’re making it 
happen” (Welles and Bogdanovich 1a998, p.215, original emphasis). A filmic proto-
poststructuralist writing formation can identify elements which might problematize 
realist verisimilitude, and can conceptualise ways to subsume that problematization 
into narrative legitimacy, but it cannot exploit these elements as effectively as a 
post-poststructuralist writing formation, and the proto-poststructuralist filmmakers’ 
ancillary comments cannot fetishize the suture as extensively as those of a post-
poststructuralist filmmaker. 
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By “revolutionary kind of shot”, Dickinson means ‘experimental’ or ‘creative’ 
rather than ‘subversive’, but he nevertheless juxtaposes the “revolutionary” 
with a “greater illusion of reality”, demonstrating a focus on a reality-effect. 
Olivier’s desire to achieve this “without so much cutting from shot to shot” 
seems to suggest a reluctance to exploit the kind of cutting that Heath 
associates with suture. It is unreasonable, however, to suggest that this form 
of minimal cutting is part of a proto-poststructuralist writing formation, 
because Dickinson notes that “[n]ormal camera work […] is ordinarily done 
by making the scene in cuts” (1948, p.30). However, Olivier certainly aims to 
minimise the threat to the “illusion of reality” that he discerns in cutting, with 
the film’s editor, Helga Cranston, claiming that Olivier stressed that cuts must 
occur “at the right psychological moment, […] which could be dictated by a 
movement, a piece of the action or by the rhythm of the Shakespearean 
speech” (Cranston unpublished, p.10). Indeed, the potential alienation of 
foregrounded authorial enunciation may have had an impact on Olivier’s 
reticence about cutting, with the long takes of deep focus photography, and 
the emphasis on fitting cutting to “the right psychological moment[s]” 
(Cranston unpublished, p.10) acting as suturing compensations for the 
potentially alienating discours of foregrounded authorial enunciation. 
 
In contrast, Branagh seems to fetishize his own drama of vision, 
foregrounding not only authorial enunciation, but his own directorial 
enunciation. In a similar way to how Heath perceived the temporary 
alienation of camera mobility as narrativised into Jaws’ shark point-of-view, 
when Branagh manipulates camera movement he inscribes that movement 
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into narrative form. So, when he uses a tracking camera to film Hamlet’s 
discussion with Rosencrantz (Timothy Spall) and Guildenstern (Reece 
Dinsdale) (Figs.6.7 and 6.8) he precedes this conversation with their arrival 
on a diegetic miniature locomotive. It is possible that there is a coincidence in 
this scene containing both the apparatus of tracking camera movement and 
a narrative embodiment of a diegetic train tracking, but it is noticeable that 
Branagh’s published screenplay highlights the connection. Russell Jackson’s 
film diary, at the end of the screenplay, includes eight photographs (with 
descriptions) of the filmmaking process. One of these is a photograph 
(Fig.6.9) described as follows: “In the snow at Blenheim: Hamlet gossips 
about the Danish theatre with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Annie Wotton, 
the Script Supervisor, follows the scene in the script, as grips propel the 
camera dolly along the track” (Jackson 1996, p.194). 
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Fig.6.7 
 
 
Fig.6.8 
 
 
Fig.6.9 
 
After the film diary, Branagh’s screenplay features glossy stills from the film, 
including four double page spreads, one of which shows Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern waving from the train at the awaiting Hamlet (Fig.6.10). 
Jackson’s film diary demonstrates the chronological primacy of this scene, 
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revealing that on the first day of location shooting, “[t]he first shot has 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern arriving by miniature train, which has been 
dressed up- as a miniature locomotive” (1996, p.193). In the bottom corner of 
the double page picture is a smaller image of the three, at the foot of the 
stairs from which they begin their ambulation that will be filmed from the 
tracking camera shown in Fig.6.9. 
 
Three stages of tracking mobile camera are thereby shown in the screenplay 
– the tracking apparatus, the three walkers filmed from this tracking 
apparatus, and the accompanying arrival of two of those characters on 
diegetic tracks. There are a number of possible motivations for the 
screenplay’s use of these images, but they each suggest a similar 
conclusion. It is possible that Branagh decided to use Blenheim’s existing 
miniature steam locomotive as an unconscious accompaniment to the 
tracking he already had planned for the discussion between Hamlet, 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. It is also possible that Branagh had already 
planned to shoot this scene from a tracking camera and decided to have 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern arrive via train to unconsciously complement 
this apparatus tracking. Or, both examples of tracking may have been 
planned in advance, in an ambiguously conscious/unconscious manner. But 
even if this last possibility is the case, the screenplay unconsciously picks up 
on this example of the reflexive drama of vision, closely aligning the two 
forms of tracking. Branagh’s filmmaking thereby exploits Heath’s 
understanding that narrative events mirror cinematographic events, and 
parapractically lingers over this reflexivity in the published screenplay. 
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Fig.6.10 
 
6.3 The opening scenes’ diachronic filmic writing formations 
 
The adaptations’ approaches to the playtext’s opening scene usefully 
demonstrate the complexities of the historical developments of the dramas of 
vision, of authorship, of knowledge, and of survival within filmic writing 
formations. A short analysis of a similar scene from Orson Welles’ Macbeth 
is included after the more substantial analysis of Olivier’s Hamlet’s opening 
scene, to demonstrate that my elaboration of how filmic cognitivist and proto-
poststructuralist writing formations operate prior to the socio-cultural 
developments which facilitated the articulation of academic poststructuralism 
is not based merely upon one potentially non-representative example. 
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6.3.1 Olivier’s opening scene’s filmic writing formations 
 
Olivier’s adaptation begins with a high angled extreme long shot slowly 
zooming in towards Elsinore’s battlements (Fig.6.11). Small wisps of fog 
(Fig.6.12) quickly coalesce into a blanket which obscures Elsinore, and over 
which appears the written enunciation of Hamlet’s ‘so oft it chances in 
particular men’ speech from Act 1 Scene 4 of the Quarto (Fig.6.13), which is 
read aloud by Olivier. This written and verbalised foregrounded authorial 
enunciation almost immediately follows the film’s conventionalised written 
opening credits. The link between these two forms of writing might be 
evidence of either a filmic cognitivist writing formation, with a focus on 
important information being provided to facilitate the subsequent film’s 
intelligibility, or of a filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation, with the 
discours-like nature of the written Shakespearean speech somewhat 
lessened by its close proximity to the conventionalised written opening 
credits. 
 
 
314 
 
 
Fig.6.11 
 
 
Fig.6.12 
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Fig.6.13 
 
 
Fig.6.14 
 
When the speech ends, and the writing and fog disappear, the camera is 
much closer to Elsinore’s closest and highest battlement, upon which is a 
static tableau of four soldiers bearing the dead Hamlet with Horatio (Norman 
Wooland) looking on (Fig.6.14). The only movement here is that of the 
camera, as it zooms in to the figures. This unattributed camera position, like 
the written enunciation, might be evidence of both a filmic cognitivist and a 
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filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation. Like Carroll’s academic 
cognitivist interpretation of a “camera movement which might represent the 
presence of some unseen, supernatural force that is observing […] for 
devilish purposes” (1990, p.155, original emphasis), Olivier in some part links 
the camera’s gaze here with the yet to be introduced ghost (later voiced by 
Olivier), or more generally invokes Marcellus’ (Anthony Quayle) assessment 
that ‘Something is rotten in the state of Denmark’ (1.4.67). The latter option 
veers towards the fainomaic, however, as the camera becomes attributed to 
the foregrounded author himself – that is, to someone who is non-diegetic. 
This is potentially closer to a filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation, 
as Olivier foregrounds an element of cinematic ‘work’ that he will shortly 
suture over. Likewise, the camera’s movement in towards a static 
representation of the foregrounded and foreknown playtext’s conclusion may 
somewhat counter realist grammar, but the challenge of the preceding 
written enunciation is now removed, and Olivier’s own conclusion to the 
Shakespearean dialogue, ‘this is the tragedy of a man who could not make 
up his mind’, which accompanies this movement in towards the static figures, 
is not accompanied by written enunciation. Indeed, this voice-over is now 
Olivier’s rather than Shakespeare’s enunciation, and may be part of a filmic 
proto-poststructuralist writing formation’s oscillation between foregrounding 
authorial enunciation and subsuming that enunciation within the conventions 
of realist grammar. 
 
The next shot, which begins the opening scene from the playtext proper, is a 
static shot of interior stairs leading up to the battlements, with Bernardo 
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(Esmond Knight) ascending (Fig.6.15). The lack of camera movement here 
can be explained within the contexts of either a filmic cognitivist or a filmic 
proto-poststructuralist writing formation. In terms of filmic cognitivism, the 
shot could be an example of an early cinematic and/or (post-Renaissance) 
theatrical proscenium coding, although this explanation would be somewhat 
atypical of a filmic cognitivist writing formation because Bordwell associates 
filmmaking in which actors “stand far away from us. They perform against a 
canvas backdrop complete with wrinkles and a painted-on door. The shot 
unfolds uninterrupted by any closer views” (1997, p.1) with a style that was 
obsolete by 1919. Bordwell might explain Olivier’s cognitivist motivations with 
reference to his claim that “[t]oday such an image seems startlingly 
‘uncinematic’, the height of theatricality” (Bordwell 1997, p.1). Olivier, 
therefore, might intend to begin the film proper with an image coded towards 
the theatrical, although this would still raise the possibility of filmic proto-
poststructuralist elements in terms of how this foregrounds authorship, and of 
how subsequent scenes subsume this foregrounded theatricality into the 
conventions of classical (seamless) realism. 
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Fig.6.15 
 
Roger Furse, the film’s designer, stresses the importance of camera mobility 
over the kind of static shot employed here. He discusses still shots which 
exploit painting’s and still photography’s “orthodox rules of composition 
[applied] to each particular shot” to create images which are  
 
very easy on the eye and will look very well in a still photograph. 
But the essence of the film is that it is not still. It is in motion, and 
in my opinion the designer’s business is to do everything he can to 
assist that mobility and flow; not to freeze it into a series of orderly 
compositions which can only impede the action, however 
distinguished they might be on the walls of a picture gallery. There 
are, of course, exceptions, which I shall refer to later. 
(Furse 1948, p.28, original emphasis, my pagination) 
 
Those examples to which he later refers do not include the shot of Bernardo 
ascending the stairs. But, as this sequence facilitates character movement 
upon the liminal staircase, there is an element in which the shot conforms to 
his concern about “mobility and flow” whilst nevertheless remaining static. 
This again provides another explanation for Olivier’s motivations regarding 
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still shots, cutting and mobile camerawork within the context of a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation – his concern is with narrative progression rather 
than the specific grammatical qualities of these various elements. 
 
However, Furse’s choice of costume design suggests that his claim that “the 
essence of the film is that it is not still” can also be understood within a filmic 
proto-poststructuralist context. He writes that “[i]t had already been decided 
that the costumes, like the sets, ought not to be too closely associated with a 
single historical period. Most of them resemble those you can see in 
Holbein’s portraits” (1948, p.32, my pagination). It is possible that there is a 
coincidence here that Furse invokes the very painting which inspired Lacan’s 
discussions about the anamorphic power of the gaze within perspectival 
painting (see section 3.3). Lacan’s seminar on the anamorphic gaze comes 
chronologically after Olivier’s film, so that if Furse makes the same link 
between The Ambassadors (1533) and the anamorphic nature of cinema’s 
mobility, then he does so in proto-poststructuralist fashion; that is 
unconsciously, and intuiting the limitations of Lacan’s Symbolic Order, as 
Holbein did, rather than precisely verbally articulating them. But his choice of 
first image, in the published screenplay, within his selection of costumes, 
sets and designs (Fig.6.16) is strikingly reminiscent of the costuming in The 
Ambassadors (1533) (Fig.6.17), suggesting that this link between Holbein’s 
mise-en-scène and the anamorphic gaze’s mise-en-abyme is shared 
between Furse and Lacan (and, indeed, Holbein). 
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Fig.6.16 
 
 
Fig.6.17 
 
A further comment in relation to the costuming both extends the filmic proto-
poststructuralist approach to manipulating cinema’s anamorphism, and 
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suggests that this understanding included other members of the film’s writing 
formations: “‘What,’ we asked ourselves, ‘is everybody’s visual idea of a King 
and Queen?’ The figures on playing cards supplied an answer” (Furse 1948, 
p.32, my emphasis and pagination). Playing cards, depicted in non-
perspectival reflections which reject perspective’s singular point designated 
to “the imaginary subject whose place we propose to fill, a place we are 
nominated to assume” (Nichols 1981, p.53) in favour of an image which is 
identical from two rival positions, reveal Lacan’s paradox about the gaze 
(1992, p.140); that it both asserts the gazer’s subjectivity and simultaneously 
encodes the subject as the object of another’s gaze (see section 3.3). The 
filmmakers’ articulation of costuming in relation to both Holbein and playing 
cards are both suggestive of an unconscious filmic proto-poststructuralist 
manipulation of cinema’s inherent anamorphism. 
 
Olivier’s handling of this static shot, and those which follow it, suggest an 
oscillation between a less anamorphic still shot and subsequent more 
anamorphic mobility subsumed within the diegetised logic of narrative which 
is consistent with an academic poststructuralist account of cinema’s mobility. 
The lack of camera movement, in the shot of Bernardo on the stairs, 
temporarily reduces the anamorphic potential of cinema’s movement, and 
subscribes to Olivier’s premise, articulated by Dickinson, that “he would like 
to make the scenes without so much cutting from shot to shot” (1948, p.30). 
 
The eventual cut to the top of the battlements shows Bernardo approaching 
from the opposite angle (Fig.6.18). The subsequent exchange between 
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Bernardo and Francisco (John Laurie) again demonstrates evidence of both 
filmic cognitivist and proto-poststructuralist writing formations. In terms of the 
former, the exchange is fundamentally erotetic – Bernardo’s opening line, 
‘Who’s there?’ (1.1.1) functioning within Carroll’s understanding that “scenes, 
situations, and events that appear earlier in the order of exposition in a story 
are related to later scenes, situations, and events in the story, as questions 
are related to answers. […] Such narration, which is at the core of popular 
narration, proceeds by generating a series of questions that the plot then 
goes on to answer” (1990, p.130). There is an extent to which the answer to 
this question is deferred, which is, again, an inherent element of the playtext 
– Francisco initially replies ‘Nay, answer me’ (1.1.2) prior to identifying 
himself, and the encounter pre-empts the dangerous answer to which the 
question is really addressed – the entrance of the ghost. This element of 
deferral can then be explained both within the contexts of the playtext, and of 
the academic cognitivist conception of how “[s]uspense in fictional narratives 
is generated as an emotional concomitant of a narrative question that has 
been raised by earlier scenes and events in a story” (Carroll 1990 p.137). 
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Fig.6.18 
 
 
Fig.6.19 
 
In terms of a filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation, the first two lines 
of the playtext are spoken within a shot/reverse shot structure (the reverse 
shot being Fig.6.19), so that the initial articulation of authorial discours is 
sutured into fainomaic and conventionalised realist histoire. There is even 
the possibility, here, that the two filmic writing formations function dialectically 
– the exchange’s erotetic nature suturing over the authorial enunciation, so 
324 
 
that rather than the spectator musing on the constructed nature of the 
Baudrian ‘work’, (s)he wonders what the answer to the diegetically and 
fainomaically situated question will be. This is an approach to rival academic 
theories that has not yet been considered – the logic of one theory 
functioning as the subsuming element of another. 
 
The subsequent exchange between Bernardo, Marcellus and Horatio is 
filmed in conventionalised realist fashion, until Bernardo’s speech about the 
ghost pre-empts its arrival. The camera zooms in towards Marcellus’ fearful 
expression, and translates this emotion, and the supernatural tone of the 
scene, into a non-realist camera technique, repeatedly ‘throbbing’ briefly out 
of and back into focus (Figs.6.20 and 6.21). Olivier’s Hamlet’s published 
screenplay describes the “throbbing” as “introduced to represent the excited 
pulse of any of the people who become conscious of the presence of the 
GHOST” (Dent 1948, p.37, original emphasis, my pagination). This technique 
might operate, within the contexts of a filmic cognitivist writing formation, as 
part of Carroll’s “emotional concomitant of a narrative question” (1990, 
p.137). It might also, if Carroll’s explanation of temporarily unattributed 
camera positions be modified to this technique, 
 
call attention to itself. The audience sees it. And the audience 
cannot help postulating that the [technique] might represent the 
presence of some unseen, supernatural force. […] The audience 
cannot know this for sure; but the point of the [technique] is to 
prompt the spectator into a state of uncertainty in which she is 
tempted toward a supernatural account, which can nevertheless 
not be embraced outright because she lacks the kind of 
eyewitness certainty discussed above. 
(Carroll 1990, p.155, original emphasis) 
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When that “eyewitness certainty” is shortly granted, and the ghost is shown, 
the erotetic nature of the throbbing technique is complete. 
 
 
Fig.6.20 
 
 
Fig.6.21 
 
In terms of a filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation, the oscillation 
between focus and non-focus follows the suturing pattern of grammatical 
incoherence/coherence, and is diegetised as a character’s subjective 
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response to the supernatural context. The suturing oscillation is, moreover, 
itself subsumed into more conventionalised realist grammar by ending with 
Marcellus’ line, ‘look where it comes again’ (1.1.38), which re-activates a 
repeated shot/reverse shot relationship between the guards (Fig.6.22) and 
the ghost (Fig.6.23). The potentially alienating discours of Marcellus’ 
Shakespearean line here, somewhat paradoxically, acts to suture over the 
previous potentially alienating camera technique. The coherent realist 
narrative space is further enhanced by an over-the-shoulder shot of the 
guards looking at the ghost (Fig.6.24). 
 
 
Fig.6.22 
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Fig.6.23 
 
 
Fig.6.24 
 
This grammatical consistency is again disrupted, as the ghost leaves, 
disorientating both the guards and the realist camera. Close-ups of the 
guards show Horatio looking the wrong way (Fig.6.25), disturbing the 
previously coherent shot/reverse shot structure. A high angle long shot, 
which establishes that the ghost has departed, reveals the guards all looking 
in different directions (Fig.6.26), again breaking the structure of shot/reverse 
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shot. This grammatical inconsistency is done for a narrative purpose, so that 
the breakdown of the camera’s vision reflects the breakdown of the diegetic 
guards’ vision. Like Heath’s drama of vision, the limitations of the spectator’s 
transcendent subjectivity is reflexively rendered into narrative form, with a 
masochistic oscillation between grammatical consistency and inconsistency. 
The filmic cognitivist element of this sequence might operate within similar 
contexts to those described above, with the temporary ambiguity about 
grammatical consistency operating as temporary ambiguity about 
intelligibility in relation to the scene’s supernatural events. And, as with the 
ostensibly irreconcilable theoretical explanations discussed in relation to the 
erotetic/suturing shot/reverse shots of the playtext’s opening lines, the 
different filmic writing formations here can actually support one another 
dialectically. The temporary ambiguity of the drama of knowledge functions 
as part of the cathartic suture from the first part of the drama of vision, 
grammatical inconsistency, to the second part of the drama of vision, the 
diegetisation of the prior grammatical inconsistency, and the resolution back 
into grammatical consistency. 
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Fig.6.25 
 
 
Fig.6.26 
 
The scene ends with an extended mobile camera shot travelling away from 
the guards and through Elsinore. The grammatical status of this shot (in fact, 
two shots, which are joined via a dissolve rather than an overt cut) is 
ambiguous. It subscribes to Olivier’s desire to avoid cutting in the pursuit of a 
“greater illusion of reality” (Dickinson 1948, p.30), but also works somewhat 
like Jaws’ potentially alienating unattributed shark point-of-view. It is 
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ambiguously attributed, perhaps to the guards, who look towards the path it 
will take as Marcellus announces that ‘Something is rotten in the state of 
Denmark’ (1.4.67) (Fig.6.27), or perhaps to the foregrounded author. 
 
 
Fig.6.27 
 
In terms of a filmic cognitivist writing formation, this unattributed camera 
movement operates within the contexts of both Carroll’s non-realist grammar 
to foster ambiguity about the supernatural, and of the erotetic – the camera 
begins its movement upon Marcellus’ statement that ‘Something is rotten’ 
(1.4.67), and explores Elsinore to find the cause of the malaise; Claudius 
(Basil Sydney). Marcellus’ damning verdict here, moreover is an interpolation 
from Act 1 Scene 4, and provides an answer, albeit ambiguously in its verbal 
content, to Horatio’s question about the ghost,60 which in the playtext ends 
                                                          
60  Let us impart what we have seen tonight 
Unto young Hamlet; for upon my life, 
This spirit, dumb to us, will speak to him. 
Do you consent we shall acquaint him with it, 
As needful in our loves, fitting our duty? (1.1.150-4) 
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with agreement from Marcellus about Horatio’s proposal,61 but not with the 
answer that Olivier visually provides. Olivier’s filmic cognitivist writing 
formation then follows Carroll’s focus on erotetic narrative sequencing, in 
which the “onset of the creature, attended by mayhem or other disturbing 
effects, raises the question of whether the human characters in the story will 
be able to uncover the source” (1990, p.100). 
 
In terms of this sequence’s filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation, 
both the anamorphic nature of the camera movement and its ambiguous 
attribution are potentially alienating, and contribute towards the suturing 
effect described by Heath. The camera establishes Elsinore’s extended 
narrative space, going so far as to introduce character-specific musical 
leitmotifs as it moves towards locations associated with certain characters, 
and it thereby serves a narrative function. The camera movement ends with 
Heath’s “totality (the jubilation of the final image)” (1985, p.514), suturing 
back into the coherent narrative space of the main hall, with the 
conventionalised realist shot/reverse shot between Claudius (Fig.6.28) and 
the trumpeters he bids flourish (Fig.6.29). The ambiguous discours-like 
enunciation (Shakespeare’s/the director Olivier’s/the guards’/no-one’s gaze?) 
of the extended camera movement is thereby subsumed back into the 
histoire of grammatical realism. The final destination of this ambiguous 
trajectory is also the intended cause of Marcellus’ assessment about the 
state of Denmark – Claudius is rotten. A further narrative cause is thereby 
                                                          
61  Let’s do’t, I pray (1.1.155) 
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attributed to the camera movement’s potential alienation. And, given that this 
narrative element is Shakespearean, and that the image of Claudius 
visualises Marcellus’ verbalised foregrounded Shakespearean enunciation, 
the suturing telos of this camera movement is a fainomaic suppression of the 
foregrounded authorial enunciation. Again, the erotetic element of the 
sequence’s filmic  cognitivist writing formation contributes towards the 
suturing catharsis of the sequence’s filmic proto-poststructuralist writing 
formation. 
 
Fig.6.28 
 
 
Fig.6.29 
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The elements of this scene which can be described as part of a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation, then, are as follows: Written information to 
facilitate narrative intelligibility; a static camera operating within the context of 
the historical development of film and theatre style; an erotetic narrative 
structure; grammatical inconsistency to create ambiguity about intelligibility, 
particularly in terms of the diegetic supernatural explanation; and an 
extended and ambiguously attributed camera movement to foster ambiguity 
about the supernatural, within an erotetic context. 
 
The elements of the scene’s filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
grammatical inconsistency are as follows: Foregrounded verbal 
Shakespearean enunciation; foregrounded written Shakespearean 
enunciation; a repeated throbbing camera de-focusing/re-focusing; a 
breakdown of the shot/reverse shot structure; and a long, ambiguously 
attributed camera movement. 
 
The elements of the scene’s filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
suturing grammatical consistency are as follows: A static (non-anamorphic) 
camera; the shot/reverse shot structure.; diegetic narrative causation for 
elements of grammatical inconsistency; fainomaic renderings of 
foregrounded authorial enunciation; use of the erotetic element of the 
cognitivist writing formation to diegetise both foregrounded authorship and 
grammatical inconsistencies. 
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The relationships between grammatical consistency and inconsistency are 
complex, but involve two principal strategies. Firstly, a limited number of 
inconsistent elements are employed at any one time. So, the potential 
alienation of an unattributed high angle camera moving in towards a static 
tableau of the playtext’s foreknown ending is accompanied by Olivier’s non-
Shakespearean and non-written voice-over, rather than by the foregrounded 
written authorial enunciation which precedes this shot, and which temporarily 
concealed the static tableau of the playtext’s foreknown ending behind a 
cloud of fog. As the analysis of chronologically later adaptations 
demonstrates, a filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation, in contrast, 
may employ more than one form of potential alienation at a time. Secondly, 
elements of grammatical inconsistency are sutured into grammatical 
consistency and/or diegetic legitimation, and the resolution occurs quite 
quickly. As the analysis of later adaptations demonstrates, a filmic post-
poststructuralist writing formation is less swift to resolve its alienating 
inconsistencies. The differences between these filmic proto- and post-
poststructuralist writing formations are the key delineations which mark out 
the diachronic development of unconscious anamorphism within filmmaking 
practice. 
 
The following table (Fig.6.30) demonstrates elements of the scene’s potential 
filmic writing formations, and how the suturing processes of the filmic proto-
poststructuralist writing formation operate: 
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Filmic cognitivist writing 
formation 
Filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation 
 Elements of grammatical 
inconsistency 
Sutured elements of 
grammatical 
consistency/diegetic 
legitimation 
Erotetic nature of verbal 
communication. 
Foregrounded verbal 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
 
Fainomaic renderings of this 
enunciation. 
 
Foregrounded enunciation 
contributes to diegetic 
legitimation of inconsistent 
camerawork. 
 
Use of the erotetic element of 
the cognitivist writing formation 
to diegetise foregrounded 
authorship. 
Writing to facilitate narrative 
intelligibility. 
Foregrounded written 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
Continuity with conventionalised 
written opening credits. 
A static camera operating within 
the context of the historical 
development of film and theatre 
style. 
Ambiguous recognition that 
mobile camera is anamorphic. 
Conventionalised techniques of 
continuity editing. 
Grammatical inconsistency to 
create ambiguity about 
intelligibility, particularly in terms 
of the diegetic supernatural 
explanation. 
A repeated throbbing camera 
de-focusing/re-focusing. 
 
Diegetic reason given for this 
inconsistency. 
 
Use of the erotetic element of 
the cognitivist writing formation 
to diegetise grammatical 
inconsistencies. 
 
Subsequent return to 
shot/reverse shot structure. 
Grammatical inconsistency to 
create ambiguity about 
intelligibility, particularly in terms 
of the diegetic supernatural 
explanation. 
A breakdown of the 
shot/reverse shot structure. 
 
Diegetic reason given for this 
inconsistency. 
 
Use of the erotetic element of 
the cognitivist writing formation 
to diegetise grammatical 
inconsistencies. 
 
Subsequent return to 
shot/reverse shot structure. 
A long, ambiguously attributed 
camera movement to foster 
ambiguity about the 
supernatural, and within an 
erotetic context. 
A long, ambiguously attributed 
camera movement. 
 
Diegetic reason given for this 
inconsistency. 
 
Use of the erotetic element of 
the cognitivist writing formation 
to diegetise grammatical 
inconsistencies. 
 
Subsequent return to 
shot/reverse shot structure. 
Fig.6.30: Olivier’s filmic writing formations 
336 
 
6.3.1.1 Welles’ Macbeth’s ghost scene’s filmic writing formations 
 
Welles’ Macbeth, released in the same year as Olivier’s Hamlet, 
demonstrates similarities in terms of its manipulations of filmic cognitivist and 
proto-poststructuralist writing formations, and provides evidence that the 
above analysis of Olivier’s film is not merely an isolated example, but reflects 
broader trends. Macbeth’s ghost scene, Act 3 Scene 4, in which the title 
character (Orson Welles) is disturbed by the vision of the murdered Banquo 
(Edgar Barrier), whom he had previously ordered killed, offers a clear 
comparison. The scene’s erotetic element is twofold; firstly concerning what 
it is that Macbeth has seen which causes him to act strangely, and secondly, 
whether the source of this confusion is a part of the diegetic world in which 
the human characters exist, or whether it is either a figment of Macbeth’s 
imagination, or a ghostly presence which only he can see. The scene’s filmic 
proto-poststructuralist element is the way in which the erotetic is grounded in 
an oscillation between realist and non-realist grammar. 
 
The scene’s diegetic space is established through non-subjective shots of 
both Macbeth, at the head of the dining table (Fig.6.31), and from behind him 
looking along the table (Fig.6.32). The length of the table is also shown from 
Macbeth’s point-of-view (Fig.6.33), as his nobles raise their cups to toast his 
success. The presence of the ghost is introduced through a close-up of 
Macbeth’s perspiring reaction (Fig.6.34). This is immediately erotetic; what is 
it that has disturbed the King? The answer is briefly deferred by 
cinematography in which Macbeth points down the table (Fig.6.35). The 
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camera tracks after the pointing finger and the shadow it casts on the wall 
(Figs.6.36 and 6.37), before landing on the table emptied of all save 
Banquo’s ghost (Fig.6.38). The subjective status of this shot is somewhat 
unclear; prior to this shot’s close-up of Macbeth (Fig.6.34) there are almost 
identical close-ups, featuring his same shocked reaction, and in which the 
King asks ‘Which of you have done this?’ (3.4.47). The initial responses to 
this are also diegetic (Fig.6.39), a retainer responding to the question with 
another; ‘What, my good lord?’ (3.4.48). But as the camera tracks from the 
last of Macbeth’s close-ups to Banquo at the opposite end of the table the 
grammatical status of the shot changes, or everyone else in the diegetic 
world disappears. The revelation that this latter possibility is not the case 
soon follows; Lady Macbeth (Jeanette Nolan), looking at her husband 
(Fig.6.40), follows his line of sight (Fig.6.41). The cut to the empty chair in 
which Macbeth had seen Banquo’s ghost sitting (Fig.6.42) is coded as Lady 
Macbeth’s point of view through the convention of showing the subject of a 
look (Fig.6.41) before cutting to the object of that look (Fig.6.42). The prior 
shot’s subjectivity in the mind of Macbeth is thereby confirmed. 
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Fig.6.31 
 
 
Fig.6.32 
 
 
Fig.6.33 
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Fig.6.34 
 
 
Fig.6.35 
 
 
Fig.6.36 
 
340 
 
 
Fig.6.37 
 
 
Fig.6.38 
 
 
Fig.6.39 
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Fig.6.40 
 
 
Fig.6.41 
 
 
Fig.6.42 
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Like Olivier’s adaptation, the filmic cognitivist and proto-poststructuralist 
elements are tightly integrated here, with the latter’s grammatical 
inconsistency sutured into narrative legitimation. It is significant that Welles 
does not clearly establish the moment when the non-subjective rendering of 
the diegetic scene shifts to a subjective vision, and indeed that he makes the 
shift ambiguous. The cinematography, at this moment, then, is anamorphic, 
without a clearly defined grammatical status. But resolution to this 
grammatical ambiguity comes swiftly, and the ambiguity is tightly linked with 
the narrative’s erotetic ambiguity. As with Olivier’s Hamlet, the scene’s filmic 
cognitivist and proto-poststructuralist writing formations work symbiotically. 
 
6.3.2 Branagh’s opening scene’s filmic writing formations 
 
Branagh’s opening scene begins, similarly to Olivier’s, with a link between 
conventionalised written opening credits (Figs.6.43 and 6.44) and written 
authorial enunciation (Fig.6.45). As with Olivier’s opening scene, there are 
close links between filmic cognitivist and poststructuralist elements of the 
writing formations at work, although there are also differences characterising 
the shift from a filmic proto- to a post- poststructuralist writing formation. In 
terms of this shift, Branagh’s written enunciation is less discours-like than 
that of Olivier in two respects. Firstly, the written enunciation gives only the 
adaptation’s title, rather than a relatively long section of verse. Secondly, 
Branagh’s written enunciation is almost immediately diegetised, as the 
camera tracks left, revealing that, as the screenplay puts it, this is a shot of a 
“huge plinth, with the screen-filling legend carved deep in the stone” 
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(Branagh 1996, p.1) (Fig.6.46). Branagh thereby almost immediately 
fainomaises the first trace of Shakespearean enunciation. The camera 
movement, too, is ambiguously grammatically consistent/inconsistent. This 
first track to the left acts to diegetise written authorial enunciation, but is itself 
at this moment unattributed, somewhat like the opening shark’s point-of-view 
in Heath’s analysis of Jaws. The screenplay describes the “Camera [as] 
creeping, like an animal” (Branagh 1996, p.1). One form of grammatical 
inconsistency (foregrounded written authorship) therefore paradoxically 
sutures over another form of grammatical inconsistency (unattributed 
anamorphic camera movement) into some form of diegetically-legitimated 
consistency. Francisco (Ray Fearon), the first guard shown, further 
diegetises the potential alienation of the unattributed, ‘animal’-like camera 
through nervous reaction shots (Fig.6.47) and point-of-view shots (Fig.6.48), 
as he scans about for the source of his dread. 
 
 
Fig.6.43 
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Fig.6.44 
 
 
Fig.6.45 
 
 
Fig.6.46 
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Fig.6.47 
 
 
Fig.6.48 
 
There is an extent to which this sequence also works within a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation. The unattributed/“animal”-like camera “might 
represent the presence of some unseen, supernatural force [which] prompt[s] 
the spectator into a state of uncertainty in which she is tempted toward a 
supernatural account, which can nevertheless not be embraced outright 
because she lacks […] eyewitness certainty” (Carroll 1990, p.155, original 
emphasis). The cognitivist writing formation at work here is also erotetic; the 
screenplay indicating that a question is being posed: “A noise. Tight on 
FRANCISCO, terrified, straining to hear where or what it might be” (Branagh 
1996, p.2). 
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At this stage the filmic cognitivist and post-poststructuralist writing formations 
work in tandem. Like Olivier’s presentation of the initially posed question, 
they simultaneously fulfil the first part of Heath’s account of the drama of 
vision’s “play on the unseen and the unforeseeable […] and the moments of 
violent irruption” (1985, p.514) and Carroll’s claim that “[s]uspense in fictional 
narratives is generated as an emotional concomitant of a narrative question” 
(1990, p.137). The following shots, which demonstrate the second element of 
the drama of vision, reveal some of the distinctions between Olivier’s filmic 
proto-poststructuralist and Branagh’s filmic post-poststructuralist writing 
formations. 
 
There are two parts to Branagh’s “violent irruption”. The first (Fig.6.49), as 
the camera moves over the statue of Old Hamlet (Brain Blessed) atop the 
plinth which bore the opening written enunciation, is described in the 
screenplay as follows: 
 
The Camera now cranes down to take in the detail of the granite 
uniform in all its splendour. The last stroke of midnight hits as we 
settle on the huge hand, which holds a sword hilt and just as we 
would seem to cut, a great rasping noise like fingernails on a 
blackboard sears through the night and we see the statue’s hand 
pull the sword from the scabbard with a savage rip! 
(Branagh 1996, p.2) 
 
It is important here not only that the sequence marks the shift from “the 
unseen and the unforeseeable [to] moments of violent irruption” (Heath 1985, 
p.514), but that Branagh seems to recognise the importance of this 
oscillation. In positioning his violent irruption “just as we would seem to cut”, 
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he expresses the drama of Heath’s juxtaposition, and in defining its sound as 
“a great rasping noise like fingernails on a blackboard” (Branagh 1996, p.2), 
he emphasises the unpleasurable nature of the violent irruption. 
 
 
Fig.6.49 
 
Branagh immediately cuts from this first violent irruption to the second. There 
is a momentary shot of Francisco reacting to the “great rasping noise”, 
accompanied by the playtext’s first line, ‘Who’s there?’ (1.1.1), shouted by an 
off-screen Bernardo (Ian McElhinney), who then leaps on to Francisco, 
knocking him to the ground (Fig.6.50), from where Bernardo gives the reply, 
‘Nay, answer me’ (1.1.2). Olivier minimised the discours-like nature of the 
opening lines with a shot/reverse shot structure. Branagh puts these lines 
into the very centre of the film’s opening drama of vision, bundling them into 
the masochistic shift from the “play on the unseen and the unforeseeable [to 
the] moments of violent irruption” (Heath 1985, p.514). 
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Fig.6.50 
 
In terms of the potential filmic cognitivist writing elements of this sequence, 
both Olivier and Branagh include an erotetic element, as the guards (over-
)react to the implied supernatural context. Both also defer answering the 
initial question, following Shakespeare’s cue, by articulating Bernardo’s brief 
refusal, and by staging the exchange as a prequel to the ghost’s arrival. 
However, Branagh’s handling of the filmic writing formations’ admixtures 
displays some significant developments from Olivier’s, both in terms of the 
extent of the erotetic deferral, and in relation to the dramatically irruptive 
nature of the question’s posing. 
 
Part of this process relates to how the exchange acts as a prequel to the 
opening scene’s principal drama, the arrival of the ghost. Olivier zooms the 
camera in on Marcellus (Jack Lemmon) immediately before showing the 
ghost, whereas Branagh’s camera is static at this point. But when Marcellus 
cries ‘Look where it comes again’ (1.1.38) Branagh zooms in on a very brief 
low angle shot of the statue/ghost (Fig.6.51), before a series of shots 
(Fig.6.52) described in the screenplay as follows: 
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They run for their lives! We are way above them in the night air. 
THE GHOST’s POV as the Camera rushes from a great height, 
swooping down on the retreating figures racing across the snow. 
We almost reach them, but no! Just in time they fling themselves 
behind a pillar. 
(Branagh 1996, p.5, my emphasis) 
 
Within the context of a filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation, the 
cinematography here functions in a similar way to Heath’s ambiguously 
attributed, potentially alienating camera movements which are made 
grammatically consistent through narrative attribution. Branagh’s screenplay 
makes this link explicit – “THE GHOST’s POV” is twice referred to as “We” 
(1996, p.5). This narrative attribution also sutures over the earlier potential 
inconsistency of the initial mobile camera’s unattributed “creeping, like an 
animal” (Branagh 1996, p.1). 
 
Fig.6.51 
 
 
Fig.6.52 
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Filming almost all of this exchange from the ghost’s point-of-view also 
subscribes to Heath’s account of the drama of vision’s reliance on the “play 
on the unseen and the unforeseeable” (1985, p.514). Olivier’s camera lingers 
on the ghost. Branagh, in this opening exchange, shows it/the statue only in 
four very brief shots, in each of which its status as an actual ghost is 
ambiguous, as no part of it moves, and it is cast in shadow with a foggy 
backlight, so that none of its features can be discerned. The only motion is 
that of the camera; towards it, in the first two shots, as it approaches; and 
away from it, in the last two shots, as it departs. Branagh prefers, at this 
stage, like Spielberg with his shark, to keep the monster predominantly 
“unseen” (Heath 1985, p.514). 
 
The potential filmic cognitivist writing formation in operation during this 
camera movement would, similar to the camera movement at the end of 
Olivier’s opening scene (see 6.3.1), function within the context of the drama 
of knowledge, so that  
 
the audience cannot help postulating that the camera movement 
might represent the presence of some unseen, supernatural force. 
[…] The audience cannot know this for sure; but the point of the 
camera movement is to prompt the spectator into a state of 
uncertainty in which she is tempted toward a supernatural 
account, which can nevertheless not be embraced outright 
because she lacks […] eyewitness certainty. 
(Carroll 1990, p.155, original emphasis) 
 
However, Carroll’s explanation of these filmmaking motivations has a very 
different understanding of the diegetic subjectivity of the “unassigned camera 
movement” than that provided by Branagh’s account in the screenplay: “It is 
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not supplying new narrative information nor is its movement explicitly 
correlated within the scene to the movement of any specific character. It has 
no assignment either in terms of narrative or characterological function. But it 
does call attention to itself. The audience sees it” (Carroll 1990, p.155, my 
emphasis). The erotetic element of Carroll’s account is significantly altered 
by Branagh’s ghostly assignation, not just in the screenplay, but in terms of 
how the sweeping camera provides an answer to the guards’ questions, 
rather than “prompt[ing] the spectator into a state of uncertainty” (Carroll 
1990, p.155). Although there is an erotetic element to the scene, once the 
ghost descends upon the guards the question is answered. The filmic writing 
formations shift decisively from the drama of knowledge to the drama of 
vision. Olivier’s handling, in showing the ghost, also answered the preceding 
question, but it did so by providing Carroll’s “eyewitness certainty” (1990, 
p.155), rather than by exploiting a potentially anamorphic form of 
grammatical inconsistency that shifts the gaze from subject to object, from 
uncertain spectator to “supernatural force” (1990, p.155). 
 
This explanation of the continuing ambiguity of anamorphic camerawork, 
after the film has diegetised its attribution, demonstrates a limitation in both 
the academic cognitivist account of what an academic poststructuralist 
account thinks of as the drama of vision, and in an explanation of how a 
filmic cognitivist writing formation operates in this regard. In section 5.3 I 
discussed Carroll’s account of this process: “a scene may also merely 
sustain an ongoing question posed earlier in the tale. For example, as the 
body count keeps mounting in Jaws in scene after scene, the question of 
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what is killing them is intensified or sustained, rather than posing a new 
question or answering the presiding one” (1990, p.134). In both Jaws and 
Branagh’s Hamlet the problematically-attributed anamorphic camera 
continues to operate after narrative assignation – the question is not 
ongoing, and cannot then be “intensified or sustained” (Carroll 1990, p.134), 
at least within an erotetic context. The filmmaking motivations cease to be 
about the drama of knowledge, at least in terms of the ongoing question 
described by Carroll. The erotetic element of a filmic cognitivist writing 
formation can pose and answer the chain of questions Carroll identifies in the 
movement from onset to discovery (1990, p.100), but it cannot function within 
the logic of an anamorphic and problematically-attributed camera that 
continues to operate after the question that it initially posed has been 
answered. The drama of knowledge’s anamorphic onset operates in a similar 
way to the drama of vision’s initial grammatical inconsistency, but it is not 
compatible with, and provides no contrasting pleasures to, the drama of 
vision’s “violent irruptions” (Heath 1985, p.514). 
 
It is possible, however, that there is another filmic cognitivist element to 
these irruptions in terms of the drama of survival (see 5.3). The pleasures of 
audiences watching the nervous Francisco could be to do with evolutionary 
dispositions towards “games involving a chase or hide-and-seek, because 
these games offer good practice in avoiding predators or in hunting prey. The 
reason so many film and television viewers choose to watch endless crime, 
horror, or hide-and-seek action dramas is […] that these dramas appeal to 
fundamental, innate dispositions in us” (Grodal 2009, p.8). The filmic 
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cognitivist writing formation might encourage Branagh to have Bernardo leap 
upon Francisco, pre-empting the ghost’s arrival, because 
 
surprise and shock often accompany the sudden appearance of 
[threats], but such emotions do not last long. Indeed, their intensity 
precludes duration, if the filmmakers expect viewers to endure 
such a film. […] [V]iewer’s suspense and anticipation are fed by 
periodic shocks and surprises, and both long- and short-term 
emotions work together to create the contours of the particular 
experience offered by the film. 
(Plantinga 2009, p.70) 
 
Branagh’s repetition of suspense and shock, then, can still operate as part of 
a filmic cognitivist writing formation. But it is also possible that if the drama of 
knowledge is compatible with the first part of the drama of vision (see 3.3), 
then both parts of the drama of vision are compatible with the drama of 
survival, with filmmaking able to reflexively manipulate the masochistic 
elements of suture to heighten the aesthetic pleasures of “global, long-lasting 
emotions (suspense, curiosity, anticipation), local emotions (fear, surprise, 
disgust), desires, aversions, pleasures, and what have you” so that “both 
long- and short-term emotions work together to create the contours of the 
particular experience offered by the film” (Plantinga 2009, p.70). Filmmakers 
need not necessarily exploit the drama of vision in order to exploit the drama 
of survival, but the former’s focus on the “play on the unseen and the 
unforeseeable [and] the moments of violent irruption” (Heath 1985, p.514) 
offers filmmakers reflexive tools to manipulate audience’s atavistic 
predispositions. Academic bioculturalism provides an alternate explanation 
for suture’s pleasures, but that does not mean that filmmaking cannot 
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manipulate multiple forms of quasi-theoretical reflexivity to exploit multiple 
affective experiences in spectators. 
 
Humanity’s omnivorous evolution, exemplified in Grodal’s invocation of how 
“hide-and-seek games offer good practice in avoiding predators or in hunting 
prey” (2009, p.8, my emphasis), suggests links between the masochism of 
fort/ the illusory jubilation of da, and the masochism of spectators staging 
themselves as the hunted/ the illusory agency of spectators staging 
themselves as the hunter. Branagh’s repeated oscillation between the gazes 
of hunted guards and hunting ghost links the dramas of survival and of 
vision. Olivier’s guards were also afraid of the ghost, and also surprised by 
one another. But Olivier’s filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation did 
not have access to the kind of reflexivity that would facilitate a dramatization 
of their fears and of the fearful being that might hunt them in the same 
oscillating subjective/objective manner. 
 
It is also significant, in terms of the development of Branagh’s filmic post-
poststructuralist writing formation, that the oscillation between the “play on 
the unseen and the unforeseeable [and] the moments of violent irruption” 
(Heath 1985, p.514) occurs twice, with the second, longer irruption 
functioning as that which is legitimated by the scene’s broad narrative thread, 
and with the former acting as a precursor. This demonstrates an 
unconscious reflexive advance on the suture identified by Heath in Jaws. For 
Heath, the initial irruption from the ambiguously attributed shark’s point-of-
view to the first attack “sets off a number of other series which knot together 
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as figures over the film. [...] Once systematized, it can be used to cheat” 
(1985, pp.512-3, my emphasis). Branagh’s rapid repetition of the 
unseen/violent irruption oscillation “which knot[s] together as figures over the 
[scene]” (Heath 1985, p.512) occurs much quicker than in Jaws, and even 
more importantly, reverses Heath’s chronological structure. In Jaws, the 
principal narrative oscillation occurs first, and then, “[o]nce systematized, it 
can be used to cheat” (1985, p.513). Branagh cheats first, the ghost’s brief 
sword unsheathing, and Bernardo’s leap onto Francisco, preceding the 
scene’s diegetising resolution of the camera’s unattributed status. It is 
possible that this initial “violent irruption” into the “play on the unseen and the 
unforeseeable” (Heath 1985, p.514) occurs at this point to suture over the 
foregrounded discours of the authorially enunciated opening lines, as 
discussed above. But Branagh’s manipulation of the drama of vision here 
goes one reflexive stage further even than that of Spielberg. If the violent 
irruption diegetises the camera’s prior ambiguous attribution, then Branagh 
defers this masochistic pleasure still more, and does not resolve this 
particular element of grammatical inconsistency until the second irruption 
attributes the camera to the ghost. 
 
Indeed, this reversal of the cheating repetition identified by Heath in Jaws 
subscribes more fully to Heath’s overall analysis of the drama of vision. For 
Heath, inconsistency generally comes before the resolution to consistency 
rather than the other way around – “there is a need to reconstruct the truth of 
vision […] – movement and fixity and movement again, from fragment […] to 
totality” (1985, p.514). Branagh’s cheat followed by the main narrative 
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irruption, towards which the cheat points, therefore more closely follows the 
drama of vision’s inherent logic, and suggests that in the period between the 
making of Jaws and Branagh’s Hamlet the systematisation of the drama, 
which Heath saw at work within the structure of the earlier film text itself, has 
become part of wider filmmaking and hermeneutic culture. 
 
The elements of this scene which can be described as part of a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation are as follows: Written information to facilitate 
narrative intelligibility; an erotetic narrative structure; grammatical 
inconsistency to create ambiguity about intelligibility, particularly in terms of 
the diegetic supernatural explanation; and the drama of survival, including 
suspense, shock and a hunting gaze. 
 
The elements of the scene’s filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
grammatical inconsistency are as follows: Foregrounded written 
Shakespearean enunciation; and ambiguously attributed camera positions. 
 
The elements of the scene’s filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
suturing grammatical consistency are as follows: Diegetisation of 
foregrounded verbal Shakespearean enunciation; shot/reverse shot 
structure, and point-of-view shots, to diegetise ambiguously attributed 
camera; Heath’s “moments of violent irruption” to juxtapose with the “play on 
the unseen and the unforeseeable” (1985, p.514) in relation to ambiguously 
attributed camera and foregrounded verbal Shakespearean enunciation; 
‘cheating’ reversed repetition of this violent irruption; diegetisation of 
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ambiguously attributed camera; and affective compatibility of the dramas of 
survival and vision. 
 
A more detailed comparison between these diachronic approaches to mixing 
and manipulating the dramas of vision, authorship, knowledge and survival 
will be undertaken presently, after addressing Zeffirelli’s and Almereyda’s 
treatments of the same scene. In the meantime, the following table (Fig.6.53) 
demonstrates elements of the scene’s potential filmic writing formations, and 
how the suturing processes of the filmic post-poststructuralist writing 
formation operate: 
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Filmic cognitivist writing 
formation 
Filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation 
 Elements of grammatical 
inconsistency 
Sutured elements of 
grammatical 
consistency/diegetic 
legitimation 
Erotetic nature of verbal 
communication. 
 
Drama of survival’s suspense 
and shock. 
Foregrounded verbal 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
 
Fainomaic renderings of this 
enunciation. 
 
Situates opening enunciation 
within Heath’s “moments of 
violent irruption” which 
juxtapose with the “play on the 
unseen and the unforeseeable” 
(1985, p.514). 
Writing to facilitate narrative 
intelligibility. 
Foregrounded written 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
Continuity with conventionalised 
written opening credits. 
 
Diegetisation of foregrounded 
verbal Shakespearean 
enunciation. 
Grammatical inconsistency to 
create ambiguity about 
intelligibility, particularly in terms 
of the diegetic supernatural 
explanation. 
 
Drama of survival’s suspense 
and shock. 
Ambiguously attributed camera 
positions. 
Diegetic reason given for this 
inconsistency. 
 
Used alongside shot/reverse 
shot structure, and point-of-view 
reaction shots. 
 
Situates ambiguous camera 
position within Heath’s 
“moments of violent irruption” 
which juxtapose with the “play 
on the unseen and the 
unforeseeable” (1985, p.514). 
 
‘Cheating’ reversed repetition of 
this violent irruption. 
 
Diegetises ambiguous camera 
into ghost’s point-of-view. 
Fig.6.53: Branagh’s filmic writing formations 
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6.3.3 Zeffirelli’s opening scene’s filmic writing formations 
 
Zeffirelli cuts the playtext’s opening scene entirely. His screenplay does 
include elements of the planned playtext’s opening scene, split into two 
parts, although these were not intended to open the film. The final film’s 
opening, which follows written credits superimposed over medieval 
battlements in a manner not dissimilar to Olivier’s introduction, is a slow track 
past, and cuts to medium close-ups and close-ups of, numerous inhabitants 
of Elsinore all looking sombrely screen left towards the castle’s crypt, to 
which Zeffirelli cuts to show Old Hamlet’s (Paul Scofield) interment. 
 
As with the two opening scenes discussed above, there are elements of both 
filmic poststructuralist and cognitivist writing formations at work. In terms of 
the former, the camera’s initial movement, on this cut to the crypt, and before 
it moves into the conventionalised “ways for holding a film’s relations as the 
coherence of the subject eye – continuity editing, matches, 30-degree and 
180-degree rules, codes of framing, and so on” (Heath 1985, p.514), is a 
leftward continuation of the castle’s inhabitants’ leftward gaze, so that this 
potentially anamorphic movement is subsumed into both a spatial and a 
narrative logic. In terms of the sequence’s filmic cognitivist writing formation, 
the camera’s initial movement across Elsinore’s inhabitants is erotetic, 
posing the question about what they are looking at, and why they are so still 
and so concerned. The cut to the crypt answers the question. 
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Within, Claudius (Alan Bates), Gertrude (Glenn Close), Polonius (Ian Holm) 
and Hamlet (Mel Gibson) mourn over the body, with close-ups of tear-stained 
faces and hands grasping earth to scatter. In terms of the filmic 
poststructuralist writing at work here, numerous glances are exchanged 
between the characters, within the conventions of the shot/reverse shot 
structure, so that narrative relationships are all expressed fainomaically, 
downplaying the foregrounded author, until Claudius utters the first of only 
three lines in the scene to Hamlet, ‘think of us/ As of a father’ (1.2.107-8). 
This first verbalised example of authorial enunciation is spoken three minutes 
into the film, and two minutes after the opening credits have ended, 
minimising this element of foregrounded enunciated discours amongst the 
scene’s seamless interpolated continuity editing. Indeed, Claudius’ brief 
speech is preceded, half a minute earlier, by Polonius’ ambiguously 
discernible utterance, as he supports the weeping Gertrude, which is 
perhaps ‘Oh madam’.62 The ambiguity of Polonius’ words/murmur here may 
actually further the impact of preceding the first enunciation of authorial 
discours with a seamless example of ostensibly spontaneous histoire which 
is so non-Shakespearean that it almost becomes wordless. 
 
The final film’s opening is closer to Olivier’s than Branagh’s, relying on 
fainomaic translation and realist continuity editing rather than the kind of 
reflexive manipulation of the drama of vision employed by Branagh. Indeed, I 
have refrained from calling Zeffirelli’s writing formation here filmic post-
                                                          
62 The screenplay makes no mention of a line or utterance here, from either 
Gertrude or Polonius, or of the latter supporting the former. 
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poststructuralist, because even though it operates after the articulation of 
academic poststructuralism, it has more in common with Olivier’s filmic proto-
poststructuralist writing formation than with Branagh’s filmic post-
poststructuralist writing formation. 
 
However, Zeffirelli’s screenplay suggests that the guards’ meeting with the 
ghost was originally envisioned in a style closer to that of Branagh. This 
demonstrates one of the advantages of analysing Shakespearean 
adaptations in relation to filmic writing formations’ diachronic development, 
because the author’s canonical status encourages the production and 
curation of ancillary materials which might not otherwise be available for 
analysis, and which demonstrate that it is not only the final cuts of films 
which provide evidence of filmmaking protocols. 
 
The screenplay reveals that the first part of the playtext’s opening scene 
(Devore and Zeffirelli 1990, pp.3-5) was to have followed the interpolated 
opening. Horatio (Stephen Dillane) and Marcellus (Christien Anholt) were to 
have approached Elsinore’s gates on horseback, with Bernardo’s (Richard 
Warwick) ‘Who’s there?’ shouted down from the ramparts above. The 
second part of the playtext’s opening scene (pp.12-13) was to have taken 
place three scenes later, after Claudius’ announcement about his 
relationship with Gertrude, and after Gertrude persuades Hamlet not to 
return to Wittenberg, provoking his ‘O that this too too solid flesh would melt’ 
soliloquy (1.2.129). 
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The screenplay describes this cut scene (after Bernardo’s speech beside an 
interior guardroom fire, about the previous sightings of the ghost) thus: 
 
30. EXT. CASTLE ELSINORE. NIGHT. 
  
The fog has claimed it. Only its tower tops are visible. 
 
DISSOLVE TO: 
 
31. EXT. STAIRWAY TO THE BATTLEMENTS. NIGHT. 
 
HORATIO, MARCELLUS, BERNARDO and FRANCISCO 
come into view and take the stairway up, disappearing into 
the fog. WE PULL BACK as their footsteps echo away. 
There is a moment of silence … and then a bell peals once. 
WE CONTINUE BACK FARTHER as everything grows still 
again. Suddenly HORATIO’s terrified voice cries out from 
above. 
 
QUICK CUT TO: 
 
32. INT. PASSAGES TO BATTLEMENTS. NIGHT. 
 
  ESTABLISHING SHOT. 
     (Devore and Zeffirelli 1990, p.13) 
 
As with the previous analyses, there are elements of both filmic cognitivst 
and poststructuralist (which, in these planned scenes is definitively post-
poststructuralist rather than proto-poststructuralist) writing formations at 
work. In terms of filmic post-poststructuralism, like Branagh, Zeffirelli’s ghost 
here is “unseen” (Heath 1985, p.514), although Zeffirelli’s screenplay does 
not explicitly attribute the camera to the ghost’s point of view. But, like 
Branagh’s treatment, Zeffirelli here twice repeats the oscillation between the 
“play on the unseen and the unforeseeable [and] the moments of violent 
irruption” (Heath 1985, p.514). The first “moment of silence” is broken as “a 
bell peals”. Then “everything grows still again [and] [s]uddenly HORATIO’s 
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terrified voice cries out” (Devore and Zeffirelli 1990, p.13). And, like Branagh, 
Zeffirelli reverses the systematisation of the cheating process identified by 
Heath in Jaws. The first irruption is merely a bell, and the second is the 
response to the genuine threat. Both Branagh and Zeffirelli executed, or 
planned to execute, a drama of vision which dispenses with Heath’s premise 
that “[o]nce systematized, it can be used to cheat” (1985, pp.512-3, my 
emphasis). In part, Shakespeare’s playtext invites this precursive repetition - 
‘Who’s there?’ (1.1.1) is an invitation to drama of one kind or another that 
prefigures the ghost’s coming. But filmmakers exploit this invitation in ways 
that are diachronically specific. Olivier has a rapid shot/reverse shot cut from 
Bernardo to Francisco as they shout their lines at one another. Branagh is 
able to manipulate (and Zeffirelli can also envisage a manipulation of) this 
invitation which exploits the reflexive masochistic elements of the drama of 
vision in a way that is inconceivable to Olivier, prior to the socio-cultural 
developments which facilitated the articulation of academic poststructuralism. 
 
In terms of the filmic cognitivist writing elements at work here, Zeffirelli’s 
refusal to align the camera’s gaze with the ghost’s, as Branagh does, is 
closer to Carroll’s statement that “the audience cannot help postulating that 
the camera movement might represent the presence of some unseen, 
supernatural force” (1990, p.155, original emphasis). Zeffirelli’s (planned) 
camerawork is therefore more erotetic than Branagh’s, and more closely 
aligned to the drama of knowledge’s focus on how “[s]uspense in fictional 
narratives is generated as an emotional concomitant of a narrative question” 
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(Carroll 1990, p.137) than on the drama of vision’s “pleasure of [suture’s] 
process – movement and fixity and movement again” (Heath 1985, p.514). 
 
However, the filmic post-poststructuralist element of Zeffirelli’s planned 
scene exploits the ghost’s erotetic nature to increase the drama of vision’s 
deferred pleasures. This is potentially more alienating than Branagh’s in that 
the presentation of the ghost is deferred not just from the opening violent 
irruption to the second, as in Branagh’s treatment, but indefinitely, or at least 
until Hamlet eventually encounters it many scenes later. On the one hand, 
there is a cognitivist element to this, as the ambiguity about a supernatural 
cause is not yet resolved, so that this planned scene provides an example of 
that which Carroll mis-read in Jaws; “a scene [which] may also merely 
sustain an ongoing question. […] [T]he question is intensified or sustained, 
rather than posing a new question” (1990, p.134). But this deferral is also 
post-poststructuralist, with a sustained refusal to diegetically resolve the 
camera’s ambiguous anamorphism. Again, the two ostensibly irreconcilable 
theoretical elements coalesce in filmmaking practice – the drama of 
knowledge’s deferred answer works dialectically with the drama of vision’s 
deferred grammatical resolution. 
 
In Zeffirelli’s screenplay, Horatio’s cry from above also operates within the 
contexts of different filmic writing formations. In refusing to provide an 
answer to what provokes it, it continues the drama of knowledge’s deferred 
erotetic nature. In terms of filmic post-poststructuralism, somewhat like 
Polonius’ ambiguous first paralinguistic utterance in the filmed opening, the 
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cry is not foregrounded as authorial enunciation. So, when Zeffirelli plans to 
exploit the masochistic drama of vision’s ambiguously attributed anamorphic 
camerawork, he does not employ the masochistic drama of authorship, or at 
least employs it in a more fainomaic, and less foregrounded, manner. He 
thereby carefully arranges different layers of grammatical inconsistency, so 
that they do not completely overpower the subsequent suture into 
grammatical consistency. Horatio’s failure to express his fear in words can 
also be part of the drama of survival’s atavistic regression to the pre-
linguistic. And, as with the other filmmaking admixtures of these various 
dramas discussed above, what might be thought of as rival and incompatible 
academic interpretations actually mutually reinforce one another, so that just 
as this scene’s deferred dramas of knowledge and of vision support one 
another, so too do its dramas of survival and of vision. 
 
It is hard to make definitive conclusions about this scene, however, because 
it was not included in the final film, and because the screenplay’s description 
of the interpolated opening scene, described above, is slightly different from 
that which is committed to celluloid. There is no ancillary evidence to explain 
why Zeffirelli cut this initial scene with the ghost, although his more general 
principal that he sought to “find other solutions” (1998, p.49) to the problems 
of what to include suggests that he felt that other scenes had provided these 
solutions. Indeed, it is not possible to know whether Zeffirelli would include 
this cut scene in his assessment that the “kind of story we wanted to do 
automatically meant some areas of the original play became unnecessary. 
They fell away by themselves, like dried branches” (in Tibbetts 1994, pp.137-
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8). It may even be that in not giving a diegetic resolution to the unseen 
nature of the ghost (at least until Hamlet’s later meeting with it), that Zeffirelli 
felt that this scene was too alienating. But it is possible to conclude that 
Zeffirelli could at least conceive of a scene that exploited the dramas of 
vision, knowledge and survival in a manner somewhat similar to Branagh. 
Almereyda’s similar reticence about presenting the playtext’s opening scene 
suggests the same. 
 
Before discussing Almereyda’s treatment, however, it is appropriate to list 
Zeffirelli’s approaches to these various dramas, with the bracketed sections 
representing those elements from the screenplay not used in the final 
version: 
 
The elements of these scenes which can be described as part of a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation are as follows; An erotetic narrative structure; 
(grammatical inconsistency to create ambiguity about intelligibility, 
particularly in terms of the diegetic supernatural explanation); (a sustained 
question, with the answer deferred); (the drama of survival, including 
suspense and shock). 
 
The elements of the scenes’ filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
grammatical inconsistency are as follows: Foregrounded verbal 
Shakespearean enunciation; anamorphic mobile camera; (unattributed 
camera position); (deferred diegetic resolution to unattributed camera). 
 
367 
 
The elements of the scenes’ filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
suturing grammatical consistency are as follows: Spontaneous, non-
Shakespearean paralinguistic utterance prior to first example of spoken 
authorial enunciation; spatial and narrative logic to anamorphic camera 
movement; shot/reverse shot structure to resolve anamorphic camera 
movement; (Heath’s “moments of violent irruption” to juxtapose with the “play 
on the unseen and the unforeseeable” (1985, p.514) in relation to unseen 
ghost); (‘cheating’ reversed repetition of this violent irruption); (deferred 
diegetic resolution of the unseen is not resolved until Hamlet’s meeting with 
the ghost). 
 
The following table (Fig.6.54) demonstrates Zeffirelli’s various filmic writing 
formations, with the bracketed sections representing those elements from the 
screenplay not used in the final version: 
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Filmic cognitivist writing 
formation 
Filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation 
 Elements of grammatical 
inconsistency 
Sutured elements of 
grammatical 
consistency/diegetic 
legitimation 
 Foregrounded verbal 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
 
Fainomaic renderings of this 
enunciation. 
 
First example of spoken 
authorial enunciation occurs 
three minutes into 
conventionalised continuity 
editing. 
 
Spontaneous, non-
Shakespearean paralinguistic 
utterance prior to first example 
of spoken authorial enunciation. 
An erotetic narrative structure. Anamorphic camera movement. Spatial and narrative logic to 
anamorphic camera movement. 
 
Shot/reverse shot structure to 
resolve anamorphic camera 
movement 
(Grammatical inconsistency to 
create ambiguity about 
intelligibility, particularly in terms 
of the diegetic supernatural 
explanation.) 
 
(A sustained question, with the 
answer deferred.) 
 
(The drama of survival, 
including suspense and shock.) 
(Unattributed camera position.) 
 
(Deferred diegetic resolution to 
unattributed camera.) 
(Situates unattributed camera 
position within Heath’s 
“moments of violent irruption” 
which juxtapose with the “play 
on the unseen and the 
unforeseeable” (1985, p.514).) 
 
(‘Cheating’ reversed repetition 
of this violent irruption.) 
 
(Deferred diegetic resolution of 
the unseen is not resolved until 
Hamlet’s meeting with the 
ghost.) 
Fig.6.54: Zeffirelli’s filmic writing formations 
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6.3.4 Almereyda’s opening scene’s filmic writing formations 
 
Almereyda’s screenplay begins thus: 
 
EXT. NEW YORK CITY: TIMES SQUARE – NIGHT 
 
A near-hallucinatory spectacle: traffic, neon, noise. 
 
Amidst surrounding electronic displays, the animated logo for the 
DENMARK CORPORATION flashes and whirls. 
 
EXT. HOTEL – NIGHT 
 
A sleek modern façade, doorman, revolving doors. 
 
Lights swim across the hotel’s identifying metal plaque: 
 
HOTEL ELSINORE 
 
* [INT. HOTEL ELSINORE; LOBBY/SURVEILLANCE DESK – 
NIGHT 
 
VIDEO MONITOR: THE LOBBY 
 
A cavernous space, in low light. There’s a surge of static. The 
image seems to shiver. 
 
We hear Bernardo’s voice muttering off-screen. 
 
BERNARDO 
 
 Who’s there? 
(Almereyda 2000, p.5) 
 
An introductory note explains the ‘*’ and ‘[’ symbols used here: “Stuff that 
was dropped or cut appears in brackets to signify its non-existence in the 
finished film; asterisks indicate notes at the back of the book, chronicling 
evolutionary upheavals as scenes were revised, rescued or lost forever” 
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(Almereyda 2000, p.xvi). The relevant note for the cut after the filmed 
“identifying metal plaque: HOTEL ELSINORE” is as follows: 
 
The bracketed lobby and basement scenes were shot and edited 
into the movie. They weren’t half bad. But it became apparent that 
the Elizabethan language, coming thick and fast at the outset, 
confused early audiences. (A test screening organised by 
Miramax yielded the second worst scores in the company’s 
history.) […] Admitting that we needed a more urgent start, Ethan 
[Hawke] and I sat down with a pixel camera and worked out a new 
introduction, a video diary excerpt from one of our favourite 
speeches. […] I held the camera while Ethan adjusted lights, 
fooled with a water glass, executed a rudimentary conjuring trick. 
[…] Hamlet’s glorious speech was stripped down. […] [I]ntercut 
with images I’d shot off the TV during the bombing of Bosnia, this 
‘improvised’ scene now kickstarts the movie, giving the Prince a 
series of intimate close-ups and a private (pixelated) language. 
The idea was to frame and foreground Shakespeare’s words, 
trusting them to bring an audience closer. The lobby scene with 
Bernardo [Rome Neal], Horatio [Karl Geary] and Marcella [Paula 
Malcomson] was accordingly collapsed, folded back into a 
flashback when Hamlet’s friends report the first ghost sighting. 
(Almereyda 2000, pp.135-6) 
 
Almereyda moves the playtext’s opening scene, then, because it “yielded the 
second worst scores in the company’s history”, which he puts down to the 
problem “that the Elizabethan language, coming thick and fast at the outset, 
confused early audiences” (Almereyda in Anderson 2000). This suppression 
of foregrounded authorial discours operates within the context of 
Almereyda’s observation that 
 
[w]atching the movie requires a certain suspension of disbelief. 
People don’t really talk like that. But the language has a tone, and 
its own life and its own logic. I hope you get acclimated and you’re 
in it, so you can just forgive words you don’t understand or even 
words that don’t seem quite right, because of the general sense 
and force of it. 
(Almereyda in Anderson 2000) 
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There is a clear filmic post-poststructuralist element to this process. 
Almereyda’s parapractic expression of his hope that “you can just forgive 
words you don’t understand or even words that don’t seem quite right” 
suggests the masochism of the process, but it is most relevant here that he 
hopes that after an unspecified period of time “you get acclimated and you’re 
in it”. It is therefore important that “[t]he lobby scene with Bernardo, Horatio 
and Marcella was accordingly collapsed, folded back into a flashback when 
Hamlet’s friends report the first ghost sighting” (Almereyda 2000, pp.135-6), 
so that, if repositioned once audiences are “acclimated” they will be able to 
“forgive words [they] don’t understand or even words that don’t seem quite 
right” (in Anderson 2000). Similarly, it is important that the scene which 
replaces the cut opening still keeps an element of foregrounded authorial 
discours (“one of our favourite speeches” (Almereyda 2000, p.135)), so that 
the drama of authorship is not completely removed, but that it must come 
across as “more urgent”, and that it appears “‘improvised’”, for which one 
might read ‘seamless’. The technique employed to achieve this 
seamlessness is to film the soliloquy as “a video diary”. These spoken 
thoughts are diegetised within the context of the self-recording, so that direct 
address is narratively legitimated by Hamlet’s actions. Another potentially 
grammatically inconsistent element is introduced to accompany the 
potentially grammatically inconsistent authorial enunciation, with the former 
paradoxically legitimating the latter. It is also possible that Almereyda 
exploits academic poststructuralism’s notion of direct address’ conservative 
functions (Feuer 1993, pp.36-7) (see section 4.2.6). 
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The spoken thoughts are also fainomised via visual manifestations – both by 
the diegetic Hamlet, who executes “a rudimentary conjuring trick” at the 
mention of his ‘mirth’ (2.2.298), and by the supervening authority of 
Almereyda’s “intercut […] images I’d shot off the TV during the bombing of 
Bosnia”, which accompany Hamlet’s ironic ‘the beauty of the world’ (2.2.308-
9). The ensuing “series of intimate close-ups and a private (pixelated) 
language” can then operate to diegetically “frame and foreground 
Shakespeare’s words, trusting them to bring an audience closer” (Almereyda 
2000, p.135). 
 
Almereyda’s alterations here demonstrate an important point about the filmic 
post-poststructuralist approach to the drama of vision, and about its 
relationship to the filmic cognitivist drama of knowledge. If the drama of 
vision relies on temporary unpleasure and its deferred catharsis then it is 
possible to overplay the unpleasurable fort of the former. Filmmakers must 
push at audience’s masochistic threshold without overstepping it, as in 
Branagh’s suggestion that he “wanted to see how much an audience might 
be encouraged to take it or to sit through it” (in Wray and Burnett 2000, 
p.172). Almereyda’s original opening, prior to the establishment of a 
systemisation of the film’s suture between foregrounded authorship and 
fainomaic realism, seems to have overstepped this threshold. This can also 
explain Zeffirelli’s cutting of the playtext’s opening scene, although his 
screenplay demonstrates that the cut scene was to have been positioned 
within the body of the film, so that the audience should by then have been 
“acclimated and you’re in it, so you can just forgive words you don’t 
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understand or even words that don’t seem quite right, because of the general 
sense and force of it” (Almereyda in Anderson 2000). 
 
Here again there is a suggestion that filmic post-poststructuralist and 
cognitivist writing formations can work in tandem, because an academic 
cognitivist interpretation of Almereyda’s original opening scene’s test 
response might focus on the failure of its drama of knowledge, with the test 
audience responding to a lack of intelligibility, rather than to its overly 
masochistic elements. Almereyda does not make sharp distinctions between 
the filmic writing formations in regard to this failed scene – his response to 
his sense that “the Elizabethan language, coming thick and fast at the outset, 
confused early audiences” (my emphasis) is not to resolve this confusion 
with clearer erotetic elements, but to admit that “we needed a more urgent 
start” (2000, p.135, my emphasis). If Hamlet’s self-recorded musings are 
more intelligible than a scene shot within the conventions of continuity editing 
but with a confusing verbal language, then that is because of their fainomaic 
and seamless (for Almereyda, “improvised” (2000, p.135)) elements, since 
the soliloquy employs the same confusing language. Both the final opening 
scene and the cut version have a similar erotetic element – the soliloquy and 
the ghost both point to subsequent revelations about what ‘is rotten in the 
state of Denmark’ (1.4.67). Almereyda chooses one over the other not 
because of their respective erotetic traits, but because of the final version’s 
“more urgent”, “improvised” (2000, p.135) qualities. 
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Both Almereyda’s final opening soliloquy, and the cut (or more precisely, 
moved) playtext’s opening scene from the screenplay, are preceded by the 
same introduction of images of New York and diegetic verbal written 
authorial enunciations. This is true of both the screenplay and the final film, 
although there are some differences between the two. Unlike the three other 
opening scenes analysed, Almereyda’s does not include, initially, opening 
credits detailing the actors, crew, film title, or any mention of Shakespeare. 
Following from the opening corporate credits, with their own soundtrack, and 
which are not superimposed over the beginning of the film’s mise-en-scène, 
Almereyda opens with a low angle shot looking up through the open sunroof 
of a limousine, over which appear the following written enunciations, which 
refer to, but are not composed of, authorial enunciation: 
 
New York City, 2000 
 
The King and C.E.O. of Denmark Corporation is dead 
 
The King’s widow has hastily remarried his younger brother 
 
The King’s son, Hamlet, returns from school, suspecting foul 
play… 
 
Although this writing is not literal enunciation, its traces are quickly 
diegetised, as the screenplay demonstrates: 
 
Amidst surrounding electronic displays, the animated logo for the 
DENMARK CORPORATION flashes and whirls. 
 
EXT. HOTEL – NIGHT 
 
A sleek modern façade, doorman, revolving doors. 
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Lights swim across the hotel’s identifying metal plaque: 
 
HOTEL ELSINORE 
(Almereyda 2000, p.5) 
 
In terms of Almereyda’s filmic cognitivist writing formation, these various 
forms of written enunciation facilitate audience intelligibility. In terms of his 
filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation, even the movement from one 
diegetic reference to authorial enunciation to another functions within the 
masochistic logic of suture, oscillating between “movement and fixity and 
movement again, from fragment […] to totality (the jubilation of the final 
image) (Heath 1985, p.514), in its shift from the initial “near-hallucinatory 
spectacle: traffic, neon, noise” and, “[a]midst surrounding electronic 
displays”, the movement and fragment of “the animated logo for the 
DENMARK CORPORATION [which] flashes and whirls” to the fixity 
and totality of “the hotel’s identifying metal plaque: HOTEL 
ELSINORE” (Almereyda 2000, p.5). Even though both these references 
to the film’s authored construction are not directly enunciated, and even 
though both are diegetised, Almereyda still includes, and lingers over, “the 
pleasure of that process – movement and fixity” (Heath 1985, p.514). 
 
The final film’s opening “video diary” (Almereyda 2000, p.135) soliloquy ends 
with an apparently non-diegetic opening title, in a bold white font on red 
(Fig.6.55). This appears two and a half minutes into the film. When, 
eventually, Hamlet attempts to ‘catch the conscience of the King’ (2.2.607), 
his film The Mousetrap, introduced through title credits of a bold white font on 
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red (Figs.6.56 and 6.57), reveals that Almereyda’s supervening previous title 
screen is identical to his character Hamlet’s (Fig.6.58) with the only 
difference being that The Mousetrap’s opening titles are seen with the 
diegetic screen’s dark border around them. This second iteration of the white 
text HAMLET on a red background occurs fifty-two and a half minutes into 
Almereyda’s film, so that it takes a full fifty minutes to suture from the first 
non-diegetic iteration to the diegetic one – so long, in fact, that audiences are 
unlikely to remember the first. Indeed, I only noticed the link on repeated 
viewings, although there are examples of academic legitimation which link 
this repetition with the film’s postmodern nature (for example, Abbate 2007, 
p.380; Cook 2011, p.192; Worthen 2003, p.112). From the perspective of 
suture, though, the second iteration is a diegetic resolution of an element of 
grammatical inconsistency (foregrounded, in the first instance as ostensibly 
non-diegetic, authorial discours), with the pleasure of the resolution 
extremely deferred. And, given the fact that I am tracing unconscious 
filmmaking responses to the socio-cultural developments which facilitated the 
advent of academic poststructuralism, and that Almereyda precedes the first 
ostensibly non-diegetic enunciation of white HAMLET on red with the 
diegetic enunciations DENMARK CORPORATION and HOTEL ELSINORE, 
it is reasonable to assume that Almereyda has internalised and reflexively 
recycled the alienating/diegetising oscillations of the drama of vision. 
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Fig.6.55 
 
 
Fig.6.56 
 
 
Fig.6.57 
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Fig.6.58 
 
As Almereyda’s screenplay note stated, the “lobby scene with Bernardo, 
Horatio and Marcella was […] collapsed, folded back into a flashback when 
Hamlet’s friends report the first ghost sighting” (2000, pp.135-6). As already 
mentioned, positioning the authorial discours of the scene later on helped 
Almereyda to “get [the audience] acclimated” to a language that “[p]eople 
don’t really talk like” (in Anderson 2000). This has the double filmic writing 
formation function of ensuring cognitive intelligibility and subsuming the post-
poststructuralist foregrounded authorship. Presenting the scene as a 
flashback, itself an element of conventionalised continuity editing, also 
fainomaises the discours of the scene in which “Hamlet’s friends report the 
first ghost sighting” (Almereyda 2000, p.136), which, according to the 
screenplay, was to be shot without any visual representation of the verse; 
that is, far less fainomaically than the final film version. The final version of 
the reported ghost sighting, then, is made more seamless by showing as well 
as enunciating the encounter. 
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One element of the screenplay’s opening scene which is cut from the film’s 
flashback, and which relates to the dramas of vision and of knowledge, is as 
follows: 
 
ON THE MONITOR: HOTEL LOBBY 
 
The picture wavers, a ghostly flicker, as Hamlet’s Father strides 
into view, a tall figure, his back to us. 
 
The figure exits one monitor – then enters another, fluttering in the 
video haze. 
(Almereyda 2000, p.6) 
 
This “fluttering” transfer from one monitor to another might reflect the 
movement of Heath’s “fragments” (1985, p.514), dramatizing the incomplete 
nature of cinematic vision. In terms of a filmic cognitive writing formation this 
could be an example that exploits the video haze to generate uncertainty 
about the supernatural explanation. The finished film does show the ghost in 
a monitor, but it does not move from one to another. It is not possible to 
reach a definitive conclusion about why the finished film does not employ this 
moving device, although it would be consistent with both of these forms of 
drama for Almereyda to employ a greater degree of reflexivity at the 
beginning of the film, before he had “acclimated” (in Anderson 2000) his 
audience, than would be appropriately dramatic at a later stage. Like 
Zeffirelli’s cut scene, however, even these elements that were not finally 
used demonstrate that the unconscious filmic writing formation which they 
express was still conceivable to the filmmakers. One should also not simply 
suppose that all elements cut fit into the kind of intentional directorial vision 
expressed by Almereyda in response to the cut opening scene – he notes 
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too, in the introduction to the screenplay, that the “extra [cut] material is 
included on the off-chance that readers might be intrigued to see how 
thoroughly a director can gut his own screenplay and still come up with a 
movie that’s considered fairly full-bodied” (2000, p.xvi). 
 
The following is a list of Almereyda’s approaches to different filmic writing 
formations, with the bracketed section representing the element from the 
screenplay not used in the final version: 
 
The elements of these scenes which can be described as part of a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation are as follows: A motivation about intelligibility; 
an erotetic narrative structure. 
 
The elements of the scenes’ filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
grammatical inconsistency are as follows: Foregrounded written 
Shakespearean enunciation; foregrounded verbal Shakespearean 
enunciation; (too much masochistic verbal foregrounded authorship which 
had to be cut); grammatical inconsistency of direct address; (fluttering 
fragments of ghost in multiple monitors). 
 
The elements of the scenes’ filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s 
suturing grammatical consistency are as follows: Diegetisation of written 
authorial enunciation; suture of diegetised written enunciation from 
movement to fixity; fainomisation of foregrounded verbal Shakespearean 
enunciation; diegetic legitimation for grammatical inconsistency of direct 
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address; extremely deferred diegetisation of written title HAMLET; movement 
of alienating discours to a position where it has become “acclimated” 
(Almereyda in Anderson 2000) and fainomaises enunciated account of 
meeting with ghost; (diegetic reason given for the ghost’s fluttering 
fragments). 
 
The following table (Fig.6.59) demonstrates Almereyda’s various filmic 
writing formations, with the bracketed sections representing those elements 
from the screenplay not used in the final version: 
 
Filmic cognitivist writing 
formation 
Filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation 
 Elements of grammatical 
inconsistency 
Sutured elements of 
grammatical 
consistency/diegetic 
legitimation 
A motivation about intelligibility. Foregrounded written 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
Diegetisation of written authorial 
enunciation. 
 
Suture of diegetised written 
enunciation from movement to 
fixity. 
 
Extremely deferred diegetisation 
of written title HAMLET. 
 Foregrounded verbal 
Shakespearean enunciation. 
 
Fainomisation of foregrounded 
verbal Shakespearean 
enunciation. 
 
Movement of alienating discours 
to a position where it has 
become “acclimated” 
(Almeryeda in Anderson 2000) 
and fainomaises enunciated 
account of meeting with ghost. 
A motivation about intelligibility. (Too much masochistic 
foregrounded verbal authorship 
which had to be cut). 
 
An erotetic narrative structure. Grammatical inconsistency of 
direct address. 
Diegetic legitimation for 
grammatical inconsistency of 
direct address. 
(Fragmentary ghost to foster 
ambiguity about intelligibility.) 
(Fluttering fragments of ghost in 
multiple monitors.) 
(Diegetic reason for the ghost’s 
fluttering fragments.) 
Fig.6.59: Almereyda’s filmic writing formations 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
The preceding analyses provide enough data to formulate some conclusions 
about the diachronic development of filmic writing formations. 
 
The first of these conclusions is that all of the films include elements which 
can be described as part of a filmic cognitivist writing formation. There are 
two potential components to a filmic cognitivist writing formation, the second 
of which, the drama of survival, is optional. It will be discussed in more detail 
shortly. The first element of a filmic cognitivist writing formation, the drama of 
knowledge, is inherent to all the films analysed. This drama aims to both 
create intelligibility for audiences, and to manipulate levels of intelligibility by 
withholding information at certain points. It is dramatic because its erotetic 
element encourages audiences to speculate about the questions and 
answers that have been provided, and which are, at points, temporarily 
withheld. 
 
All the films also demonstrate evidence of the dramas of vision and of 
authorship. They all masochistically oscillate from anamorphic grammatical 
inconsistency to diegetic legitimation for this inconsistency and/or the 
cathartic resolution of grammatical consistency, and from foregrounded 
authorial enunciation to its fainomaic subsumption. However, there are 
substantial differences between the ways that a filmic proto-poststructuralist 
and a filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation manipulate these 
oscillations. The former attempts to ensure that alienating inconsistencies do 
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not overlap with one another, and that such inconsistencies are quickly 
resolved. A filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation is less quick to 
make resolutions, and more willing to postpone masochism’s deferred 
catharsis. It can also manipulate conservative reflexivity to the point that it 
uses one form of inconsistency to suture over another, using, for example, 
direct address to diegetically legitimate foregrounded authorial enunciation, 
or this authorial enunciation to diegetically legitimate anamorphic camera 
movements. 
 
The diachronic distinctions between filmic proto- and post- poststructuralist 
writing formations seem to revolve (unconsciously) around the socio-cultural 
developments which facilitated the historically specific articulation of 
academic poststructuralism. Prior to these developments and this 
articulation, filmmakers make vague parapractic statements about the 
importance of the camera’s movement, or intuit the anamorphic nature of 
perspective in a similar manner to, pointing forwards, Lacan and, pointing 
backwards, to Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533) (see sections 1.4, 2.3.2 
and 3.3). Filmic proto-poststructuralism, as a form of artistic practice, is 
therefore a writing formation that is at least as old as the Early Modern era. 
Filmic post-poststructuralist filmmakers make parapractic statements that are 
much more closely aligned to academic poststructuralism, setting up the 
same binaries between “an academic exercise” (Zeffirelli 1998, p.51) and 
“the fantasy of the audience” (Zeffirelli 1990, p.254), the “theoretical” and the 
“intuitive” (Branagh in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.178), “critical theory” and 
“‘Suit[ing] the action to the word, the word to the action’” (Almereyda 2000, 
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p.x); attempting to obfuscate their transformative work (“it’s the effort to be 
effortless I’m interested in” (Branagh in Billington 1999)); and pushing the 
masochistic limits of suture (“how much an audience might be encouraged to 
take it” (Branagh in Wray and Burnett 2000, p.172)). Filmic post-
poststructuralist filmmakers reflexively repeat suture’s oscillations, setting up 
cheating prequels to deferred diegetically-legitimated resolutions within a 
system that has been systematised outside the film texts which Heath (1985, 
pp.512-3) identified as being systematised within in filmmaking 
contemporaneous with academic poststructuralism’s mid-‘70s acme. 
 
There are also important distinctions in the relationships between filmic 
proto-/post-poststructuralist writing formations and a filmic cognitivist writing 
formation. Both filmic proto- and post- poststructuralist writing formations 
may operate simultaneously and, at times, symbiotically with, a filmic 
cognitivist writing formation. Both foregrounded authorial enunciation and 
anamorphic camera movement may be subsumed into an erotetic context, 
so the question which Wollen saw as potentially raised by grammatical 
inconsistency, “‘What is this film for?’” is transformed into “the orthodox 
narrative questions, ‘Why did that happen?’ and ‘What is going to happen 
next?’” (1985, p.503). The deferred catharsis of the dramas of vision and of 
authorship can then function alongside the deferred intelligibility of the drama 
of knowledge. 
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A filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation can take this reflexive 
admixture of filmic writing formations one stage further. It does this, in part, 
by extending its deferred resolutions. Filmic post-poststructuralist filmmakers 
can continue to manipulate realist cinema’s anamorphism long after erotetic 
legitimations for grammatical inconsistency have been answered, sustaining 
the drama of vision beyond the inquisitive limits of the drama of knowledge. 
Filmic post-poststructuralism can also work with the other potential element 
of a filmic cognitivist writing formation, the drama of survival. Repetition of 
the drama of vision’s oscillations between the “play on the unseen and the 
unforeseeable […] and the moments of violent irruption” (Heath 1985, p.514) 
heightens the drama of survival’s atavistic pleasures in experiencing 
sensations like hunting prey and being hunted. The drama of vision’s 
oscillating anamorphic subjective viewpoints reinforce the drama of survival’s 
conflicting omnivorous positions as both hunter and hunted, and the drama 
of vision’s oscillating revelation of passivity and subsequent illusion of 
agency reflect the unpleasure of the drama of survival’s hunted coding and 
the illusory activity of its hunting coding. By reflexively manipulating the 
drama of vision, filmic post-poststructuralist filmmakers can heighten their 
manipulations of the drama of survival. 
 
In part, then, filmmakers’ manipulations of these purportedly essential human 
dispositions and their various dramas reflect broad theories that go back at 
least as far as the Early Modern era. But lessons unconsciously learnt from 
academic theoretical discourse facilitate filmmaking objectives which seek to 
create pleasurable effects deriving from various admixtures of these dramas. 
386 
 
In this sense, making distinctions between filmic poststructuralist and 
cognitivist writing formations is an arbitrary separation derived from the 
conventions of the theoretical debates within academic discourse but not 
applicable to filmmaking itself. Both filmic proto- and post- poststructuralist 
writing formations inherently operate alongside a filmic cognitivist writing 
formation. The dramas of vision and authorship, on the one hand, and of 
knowledge and survival, on the other, may elicit different responses from 
spectators, but they use similar filmmaking techniques to elicit those 
responses, and one response often heightens another. There is, then, no 
real distinction between a filmic poststructuralist and a filmic cognitive writing 
formation, because the cognitive elements operate within and reinforce the 
suturing logic of the poststructuralist elements. It is therefore more accurate 
to say that a filmic cognitive/proto-poststructuralist writing formation 
manipulates the dramas of vision, authorship (in the case of an adaptation) 
and knowledge, and that a filmic cognitive/post-poststructuralist writing 
formation has enhanced forms of manipulation of these dramas, and 
includes the drama of survival also. That is not to say that a filmic 
cognitive/proto-poststructuralist writing formation cannot manipulate the 
drama of survival, as the earlier discussions of Cat People (see section 5.3) 
demonstrates. But Cat People is an historically unrepresentative early 
example pointing towards a theory that had, in 1942, not yet been articulated 
at an academic level, and as Baird notes, “[m]y study of over 100 American 
horror and thriller films from the early 30s to the present reveals formal 
refinements and increased usage of this effect” (2000, p.13). 
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I discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3 that it is difficult to discern exactly where 
the influences for these filmic writing formations come from. I have set out, in 
this case study, to show that the socio-cultural developments which 
facilitated academic discourse are amongst these influences. But the 
contours of these influences should be thought of dialectically. Film viewing, 
filmmaking, and film theorising all encourage filmmakers and film academics 
to think (quasi-)theoretically, and to exploit whichever ideas can facilitate 
their dramatic, narrative, cognitive, emotional and/or ideological objectives, 
even if they do not consciously understand those objectives. Film studies’ 
theoretical impasse, in this sense, misrecognises filmmaking’s motivations, 
which are to dialectically exploit whatever dramatic, narrative, emotional, 
cognitive and/or ideological resources are available. 
 
The manipulation of quasi-theoretical ideas into aesthetic practice can 
reorient the political and philosophical praxis of the original academic 
discourses. It is in this sense that it is useful to think of the process along the 
lines of Dawkins’ memes (see 5.3). Filmmaking’s unconscious manipulation 
of academic poststructuralism is not only mimetic but also memetic, with all 
the pragmatic variation and mutation associated with Dawkin’s analogy 
(1989, p.352) for the meme: the Darwinian competition of the selfish gene. 
An academic theory such as academic poststructuralism, with the explicit 
radical intention of elucidating the misrecognition which acts to obfuscate the 
capitalist subject’s “real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971, p.153) (see 
section 3.2), can mutate into a conservative and masochistic manipulation of 
388 
 
academic poststructuralism’s reflexivity, with adaptation acting as the highest 
stage of this selfish memesis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusions 
 
The thesis makes three distinct, though interrelated, contributions to the field. 
The first of these contributions is the thesis’ approach to film studies’ 
theoretical impasse between poststructuralism and cognitivism. It proposes a 
new methodology (2.3) to address the impasse by analysing shared socio-
cultural determinants in academic theorising and filmic writing formations. 
 
The second contribution is the elaboration of how these shared determinants 
influence a particular form of filmmaking practice, which I call a filmic 
poststructuralist writing formation. I analyse how this filmic writing formation 
operates in realist adaptation, because adaptation both increases the 
number of anamorphic elements operating in film, in the way that it 
simultaneously foregrounds and obfuscates canonical authorship, and 
because adaptation also facilitates a diachronic analysis of the development 
of filmic writing formations through multiple adaptations of the same source 
texts made at different historical moments. This contribution has two 
elements; a taxonomy of how realist adaptation manipulates authorial 
enunciation (chapter 4), and a theoretical account of how this manipulation 
operates (chapter 3), including an account of the reasons why existing 
adaptation studies are currently unable to recognise the manipulations (3.4). 
 
The third contribution is an examination of how academic theorising relates 
to filmic writing formations in a historically unfolding manner. This 
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examination suggests that filmmaking can react to, and creatively 
manipulate, the same socio-cultural contexts which facilitated particular 
developments in academic theoretical discourse across time, and manipulate 
those contexts which facilitate strategies for interpreting anamorphic drama 
and ideology, transforming them into strategies to enhance anamorphic 
drama and ideology (chapter 6). The following three sections consider the 
implications of each of these three contributions in turn. 
 
7.1 The field’s theoretical impasse, and shared socio-cultural 
determinants in academic theorising and filmic writing formations 
 
The methodological deadlock between proponents of poststructuralism and 
cognitivism is of ongoing concern because of the centrality of ideology to the 
impasse (see 1.2 and 2.2.2). The internal logic of each paradigm can 
effectively refute, but not meaningfully debate with, the internal logic of the 
other paradigm. The thesis has argued that these theories are influenced by 
complex material, historical and intellectual contexts (1.3 and 2.3.2), and 
applied this insight to the constitution of a new schema that can analyse the 
shared socio-cultural determinants in both academic theorising and filmic 
writing formations. This schema (2.3.2) looks for the ways that historically 
specific academic theories relate to historically specific writing formations 
within films. This new approach engages with the aforementioned deadlock 
by suggesting that no one academic paradigm offers the definitive insight 
into how film operates, but that filmmaking and film theorising are both 
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historically specific manifestations of the same underlying socio-cultural 
determinants. 
 
7.2 A poststructuralist filmic writing formation in realist adaptation 
 
The study of realist adaptation facilitates this new methodology in two ways. 
Firstly, the simultaneously foregrounded and obfuscated canonical author 
enhances the number of anamorphic traces operating within film, thereby 
providing more data for analysis. Secondly, multiple adaptations of the same 
source text made at different time periods provide comparative conditions to 
analyse the ways in which the historically developing socio-cultural 
conditions which influence academic theorising also influence filmic writing 
formations. 
 
Adaptation studies, dominated first by proponents of fidelity analysis and 
then by proponents of dialogism, is not currently able to analyse how filmic 
writing formations operate in realist adaptation. The dialogic focus on the 
emancipatory potential of the adapted film text, at the expense of the 
emancipatory potential of the vanguard critic, intentionally removes the 
original author as the locus of intended meaning, but also unintentionally 
removes the original author as the locus of how a filmic poststructuralist 
writing formation manipulates enunciation for a pleasurable ideological effect 
(see 3.4). 
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In attempting to challenge the hegemonic dominance of unknowable 
authorial intentions, dialogic adaptation studies thereby paradoxically 
contributes towards realist film’s ideological obfuscation of its authored 
construction. In displacing the singular importance of the canonical author 
dialogism misplaces the centrality of the author that might reveal the 
ideological illusion. Proponents of dialogism have therefore highlighted and 
problematized one of adaptation’s hegemonic elements at the expense of 
another. A Benvenistene approach to adaptation, which this thesis proposes 
and investigates, can analyse the different ways that realist adaptation 
manipulates authorial enunciation, and the different ways that both fidelity 
criticism and dialogism legitimate these manipulations. As such, this 
approach to adaptation is the bearer of bad news for dialogism – although 
the intertextual development of adaptation might challenge the canonicity of 
‘great’ literature and drama, it still operates within the formal constraints of 
realism’s ideological suture. But, while the Benvenistene approach is less 
optimistic about the subversive potential of texts, it does suggest the 
importance of a return to the subversive potential of criticism. While it 
problematizes the dialogic claim that “[a]daptations […] can take an activist 
stance toward their source[s]” (Stam 2000a, p.64), it returns the responsibility 
of activism to criticism. The thesis claims, then, that it is adaptation studies, 
and not adaptation itself, that is (or can be) the radical art. The thesis uses 
this methodological and political approach to construct a taxonomy of the 
characteristics of a filmic poststructuralist writing formation, which reflexively 
manipulates authorial enunciation within realist adaptation (chapter 4). 
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7.3 Filmic writing formations and academic theoretical discourse 
 
The thesis has not just applied different theories to film texts and explained 
which fits most accurately. Such an approach would demonstrate a tabula 
rasa theoretical approach that can be persuaded by the evidence of the 
chosen texts. Instead, the thesis has delineated the applicability of different 
theoretical approaches to the texts diachronically, to see whether films 
manipulate dramas in ways that respond to the socio-cultural developments 
which facilitated academic theoretical discourse. It has defined these 
manipulations as filmic writing formations, and generated evidence that they 
respond to the socio-cultural developments which facilitated academic 
theoretical discourse by tracing the historical development of the former 
against the latter. 
 
The case study of four adaptations of Hamlet, which generates this evidence, 
suggests that both before and after the academic articulation of the 
cognitivist drama of knowledge filmmakers exploit this drama within the 
parameters of a filmic cognitivist writing formation. Filmmakers do this in an 
erotetic manner, by temporarily withholding narrative information at certain 
points, so as to encourage audiences to speculate about the questions and 
answers that the film provides. Both before and after the socio-cultural 
developments which facilitated the academic articulation of poststructuralism 
filmmakers exploit Heath’s drama of vision (1985, p.514) and the drama of 
authorship (see 3.3 and chapter 4). These dramas masochistically oscillate 
between grammatical inconsistency and consistency, and between 
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foregrounded authorial enunciation and its fainomaic containment (see 4.2). 
Filmmakers also mix these writing formations together in ways that 
proponents of monolithic academic theories cannot envisage, so that both 
foregrounded authorial enunciation and grammatical inconsistency can be 
contained into an erotetic context. The deferred catharsis of the dramas of 
vision and of authorship thereby functions alongside the deferred intelligibility 
of the drama of knowledge. 
 
Prior to the socio-cultural developments which facilitated the advent of 
academic poststructuralism, a filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation 
was less likely to overlap, and quick to cathartically resolve, alienating 
inconsistencies. After the socio-cultural developments which facilitated the 
articulation of academic poststructuralism, a filmic post-poststructuralist 
writing formation is more likely to overlap its inconsistencies, to be slower to 
resolve them, and can even suture over one form of inconsistency with 
another. Whereas a filmic proto-poststructuralist writing formation closely 
links the inconsistencies of the dramas of vision and authorship with the 
containing logic of the drama of knowledge, a filmic post-poststructuralist 
writing formation can extend its alienating anamorphism beyond the point 
where erotetic legitimations for grammatical inconsistency have been 
answered. A filmic post-poststructuralist writing formation’s oscillations 
between the “play on the unseen and the unforeseeable […] and the 
moments of violent irruption” (Heath 1985, p.514) also work alongside the 
drama of survival’s focus on the atavistic pleasures of experiencing hunting 
and being hunted. 
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Filmmakers, then, exploit symbiotic dramas to elicit numerous audience 
responses, and use similar filmmaking techniques to elicit those responses, 
with the response to one drama able to enhance the response to another 
drama. The inter-paradigm debates between academic poststructuralism and 
cognitivism have therefore misunderstood how the interpretative strategies 
they employ operate. It does not matter whether academic poststructuralism 
or cognitivism offers the more convincing explanation of how film operates if 
filmmakers themselves are (sometimes unconsciously) exploiting the 
dramatic impulses underlying both theoretical contexts to better facilitate 
desired audience responses which can include the dramas of knowledge, 
survival, vision and authorship all at the same time, without their being 
mutually exclusive. The more accurate distinction, in fact, is not between a 
filmic cognitivist and a filmic poststructuralist writing formation, because the 
actual writing that filmmakers undertake is influenced by the dramas of 
knowledge, survival, vision and authorship which are associated with the 
interpretative strategies of both academic cognitivism and academic 
poststructuralism. The case study suggests that a more accurate distinction 
would be between the filmic writing formation that bundles together these 
dramas prior to the socio-cultural developments which facilitated the 
articulation of academic poststructuralism, and the filmic writing formation 
that combines these dramas together after the socio-cultural developments 
which facilitated that articulation. The former is therefore actually a filmic 
cognitive/proto-poststructuralist writing formation, and the latter is a filmic 
cognitive/post-poststructuralist writing formation. The latter manipulates the 
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dramas of the former in enhanced ways because of the impact of the socio-
cultural developments which facilitated academic poststructuralism. 
 
This, however, leads to a paradoxical situation. It is the praxis-driven, overtly 
and subjectively political/emancipatory theory of academic poststructuralism 
that is reflexively manipulated, within a filmic cognitive/post-poststructuralist 
writing formation, to elicit enhanced forms of masochistic suture within 
audiences. The previous chapter’s conclusion (6.4) equated this mutation to 
Dawkins’ meme, the process whereby ideas spread and evolve, like his 
selfish gene (1989, p.352), and alter the original idea’s composition in the 
process. Here an idea concerned with dispelling the realist text’s obfuscation 
of the capitalist subject’s “real conditions of existence” (Althusser 1971, 
p.153) has evolved into its binary opposite: an additional form of 
conservative obfuscatory reflexivity. The historically developing socio-cultural 
contexts which conditioned academic poststructuralism thus also facilitated a 
more anamorphic filmmaking and film spectating culture, in which 
innovations in realist film grammar that might have once threatened 
verisimilitude have become new filmmaking conventions which participate in 
enhanced forms of suture’s oscillating masochism. If suture’s powerful 
cathartic containment relies on the prior revelation of artifice, then enhanced 
ways in which filmmakers can present and contain this artifice contribute 
towards a more masochistic film culture. The more recent, less 
grammatically conservative filmmaking culture is thereby, somewhat 
counterintuitively, a more ideologically conservative filmmaking culture. 
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But, as with this thesis’ critique of the dialogic focus on adapted texts’ 
emancipatory potential (3.4 and 7.2), if the realist text is thought of as a 
conservative obfuscator of Althusser’s “real conditions of existence” (1971, 
p.153), then the task of the radical vanguard critic is clear. The thesis has 
established a new methodology to continue this task. Academic 
poststructuralism is an attempt to analyse and critique film’s ideological 
anamorphism. As the thesis’ new methodology has demonstrated, however, 
film’s anamorphism is a historically developing process, which responds to 
socio-cultural changes in a similar manner to how academic theorising 
responds to those changes. This insight demonstrates that the relationships 
between film and ideology are never fixed, and facilitates a clearer 
investigation into those relationships than has hitherto been the case. 
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